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**WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM**

# MEMOIRS OF THE COMTESSE DE BOIGNE

1781-1830

EDITED FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT  
BY CHARLES NICOULLAUD

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*William Pitt*  
*First Earl of Chatham.*

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# WILLIAM PITT EARL OF CHATHAM

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
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IN THREE VOLUMES



*Volume II*

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ALFRED H. YOUNG  
1897

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## ERRATA

Page 17, line 12, *for* 'Galissonnière died' *read* 'de la Galissonnière was recalled.'

Page 41, lines 21 and 31, *for* 'Loudon' *read* 'Loudoun.'

Page 43, line 19, *for* 'high chancellor' *read* 'chief justice.'

Page 43, line 34, *for* 'lord chancellors' *read* 'judges.'

Page 51, line 33, page 63, line 11, page 75, lines 22, 28, page 177, line 19, page 227, line 36, *for* 'secretary of war' *read* 'secretary at war.'

Page 172, line 15, *for* 'Cascal' *read* 'Casco.'

Page 172, line 18, *for* 'Chandière' *read* 'Chaudière.'

Page 186, line 19, *for* '1757' *read* '1755.'

Page 186, line 20, *for* 'following year' *read* '1758.'

Page 201, line 24, page 203, line 35, *for* 'Gabreuse' *read* 'Gabarus.'

Page 203, line 1, page 205, line 39, page 206, line 26, *for* 'Ducour' *read* 'Drucour.'

Page 210, line 38, *for* 'Rayston' *read* 'Raestown.'

Page 213, line 3, *for* 'Gorea' *read* 'Goree.'

Page 225, lines 5, 7, 11, 14, 22, *for* 'Port' *read* 'Fort.'

Page 253, line 15, *for* 'state' *read* 'province.'

Page 259, line 27, page 262, line 25, *for* 'Levy' *read* 'Lévis.'

Page 311, line 23, *for* 'Rheinfeld' *read* 'Rheinberg.'

Page 344, line 26, *for* 'Bouchet' *read* 'Bouvet.'

Page 385, line 37, page 386, line 1, *for* 'San Domingo' *read* 'Dominica.'

# WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM

## INTRODUCTION

WE have accompanied Pitt through all the stages of his career to his maturity, and have seen that although, by virtue of his gifts and his powerful personality, he attained reputation, wealth, and high office, he nevertheless failed to reach the real goal of his endeavours. Again and again he believed himself to have grasped the fruit of his labours, but it again and again eluded him, until at last he staked his all, risked everything that he had won, to further his chance of winning the highest prize. We have thus surveyed by far the greater part of his life—almost the half of his manhood—without seeing him engaged upon a task suited to his capacities and his inclinations. But now, at last, a wide field is opened to his originality, by the summons to conduct a great war, which marks the culmination of a long development. Hence this war will form the chief subject of this second volume, this second part of my work; and to ensure a full understanding of what befalls, it is advisable to acquire some knowledge of the circumstances which gave rise to the war, and of those under which it was waged. A general acquaintance with the position and the antagonisms of the European states may be presupposed; it is to the condition of the colonies and to their development that we must direct our attention.

It is seldom that a dispute between two nations has been so entirely the product of geographical conditions as was the contest between England and France which was waged in America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Under other circumstances differences and boundary disputes would doubtless have occurred, but it is improbable that that desire and determined endeavour to secure sole and complete posses-

sion, which led to a mortal combat, would have been provoked. As it was, each colony, as it advanced upon the lines prescribed by nature, cut at the roots of the other colony, and robbed it of its capacity for development, indeed for existence. To outflank one another, to encroach upon and dismember one another's domains, proved to be the task imposed upon the colonies by the geographical situation.

The colonisation of the continent naturally took place from the east coast, that nearest Europe. This coast, in the most suitable latitudes for the purpose, is very irregular, provided with deep bays and excellent harbours, so that the most favourable conditions existed for the construction of a chain of colonies extending from north to south. The numerous bays of New England, the inlets about Long Island, the estuary of the Delaware, the gigantic Chesapeake Bay, with its ranges of minor inlets, and lastly, farther to the south, the great harbours of South Carolina and Georgia, invited the foundation of maritime towns, the colonisation of the neighbouring territory, and the development of trade with the interior. It was England which, since the middle of the seventeenth century, had been profiting by the situation, and had here founded colonies. The Dutch commercial settlements on the site of the New York of to-day had also speedily fallen into the hands of England.

But, strange to say, the proper and most important lines of communication with the interior of the continent were outside of this domain. Comparatively near to the coast, and parallel with it, there ran from south to north long chains of mountains—the Alleghanies, the Blue Ridge, and the Green Mountains—which form a natural boundary and limit to the fertile coast territories. The rivers rising in these mountains have a short and rapid course to the ocean, and served consequently only as a means of local communication. The great entrance-gates to the enormous interior, with its inexhaustible wealth, were situated elsewhere far to the north and south. The broad St. Lawrence, with its long estuary widening to a breadth of eighty miles, offered an easy waterway to the great Canadian Lakes, the basins of which cut into the surrounding country and opened it to colonisation. And this land of promise, which discharged its waters into the ocean outside of English territory, lay just behind that territory and formed



the hinterland of New York and Pennsylvania. But this was not all. The country lying directly to the south of the English coast territory also possessed a river system which did not find its outlet in the direction of the east coast. All its streams, uniting into navigable rivers, fell into the royal main river, the Mississippi, which bore southwards the whole water discharge of the central part of the continent into the Gulf of Mexico. The total drainage area of the Mississippi with its tributaries is 1,257,545 square miles, and it presents some 16,000 miles of navigable water—unmistakably a possession worth a severe struggle. It formed the hinterland of the southern English colonies, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, but was separated from them by the above-mentioned mountain chains more effectively than from the Canadian Lakes, which lie not many miles from the sources of some of the northern tributaries. The possessors of the southern shores of the Lakes would find themselves practically in the basin of the Mississippi, and would inevitably feel impelled to explore and colonise that fertile district with its excellent means of communication. And after the first step in this direction had been taken, the advance would inevitably continue until the second great entrance-gate of the continent, the estuary on the Gulf of Mexico, had been reached and secured.

It was the French who, at an early period, took possession of the estuary and shores of the St. Lawrence, and consequently found themselves embarked on the course above described. They penetrated through the continent to the mouth of the Mississippi, with which France immediately established direct sea communication with a view to colonisation. Having thus made themselves masters of the important north and south entrances, their next inevitable step was to endeavour to possess themselves of the whole hinterland of the English colonies, with the main features of which their explorers had already acquainted them.

The advance thus required of the French by the geographical situation implied a menace to the English. But the natural formation of the country demanded an advance on the part of the English also, by which the French in their turn might consider themselves seriously endangered. The Alleghanies, the natural boundary of the English colonies, form a very inefficient frontier. They are a chain of mode-

rate height, distinguished by the remarkable phenomenon that several of the rivers which descend from them to the Atlantic have their sources on the western side of the chain; whilst others, which belong to the Mississippi, rise on the eastern side, the result being that the chain is broken by transverse valleys. Although the routes into the interior thus formed were more inconvenient, and entailed longer land transport than did the communications by the Lakes and the Mississippi, they had the advantage in the matter of shortness. There was the possibility that the English might break the line of communication, five thousand miles long, between Canada and the mouth of the Mississippi, and drive the French northwards and southwards into the less favoured parts of the continent. This again was a consequence likely to result from the configuration of the country. The specially threatened points in this case would be the valley of the Upper Ohio, which provided the shortest line of communication between the French colonies and the eastern shore of Lake Ontario, from which the almost indispensable passage across the lake could be blockaded or rendered dangerous. Nor must we leave out of account the much frequented route by the Hudson River, Lake George, Lake Champlain, and the Richelieu River, although the seizure of it would not so much imply a cutting of the line of communication as a menace to the headquarters of the hostile power, this being the route which led directly to Montreal, the capital of Canada.

And we have also, in the last place, to note that the islands and peninsulas at the estuary of the St. Lawrence, more especially Newfoundland, Cape Breton, and Acadia, excited the Englishman's spirit of maritime enterprise, from the fact that their loss to the French would mean a great hindrance to intercourse between France and her colony. Newfoundland and Acadia actually fell at an early period into the hands of England; the fate of Cape Breton, though it had been already conquered once, was only determined by the war with which we are now concerned.

The result of the attempts made on both sides naturally depended very largely upon the character, the interest, and vigour of the colonies; this point, therefore, must receive some consideration.

The governmental policy of both nations was originally the

same. Societies, or even single individuals, received concessions for the founding of settlements in given districts. The concessionists brought out settlers, encouraged agriculture, and endeavoured to develop commerce. But whereas in the English settlements there were to be found numbers of really excellent colonists, who, progressing by slow degrees, steadily increased the area of cultivation, the French settlements were sadly lacking in this necessary element of success. Numbers of wild, adventurous men, thirsting to accumulate wealth, crossed the Atlantic, but few industrious workers. The explanation of this difference lies in the fact that the English colonists succeeded from the first in ensuring themselves greater liberty of action than did the French. They divided themselves, according to their religious and political creeds, into separate communities, and scattered themselves thus over the long coast, whilst the French were held together in a single colony under one central administration. All the discontented elements in the English population felt tempted to cross to America, where every man could find the arrangements he desired; whereas, all that Frenchmen could expect there was the freedom of the forests—not a settled life shaped according to their taste. This does not mean that the English government acted upon sounder principles. It endeavoured, like the French government, to keep the colonists in subjection and turn them to account. Violent disputes were the consequence of this endeavour. But the means of control at its disposal were inferior to those in the hands of French absolutism, and, moreover, the English colonists were inspired by a far stronger determination to be independent. France, too, possessed, in the Huguenots, the element of intellectual independence in combination with economic efficiency; but as soon as the Huguenots were introduced as settlers, the religious warfare of the mother-country began afresh in the colony, and the government found itself obliged to exclude this capable class of citizens. It thus avoided the danger of secession, but laid itself open to that of conquest.

Mistakes were also made by the English government, especially in the domain of economics; for the science of economics was as yet in its infancy, and the standard of political morality among the privileged classes was far from high; but the colonists succeeded to a certain extent in protecting themselves

from the consequences of these mistakes. They resisted taxation by the mother-country; they succeeded in eluding many of her oppressive regulations for trade and industry, so that a comparatively healthy development of both became possible. Real industrial success, and very profitable commercial intercourse with Europe, were beyond their power; for all the wares demanded by a superior style of living they were obliged to pay a heavy tribute to England; but activity in manufacture and commerce was not altogether prevented, and agriculture and trade with the interior flourished. These matters were regulated by their own legislation, which was not lacking in intelligence and expert knowledge.

The French colonists were much less favourably situated. They suffered from the same restrictions as the English settlers. Manufactured goods had to be imported at high prices from France. But in their case hindrances were also placed in the way of agriculture—in part, the same hindrances which detracted from its productivity in the mother-country, and oppressed the peasant class. The authorities, instead of endeavouring here, where they had a *tabula rasa* and where no historical institutions need be considered, to make the most appropriate and efficient regulations and arrangements, transplanted the antiquated home institutions to the colony. The land was distributed according to the principles of the feudal system; wealthy nobles received estates, not for personal cultivation, but for redistribution among a number of settlers, who were bound to render certain equivalents. Between 1663 and 1673 no fewer than two hundred and ten such seigneuries were created, varying in size from two to ten square leagues. These were generally distributed in parcels of ninety acres, after the feudal lord had built his castle and the mill, with its monopoly of grinding for all his dependents. The religious organisations, which sprang into existence in excessive numbers, also received large grants of land, with the result that all the evils which existed in France from possession under the dead hand were introduced into the new country. Moreover, it was not long before the government officials took possession of the grain trade, and formed a ring which made competition on the part of the landowners impossible. There was almost no chance of attaining to prosperity by labour. No wonder that the inclination to emigrate rather died out than increased!



Who would leave France and face the difficulties and dangers of the voyage and the first installation, only to be exposed to the same restrictions and oppressions as at home? Discharged soldiers were sometimes persuaded to emigrate, in order to increase the colonial population. The whole Carignan regiment, which had fought victoriously in Hungary against the Turks, allowed itself to be transported to New France, where it formed the nucleus of a flourishing settlement. Only the most favourably situated districts, however, was it found possible to cultivate and civilise.

Hence there was but a very gradual increase of population. In Colbert's time New France had 2500 inhabitants; before the death of Louis xiv. the number had risen to about 25,000, and in 1750 to 80,000, an increase which must be regarded as very slight for a young colony in such an extensive territory. And these inhabitants were, for the most part, not cultivators of the ground or people plying their trades in the townships, but hunters and traders; for it was to men by nature inclined to adventure and a roving life that the colonies proved most attractive. It was a peculiarity of New France that most of its French inhabitants lived scattered about in the forests, like the natives, with whom they were on friendly terms, and with whom they traded. This suited the colonists, but was a serious source of weakness to the colony, for it made rapid concentration for purposes of defence impossible. The defencelessness of these isolated settlements was repeatedly proved in case of attack by hostile Indian tribes or European enemies.

Another consequence of these conditions was that the colony formed a poor base for military operations on a large scale—a fact which proved of decisive moment in the Seven Years' war. The agricultural produce barely sufficed, even when there was no failure in the harvest, to support the tillers of the ground and the population of the towns; without supplies from home it was neither possible to maintain a large military force in the colony, nor to provide it, when absent on long expeditions, with means of subsistence and munitions of war. Far more favourably situated were the English troops, who could rely upon rich agricultural colonies, where everything they required was at hand and at their disposal. It was France, the weaker maritime power, which was much the more dependent of the two upon the communication between the



mother-country and the colony. It is also to be remembered that the thinly populated colony of New France could not produce nearly as many fighting men as the comparatively dense population of the English colonies.

Even more unreliable as a power was the other French colony on North American soil, Louisiana. Here the unhealthy climate, and the difficulty of cultivation in the marshy districts, were the chief hindrances to the development of the settlement. But faulty systems of administration and mistakes were to blame in this case also, and from the time of its foundation in 1699 until the third decade of the eighteenth century the colony barely contrived to exist. Then matters improved a little—the population, inclusive of negroes, rose to eight thousand; but, as in Canada, small scattered settlements were in favour. The more valuable tropical products, cotton, sugar, tobacco, etc., were the principal crops grown, especially after a source of food-supplies was discovered in the interior of the continent. In the country of the Illinois, a tribe of Indians inhabiting the district between the Mississippi and Lake Michigan, there had been found (more particularly in the valley of the Kaskaskia) excellent arable ground, which, when well cultivated, yielded good harvests. Hence every year great flotillas of boats descended the Mississippi to New Orleans, where they discharged their cargoes of flour, pigs, etc. They received in exchange the products of the southern settlements, and then set out on the return journey, which occupied several months. Free communication by means of the great river was, therefore, a necessity of life to the delta colony, and this in itself rendered it an unsuitable base for great military expeditions into the interior.

Taking all these circumstances into consideration, it seems truly remarkable that the French were able not only to hold their ground in America so long, but even to prove at times extremely dangerous to the English. The disadvantages of the French were, however, compensated by others dangerous to their enemies.

First among these must be mentioned the defective cohesion between the different English colonies. Each of them ruled itself in the manner of a completely independent state, placing its own interests before those of any other, or of the whole collectively; and the sovereign mother-country possessed

no compulsory power, or at least was not in a position to exercise it. The separate colonies undoubtedly exerted themselves to ward off dangers, to prevent anything injurious to their own interests, and to ensure their own development, but they were very indifferent to the dangers threatening their neighbours, and still more so to those of distant colonies. And there were jealousies and boundary disputes, especially in the interior, where the charters had defined no exact boundary-lines.<sup>1</sup> Only when the interests of several colonies were threatened simultaneously did these occasionally unite in common action, and this only in cases of real danger. On occasions of less moment they not infrequently acted in mutual opposition. There were, indeed, far-sighted men, who had conceived the idea of a colonial federation, and who regarded federation as imperative in the prospect of a struggle with France. In the year 1754 Benjamin Franklin prepared the scheme of union. But the aversion of the colonies to any limitation of their right of independent action remained insurmountable. The English government also made attempts to bring about a union; but its plans too clearly betrayed a tendency to increase the influence and financial advantage of the mother-country, and consequently appealed still less to the colonists. Thus disunion and dissension constituted one significant element of weakness.

The actual defensive power of the colonies was but little affected in consequence. The stronger the pressure exerted upon them, the more energetic their resistance and the greater their unanimity. A great catastrophe would undoubtedly have roused all the existing forces to joint resistance. The disunion itself betokened a strong feeling of independence, and of contempt for the opponent. But this negligence might make the enclosure of the colonies possible, and favour a limitation of the territory which would afterwards be required for their expansion. It might prevent the timely commencement of offensive measures for the destruction of such barriers before their stability had been secured. A French colonial policy at once energetic and prudent, avoiding any too open infringement of their rival's interests, might have secured this stability; the most important condition for its accomplishment would have

<sup>1</sup> Even the Indians mocked at this dissension. See J. Winsor, *The Struggle between England and France*, p. 4.

been the possession of reliable bases of operation, in other words, of populous agricultural colonies at the estuaries of both of the great rivers. A certain jealousy doubtless existed also between the two French colonies, Louisiana and Canada ; there was occasional friction, and boundary disputes were not unknown. But these were not so dangerous to the French as to their rivals, because the final decision rested with a higher power, which was unquestionably obeyed.

It must not be forgotten that all these territories, for the possession of which the two European nations were at strife for more than a century, were by no means ownerless. They were inhabited by numbers of Indian tribes, who regarded themselves as the owners, though their relatively scanty numbers could not be considered as a population. The general idea concerning these natives is very erroneous. They are usually regarded as mere savages incapable of civilisation, and consequently obliged to retreat before it, either to perish altogether or to find new abodes in unexplored regions. This assumption is unwarranted by facts. They were rather in that stage of development in which a race begins to abandon a nomadic life supported by hunting for a more settled form of existence. The majority of them still roamed the forests and the prairies ; changes of abode were constant ; but some by no means unimportant tribes had already begun to cultivate the soil, and had, in consequence, arrived at a stage of comparative prosperity. We find, as far back as the seventeenth century, a branch of the Iroquois tribe in the north-east, the Miamis and Illinois in the west, and the Cherokees in the south, engaged in agriculture and cattle-breeding—the last-mentioned actually preferring vegetable to animal food. Therefore there was no question of their incapacity to lead a settled life. The red race was as capable of civilisation as the races of other continents ; but it came into contact at too early a stage of its own development with the advanced civilisation of the West, the injurious influence of which it was not strong enough to resist. Here and there, where circumstances permitted, it continued to develop admirably. The community of the Cherokees became a flourishing Christian agricultural state, the organisation and economic condition of which left nothing to be desired ; and the mean avarice which inspired the iniquity of its destruction leaves a dark stain on the history of the United States.

If we compare the influence which the two nations exerted upon the natives, we find that the French had at first decidedly the advantage. With the exception of some especially warlike tribes in the west and south, who would permit no strangers within their hunting-grounds, all the Indians were well disposed towards them and prepared to assist them against their enemies. But by degrees the English too gained a following, which they increased steadily at their rivals' cost. They succeeded not only in winning over the tribes living nearest to their possessions, or at least in alienating them from the French, but also contrived to incite the most distant tribes against the French, with results which not infrequently led to the interruption of important lines of communication. These successes the English did not owe to any moral superiority, but to advantages of a material nature and to an unscrupulousness which there was no government to restrain.

Although the English settlements spread very slowly into the interior, the hinterland, far within and beyond the French sphere of influence, was visited at a very early period by traders from the Atlantic colonies. In the north, in the west, and in the south-west, these disputed the market with the French and endeavoured to establish political connections. They were successful not only with the avowed enemies of French expansion, the Sioux, Foxes, etc., but also with the old friends of their rivals. One cause of their success was that manufactured goods were to be procured at a much lower price in the English colonies than in Canada or Louisiana, so that English traders could give the Indians more in exchange for their furs and other products; but the chief reason was that in the French possessions the sale of spirituous liquors to the Indians was strictly forbidden, whereas in the English it was permitted. Quantities of rum, which, according to the law, should have been shipped first to England, and exported to America from that country alone, were sent directly from the British sugar-producing islands to Pennsylvania, and conveyed thence to the Indians as a chief article of trade. The French government was perfectly aware of the disadvantage which it incurred by prohibiting the sale of brandy, but Louis XIV. would not permit any injury to the natives. The prohibition was issued, and it continued to be enforced.

As regards their history, the French colonies in America



5- were founded before the English, which fact explains the very extensive pretensions of France. After the St. Lawrence was discovered by Jacques Cartier about 1634-5, a company which had been formed in 1602, consisting of a hundred members, of whom Samuel de Champlain was the most distinguished, founded the settlements of Quebec on the St. Lawrence, and Port Royal, the Annapolis of to-day, in Acadia. It was not long before the English attempted to gain this territory. During a war with France the unfortified places actually fell into their hands, and remained English from 1629 to 1632, when Richelieu procured their restitution under the peace of St. Germain. The following peaceful decades, during which England, except while under Cromwell's rule, was occupied with her own affairs, or was on friendly terms with France, were employed in the extension of cultivation and the opening up of the interior as far as the Lakes, where unexpectedly brilliant prospects discovered themselves. Fort Frontenac, built about 1670 where the St. Lawrence issues from Lake Ontario, was the first fortified place in this region; and about the same time the tributaries of the Mississippi and that great river itself were discovered. In 1682 the intrepid explorer La Salle, with unprecedented daring, made his way down the Mississippi to the sea, a performance which, as already mentioned, led to the foundation of the colony of Louisiana.

But from this time onwards the rapid extension of French influence was constantly threatened at its base, in the region of the St. Lawrence. The European conflict with England was extended to the colonies, and its result in Europe reacted upon them, so that the final results in America were for the most part not directly attributable to the events of the colonial war. The French successes of the nineties, especially the glorious defence of Quebec by Frontenac from the 16th to the 20th of October 1690, were of no advantage except that they led the way to the formation of a league with a great number of Indian tribes, including the Iroquois. The war of the Spanish Succession, in which the French colony, though less successful, suffered no actual disaster except the surrender of Port Royal by an incapable commander, ended with a peace which imposed disproportionate sacrifices upon the French in America. As the decisions of this peace of Utrecht thence-



forward formed the mutually recognised, if very uncertain, basis for the further development of either colonial empire, they must receive more detailed consideration.

France had hitherto laid claim to the whole of the north, indeed to the whole continent, with the exception of the Spanish possessions and the existing English settlements: large areas were now subtracted from her dominions as an equivalent for the recognition of the Bourbons on the Spanish throne. From the north to the south, boundary-lines were drawn to which British rule was to reach. In the north a line was drawn from the coast of Labrador, at 58° 30' latitude north, to Lake Mistassin, and thence westward along the forty-ninth degree (the same degree which to-day forms the boundary-line between the United States and the Dominion of Canada) to the Pacific Ocean. The territory to the north of this was to belong to the English Hudson's Bay Company. In the east, Acadia, the peninsula which lies to the south of the estuary of the St. Lawrence, and which is now known as Nova Scotia, was made over to England; but there was some uncertainty as to what was included under the name, and the English laid claim to much more than Acadia proper. Newfoundland was also assigned to them, though the French retained equal rights to the fisheries off its coast. The regulation regarding the southern frontiers was that each nation was bound to respect the territory of the Indian tribes in league with its rival—the Iroquois being recognised as allies of England. This amounted simply to a shelving of the boundary question in that region, for it was impossible to define the hunting-grounds of Indian tribes with any precision, and least of all those of the Iroquois, who had been perpetually changing their haunts during the last decades. The French limited these last to the proper seat of the tribe, the districts south of Lake Ontario and on the banks of the Hudson, but the English regarded all the territory over which the tribe's influence had extended at the time of its greatest prosperity as belonging to the 'Six Nations.' It is evident that, though both parties desired peace for the time being, neither wished to be bound to any permanent arrangement in this direction, since each hoped to create more favourable conditions to influence the final decision of the future. The spirit which would make a real and lasting

peace possible, the desire for a legal settlement of the actual position, did not exist. No definite arrangement was made for the huge districts between the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic, with the exception of the peninsula of Nova Scotia, or for the great Ohio river-basin the whole way down to the Mississippi.

When we consider the position thus created, we see that the advance of the French over the great region to the west of the Alleghanies had not been definitely checked, but that the base of their power, their possessions at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, had been restricted and menaced by the enemy's positions in Acadia and Newfoundland. They endeavoured, in consequence, to provide themselves with a stronghold upon the territory remaining to them, which should ensure free communication with the ocean, and thereby with the mother-country. On the island of Cape Breton, between the two English territories, the fortified settlement of Louisburg was founded in 1720. The necessary colonists were obtained from the neighbouring possessions which had been ceded.

In spite of this unfavourable situation at the mouth of the river the French colony progressed energetically. More and more of the interior was occupied, and fort after fort was built to ensure possession. Fort Beauséjour controlled the isthmus between Acadia and the mainland, Fort Niagara the connection between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, Fort Frédéric, afterwards called Crown Point, the southern end of Lake Champlain, and, consequently, the route from New York to Montreal. Even in the far west, at Lake Bourbon (Winnipeg), forts were erected. The boundary-line separating the two colonies of Canada and Louisiana, between which differences on the subject of trade in the interior had arisen, was in 1717 defined by royal decree in terms which placed the district of the Illinois, important to the delta colony as a source of food-supplies, under the administration of Louisiana. A menacing circumstance was the occupation and fortification by the English of Oswego, on the southern shore of Lake Ontario; for their possession of this point at once brought about brisk traffic between the lake territories and the English Atlantic coast colonies. The French, however, made a counter-move by erecting a fort (Toronto) on the opposite shore of Lake Ontario, and by stationing armed cruisers on the lake.

The prosperous development of the French colony received a check during the War of the Austrian Succession, by which the whole American domain was again endangered, since France required all her forces for the war in Europe. In 1745 English colonial troops succeeded in forcing Louisburg, which was insufficiently fortified, to capitulate—a result, however, chiefly due to the corruption which prevailed within the ramparts. A French fleet, which was sent out in the following year to attempt recapture, suffered such injury from storms that it could effect nothing. It would have been possible for England at this time, if not to overthrow the French colonial power, at least to endanger its existence by a prosecution of this and other successes. But the English government regarded events in Europe as of greater importance, and also saw in French Canada a check upon the lust of independence in the English colonies. This very conquest of Louisburg by colonial troops aroused its misgivings, and the fort was, consequently, restored to the French by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. France once more gained a respite in which to strengthen and develop her colony, and to draw the chain tighter with which she was endeavouring to encircle the English possessions.

It cannot be denied that she made excellent use of her time. Galissonnière, a very capable governor, built a second fort on the Isthmus of Acadia, and completed the chain of forts which stretched from the St. Lawrence along the shores of Lakes Erie and Ontario to Chicago, and thence to the Mississippi. On the bank of this river, near the mouth of the Kaskaskia, lay Fort Chartres, which had long been one of the most important French strongholds. In addition to this old line, he endeavoured to construct a new chain of forts nearer to the English possessions. This latter began at Fort Niagara, stretched along the southern shore of Lake Erie, and thence in a southerly direction to the Alleghany River, which it followed to the Ohio, or La belle Rivière, as the French called it. These fortifications were to prevent an English advance into the valley of the Ohio. And it was in this very neighbourhood that the contentions arose which ushered in the Seven Years' war. The French laboured under one great disadvantage here. Galissonnière's attempts to procure from the mother-country the settlers for the Ohio valley, who would

have proved its best defence, were made in vain. The English, on the other hand, had no lack of capable colonists at their disposal. The French, however, were more energetic in the matter of military operations. They protected the Indian tribes in alliance with them against hostile tribes and against the rapacity of the traders, thereby increasing their reputation and the number of their allies. The English colonies would do nothing for the tribes in league with them. The Quakers, who predominated in Pennsylvania, opposed all military measures; it was owing to the zeal and persuasive power of Benjamin Franklin that the most indispensable steps were taken. These conditions largely contributed to the success of the French at the outset.

The progress of English colonisation towards the west was somewhat slow. The first new settlements were in some of the high valleys of the Alleghany range, which were well adapted for cultivation, as they were watered by many streams running parallel with the mountain chain and with each other, either from south-west to north-east, or from north-east to south-west. In making grants of land such rivers, and the direct line of connection between their sources, were generally chosen as the boundaries. This plan was satisfactory enough at first, but afterwards many disputes arising from discrepancies of nomenclature called for settlement. As early as 1726 the colony of Virginia annexed the valley of the Shenandoah, a river flowing into the Potomac from the south. The settlers were actually drawn from Pennsylvania, and were chiefly Scotsmen from Ireland and Germans from the Palatinate, who proved both capable farmers and soldiers. Great speculators provided the means for exploiting the different valleys. In 1735 a certain James Patton received a grant of 120,000 acres in the neighbourhood of what is now the town of Staunton; and in 1749, 800,000 acres, lying to the west of the principal chain of the Alleghanies, and watered by the tributaries of the Kanawha, were granted to the Loyal Land Company. Franklin advocated the idea of advancing the settlements into the valley of the Ohio, so as to occupy the territory between that river and Lake Erie, and thus cut the most direct line of communication between Canada and Louisiana. Although this was not done, an Ohio Company was founded, in 1748, which was endowed with 200,000 acres



lying between the Monongahela and the Kanawha (that is, south of the Ohio) on the condition that it should settle a hundred families on the land and build a fort within seven years. And in other directions advances were made towards the Ohio valley; in the north, for instance, settlements were formed in the valley of the Juniata, a tributary of the Susquehanna. The French soon began to feel their possessions threatened.

In June 1749 Governor Galissonnière despatched an expedition, under Bienville de Célon, along the Alleghany River to the Ohio to investigate the situation, and to take possession of the district. Shortly afterwards Galissonnière died. He was succeeded by Admiral Jonquière, whose term of office lasted only till 1752, when he was replaced by an able and energetic administrator, the Marquis Duquesne. It was under Duquesne, and in consequence of his aggressive measures, that the war broke out, the prelude to which was outlined in the first volume of this work.

Such, then, was the position in North America. The English were in possession of many promising colonies with a numerous and settled population; their frontiers were steadily extending across the intervening mountain chain into the interior of the continent, and their commercial connections extended far into the region of the Lakes and of the Mississippi. They were also masters of great island dominions at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and of the whole uncolonised north. The French, from the narrow bases of the thinly populated, poorly cultivated colonies at the mouths of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, were endeavouring, by military means, to secure possession of a huge interior capable of civilisation. As they were themselves unable to contribute many settlers, they hoped to turn its resources to account by means of the native tribes that were beginning to lead a settled life. The English domain was broken into many important separate colonies, very loosely connected, disinclined to joint action, and in strained relations with the mother-country; the French domain, though divided into two large colonies, separately administered, was directly under the strong centralisation of the home government. The tendency to advance which existed on both sides, and was the result of geographical conditions, could not but lead to a decisive conflict,

*was recalled*



in which the comparative vitality of the two systems would be put to the test.

Another American region in which France and England were rivals, and had already often come into conflict, was that of the West Indian Islands. Here the possessions of the two nations had long been tolerably well defined. The rivalry was purely commercial. Of the Lesser Antilles, England owned Barbadoes, the most easterly and consequently the most convenient starting-point for commercial intercourse between Europe and the West Indies; she also held some of the north-western smaller islands—St. Christopher, Antigua, Anguilla, and the Virgin Islands; in the Greater Antilles she owned the rising island of Jamaica, which had been taken in Cromwell's day from the Spaniards. Her other possessions were the almost uninhabited Bahama Islands (on which there was merely a naval station to overawe the filibusters), some settlements on the Mosquito Coast in Central America occupied with the timber trade, and a part of Guiana.

With the exception of Jamaica, whose period of greatest prosperity was yet to come, these colonies had all passed their prime. Their productivity was decreasing, and their commercial practices and laws had not kept pace with the times. The English government kept their trade determinedly under tutelage for the enrichment of the mother-country. Their products might be exported to England alone, and all manufactured goods had to be imported from that country. Commerce even with the English possessions in North America was restricted. All this placed the English West Indian colonies at a disadvantage as compared with those of other nations; the system led, moreover, to constant recriminations with the mother-country, whose powerful government introduced no beneficial changes, or at least none of any importance. Most profitable of all to the colonists was the smuggling trade with the neighbouring Spanish islands, and this was chiefly in English hands. The manner in which it was carried on, and the quarrels to which it led, have been already noticed.

In the French colonies the prevailing conditions were much more favourable. Here, where success depended, not upon populous settlements and agricultural activity, but upon the foundation and management of great plantations, that is to say upon organising and commercial capacity, the French were

in their element ; all was stir and activity, and at the time in question their colonies were more prosperous than the English. The most important of their possessions were Martinique and the western part of St. Domingo, which was far more valuable than the eastern, Spanish part. They also held the islands of Grenada, Guadeloupe, and Marie Galante. The commercial policy of the government was at first similar to that pursued by the English government, but in 1717 a change began. Most of the restrictions were removed, so that the islands were enabled to trade untroubled by heavy duties, both with the mother-country and with other nations. The provision of continental Europe with tropical products fell to a great extent into their hands ; they held, indeed, almost a monopoly of the sugar trade, and the mother-country found herself amply compensated by the increase of commercial traffic.

These advantages did not prevent conflicts between the despotic home government and the planters. The former sought support from the small landowners. This attempted division of interests did not succeed, but any open resistance to the government was precluded, if by nothing else, by the fear of a possible rising of the numerous slaves in the event of any disturbance.

Besides the islands which were in the uncontested possession of one nation or another, there were several which had long been considered neutral and the property of the natives ; this tacit agreement had been confirmed by a treaty of 1731. These were Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Tobago. The treaty, however, was not strictly observed. Without any active opposition on the part of the English, the French made settlements in different parts of these islands, preparatory to their annexation. Not till shortly before the great war broke out was this procedure censured by England and made a point of dispute.

The agricultural and commercial conditions prevailing in the different islands naturally provided no reliable indication as to their probable value in case of war. The planters as a body were strongly averse to warlike complications, which would in all probability, as far as they were concerned, lead to disproportionately great losses. In the case of hostile invasions they actually preferred to come to an understanding with the enemy, a change of ruler being less injurious to them than

the devastation of their plantations; moreover, their final destiny was generally decided by European diplomacy.

The second great territory, the fate of which was to be decided by the coming war was the peninsula of India; and the conditions there prevailing remain to be considered.

The chief difference between the colonial development in India and that in America lay in the circumstance that the European rivalry was less keen in India. There were periods of conflict, but there were also long periods during which the Europeans lived in peaceful proximity; a certain community of interests was produced by the identity of their relations towards the powerful native states, whose power to injure them was very different from that of the North American Indians.<sup>1</sup> The object which the European countries had in view was not the acquisition of territory, but the expansion of their trade; and for this purpose the favour of the native princes was indispensable; here they undoubtedly strove to supplant each other.

In the course of centuries India has repeatedly been exposed to great foreign invasions. Some of these resulted in permanent conquest, so that a certain stratification of populations and governments had been produced. The groundwork of the political structure was formed by the numerous Hindu kingdoms, which had existed from remote antiquity; some of these held their ground through all the storms of the ages with extraordinary tenacity. The kingdom of Pandya or Madura, for example, existed for two thousand years; at the beginning of the fourteenth century the throne was occupied by its one hundred and sixteenth king. It is easy to imagine how firmly rooted were all the institutions of such states.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Mohammedan invasions from the north-west were made, first by the Turkish Ghaznavids, and then by the Afghan Ghôrîds, the area of whose conquest and rule embraced the whole valley of the Ganges, and from Bengal extended gradually southwards. This great empire in course of time was broken into a number of states, and this disruption, in combination with religious intolerance, in time so undermined its strength, that a Mongol chief in the sixteenth century dared to attempt its conquest. A descendant of Timur, lord of a small territory on the banks of the

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i. p. 14.

Jaxartes, took possession of Cabul in 1504, and thence, like the Ghôrîds in their day, advanced to the conquest of the great Indian river-basins. After a long resistance the Mohammedan confederation collapsed; and now the great Emperor Akbar created his mighty empire, which extended to the east coast. The religious tolerance which the new rulers practised, Moslems though they were, contributed greatly to their success.

Thus were the conditions established which existed when the English first came to India. The Great Mogul in Delhi, the feudal lord of all the Mohammedan princes in India (for the eastern and southern territories had also been conquered by Akbar's successors), was at first in possession of vast power; and even after the death of the great Aurungzebe in 1707, and the declension of the empire, he remained the crown of the whole political edifice, and was honoured as the source of all power. Whatever the independence of his vassals, the viceroys of the great provinces, and the nabobs, phousdars, etc., of the smaller territories, it was his firman alone which secured them their positions. Charters from the Mogul were indispensable to secure the possessions and privileges of the Europeans. On occasion they provided themselves with forged title-deeds of the kind.

The founding of the Mahratta state is to be regarded as a powerful reaction of the oppressed Hindu races against the foreign occupation. It was in the middle of the eighteenth century that this state attained to great importance. Created and guided by powerful rulers, it gradually spread from the town of Poona northwards to the upper Ganges, and across the peninsula to the east coast. It proved incapable of permanent resistance to the great Emperor Aurungzebe, who so shattered its power that, from 1690 onwards, it ceased for a time to exist; but under the conqueror's weak successors it came to life again in another form. It now consisted of a confederation of independent states, led by the minister of the powerless titular ruler, the Peshwa. In this form it enjoyed another period of prosperity. The mobile Mahratta mounted troops, thirsting for booty, took part in every conflict, and were a power with which the Europeans had always to reckon. Their successes would have been far more important had they been able to unite for the prosecution of greater aims.



But unanimity was lacking. Any one could secure their help for money or what could be turned into money, and they consequently served chiefly to preserve the balance of power between different conflicting parties, whether Mongolian rulers or European nations.

It was into this ferment of states and nations that the European colonial settlements had intruded themselves. We have repeatedly had occasion to treat of the East India Company and its earlier history, so that any characterisation of it is unnecessary here. The most important event of later occurrence was the founding of Calcutta, with Fort William, for which an imperial firman had been procured in the year 1690. Since 1664 the East India Company had been confronted by a French imitation in the *Compagnie des Indes*, which, to begin with, not unwisely confined itself to the foundation of settlements on the route to India before beginning to establish factories on the peninsula itself. After an unsuccessful attempt at colonisation in Madagascar, France obtained possession of the Maskarene Islands to the east of it, the Isle de Bourbon and the Isle de France. The latter especially, on account of its harbour and its products, was of the greatest importance as an aid to the defence of possessions in India. In India itself, after various successes and reverses, the colony of Pondicherry was founded by the capable and honourable François Martin. It was finally acknowledged as a French colony at the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick. In 1676 the settlement of Chandernagore on the Hooghly was founded, a position which did not become of importance until the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, under Dupleix. Another gain of the year 1676 was Mahé on the Malabar Coast, a strong position, by the capture of which La Bourdonnais made himself famous.

In India, as well as in America, the French succeeded in winning the favour of the natives. Under François Martin, and, after 1735, under Benoît Dumas, they enjoyed high prestige for their trustworthiness and strict honesty. This was enhanced when Dumas successfully repulsed an attack of the powerful Mahrattas, induced by his protection of a Mongolian princely family. The Great Mogul thanked him for his services, and conferred on him the title of Nabob. The favour of the native princes, which was continued to Dumas'



successor, Dupleix, was the salvation of the French settlements when the mother-country, at the time of the war of the Austrian Succession, withdrew her assistance, even recalling the defensive fleet. The Nabob of the Carnatic forbade any attack on the part of the English, who were thus compelled to remain inactive.

French prestige suffered some diminution in consequence, but rose again in the year 1746 when the Governor of the Maskarenes, La Bourdonnais, appeared with a fleet which he had raised himself, and succeeded, with the help of the French settlers, in capturing Madras, which was inadequately defended. An unpleasant dispute unfortunately arose between the two governors, which ended in the departure of La Bourdonnais, and led to hostilities on the part of the Nabob. It was on this occasion, however, that the military superiority of the Europeans to the natives was for the first time clearly displayed; the Nabob's army of ten thousand men was completely defeated at St. Thomé by a few hundred Frenchmen and Indian mercenaries, an event which was of far-reaching importance. The French were unable to follow up their advantage, and the war ended with the restitution of what had been conquered. Madras was on this occasion exchanged for Louisburg in North America.

During the following period of peace the relative position of the two powers in India was remarkable. It was impossible for either to attack the possessions of the other, or to initiate any direct conflict. But there was nothing to prevent either from supporting the different native powers in their enterprises and quarrels and succession disputes. On such occasions the French and English troops naturally came into conflict; but they were under these circumstances not considered as representing their companies, but as mercenaries hired by the Indian princes—a transparent fiction, which it was sometimes hardly possible to maintain.

This was the form which the rivalry assumed during the years of peace. The French, under Dupleix, had generally the advantage, chiefly because of their success in winning the exclusive favour of the powerful Viceroy of the Deccan, an almost independent vassal of the Mogul, and the feudal lord of the disputed principalities. A French bodyguard under Colonel Bussy decided the issue of a disputed succession to the

viceroyalty, and the new ruler, Salabad Jang, allowed himself to be entirely guided by the advice of the officer to whose intervention he owed his throne, a line of policy which proved extremely advantageous to both parties. But all the projects of the French were rendered futile by their inability, in spite of the utmost exertions, to make themselves masters of one position, the town of Trichinopoly, which Mahomed Ali, the rival Nabob of the Carnatic, an ally of the English, had chosen as his place of refuge, and which he succeeded in defending. The fall of this stronghold would have rendered the English position on the east coast untenable, but Dupleix was unable to capture it for the reason that the directors of the company at home, who were entirely under the influence of the government, had no comprehension of his plans, which had been developed gradually as they were dictated by the course of events. They had assumed no definite form in his reports; the last, which fully explained the situation, arrived when it was too late to alter the decision which had been taken. The idea at home was that the governor's projects were vague and impracticable, and that he was aiming at acquisition simply for the purpose of placing the company on a better financial basis. But as its finances were unmistakably damaged by the constant warfare, and as it was the general opinion that the Indians, chief among them the Mogul, would not long allow the foreigners to continue extending their possessions and influence, Dupleix's policy was condemned. Assistance was not sent to him at decisive moments; and in 1754, whilst the third siege of Trichinopoly was in progress, the directors were seduced by the English company into the conclusion of a treaty, one result of which was the recall of the highly gifted governor. His incapable successor, Godeheu, came to an agreement with the English, the advantages of which were almost entirely on their side; it was never carried out, but it nevertheless rendered the realisation of Dupleix's plans impossible. The accession of Mahomed Ali as Nabob of the Carnatic could no longer be prevented. The position of the French, however, remained important, because Bussy still retained his post at the court of the Viceroy of the Deccan, and because, through the Viceroy, they had acquired possession of four fertile provinces on the east coast, north of the Godaveri delta. The difficulties which were beginning to

confront the English in Bengal might easily enable the French to resume the upper hand.

Such, then, was the general situation in those lands beyond the seas where the rivalry between England and France had developed. We may now proceed to describe the events which are directly connected with the career of William Pitt, and on which he was destined to exercise a decisive influence.

# SECTION I

## THE FIRST PITT MINISTRY

### CHAPTER I

#### THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAR

It cannot be denied that the preparations for the war were inadequate, though it is impossible to apportion the blame with certainty. The Pelhams, while in power, had done nothing in the way of preparation; they had themselves no desire to cause new complications, and they knew that the French court was not anxious for war. Cumberland's friends, before they came into office, had paid little heed to military and naval administration, and when they contrived to begin a war to which Newcastle was entirely opposed, they reproached him and his adherents with negligence.<sup>1</sup> Nor had Pitt and his friends behaved as the interests of the nation required. Now, indeed, he thundered against the neglect of military preparations, and against the policy of provocation before preparation. But the not unfair retort was made that his reproaches came too late, that he had kept silence for years when he ought to have spoken, when there would have been time to avoid the mistakes of which he complained. The reason was that he himself had been deluded. Newcastle had kept him waiting in the expectation of a seat in the cabinet, which would have enabled him to repair all neglect; and now, when he clearly recognised his delusion, the war was at hand. He had unmistakably wasted too much time in endeavouring to obtain office, first by compliance, then by threats. Had he acted otherwise his standpoint would have been far more secure.

<sup>1</sup> *Dodington Diary*, May 17, 1756.

Even now he did not choose the attitude best suited to the attainment of his purpose. His desire was to win the favour of the nation and of the heir-apparent; through their support he hoped, at a favourable opportunity, to seize the helm of the state. He therefore proceeded, in his old style, to oppose the Hanoverian measures, namely, the subsidy treaties and the transport of German troops to England for the protection of the country in case of invasion. But he was mistaken upon the opinion prevailing in the quarters where he desired to ingratiate himself.<sup>1</sup> The French military preparations had produced universal consternation. A descent on the English coast was in those days by no means an impossible contingency, even when the protecting fleet was in first-rate condition, for wind and weather might easily prevent the timely arrival of that fleet at the threatened point; and at the moment the fitness of the navy for war left much to be desired, and no great amount of reliance was placed on it. As for the militia, though it was the fashion to boast of them, people knew perfectly well how much they were really worth. When serious danger threatened their credit sank. Therefore there was a general feeling of relief when the German mercenaries made their appearance on English soil. Hanover suddenly became popular; and Pitt, who had opposed the importation of these soldiers, was forsaken by his admirers. 'Opposition must be wrong,' was the general dictum, 'when we are ready to be eat up by the French.'<sup>2</sup> Even Pitt's friendship with the Prince of Wales was endangered, since the prince, too, recognised the imperative necessity of the measure.

It cannot, therefore, be said that Pitt's prospects in the spring of the year 1756 were particularly hopeful. The course of events, however, improved his chances. The disaster which befell England at Minorca dealt the first heavy blow to the existing system.<sup>3</sup>

We have already seen that, when the news came of the war preparations at Toulon, Admiral John Byng was ordered to

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, *Memoirs of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 506.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 161: Potter to Pitt, June 4, 1756.

<sup>3</sup> For the military occurrences see Waddington, *Louis XV. et le renversement des alliances*, Paris, 1896; Pajol, *Les guerres sous Louis XV.*, vol. iv., Paris, 1855; Campbell, *Lives of the British Admirals*, vol. vi., London, 1817, etc.



the Mediterranean with a fleet of ten vessels. After repeated delays he weighed anchor on the 31st of March. The choice of this commander was unfortunate. Byng, a son of Viscount Torrington, was born in 1704, and had risen rapidly in his profession, thanks to his influential connections and a certain amount of capacity. He had held an important post, but had never had an opportunity of securing naval distinction. In view of the decisive importance of the task to be accomplished, it would have been wiser to entrust the enterprise to an officer with some experience in great undertakings. And why, one cannot but ask, had not earlier and more efficient measures been taken for the protection of the English possessions in the Mediterranean?

It is to be observed in the next place,<sup>1</sup> that, although England had sixty-three men-of-war at her disposal in Europe, a large portion of these were already occupied; some watched the Atlantic ports of France and confined the fleets there lying in harbour; others convoyed the transport ships bringing the troops from Germany. Of those remaining, by no means all were ready for sea. The chief deficiency was in sailors and marines, who could not be provided at such short notice. Even Byng's small squadron was delayed two or three days waiting for the last contingent of two hundred men to arrive. At least four thousand men were lacking to the full complement of the sixty-three ships-of-the-line.<sup>2</sup> And, lastly, the cabinet held that the defence of the Channel must be regarded as the most important task. Even Fox declared that they must, before all else, protect the heart. If they sent a stronger fleet to the Mediterranean, they might find themselves obliged to defend the Channel with inferior forces, and in that case there would be no end to the reproaches heaped on them. They would be called fools for denuding the shores of England on account of a French demonstration in the Mediterranean.<sup>3</sup> For, up to the last moment, English officialdom did not believe in any serious intentions on the part of the French. Even in Byng's instructions stress was laid upon the probability that the French fleet would direct

<sup>1</sup> So Newcastle told Dodington on the 6th of May 1756.—*Dodington Diary*.

<sup>2</sup> *Dodington Diary*.

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Fox, May 8, 1756.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

its course to America, and instructions are given for his procedure in this case.<sup>1</sup>

The ministers certainly deserved reproach for the neglected state of the fortifications of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and for their refusal to grant the appeals for a reinforcement of the garrisons; but here, too, they had undoubtedly been influenced by their anxiety to protect the coast of Britain. And it seemed sufficient that Fort St. Philip should be able to hold out for from four to six weeks, for they were certain that the siege would be raised in that time.

In Byng and his squadron, small though it was, full confidence was placed. When he had added to it the three vessels already stationed at Port Mahon, he would certainly be a match for the French Mediterranean fleet. After his departure, however, Newcastle and Fox desired that reinforcements should be sent to Gibraltar and Minorca; but Lord Anson, the first lord of the admiralty, declared that this could not possibly be done before the arrival of the Hessian troops in England.<sup>2</sup> In his opinion the relief of the island by Byng might be considered certain. This same Admiral Anson, who had made himself a name in the last war by his adventurous circumnavigation of the globe, was now a devoted adherent of the Duke of Newcastle. In 1748 he had married a daughter of Lord Hardwicke, and shortly afterwards he had succeeded Lord Sandwich as first lord of the admiralty. He was a favourite with the king, who always, when possible, chose to be escorted to the Continent by him; but Pitt does not seem to have had a high opinion of him.<sup>3</sup> On the present occasion Anson was undoubtedly guilty of carelessness in the discharge of his duty; for no one can believe that it would have been impossible, by the exercise of a little energy, to provide and despatch a few more ships. But activity and determination were lacking in the administration generally. A few disasters were needed to arouse the latent forces.

The prevailing want of energy displayed itself in Byng's management of the expedition entrusted to his squadron; and in judging his behaviour we must remember that it was quite in accord with the practice of the day. The cautious,

<sup>1</sup> Campbell, *Lives of the British Admirals*, vi. 307.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle to Fox, May 8.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>3</sup> Campbell, *Admirals of England*: Lord Anson.

methodical manner of conducting war which had become the established custom on land was also practised at sea; it was not permissible to risk too much, because the sums represented by troops and material of war were too enormous. The best means of justifying and legalising weak plans of action were provided by the council of war. When such a council was held, the president generally represented the situation as so unfavourable that the 'sensible' members carried the day, and the step was decided which he desired, but had not dared to take on his own responsibility. These perpetual councils were a positive military calamity at that time, because they prevented energetic action. Frederick the Great's outspoken objection to them is well known. I have a classic example before me in an account (in the Chatham Manuscripts) of the English expedition against Port L'Orient in 1746. The plan of action, which was carried out over and over again, was as follows: 'Land and lay siege; summon the enemy to surrender; on the enemy's refusal hold a council of war; give up the attempt and make another elsewhere.' Naturally the whole expedition was void of result. Byng acted on similar principles. When he arrived at Gibraltar, where he was to ship stores and troops, he found the fortress in such a wretched condition that he did not consider it advisable to follow his instructions. A council of war was held, in which it was determined not to convey troops from Gibraltar to Minorca, since it would be difficult to land them there, and would merely add to the number of those who would inevitably become prisoners of war. Thus the principal task of the expedition, the relief of Fort St. Philip or the reinforcement of its garrison, was abandoned, and all that was attempted was to keep the hostile fleet in check. But, instead of at least immediately going in search of this fleet, Byng remained no fewer than six days at Gibraltar before continuing his course. This conduct was the more culpable as during these days a ship which had escaped from Port Mahon arrived, the captain of which, O'Hara by name, described the situation of the fort as by no means desperate, and the French force as comparatively insignificant. O'Hara proceeded at once to England, and gave the government the first news of the ominous measures of its admiral.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 191.

## THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAR 31

It must be admitted that Byng was badly supported by the government. He had no frigates for the observation and intelligence department of the service; he had none of the hospital-ships which usually accompanied a squadron; and the stores with which he was supplied were insufficient. But what had not others done under far more unfavourable circumstances! We need go no further than La Bourdonnais, who had created a fleet for himself at the Isle de France from captured merchantmen, and with it driven the English from the east coast of India. The situation demanded self-reliance in surmounting difficulties, and readiness to stake all for the attainment of the end in view. But the English admiral was lacking in the necessary energy and determination. As far as his personal character was concerned, he might not have been unequal to his task had he been inspired to regard energetic action as his duty; for there is no doubt that he consistently endeavoured to do what he considered his duty; but he had assimilated the methodical principles of the day, and had not enough independence of mind to free himself.

Byng then sailed to Minorca, where he attempted to open communication with the garrison of the invested Fort St. Philip, but was prevented from so doing by the appearance of the French fleet under Galissonnière. On the 19th of May an engagement between the two fleets took place. Their numbers were equal, and they cannonaded each other for several hours without either side gaining any decided advantage. Byng's behaviour on this occasion was quite courageous, but he was somewhat hampered by the fear of making mistakes. He allowed his tactics, strangely enough, to be influenced by the decision of the court-martial which tried and condemned Admiral Matthews after the battle of Toulon in 1744, and he in consequence omitted a movement which ought to have been made.<sup>1</sup> It was, however, not this, but his subsequent behaviour, which brought disaster upon him.

Galissonnière withdrew his ships from action somewhat early, because he did not wish to run useless risks; Byng also collected his squadron. His ships had suffered considerable damage, and he had lost a number of men. On the 24th of May he summoned a council of war to determine whether the squadron should remain in the neighbourhood of Minorca or

<sup>1</sup> Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*.



return to Gibraltar. The council declared for return. This decision was actuated by several reasons. They believed that the losses the squadron had suffered placed them at too great a disadvantage in their contest with the French; but what carried still more weight with them was their inability, from lack of a hospital-ship, to land the wounded. They seem to have taken for granted the impossibility under the circumstances of relieving the besieged garrison. But the admiral was determined, after procuring the necessary supplies and reinforcements, to return to the island and to renew the attack.

Byng was again mistaken in again placing the safety of his ships and of his sailors before the fulfilment of the task entrusted to him. Instead of landing troops at all costs on the island (which was large enough for the purpose), so as to protract the siege, the result of which might depend on the gain of a single day, he chose to ensure the safety of his ships. This was by no means an uncommon line of conduct in those times, but it was regarded in this case as a graver crime than usual, because it led to the loss of a Crown possession, whereas in the majority of cases it merely rendered offensive operations ineffectual.

The news of Byng's proceedings at Gibraltar reached London on the 31st of May;<sup>1</sup> the news of the battle and the determination to retreat arrived on the 2nd of June. The cabinet was plunged into extreme consternation, and the nation raised a cry of indignation. There had been weeks of anxious expectation, of mingled fear and hope; but no one had doubted that there would be a hot struggle, and that the admiral would put forth all his strength; now it became known that, after an indecisive action, he had calmly deserted the position for which the whole of England was trembling.<sup>2</sup> Two explanations were possible. Either the expedition had been so badly equipped that Byng had been really unable to fulfil his task, in which case the whole of the odium fell upon the ministry; or else the admiral had not done his duty, and had failed to use the means placed at his disposal, in which case, though the government was not entirely exculpated, it was he who was chiefly to blame. Newcastle was terrified, and did everything

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 191.

<sup>2</sup> The Prussian ambassador's report, dated June 4 (preserved in the Berlin Archives), gives an account of the state of popular feeling.



in his power to direct the wrath of the nation upon the unfortunate admiral, and to conceal the mistakes made by the government. He could truthfully aver that he had desired to send reinforcements, and had only been prevented by the admiralty; Fox, however, told him frankly that those highest in authority would be held responsible for any neglect.<sup>1</sup> The next proceeding was to prepare Admiral Byng's report for publication by expunging everything which might lead to an assumption of negligence on the part of the government, or which might speak in Byng's favour.<sup>2</sup> The unprotected condition of Gibraltar, the want of a hospital-ship, the attempts to open communication with the garrison of the fort, the bad condition of several of the ships after the engagement, the anxiety regarding the wounded, the intention to return to Minorca—all the passages relating to these subjects were simply omitted; and the nation was, consequently, presented with a falsified account of the occurrence. Now any one reading the report was certain to receive the impression that Byng's conduct had been the result of indifference to his task, combined with want of energy. Sir Edward Hawke and Admiral Saunders were sent to supersede him in his command and to send him to London under arrest. The government order to this effect was published in the newspapers, where Byng's report had also appeared.

Somewhat inexplicable is Hawke's unusual delay in reaching Gibraltar, and in proceeding thence to Minorca. The 5th of June was the date fixed for his departure from England;<sup>3</sup> he did not arrive at Gibraltar till the 4th of July, and did not sail again till the 10th.<sup>4</sup> There must either have been some irregular proceeding here, or else the winds must have been extraordinarily unfavourable. It was too late to save the island. On the 15th of July, Hawke, with the English squadron, which now consisted of seventeen vessels, met the returning garrison of Fort St. Philip, which had capitulated on the 28th of June.

The aim which France had in view in seizing Minorca was

<sup>1</sup> *Dodington Diary*.

<sup>2</sup> Campbell, *Lives of the British Admirals*: Byng. Campbell gives the complete report, with indication of the passages omitted.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Prussian ambassador.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>4</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, art. Hawke.

not attained. The court of Versailles offered to make over the island to Spain and to assist in seizing Gibraltar, if Spain would join the alliance against England.<sup>1</sup> Maria Theresa supported this proposal, writing a letter in behalf of it to Queen Barbara; but Ferdinand VI. was too pacific a king to accept it. He continued to steer a carefully calculated middle course; neither the French nor the English party was allowed to gain any lasting preponderance of influence at his court.

In the meanwhile, serious tension had come about in Germany which was far from welcome to the ministry. The Westminster Convention had been concluded, on the one hand, with the aim of protecting Hanover against Prussia, and at the same time, by means of Prussia, against France; on the other, with that of convincing Austria of the peaceful intentions of the King of Prussia and inducing her to make better provision for the security of the Austrian Netherlands. The alliance of the empress-queen with France (even though the treaty of Versailles was only of a defensive nature) produced an important change in the situation. It was still believed in London that King Frederick had no intention of making an attack; but now an attack by Austria on Prussia was regarded as possible. This the English ministers considered it their duty to prevent, in order that the power of Prussia might remain available for the protection of Hanover; and they endeavoured to secure their object partly by restraining their ally from imprudent actions which might provide Austria with a *casus belli*, and possibly France with a reason for supporting Austria, and partly by bringing influence to bear upon the Russian court, which would prevent an alliance of Russia with Austria against Prussia. But this policy betrayed an entire misapprehension of Prussia's intentions. King Frederick was by no means so peaceably inclined as was supposed in London. He desired to pose as the threatened party and therefore he intentionally took apparently imprudent steps in order to provoke threats,<sup>2</sup> which would serve him with a pretext for taking up arms against Austria; but he naturally

<sup>1</sup> See Lafuente, *Historia general de España*, xiv.

<sup>2</sup> See Max Lehmann, *Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprung des Siebenjährigen Kriegs*, 1894; also the literature in connection with this book, including my own contribution to the subject, *Zum Ursprung des Siebenjährigen Kriegs*, Nord und Süd, 1898.

did not wish to see France and Russia allied against him, and therefore he was well pleased that England should keep France in check and influence the court of St. Petersburg in his favour. The intentions of the allied courts remained in radical opposition upon one point; and as England was acting at St. Petersburg only in what she *considered* to be Frederick's interest, she did not further what at the time *was* his interest. Hanbury Williams succeeded in restraining the empress from taking hostile action against Prussia, and even in reconciling her to the Westminster Convention; but in either case with the presupposition that the king meant to keep the peace. The English ambassador went so far as to affirm that, if King Frederick, contrary to expectation, should commence hostilities against the empress-queen, England would fulfil her obligation to defend Austria<sup>1</sup>—an affirmation by which he only confirmed the Russian empress in her intention to oppose any offensive movement on the part of Frederick. This was in exact contradiction to the Prussian king's expectations of England; but the idea that he might attack never occurred to the English, who believed themselves to be acting entirely in accordance with his plans.

In May and June the English party were in disfavour at St. Petersburg, and some military movements against Prussia were actually made by Russia; but in the beginning of July they were stopped, at a hint from Austria. To what extent a gift of money to the Russian chancellor, Bestuscheff, who complained of his insufficient salary of only seven thousand roubles,<sup>2</sup> influenced this cessation of operations, it is impossible to say. Frederick had at once despatched troops to the frontier, and took advantage of the opportunity to carry out several transfers of regiments, which proceeding naturally aroused suspicion at the court of Vienna. Austria had previously made secret military preparations; and as she now began to prepare more vigorously and openly, the tension soon developed which led to war.

The English cabinet minister, Holderness, promptly urged King Frederick to be prudent, and begged of him to send satisfactory explanations to St. Petersburg. Any movement of troops in the east, so he wrote, ought to be carried out as

<sup>1</sup> See Hanbury Williams's report of June 25, 1756.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 9, 1756.

quietly as possible, since, in Vienna, the worst possible construction was at once put upon all military activity. He might make what display he chose at the Rhine, in the district of Cleve, where it would inspire Holland with courage to ally herself with him.<sup>1</sup> We see here again how absolutely the allied courts differed in their conception of the situation.

Whilst the course of events in Germany was making for war, the English ambassador was steadily gaining ground at St. Petersburg. Bestuscheff did his best; Peter and Catherine, the heir-apparent and his wife, exerted their influence in favour of England; the latter went the length of asking Williams for the sum of 10,000 roubles for purposes of agitation—a request which was, of course, willingly granted.<sup>2</sup> The empress was offended by the check she had received from Austria after she had resolved to go to war, and refused to interfere again. A new and more comprehensive treaty with England was expected.<sup>3</sup> But as the basis of any agreement on the Prussian question, the stipulation that Frederick must keep the peace was maintained. ‘The empress is resolved,’ writes Hanbury Williams on the 4th of September, ‘should the King of Prussia attack the empress-queen, to fall upon his Prussian majesty with a very large army; but should the King of Prussia be attacked by the house of Austria, this court will remain neutral.’

It is matter of history that at the end of July King Frederick formally demanded an explanation from the empress-queen of the military preparations in progress—doubtless expecting no very friendly answer. His envoy, Klinggräffen, applied to the English ambassador, Keith, for information upon the formalities to be observed, and then had a preliminary interview with Kaunitz.<sup>4</sup> But being himself uninformed of the real intentions of his royal master, Klinggräffen on this occasion, following the Englishman’s advice, endeavoured to soften the unpleasantness of the step he had been commanded to take, by attempting to adduce all available proofs of Prussia’s pacific intentions. Kaunitz, however,

<sup>1</sup> Holderness to Mitchell, July 13, 1756.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Reports of July 9 and August 6, 1756.—Public Record Office.

<sup>3</sup> Report of August 24.—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> Report by Keith, the English ambassador at the court of Vienna, July 28, 1756.—Public Record Office.



wished that the enemy's attitude should be as defiant as possible, so as to afford Austria an opportunity to denounce him to her allies and claim their assistance; he therefore broke off these friendly explanations abruptly;<sup>1</sup> and in the formal audience which ensued, Prussia's demand was refused.

There was considerable alarm in London at the warlike turn events were taking, and at the behaviour of the ally, which, however, the ministers regarded as a mistake arising from incorrect information. They themselves believed that Austria had hostile intentions;<sup>2</sup> and they were also convinced that any warlike demonstration on Frederick's part would lead France and Russia to support Austria.<sup>3</sup> They therefore poured forth warnings and dissuasive arguments in the hope of diverting the king, ere it was too late, from the dangerous path.<sup>4</sup> Hanbury Williams at St. Petersburg was horrified when he heard that Frederick had reproached the empress-queen with the conclusion of an offensive alliance with Russia. He gave the most solemn assurances that the rumour of such an alliance was absolutely false, and expressed the hope that his letter (dated September 7) would arrive in time to prevent mischief.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'To this Mr. Klinggräffen replied, that he was in a condition to show that the informations they had received of that kind [Prussian war preparations] were ill-grounded;—and he was going to enter into particulars; but Ct. Kaunitz prevented him by breaking off the conversation abruptly.' No mention is made of this in Klinggräffen's report to the king.—*Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs d. Gr.*, xiii. 163.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle writes to Sir Joseph Yorke (Hardwicke's son) at the Hague on the 11th of June 1756: 'The truth is, that, when we would not, nor could not begin a war upon the King of Prussia, and agree to the extravagant plan which they proposed last year at Hanover for that purpose; the view of which plan was very luckily thus explained to Mr. Keith, who upon asking Count Caunitz how that was to be accomplished, received this memorable answer, *en attaquant le Roy de Prusse, morbleu*. Then the Court of Vienna began to turn their thoughts, how they might revenge themselves (tho' now unprovok'd) of the King of Prussia; and pursue all their blind bigotted designs against the Protestants in the Empire and the Protestant cause. For this reason they made the renewal of the treaty of Westphalia . . . the base of their present treaty with France.'—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>3</sup> Keith reports on the 14th of July that in making their preparations the Austrians are guided by the measures taken by Frederick. 'And I believe,' he writes, 'they are sincere in declaring that they will not be the aggressors; but I imagine, at the same time, that they would not be sorry if His Pruss. Maj. gave the first blow, in order to put them in the *Casus foederis* of demanding the assistance of France and Russia.'—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> Prussian ambassador's report of August 6.—Berlin Archives. Holderness to Mitchell, August 6.—Public Record Office.

<sup>5</sup> To Holderness, September 7, 1756.—Public Record Office.

A few days later he reported that the Empress Elizabeth was most indignant at Frederick's assertion.<sup>1</sup>

The onset of the Prussian ruler was, as soon appeared, no longer to be prevented; and the next question was: What position was England to adopt? Frederick had taken great trouble to convince Mitchell, the English ambassador, that the imperial courts had taken steps of a threatening nature, and that he was obliged to forestall further action on their part; he had even, in his eagerness to prove his case, gone the length of citing very unreliable information, but he had not succeeded. The English government was too well informed upon the real state of affairs to be deceived. In view of past utterances, England, now that the king was actually attacking Austria, was bound to enter the lists against him herself, and thereby fulfil the obligations of the defensive treaty. At an earlier period she might have done so, for such had been her intention at the time when the Westminster Convention was concluded. But since then the situation had been so modified by the Franco-Austrian alliance that such action was no longer possible. English and French troops might have found themselves fighting on the same side. The only course open to the ministry was to make the best of the awkward situation, unless they were prepared to lose their solitary ally. Since they had consistently persuaded the nation that a pacific attitude on the part of the Prussian king had been ensured by the Westminster Convention, they found themselves obliged, lest they should seem to have been deceived, to adopt Frederick's standpoint and to represent Kaunitz's great plot as a sufficient and imperative reason for the king's anticipation of his opponents by taking the offensive. In no other way could they defend their policy to the Parliament, and especially to Pitt, the keenest critic in the Lower House, who at once detected every weak point in a position.

<sup>1. 1756</sup> Nor was this enough. The ministers were also obliged to show that the Prussian alliance was still of advantage to England; otherwise a severe condemnation of the whole Westminster policy would be the result. Was there any sense, their opponents would argue, in allying the nation with a sovereign who was so exposed to the hostility of foreign powers that he was not in a position to fulfil the obligations he under-

<sup>1</sup> Report of September 11, 1756. — Public Record Office.

took? Why had the government not foreseen this possibility and made provision for it? It was felt that a slight deception must be practised on the nation, and to this end application was made to Frederick the Great. On the 10th of August the Prussian ambassador thus communicates to his master the wishes of the English ministers:<sup>1</sup> 'If your majesty would immediately promise support to the Elector of Hanover, and would send it to him at the time when your majesty thinks proper to begin operations against the Austrians, the king will no longer feel such anxiety; and the ministry will be in a position to prove to the nation that, although your majesty has considered it necessary to anticipate the attacks of your enemies, you have at the same time fulfilled your obligations to his British majesty.' He went on to observe that Frederick might reasonably withdraw his troops from the west in spring, as soon as the Russians began to attack. Such, then, is the almost plaintive request of the London cabinet—that King Frederick will help it out of its difficulty, will send troops, even if it be only for a few months, until the storms in Parliament pass over. The cabinet could exercise no pressure, for it was unanimously felt that the alliance with Frederick must be maintained and that Hanover must be defended.<sup>2</sup> Holderness went the length of intimating to Frederick, on the 10th of August, that if his majesty brought on war by making an attack, it was his duty to protect Hanover;<sup>3</sup> but he did not insist; he rather endeavoured to persuade the king to fulfil the desire of the English cabinet, by justifying his aggressive policy and recognising that he was acting under compulsion. In the letter above-mentioned, written by the Prussian ambassador on the 10th of August, we find for the first time Frederick's standpoint represented as that of the English ministers also.<sup>4</sup> The ambassador himself is quite unaware of any ulterior motive; he repeats in all good faith what the ministers have said to him, and considers it perfectly natural that they should see the situa-

<sup>1</sup> *Gesandtschaftsbericht*.—Berlin Archives. This passage is not printed in the *Politische Korrespondenz* (xiii. 248).

<sup>2</sup> Holderness to Newcastle, September 9, 1756. 'It is admitted on all hands that we must assist in defending Hanover; that we must maintain our alliance with the King of Prussia.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> To Mitchell.—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xiii. 248.

tion in the same light as he does, and as he believes his master to do. The king, however, understood the situation better, and at once recognised the concession conveyed by the utterances of the English ministers; he therefore in return promised to send eleven thousand soldiers from Pomerania to the Rhine whenever the French despatched troops to the Rhine district, but with the stipulation that they must return to the eastern frontier in February.<sup>1</sup>

Thus this unfortunate affair was settled in a tolerably satisfactory manner. The renewal of the contest between the two great German powers really amounted to a defeat of the English policy; for the settlement of their differences had always been a cherished aim of the English court. And the outbreak of hostilities also meant that the Westminster Convention had failed in its purpose. But at least it could now be affirmed that Prussia intended to fulfil one of its obligations, by defending Hanover. Disasters, however, went on accumulating to such an extent that the existence of the government was seriously endangered.

In America, after the defeat of General Braddock, circumstances changed somewhat for the better. Braddock's successor in command, Mr. Shirley, took the most necessary measures of defence, chief among them being the renewal of the fortifications of Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario, a very important point, the furthest to which the English possessions as yet extended. The English gained a success in October 1755, when Colonel Johnson, with the English colonial militia, defeated the French under Baron Dieskau. Dieskau, marching south from Montreal by the great route to the Hudson River, encountered the English in the neighbourhood of Fort St. George. In the engagement which ensued, the French commander was wounded; his representative ordered a retreat upon the last position which the troops had occupied; during this movement they were pursued by the English and Dieskau was taken prisoner. The English could consequently regard the affair as a victory for them; and it was of a certain importance, if not from a military, still from a political point of view. Yet the chief event of the engagement, the capture of Dieskau, was in reality a piece of good fortune for the French, since it led to the despatch of a remarkably capable general, who had

<sup>1</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xiii. 249.



already distinguished himself in the war of the Austrian Succession, and whose energy kept the French in possession of Canada for some years longer—the Marquis de Montcalm. During the winter nothing of great importance happened. After their victory over Braddock, the French succeeded in making the Indian tribes in the valley of the Ohio their allies, and instigating them to raids far into the English colonies. There were skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Fort Oswego, and its communications were sometimes threatened; but on the Hudson route the position remained the same.

In February 1756 Montcalm was appointed French commander-in-chief, acting, however, under the authority of Vaudreuil, the Governor of Canada. He arrived at Quebec on the 12th of May, and at once proceeded to take energetic measures. His plan was to check the progress of the English on the Hudson route by sending a strong body of troops in that direction, whilst he himself, taking as many as could be spared, attacked Fort Oswego.

The English government also sent out a new commander-in-chief, but they were less fortunate in their choice, which fell on the Earl of Loudon, a man with excellent connections (a friend of Lord Halifax, the minister for the colonies), but not well qualified for this difficult and responsible post. He was appointed commander-in-chief in all the British provinces of the continent of America, and in this quality occupied an independent position equal in authority to that of the governors of the colonies, with special instructions to enforce colonial obedience to the central government. Discord was the immediate result, a discord which inevitably hampered the joint action that was necessary.

Loudon arrived in America later than was intended, and spent a considerable time in asserting and securing his position and authority. It was the end of July before he reached Albany, the general rendezvous, with his reinforcements, and he remained there inactive while decisive events were occurring at Lake Ontario. Montcalm had concentrated his troops, to the number of 3200, with 51 guns, at Fort Frontenac, where the St. Lawrence flows out of Lake Ontario. He landed this corps, which far outnumbered the English troops, on the 11th of August, at Fort Ontario, a small fort in the neighbourhood of Oswego, which surrendered after a short struggle. Oswego

itself was then attacked from all sides. It could not long withstand the heavy cannonade. When the English commander fell, his successor called a council of war, in which it was decided to capitulate. About 1700 prisoners and a quantity of military stores fell into the hands of the victors. But the most important result was that the English were dispossessed of all their power in the region of the Lakes, and that the French could now establish direct communication between the St. Lawrence and the upper Ohio. The news of this serious misfortune reached London on the 30th of September,<sup>1</sup> and aroused great excitement throughout the country. It may be said to have given the death-blow to the Newcastle ministry.

Newcastle and his colleagues had, of course, been eagerly occupied all the summer in propping up and repairing the ministerial edifice as best they could, partly by improving the military outlook and taking measures to prevent any further misfortunes, partly by careful preparation for the parliamentary session. They had had their first cause of rejoicing in July, when English warships obtained possession of Choiseul, a small Channel island, from which it was easy to attack the English Channel islands, Jersey and Guernsey. It was, however, not a sufficient equivalent for Minorca. Then, in consequence of the complications on the Continent, the danger of invasion steadily diminished. Eight thousand men were being added to the English army, and these, with the prospective return of the four regiments which had defended Minorca, made the retention of the German troops in England superfluous.<sup>2</sup> It was proposed to send them home, where they, in combination with the Prussian contingent, would constitute the army necessary for the defence of Hanover. This move was greatly to be desired on account of the troops themselves, for the unfortunate men had been camping in tents ever since they came to England, as they might not be quartered in private houses without a special decree of Parliament.<sup>3</sup> And Parliament would not meet, at the earliest, until November, whilst the men might suffer many hardships in October.

As regarded the parliamentary position, the old majority

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian ambassador, October 1.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 30, 1756.

<sup>3</sup> Reports of the Prussian ambassador, November 2 and 9, 1756.

remained, and all that was immediately imperative on the ministry was to defend itself against the violent attacks which were to be expected from the opposition in such a skilful manner, and with such satisfactory explanations, that there would be no secession from the ranks of its supporters, and that the House would not be too strongly influenced by the mood of the nation. How entirely public opinion had already turned against the government Newcastle learned to his cost when, on 11th September, a Greenwich mob pelted him with mud, obliging him to take refuge in the Observatory. In the streets of Westminster a song was sung which relegated him to the block and Admiral Byng to the yard-arm. It is easy to imagine the effect produced on the timid duke by such demonstrations.

He certainly still had the best rhetorical champions at his side. Murray and Fox were the pillars which supported the government, and as long as they stood firm there was no serious danger. But they began to totter. In June 1756 the ~~lord high chancellor~~, Sir Dudley Ryder, died unexpectedly, and Murray was the single applicant for the vacant post. He asked at the same time for a peerage.<sup>1</sup> To Newcastle this signified ruin, for Murray elevated to the peerage would no longer be able to give his support to the government where it was of vital importance, namely, in the House of Commons. Murray, however, declared plainly that if his application were not granted he would certainly give up the appointment which he at present held; and as a dissatisfied adherent was useless, the duke determined to support his application. The king was most unwilling to grant it; he wished to postpone the appointment till the spring of 1757, but in the end he had to yield; there was much delay, but on the 25th of October, before Parliament met, Murray, as Lord Mansfield, entered upon the functions of the highest juridical office. He was one of England's most eminent ~~lord chancellors~~. His behaviour on this occasion is not to be ascribed merely to his desire for a peerage and a higher appointment; the former, at least, he knew he could have had later. It was the unfortunate and involved position of the country which induced him to seize and use determinedly this opportunity of withdrawing with honour from the situation. He had no desire to continue to act as Newcastle's

<sup>1</sup> See on this subject Harris's *Life of Hardwicke*, iii. 60, ff.

cat's-paw, seeing that the fire since recent occurrences had become extremely hot.

And Fox, too, Newcastle's other mainstay, considered it advisable to avoid the disturbances threatened in the coming parliamentary winter, and to assist in forming a more suitable government for the endangered state ; but his proceedings are intimately connected with the events to be considered in our next chapter, and will be treated there. In the present chapter my aim has simply been to tell how the circle was finally broken which excluded Pitt from the government, and how the conditions were evolved which made his elevation possible. In learning this, we have at the same time acquired a knowledge of the diplomatic and military foundations upon which it became our hero's task to build.

## CHAPTER II

### PITT'S RISE TO POWER

WE have previously seen that the rupture with Newcastle had destroyed the basis on which Pitt had hoped to advance to power, and that he was now looking for new means of support. The rise of the Leicester House party seemed to provide the desired opportunity. In the year 1755 Pitt was not in direct connection with the court of the heir-apparent, though he had by no means dismissed that influence from his calculations; at that moment an event took place which disturbed the relations between the king and his grandson.

George II. was anxious to see the young prince married, no doubt with the sole object of securing the position of his dynasty. His choice fell upon Sophia Caroline, a daughter of the Duke of Brunswick Wolfenbüttel, and niece of King Frederick of Prussia; he had made her acquaintance during his stay in Hanover.<sup>1</sup> The Princess of Wales, however, was opposed to this project; she feared the influence that the young and clever wife would undoubtedly acquire upon her son, who was a somewhat domesticated character, and she, therefore, succeeded in inspiring the prince with suspicion of his grandfather's plans. George conceived the idea that his personal interests were to be sacrificed for political objects, opposed the king's desires, and did not improve his temper in consequence. Pitt and Legge are also said to have used their influence against the marriage,<sup>2</sup> though by what means is not clear.

In the summer of 1756 a more serious matter occurred, in which Pitt played a considerable part, with the object of securing himself in the favour of the young court. Prince

<sup>1</sup> Cp. on this point Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 40 f.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs of George II.*, ii. 37.



George came of age on June 4, and custom demanded that he should be provided with an establishment of his own, and with the income necessary for its maintenance. The king was especially anxious to remove his grandson upon this occasion from his mother's influence and from the female society with which he was surrounded, of which the prince's guardian, Lord Waldegrave, draws a somewhat unfavourable picture in his memoirs. An additional reason was the gossip that had arisen concerning the relations of the fashionable Lord Bute with the widowed princess. The intimacy was too close not to have given rise to rumours of the worst kind, though for the truth of these no reliable evidence can be found. Thus it was to be expected that the king would grant an appanage only upon condition that the prince should leave his mother and occupy the house which his grandfather would assign to him. This, however, was what the princess, and the prince who followed her lead, were particularly anxious to avoid.

On May 31 the young court was informed, through Lord Waldegrave, that the king proposed to grant the prince a yearly revenue of £40,000, together with what was necessary for his position; to this announcement he added that he had caused the rooms of the late prince in Kensington, and those of the queen in St. James's, to be fitted up for his grandson.<sup>1</sup> Thus the king desired that the prince should change his residence, though he did not, as was apprehended, make the appanage conditional upon the change, and the prince, therefore, had the opportunity of gratefully accepting the one and politely refusing the other. The question now arises how the king came to make this obvious blunder, which was fatal to the success of his policy.

For the solution of this question, a letter of Lord Bute to Pitt, under date June 3, 1756,<sup>2</sup> is of high importance. It begins as follows: 'My worthy friend, I am immensely happy to hear of your success. I am desired by the Royal Highnesses, the Prince and Princess, to assure you of their being most sensible of the zeal and activity you have shown in a business concerning them so nearly. May success attend it equal to all our good intentions,' etc. Pitt was thus most certainly involved in the affair in question; we can, however,

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 206 f.; *Grenville Papers*, i. 163.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 156 ff.

point to no other success which he then secured except this favourable wording of the king's offer; hence it is probable that Pitt, somehow or other, dictated the form of proposal. There is, however, another piece of evidence, which explains how this may have been possible. In a later letter of Bute<sup>1</sup> clear reference is made to the negotiations which Bute conducted with the Duke of Newcastle through Pitt, and by which the duke's attitude was determined. The duke was thus the means by which the party was able to influence the king's resolve, and the fact is more probable, in view of Newcastle's habit of securing his position against every eventuality. He would not have been likely to let slip an opportunity of securing the favour of the heir-apparent, upon whom he might shortly become entirely dependent. Pitt, again, was the most suitable adviser to lay the situation strongly before him, to terrify him into submission, and thus to secure the desired concession. Lord Waldegrave also relates that the young court applied to Newcastle, though he asserts, through ignorance of the real course of events, that they met with a complete refusal. This remark refers, indeed, to a second matter, which is very closely connected with the foregoing.

The course of events, as appears from the evidence at our disposal, seems to me to have been as follows. Pitt was commissioned by the prince and princess to negotiate with Newcastle at the end of May, and was perhaps supported by Legge, who also seems to have been involved in this affair. Pitt succeeded in inducing the duke, without disclosing his own intentions, to formulate the king's message in a manner which allowed the heir-apparent to remain in his mother's house. When the document was brought by the hands of Lord Waldegrave, who had no suspicion of the plot, Legge is said to have undertaken the task of drafting the answer, on the careful wording of which much depended.<sup>2</sup> In this answer the prince expresses his deep appreciation of his grandfather's kindness, whose offer he gratefully accepts, while earnestly begging his majesty not to insist upon his separation from his mother, as this would be a source of grief to both of them. The princess again contented herself with expressing her deep gratitude for the king's interest in herself and in the prince, without making any reference to the desired change of resi-

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 170 f.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 207.

dence. Thus the king had fallen into the trap, which his own ministers had laid for him in fear of his grandson. He could not possibly recall the grant merely because the prince had shown affection for his mother; nor, again, could he enforce every detail of the offer, or oblige his heir, who was now of age, to remove to a new house, as this would have been tantamount to imprisonment. Nobody would have ventured to support the enforcement of this condition, or to face the uproar which such an attempt would have provoked, exactly at the moment when the first disastrous news came in from the Mediterranean. Thus upon this point the king had come off the loser, and his grandson quietly continued in his previous mode of life, though the virtual prohibition was not recalled.

A second point now arose: Newcastle was very despondent at Byng's report, and proposed to utilise the instalment of the prince's household to gain as many new friends for himself as possible. Among others, Lord Waldegrave was appointed groom of the stole. The princess, however, and therefore the prince, were anxious that Lord Bute should have this most important post, which implied virtual command. A conference upon the question took place between Bute and the duke in Pitt's house, in the course of which the minister was informed of the desires of the young court, and of the fact that the prince claimed the right of choosing his subordinates.<sup>1</sup> This was a disagreeable blow for Newcastle, as his means of influence was thereby removed. He could not, however, break with the heir-apparent, and consented that a letter explaining the facts should be sent to the king. Bute accordingly waited for the duke to secure the desired confirmation of the prince's request. Newcastle, however, did not apply for permission; he proposed, perhaps on the advice of the Chancellor Hardwicke, who still had great influence upon him, that a message should be sent to the prince, asking whether he insisted upon remaining with his mother, and whether he wished to have Lord Bute as groom of the stole.<sup>2</sup> Thus, instead of gaining the exclusive right of appointment, the prince found that the reality of his main wish was questioned. Lord Bute was extremely dissatisfied with this result, and blamed Pitt for this breach of agreement. His previous letters to Pitt had been couched in very friendly terms, but

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 170 f.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 221.

upon this occasion he wrote in a cold and formal style, complaining of the duke's proposal, and again explaining the desires of the prince.<sup>1</sup> 'Lord Bute,' his words ran, 'flatters himself, Mr. Pitt will perceive how inconsistent the smallest hint of the Prince's wishes would be with the free choice he meets from his Majesty's indulgence.' Thus the main principle was surrendered, and the prince was subjected to conditions of life more stringent than those endured by any member of the government, in so far as he was unable to choose his own personal servants.

We have no information concerning the effect produced upon Pitt by this epistle, or upon the further course of the negotiations. In any case the prince was obliged to send a letter to the king on July 12,<sup>2</sup> which ran as follows: 'Hitherto I have not ventured to express my most anxious desire to your Majesty, that the Earl of Bute should receive one of the most important posts in my household; but as your Majesty now orders me to declare my opinion on this subject, I humbly venture to lay my ardent desire at your Majesty's feet, which is at the same time the only request that I have to make concerning the Court which your Majesty is graciously furnishing for me; nothing could make me happier or fill my mind with warmer gratitude than your Majesty's gracious consent in favour of a character, an early and long acquaintance with whom has naturally won my high esteem, and of whose devotion and zeal for your Majesty I am most firmly convinced.'

Such is the document in which Prince George acknowledges Lord Bute as his friend and favourite, a relationship which was to be of long duration and of great importance both to English history in general and to Pitt's career in particular. His effort, however, upon this occasion did not meet with immediate success. The king discussed the question at a cabinet council,<sup>3</sup> at which nobody except Lord Waldegrave ventured to say what he thought. The other members were chiefly anxious to avoid offending either the king or the heir-apparent. Newcastle also took a middle course, advising that another post should be found for Bute, as the king would not confirm his appointment to the office he desired. The duke in particular was anxious to put off the moment of decision.

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 170 f.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>3</sup> Waldegrave, p. 67 ff.



Waldegrave alone declared openly that the appointment must be confirmed without delay, that it might appear an act of grace, for it would be extorted from the government at a later period. He had been the prince's tutor for many years, and had therefore the clearest knowledge of the situation, while he was anxious to be relieved of a highly uncomfortable post, in which he was able to do little real service. The king, however, wished to see him at the head of the new household as an honest and disinterested supporter of his own views, and therefore plainly declared as a result of the discussion that he would decline to appoint Bute as groom of the stole.

In no long time the ministry found itself in so precarious a position that Newcastle thought it advisable to secure the desired concession for the young court. When the news of the fall of Minorca arrived on July 15, he and his friends urged the king to confirm Bute's appointment.<sup>1</sup> George II. energetically declined; in the first place, he had already pronounced his refusal, and in addition Lord Hardwicke pointed out to him that while he had refused Bute's appointment as groom of the stole, he need have no scruples upon the question of finding him another office. The king declined to consider this sophism, and preferred to countermand his previous orders. The matter was settled in Bute's favour towards the end of September,<sup>2</sup> though it was not until later that his appointment was actually confirmed.

Meanwhile Newcastle had strengthened his position on either side. On the one hand, he was able to appear as the benevolent friend of the young court, who had secured the fulfilment of the prince's desires in the teeth of all obstacles. Pitt failed to reap the fruit of his efforts, for Bute regarded him as responsible for the initial failure, no doubt at the duke's suggestion. On the other hand, Newcastle was able to persuade the king that it was not he but Fox who had urged the elevation of the prince's favourite, though Fox had only spoken a few words in the course of conversation in favour of the step.<sup>3</sup>

At the outset of October, when the outlook was blackened by the fall of Oswego, the king formally consented that the prince should remain with his mother, and that Bute should become head of the establishment as groom of the stole, after Waldegrave had voluntarily resigned his office. A conciliatory

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 250.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 256.

letter from the king to his grandson was drawn up by Newcastle and Hardwicke.<sup>1</sup> The actual appointment took place on October 27, but the king declined to confer the key, which was the token of office, in person, and this was brought to its recipient by the Duke of Grafton. When Bute appeared to kiss hands, the king declined to vouchsafe him a single word.<sup>2</sup> It was a favour that had been wrested from him, like Pitt's previous appointment to the paymastership, and the man who had exerted pressure, Fox, as the king believed, could no longer count upon his favour. On the other hand, the king's attitude deprived Newcastle of the advantage he thought to secure with the heir-apparent, for Prince George and Bute regarded him as responsible for this rebuff.

Fox found his position considerably more difficult after these recent political and military events. His colleagues were at variance with him, as he had forced his war policy upon them, with the result of the present fiasco; the king despised him for his inadequate knowledge of foreign affairs and his dependence upon Cumberland, whose paramount position had become a source of inconvenience;<sup>3</sup> and with Leicester House his relations were continually strained. So early as the summer, when Newcastle had complained of his difficulties, Fox had expressed a wish to retire, and had suggested the appointment of Pitt as secretary of state. No doubt he wished to make his colleague understand that if he were not treated with due respect, he would be capable of suddenly retiring from the ministry. For the moment the duke took no notice of his remarks, being little desirous of change at that time; when, however, the news of Oswego arrived, and its decisive importance for the question of Bute's appointment became obvious, he was forced to consider the advisability of summoning Pitt, and began to prepare for that eventuality. He informed Fox, through Lord Barrington, the secretary of war, that he had not forgotten his former proposal, and that he was prepared to make an offer to Pitt. Fox showed full readiness to meet his views. He repeated his desire to resign, and requested some minor office without a seat in the cabinet.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 528; Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 66 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 259; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Eighth Rep.*, App., p. 222.—H. Digby to Lord Digby (nephew of Fox), October 28, 1756.

<sup>3</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 178.

<sup>4</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 174 f.

The question was thus settled for the moment, and Newcastle thought the game was entirely in his hands; he did not regard Fox's desire as genuine, but rather in the nature of a threat, and thus considered that there was no likelihood of his resignation at an inconvenient moment; moreover, he could now proceed undisturbed with the task of creating new forces, and when this was accomplished could easily remove his colleague from office on the ground of his former assertions. He therefore spent the following days in making appointments to the household of the Prince of Wales and securing political friendships by means of the offices thus placed at his disposal.<sup>1</sup> No less than ten of his appointments were members of the House of Commons, who were thus bound to vote for the government in accordance with prevailing custom. Not until all had been arranged with the government was Fox informed of these proceedings, and the only concession that the duke made to him was to gain an appointment for one of his nephews, Lord Digby, an invalid who was not likely to live long.

Fox, however, now proceeded to action, and threw the prime minister into the greatest embarrassment. On October 13 he informed Newcastle and Hardwicke, referring to his conversation with Lord Barrington, and emphasising the untenable nature of his position, that he had determined to resign his office.<sup>2</sup> The two ministers were thunderstruck. They had proposed to relieve themselves of Fox at a later period, when they had consolidated their position and found some one to take his place; now he suddenly cut the ground from under their feet by abandoning them at a moment when he was more or less indispensable. It was now impossible to hold the scales between Pitt and Fox, a policy which Newcastle had previously pursued with masterly success, for the reason that one of the rivals voluntarily retired from the contest. The ministers found Pitt thrown upon their hands for good or for evil. Their apprehensions are expressed in the correspondence between Newcastle and Hardwicke,<sup>3</sup> which is full of the most varied conjectures concerning the reasons and the consequences of this resolve. In any case, it was obvious that they must immediately enter upon relations with Pitt, and begin prepara-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 253.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 69 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, iii. 70 ff.

tions to that end, but what to do if Pitt declined to help them they could not decide, and this latter possibility was a heavy anxiety.

The man, however, who had caused this confusion was by no means satisfied. Fox did not wish to retire absolutely from the administration, but hoped that his action would induce the king to retain him in office under more favourable conditions.<sup>1</sup> If his expectations were realised, he would have gained a victory over Newcastle, while if the king accepted his resignation, he foresaw that he also would be forced to apply to Pitt, unless he meant to retire unconditionally, and thus to expose himself to the danger of being called to account by his conquerors for his conduct in office.

We have thus to observe two parallel lines of action: Newcastle was attempting to complete a defective ministry, and Fox to secure a stronger position. Let us first examine the proceedings of Fox.

He began by personal application to the king's mistress, the Countess of Yarmouth, in order to discover the monarch's views, and if possible to influence him. She was to transmit his request to the monarch. The hopeless nature of his position then became clear to him.<sup>2</sup> The countess informed him that the king would be so surprised and vexed at this step that she could not possibly venture to intervene between them, and that Fox had better abandon his proposal at any cost. This, however, was impossible, as Fox had already announced his wishes to Newcastle; he was therefore obliged to choose another messenger and leave things to take their course. Lord Granville undertook this disagreeable task, and handed the resignation to the king at an audience on October 15.<sup>3</sup> Granville himself had some misgivings, of which he informed Fox, that he might himself possibly incur the king's wrath or suspicion. He made additions to and subtractions from the document as he thought advisable, and he aroused the violent resentment of his employer in consequence.

Three days afterwards Fox was himself summoned to an

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 252.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. MSS. Comm., Eighth Rep.*, App., p. 220.—Fox to Digby. This undated letter belongs to October 14, 1756, since Granville's audience is mentioned as appointed for 'to-morrow.'

<sup>3</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 199 ff.; Walpole, ii. 253 f.



audience at Lady Yarmouth's intercession,<sup>1</sup> but her hopes of avoiding a breach were not fulfilled. The king did not show the smallest desire to retain the retiring minister, but poured upon him all the vials of his wrath, reproaching him particularly for forcing the appointment of 'that coxcomb Bute' as groom of the stole. Attempts at defence were useless, and the king was left in suspicion that Fox was in alliance with Leicester House. Thus his hopes of retaining or improving his position came to an end, though he consoled himself with the thought that if Pitt declined to act, the Newcastle government would be overthrown.

The king and his mistress now saw the necessity of summoning Pitt. The king referred to this possibility during Granville's audience, but when the earl advised this step, saying that the ministry must have some one, he had immediately announced the fact which caused him apprehension. 'I am convinced,' he said, 'that Pitt will not do my business,' by which expression he referred to the continuance of the Hanoverian policy. Here, however, he was wrong, for as we have already seen, Pitt's attitude upon the Hanoverian question was only a means to an end. If he secured the conduct of the war Pitt was quite ready to agree to the king's wishes. In any case George desired that Pitt should be carefully sounded as to his views, though no mention was to be made for the moment of a possibility of the royal consent. For this object Hardwicke wrote on October 16 to summon Pitt to a conference on the morning of Tuesday the 19th at the house of Lord Royston, his son.<sup>2</sup> Pitt gave a suitable reply, but was determined to pledge himself neither to take office under Newcastle, nor to give any assurance which might hamper an impeachment of the ministers in case of their retirement. No deliberations took place previous to the conference, nor did he inform Bute of his action, as he wished to be uninfluenced by outside advice on taking this decisive course.<sup>3</sup>

The decision with which Pitt declined the proposal of Newcastle and his friends on this occasion would be almost inexplicable were it not that new points of difference had arisen since the date of the former overtures. Pitt might now expect to obtain from the duke the secretaryship of state and

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, ii. 256 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 177 f.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 76 f.

the conduct of the war, which he had formerly desired in vain; even if the duke had no intention of granting this irreducible minimum, it was none the less worth while to begin negotiations with hopes of a compromise, and to see whether concessions acceptable to both parties might not be secured. The pressure of the present circumstances gave grounds for expecting thus much. Even when Pitt afterwards entered the ministry without Newcastle and Fox, far-seeing observers wondered why he had not preferred to form an administration in conjunction with the duke, which would have had better prospects of permanence. 'However, a great intellect,' they said, 'cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary cleverness.'<sup>1</sup> Pitt, however, did not even request definite or difficult concessions; he declined absolutely to enter upon any alliance with Newcastle, and would have nothing whatever to do with him.

The new reasons which led him to this conclusion may have lain in the defective conduct of the war, for which he wished to call the ministers to account, though he could hardly have failed to see that Newcastle was not entirely, and was perhaps least of all, to blame. Cumberland, Fox, and Anson were chiefly responsible for these measures, the erroneous nature of which was also a matter of hot dispute. Why, then, did Pitt turn his back so persistently upon Newcastle? I am inclined to think that other reasons must be found for his anger and his refusal, and that these were actuated by the treachery which the duke had shown to Pitt in the affairs of the young court, and which had inspired him with this aversion to his former patron. Newcastle had formerly injured his credit with the king, and enviously prevented his rise to power, while in the summer he had gone so far as to discredit him in the quarter in which he had placed his entire hopes of future advancement. In consequence his confidence had been so shattered and his aversion so increased that he declined any possible connection with the duke, even under the most favourable conditions. Perhaps, and indeed probably, he hoped by breaking with Newcastle and declining his offer to clear himself from the suspicions entertained by Leicester House, that he had intrigued with the duke upon the business of the prince's establishment. The duke, indeed, instead of

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 536.

leaving the heir-apparent to make the appointments to the new court, had distributed them himself, and secured adherents by this means. Bute thought, on the duke's authority, that Pitt was at the bottom of this action. If Pitt now separated from the duke his share of the profit would be lost, and it would therefore be supposed that he had had no part in the intrigue. As a matter of fact his relations with Bute became more friendly from this time onward. Thus Pitt sacrificed, as he had done before, immediate advantage to secure greater profit hereafter, and formed a weak ministry that he might gain a larger place in the affections of the heir-apparent in the future.

The conference with Hardwicke ran the course which Pitt had foreseen and desired.<sup>1</sup> For three and a half hours, in Lord Royston's dressing-room, the chancellor strove to persuade him without the smallest success. Pitt would have nothing to do with the duke or his policy, and union was therefore impossible. The details of the conversation have not been transmitted to us, nor are they of any great importance, as we know Pitt's intentions from his own statements. At the end of the conference either party hastened to inform those interested of the details and the result. Hardwicke went to the king, who accepted the news with comparative equanimity, while Pitt went to his town house in Brook Street, where his friends had been previously advised<sup>2</sup> to join him in the evening.

A discussion with these friends induced Pitt to adopt a course of action not entirely consistent with his previous attitude. On Thursday, October 21 (the interview with Hardwicke had taken place on the Tuesday), he asked for a meeting with Lady Yarmouth, whom he had previously not deigned to visit.<sup>3</sup> The reason for this step is obvious. He did not wish the king to take the explanations of his chancellor as literally true, and he wished to enlighten him upon his real motives. As a would-be minister, he was forced to maintain a strong contradistinction between his own policy and that of the government in power, with the object of defeating and overthrowing them, whereas if he gained the post he desired he would be obliged to follow in general the course of his

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 77 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 178.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, ii. 259; Glover, p. 61.

predecessors. The ship of state cannot be so easily turned in this direction or in that as a strict adherence to party programme would imply. He had plainly declared his opposition to the chancellor, who had thus sufficient evidence to convince the king of the dangerous nature of his policy. It was now his object to take this weapon from the chancellor's hand by informing the king through another channel of his real intentions, and this was the chief object of his visit to the king's mistress. The attention shown to a member of the Hanoverian party by this visit was in itself an announcement of his views. He then hinted that he would not abandon the king's electorate, and he gave cautious expression to this intention in words. Whether his action produced any effect, or whether George II. had resolved upon Pitt's promotion in any case, cannot be determined; the latter seems the more probable alternative, as the king had previously expressed a more favourable opinion of Pitt's character.<sup>1</sup>

As regards the other party, Hardwicke, at the wish of Newcastle, made a second attempt, on Sunday, October 24, to gain Pitt over by reporting the king's displeasure at his refusal. Once more he was unsuccessful, and Newcastle was obliged to face the fact that the days of his long ministry were numbered. He complained dismally to the lord chancellor of the evil treatment he had received, regardless of the far worse treatment which he had given to many others, and not least to the man who now undertook his overthrow.

As the Newcastle-Fox alliance had been shattered, and the Newcastle-Pitt alliance was impossible, only one possible combination remained if the old arrangement was to be preserved, a union between Fox and Pitt, which had previously existed, though on the opposition side. In fact serious attempts were now made to arrive at this solution. On October 27 the king sent for Fox and commissioned him to try and arrive at an understanding with Pitt.<sup>2</sup> Fox declared his readiness to make the attempt, and found a favourable opportunity the next day of making his proposals. On Thursday, 28th, Bute was admitted to kiss hands as the groom of the stole, and was confirmed in his office, while early on Friday the prince held his first levée as master of an independent establishment. Here the two rivals met, and a conversation took place upon the stairs, the

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, ii. 262 f.



content of which is very variously reported.<sup>1</sup> In any case Fox explained more or less clearly that Pitt was to be invited to join the ministry, whereupon Pitt attempted to discover whether Fox was concerned in the new arrangements; and when the latter was unable to deny this, Pitt declared his absolute refusal to participate, stating that he would deal only with those whom he could respect and trust. The contempt which Pitt showed for his former ally upon this occasion is chiefly to be ascribed to the fact that he regarded these vexatious suppositions as an insult, seeing that he had often enough expressly declined any union with Fox. Fox himself saw that Pitt could not act otherwise, or at any rate persuaded himself of the fact, with the object of concealing his defeat. He wrote on the 30th to the Duke of Bedford:<sup>2</sup> 'He (Pitt) could not act with me as minister. He foresaw, I suppose, that my place would be in the Treasury. I cannot much blame him, my Lord, for in that case what would he be but Paymaster again, under another Pelham, with employment of higher rank?'

It was therefore necessary to renounce the hope of using the existing elements of the ministry, and to attempt the formation of a new organisation, with Pitt as its centre. Lord Granville, who had been closely connected with Fox during the last period (we know that both men had formed the nucleus of the war party), attempted to induce his colleague to form an independent administration, but his proposals were rejected, and he was forced to come over to Pitt's side.<sup>3</sup> It was impossible for Pitt to undertake the formation of a cabinet independently, for he possessed neither a sufficient following nor the necessary social position. In view of the inevitable weakness which was obviously bound to characterise the new government, it was imperatively necessary that a peer of high reputation should act as leader whom the proud whig nobility would be willing to recognise as their chief. Thus, at Pitt's express desire, the king entrusted the Duke of Devonshire with the formation and the conduct of the ministry.

William Cavendish, fourth Duke of Devonshire, had already occupied several important posts in spite of his comparatively

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, ii. 202 f. ; Glover, p. 69 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Glover, p. 70.

youthful age.<sup>1</sup> Born in 1720, he had entered the House of Commons in 1741, had succeeded by marriage to large estates in Ireland, and after his elevation as Marquis of Hartington, had been appointed equerry in June 1751. From March 1755 he had been acting as lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and in December of that year he inherited the title of Duke of Devonshire on his grandfather's death. He had shown himself an adroit and capable administrator, especially in Ireland, where he satisfied every party by agreeing to their wishes without committing himself to any material improvements. The consequent popularity which he enjoyed, his parliamentary experience in both Houses, his wide knowledge, and many other advantages, turned men's eyes towards him at this moment. His wealth and his high position as head of one of the most important whig families would have enabled him to form a party independently, and he would have been joined by many whigs who were dissatisfied with the ministry. He had, however, no interest in party intrigues, and had never aimed at parliamentary power. However, as prime minister, he might well become the right man in the right place, for as such it was chiefly important that he should clear the path for the real leader of the policy, and secure his freedom of action.

It cannot be denied that Pitt and several of his friends were somewhat unduly exalted by their present position of predominance and by the overtures which they received from every quarter. They felt themselves the undisputed masters of the situation, and considered that they could turn this favourable conjuncture of events to any account they pleased. However, their joy was somewhat damped by a very cold reception<sup>2</sup> at the king's levée on his birthday (October 30), in consequence of which they thought it the more necessary to proceed to decisive action.

On the evening of the king's birthday, the day after Devonshire had been entrusted with the formation of the ministry, Pitt's little party met at dinner at the house of Sir Richard Lyttelton, the brother of Sir George.<sup>3</sup> Lord Temple, George Grenville, George Townshend, the poet Richard Glover, and some others, were present. Pitt had been forced by the course

<sup>1</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography* ; Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 190.

<sup>3</sup> Glover, p. 63 ff.

of events to put off his journey to Bath, and was now suffering from the results; his gout confined him to his bed, and he could not take part in the discussion, which was chiefly marked by a triumphant consciousness of victory; the basis for their future plans was the fact that they were apparently indispensable. Everybody, or at any rate the leaders, were convinced that the dangerous position of the state, as it had now secured their advancement, would also enable them to secure the accomplishment of their demands sooner or later. Thus they placed no limits to their wishes, and mooted the most extravagant projects, proposing to lay their seals and portfolios at the feet of any possible adversaries, until the difficulties of the situation enforced their compliance. All the influential officials of the present administration were to be dismissed, and any others who might prove dangerous; their conduct in office was to be strictly investigated; the king was no longer to be supreme ruler, but was to be taught to know his place; there was no need to consider the Parliament, which consisted merely of the creatures of the retiring government; they could concentrate their attention upon the justice and suitability of their measures; if the House did not agree, it would soon fall under the influence of the prevailing despair, and Pitt would merely rise the higher. As regards their measures, they proposed to continue the continental policy only so far as Pitt might deem advisable. The foreign troops were to be sent home, and a militia formed in accordance with Pitt's proposals. A disputed question was whether Lord Holderness should retain his secretaryship of state, upon which point the king had insisted strongly. He, however, had committed an action which had made him extremely unpopular with all so-called patriots. A Hanoverian soldier had been accused, though falsely, of some minor theft, and Holderness had interfered to withdraw him from the jurisdiction of the English courts and to hand him over to his commander. This action had avoided complications, and prevented the strong national feeling from committing an act of injustice, but the opposition, and Pitt in particular, denounced the minister's action as a breach of the constitution.

The views developed at this meeting were drawn up and reduced to writing by Richard Glover, the resulting document being brought on the following day by George Townshend

to the head of the party for his approval. Pitt lay in bed, and was so helpless that he could not even read the document himself. Townshend read it over to him, and he gave his complete approval. He was somewhat irritated at the observation that he had been brought into his present situation by the unfavourable events of the war, for he had expected some compliment on his capacities, but he immediately recognised the tactical error he had made, and was quickly appeased.

While Pitt's adherents were thus developing the most brilliant plans and hopes, there was no inclination to unconditional surrender in the party with which the final decision lay. The temper prevailing in Brook Street soon made itself felt in the course of the negotiations which Devonshire opened with Pitt.<sup>1</sup> Pitt was highly aggressive and dictatorial, disinclined to any form of concession; the king regarded this as a personal affront and complained bitterly. The only consolation was that Pitt's group did not venture to occupy the treasury posts themselves. It was hoped that Devonshire would exercise some control over Pitt and his friends, and that Fox, though he held no cabinet office, would prove a sufficient force in the House of Commons to prevent the absolute subjugation of the king. Lord Granville, whom the king continued to regard as his saviour, now came forward with a plan which he propounded on Tuesday, November 2. He proposed to offer Pitt and his friends not everything, but yet so much that they could not refuse without discrediting themselves in the eyes of the nation. If they declined the offer the government must move on without them, and might expect to outlive the attacks of the opposition if any attack were ventured under these circumstances. The king consented to the proposal and summoned a conference on the evening of November 3 of the cabinet ministers and other prominent members of both Houses, at which the matter was discussed. Among other participants was the Duke of Bedford, who continued his intimacy with Fox. The result of the discussion was that Pitt's list of ministers was somewhat reduced. It was made a *sine qua non* that Legge, whom Pitt had chosen as chancellor of the exchequer, should not be admitted to that office, while Fox, whose entry into the cabinet Pitt had absolutely opposed, was to become chancellor of the exchequer.

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 207 ff.



The reason for this proposal was that Devonshire energetically declined to co-operate with Legge in the financial administration.

This was a highly dangerous resolve, and Devonshire himself was the first to be convinced of the fact. Two friends, Mr. Conway and Horace Walpole, whom he met shortly afterwards, explained to him that the lords could not draw back when the offer had once been made to Pitt, while Pitt, in view of what had passed, could not possibly submit to these demands, and that the step, in consequence, would produce a breach which would shake the state to its foundations in the present situation. The duke, who was of a timid nature, and inclined to compromise, grew frightened, and went to the king next morning to inform him of his readiness to accept the exchequer appointment unconditionally. Fox was naturally bitterly disappointed, but he eventually put a good face upon the matter. To secure, as he said, the necessary domestic peace for the state, he even refused the paymastership that was offered to him. Separated from Newcastle, and in opposition to Pitt, he would not be minister at all if he could not be prime minister.<sup>1</sup>

This step on the part of the duke and Fox decided the victory in Pitt's favour. It would be necessary to reorganise the ministry in general in accordance with his desires, although his rivals and opponents were able to retain a considerable number of offices, and so to disturb his power of effective action, and even to undermine his position. Pitt's friends were by no means sufficiently numerous to occupy all the vacant posts, and in making his appointments he was obliged to consider capacity and previous experience. Naturally he gave the more important or lucrative posts to his own adherents. He himself took the secretaryship of state for the south, as he could not secure the more important secretaryship for the north. Lord Temple was placed in charge of the admiralty, George Grenville became paymaster for the navy, Legge chancellor of the exchequer, and James Grenville was made lord of the treasury. The king demanded one concession, that Lord Holderness should retain the secretaryship for the north, and thus retain control of Hanoverian affairs. In general Pitt was obliged to exercise his power of dismissal

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 210 : Fox to Bedford, November 2, 1756 ; Fox to Sackville, November 4 : *Hist. MSS. Comm., Ninth Rep.*, part iii. p. 11 f.

most cautiously, as he had but few candidates for the appointments thus vacated.<sup>1</sup> The number of those at his disposal was further diminished by the fact that his nominees were obliged to seek re-election to Parliament, and that their prospects in many cases were not particularly favourable. Pitt himself, who had represented the family borough of the Duke of Newcastle, was forced to look for another seat. Under these circumstances Fox and Newcastle had little difficulty in retaining a number of their friends in office. Lord Granville remained president of the privy council, Lord Halifax first lord of the board of trade, Lord Barrington secretary of war, while even the military paymaster was left undisturbed. Fox and Newcastle were also able to introduce new officials from the number of their adherents. Thus Lord Gower became keeper of the privy seal, and Hardwicke's son, Charles Yorke, solicitor-general. Even the Duke of Bedford, the confidential friend of Fox, shortly afterwards became lord-lieutenant of Ireland. Another alien personality thus entered the government. He himself had little inclination for the honour, but the ambition of his wife induced him to consent. The following members of the late government retired absolutely: Newcastle, Hardwicke, Lord Anson, Fox, and George Lyttelton, though their fate was made as light as possible by the favours of the king, who bestowed upon them pensions, expectations of office, or honours. Thus Sir George became a peer with the title of Baron Lyttelton and entered the House of Lords. Since his rupture with Pitt he had continued to support the ministry, and had made no overtures to his former friend. It was not likely that he felt any moral objection to the means which Pitt employed, the true nature of which was clear to him. He had himself acted very similarly at an earlier period. But the methods of his old companion were too bold for him to follow. Moreover, his literary interests were still strong, and an enforced period of leisure in these tempestuous times was by no means displeasing to him.

The Duke of Newcastle resigned his office on November 11, after occupying various ministerial posts for no less than twenty-five years. During that period his income had de-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, ii. 263 and 270 ff. The difficulties of forming the cabinet are evidenced by *Chatham Papers*, p. 186 ff.

creased from £30,000 to £13,000,<sup>1</sup> chiefly owing to the system of corruption and patronage by which he had continually maintained his position. He was naturally able to represent this as a great sacrifice to the welfare of the state, and foreign ambassadors expressed their admiration of his disinterestedness,<sup>2</sup> the more so as he asked for no compensation upon his retirement, but contented himself with a dukedom for his nephew, Lord Lincoln, and some marks of favour for his immediate relations and helpers. His friend, Lord Hardwicke, delivered the great seal into the king's hands on the 19th; the lord chancellorship being vacant, the seal was entrusted to a commission of lawyers. Pitt took over the seals on December 4.

An attempt to discover the central points in this labyrinth of intrigues and negotiations, of which I have tried to give a clear and connected narrative, an attempt, that is, to discover the actual forces which raised Pitt to power, will show two main factors of which Pitt was ready to avail himself, as indeed he avowed: these were the pressure of public opinion and the favour of the heir-apparent.

Reports of disaster from the various seats of war, and the unusual complication of the political situation, had made the nation deeply despondent for the future, and aroused a profound mistrust of the leading ministers. The inevitable result was a call for a man to save the country. Every important personality was already actively employed in the conduct of affairs, but no one was able to stem the tide of disaster, while all were more or less compromised by actual mistakes or mutual accusations. Granville was still suffering under the reproaches which had formerly been levelled against his ministerial conduct; Chesterfield and Bedford were alike responsible for the ill success of the Austrian War of Succession, as were Cumberland, Newcastle, Fox, and Lord Anson for the latest disasters, and for the generally unfortunate character of the

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, ii. 272.

<sup>2</sup> The Bavarian ambassador Haslang to his ministry, November 12, 1756: 'Je suis très persuadé que ce nouveau ministère ne saurait être de grande durée, et qu'on sera obligé de revenir au Duc de Newcastle. Ce ministre qui a sacrifié plus de la moitié de son bien dans un service de trente ans, n'a demandé d'autre recompence que le titre de Duc pour son neveu et héritier. . . . Sa droiture et son désintéressement feront toujours son éloge.'—Confidential Miscellaneous (copies of letters) Public Record Office.

whole situation. There was but one man who had never been admitted to the government, and who had always been the severest critic of other men's policies, and this was William Pitt. Thus it was inevitable that the public should regard him as the only capable man and as their destined saviour, who had been excluded from the government by incapable ministers, simply because they were convinced of his superiority to themselves. This view was not entirely incorrect. It was true that Newcastle's jealousy had been the main obstacle to Pitt's advancement. It was no less true that Pitt was an unusually energetic and clever character, but his mode of self-advertisement did not justify the great confidence which the nation reposed in him. The mob-oratory with which he rejected the measures of the government upon inadequate proof, and advanced his own very disputable plans as infallible, the want of logical power in his speeches, and worse defects than want of logic, could not fail to repel such competent judges as George Lyttelton and Lord Mansfield. Pitt, however, had calculated upon the fact that the mass of the people, whose influence in the present situation was enormous, were not capable of judgment. He came before them in the character they wished to see, and to which they were prepared to give their confidence, a character as unlike as possible to the ministers in power, as full as possible of new ideas, which, whether they would stand examination or not, secured the approval of the people as a whole. When he was once in power it did not matter what measures he adopted or whether he remained faithful to his former principles, provided and provided only that he was successful. It would then be possible for him gradually to bridge the gulf which he had opened between himself and the government he had defeated, and follow in their steps so far as he thought advisable.

Pitt was supported also by the heir-apparent. We have seen how Pitt strove to gain his favour and how Newcastle frustrated this object. There was, however, no permanent breach between Pitt and Bute, and he was largely helped by the fact that he was regarded as a favourite at Leicester House. It is impossible to prove any direct co-operation of Bute in the course of the negotiations between the parties, but when the Devonshire ministry was in process of formation, Bute was a frequent participant in the discussions and negotia-



tions, and gave undisguised expression to the interest taken by the young court in the new government.<sup>1</sup> Many were thus silenced who would gladly have opposed the new order of things, and thus alone was it possible for the new ministers to undertake the task of government, notwithstanding their scanty credit in Parliament; none the less, the only justification for so desperate a venture was a change for the better in the war. Pitt thus found a hard task before him. For the first time in his life it was his business, not only to speak, but also to act and to relieve the state of its heavy anxieties, a task in which much fell to the part of fortune. We have now to show how far he succeeded.

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 191 ff.

## CHAPTER III

### FUNDAMENTAL MEASURES

THE news of Pitt's promotion excited general delight throughout the kingdom. Both the opponents of the previous ministry, the so-called oligarchy, and all who were dissatisfied with existing conditions and with the plutocratic system of government, loudly expressed their satisfaction.<sup>1</sup> Together with a spirit of morality and patriotism there was also selfishness. The fleet and the army thought that Pitt's government would clear their road to fame and honour, the clergy already saw themselves relieved of the burden of governmental patronage, the city merchants looked for the removal of foreign restrictions and rivalry, while Leicester House hoped to exercise a decisive power through Pitt, whom they regarded as their adherent; the tories, who had been long excluded from the government, were ready to support a man whom they considered the champion of free elections, and thus of their own interests. They hurried up from all quarters of the kingdom to take their seats in both Houses of Parliament and to share in the struggle against the old order of things. Those forces, by means of which Robert Walpole had formerly been overthrown, though to the grievous disappointment of the victors, now placed themselves at the disposal of the man who had founded his reputation upon his unbounded opposition to Walpole and his system. On this occasion they believed themselves secure of their object, for Newcastle and his party, who had formerly robbed them of the fruits of victory, had now been driven out by Pitt.

Yet most of these desires and hopes were alike vain and premature. The king was still alive and had not the least intention of changing his old methods of government or of

<sup>1</sup> Glover, p. 71 f.

throwing himself into the arms of a party who regarded his private interests with coldness and indifference, if not with hostility. The Parliament and the whole of the administration was still entangled in the meshes of corruption, which was far too widespread for an individual statesman to destroy, however advantageous his position. Such a task could only be achieved by means of a long period of pioneering work and by extensive changes in the governmental and electoral systems. Pitt was utterly incapable of accomplishing the work he was supposed to have in hand, for the reason that, as we have seen, he was not master of the situation and was confronted by a number of divergent or opposition forces which he could not disregard, while he could only expect a majority in Parliament so long as he confined himself to the business of guiding the ship of state safely through the rapids into which it had been drawn.

Pitt's chief difficulties arose from the fact that he had made, while in opposition, a large number of promises, or had given rise to hopes which he now found it difficult to fulfil.<sup>1</sup> Among these was the demand for an investigation of the conduct of the previous government, by which he alienated many of his colleagues; there was the task of the re-elections and of bringing government influence to bear, by which he was forced to undermine his own position; there was the business of sending home the foreign troops, a dangerous undertaking in view of the possibility of fresh attempts at invasion. Even if the projected militia bill should be passed and the national powers of defence correspondingly increased, a considerable time would necessarily elapse before the practical effect of the bill brought security against any attack. An unusually dangerous question was the Hanoverian policy, upon which he had publicly pledged his word with unusual firmness. In fact his position was extraordinarily difficult. He was, so to speak, riding two horses who were pulling against one another and must at all costs be kept together.<sup>2</sup> The favour of the nation

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 536: G. Lyttelton to his brother, November 25, 1756.

<sup>2</sup> Colloredo to Kaunitz, November 26, 1756: 'So far as can be seen, the first Parliamentary debates will be comparatively peaceful. But if attempts should be made to change methods of administration and to strike out new paths, opposition will certainly be offered by the members of the former ministry . . . and their adherents in Parliament.'—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

had secured his promotion, but upon the condition that he carried out certain reforms. The king had confirmed his promotion under pressure of public opinion, but again upon condition that he should not carry out these reforms, or at any rate not in their entirety. Too many innovations would lose him the king's favour, besides being productive of other inconveniences damaging to his position; disinclination to change would alienate the favour of his admirers, and the old oligarchy might then proceed to action without fear. The only safe course was a compromise which would not produce excessive disappointment on the one side nor excessive animosity on the other; meanwhile Pitt might use his post as minister to strengthen his general position. He might consolidate his power by gaining increased favour with the king, with whom he was now in constant personal intercourse, and also by showing himself indispensable through his capable conduct of the war. Such, then, is the programme that we have to watch during Pitt's tenure of office, though a grievous hindrance to its fulfilment was the miserable condition of his health, which continued throughout this critical period, a fact which deserves special mention. Had he not at this moment been tormented with the gout for months at a time, he might have been able to secure a permanency in the new arrangements which would have greatly modified the course of his later career.

At this moment, however, Pitt was able to carry out the final steps of his entry to office. The opening of Parliament was appointed for December 2, before the announcement of the ministerial appointments, in order that the new ministers might be able to appear as members of the House. The speech from the throne was composed by Pitt and his friends, and thus early some small friction arose with the king, who returned the draft for abbreviation.<sup>1</sup> The most important point of the speech was the recommendation of a militia bill and the consequent return of the foreign troops to their own country.<sup>2</sup> According to custom, the authors of the speech from the throne also drew up the addresses in reply for both Houses. Pitt undertook the address for the Commons and

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs of George II.*, ii. 276.

<sup>2</sup> For this and the following cp. Glover, p. 75 f.; Waldegrave, p. 89 f.; *Grenville Papers*, i. 182; and Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 542 f.



Devonshire that for the Lords. The duke neglected to consult Lord Temple, Pitt's confidential adviser in the House of Lords, and a passage found its way into the address which was likely to arouse some opposition. The House expressed its thanks to the king for the employment of the foreign troops in the protection of its own coasts, and thus gave its approval to a measure of the former government which Pitt and his friends had opposed, though not indeed in accordance with the wishes of the people. Temple was confined to his bed with fever, and as soon as he heard of this passage he flew into a violent temper, chiefly for the reason that he had not been consulted. It would, in any case, have been easy to devise some form of words satisfactory to both parties. He immediately wrote to the duke, explaining the inadmissible nature of the clause, and announcing his intention of appearing at the debate, whatever his state of health, in order to oppose the address. He asserted that action of this kind would lead to the dissolution of the new government, as he at least was not inclined to continue a member of a government with which he could not agree upon principle. The duke replied that it was too late to make any change, and thus the very first measure of the new government was productive of friction.

Immediately upon the opening of Parliament on December 2, the speech from the throne was read, and the two Houses proceeded to discuss their replies. In the House of Commons Pitt proposed the address in a very moderate speech. He avoided any attack upon the previous government, leaving all criticism of their measures to the coming investigation, and regarding assertions as futile before that decision was known. He admitted that to send back the Hanoverian troops would create a gap in the forces of the country, which some effort would be required to fill, an observation which might be regarded as expressing some approval of their employment in England. In contrast to one of his friends, who had boasted of the enormous military power of England, Pitt dwelt upon the inadequacy of the navy and the dangerous strength of the French fleet. Great was the difference between this and his former speeches. It was obvious that the opposition member who explained and contorted facts to suit party interests had given way to the responsible minister who was obliged to take

his stand upon the firm basis of truth and to avoid extremes. The address was adopted without difficulty.

In the House of Lords the angry Temple, who was unable forthwith to abandon his habits of opposition, actually appeared in a miserable state of health, with blisters on his neck, to oppose the new leader of the ministry of which he was himself a member. He asserted that the people were wounded by the very mention of the Hanoverian soldiers or of any foreign mercenaries, and that such expressions as these would arouse suspicion that there was to be no general change of measures, with the result that the prevailing union would be disturbed. This announcement by no means corresponded with the conciliatory attitude of Pitt, who was prepared to give some countenance to the Hanoverian policy, and was far from contemplating an absolute change. 'Heaven save us from our friends,' he may well have thought at that moment. Temple's action produced no effect, for immediately after his speech he was forced to return to bed, and the address was adopted without opposition. His outburst had been nothing more than a somewhat clumsy demonstration.

More serious, however, was the next turn of affairs. The king was anxious that the answer of the Commons should contain a similar expression of thanks, and returned their reply for the alteration to be made. This, however, was more than Pitt could bear. Such action would, on the one hand, have contradicted his express principles, and would, on the other, have been regarded as a personal defeat. He therefore boldly declared that he was prepared not only to oppose any attempt of the kind, but also to decline the seals if such an attempt were made. Lord Granville now intervened, and succeeded in inducing the king to give way. However, the circumstance was not calculated to inspire confidence in the new ministry, as it had already brought to the surface certain lines of cleavage in the constitution of Pitt's party.

Shortly after these events Parliament was prorogued that the ministerial appointments might be made and the consequent elections carried through. On December 4 Pitt appeared before the king and received the seals and keys from his hands. His malady then overcame him for a considerable period, and on the seventh he was forced to take the oath in his own house. The protocol upon the point

was, however, dated from St. James's.<sup>1</sup> He thus lost his parliamentary seat, which he had hitherto owed to Newcastle's favour. There was no prospect of his success at Aldborough, which had elected him in 1754, and it was therefore necessary to find another seat. No doubt he would have been successful at Bath in view of his extraordinary popularity, but there was no vacancy for him at this moment. From November 16 he was in constant communication with Dr. Ayscough, who had been largely involved in electioneering business from the time of Prince Frederick onwards.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Ayscough undertook to secure the seat of Oakhampton, which had been vacated by George Lyttelton's promotion to the House of Lords. The attempt proved successful. On December 3 the mayor, Henry Luxmoore, whose family had defeated Ayscough's candidate in 1747 by declaring for Lyttelton, offered the vacant seat to the new secretary of state,<sup>3</sup> and the election in Pitt's favour followed. Dr. Ayscough probably intended to gain some return for this kindness, for we find that he repeatedly petitioned Pitt for posts at a later period, including a request for the bishopric of Norwich in 1761.

Thus far all obstacles had been smoothed away, and Pitt's administration might now have begun its work if his activity had not been impeded by his illness. On December 6 he gathered the most important members of Parliament at his house, but was unable on the next day to be present at a meeting of his friends and supporters.<sup>4</sup> It was not until December 14 that he was able to receive the foreign ambassadors for the first time.<sup>5</sup>

Although Pitt had been appointed secretary of state for foreign affairs, yet not even as such was he entrusted with the entire conduct of foreign policy. As we have often noticed, there were two principal secretaries of state, of whom one took charge of the relations with northern and the other of

<sup>1</sup> Bancroft, *History of the Revolution in America* (Kretzschmar's translation), i. 197.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Congratulatory letter from Ayscough to Pitt.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>4</sup> H. Digby to Lord Digby, December 7, 1756: 'Mr. Pitt had all the considerable people of the House of Commons at his house the night before the meeting at the Cockpit, and was to have been at the Cockpit, but as he was not well enough, Mr. Legge went and made his excuse.'—*Hist. MSS. Comm.*

<sup>5</sup> The Danish ambassador Rantzau to the minister Bernstorff, December 14, 1756.—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

those with southern states. The line of demarcation was, geographically speaking, somewhat vague; the whole of Germany, including Austria, belonged to the northern department, and to the southern, France and the southern states, English and Irish affairs, together with India and the colonies; as a matter of fact, there was a certain distinction between these groups which made their separate treatment less impracticable than might appear. Relations with the so-called northern states concerned almost exclusively continental interests and those of the Baltic Sea. States like Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden had either no fleets, or else small ones, intended only for inland seas, and these took little or no part in the great questions of transmaritime policy.<sup>1</sup> The central point of consideration here was Hanover, which as a member of the empire was in connection with Austria and the German states, with Prussia as her neighbour and with the Scandinavian states through Denmark. Even Russia was influenced by Hanover, as we have seen, in the effort to secure her interests. To these were added various questions arising from trade in the north, which were especially important to English maritime affairs on account of the naval material thence imported. Hence, upon the whole, the northern department was chiefly occupied with the business of the continental states. On the other hand, the secretary for the south was in correspondence with the great sea powers, France, Spain, Portugal, and with the Mediterranean states, that is to say, with all those countries whose interests might touch England, either upon the sea or in countries over seas. To this category belonged the states of the Apennine and Balkan peninsulas, for the Mediterranean became steadily more important to England as her colonial empire grew. Thus the energies of this minister were chiefly concentrated upon questions of naval and colonial policy. Holland alone was apparently misplaced in consequence of this division, for, though a highly important colonial power, it was assigned to the northern secretary. There was some justification for this, as during the last century Holland had been constantly involved in England's continental wars, while the two powers had steadily diverged upon points of transmaritime policy.

Granted that this division of foreign affairs was practically

<sup>1</sup> Fitzmaurice, *Life of Shelburne*, ii. 1.



possible, and to some extent justifiable, it cannot be denied that the system might involve many inconveniences. Notwithstanding its various branches, foreign policy is a whole, the different threads of which are constantly crossing, and can only be conducted by two ministers when they are in close connection with one another. Such connection for the most part existed, and it was a rare occurrence for two secretaries of state to strike out independent lines of action. Either they worked in co-operation, though provision for this was difficult, or one became so preponderant over the other as to throw his colleague into the shade. This was the case with Robert Walpole and his colleagues, and more or less with Newcastle and his subordinates; again, the prime minister might direct the two secretaries, as Newcastle did, or attempted to do, when he had taken over the treasury. Finally, in cases of dispute, it was always possible to appeal to the members of the cabinet. Constitutionally they formed a final court of appeal, though it might be questionable whether the Parliament or the political situation would allow them to enforce their decision upon ministers to whom they were opposed.

In the case before us, Pitt's object was to gain absolute command. For this purpose he should have taken the northern department, for the king was inclined to go his own way upon questions of continental policy, and thus to cross the path of his prime minister; this would not be the case if the minister himself were responsible for the policy in question. It was perfectly possible to leave the business of the southern department in other hands, as the king's private interests were not here concerned, and the minister in charge would have been forced to move within the limits marked out for him. Such an arrangement Pitt had been unable to secure. He had been obliged to take the southern department and leave the northern to Lord Holderness, which implied a defeat for himself. The arrangement had indeed this advantage, that for measures which were necessary and which promoted Hanoverian interests, while conflicting with his former assertions, he could not be made entirely responsible; on the other hand, much might be undertaken and dexterously carried out without open opposition to him. As a matter of fact, Holderness, who represented the king's interests, acted in comparative independence for German policy, and continued this course

undisturbed even after Pitt's resignation, though as long as Pitt was in office Holderness consulted him upon important points. Pitt was then able, with his usual dexterity, to persuade Parliament of the necessity of what was done or demanded.

In his own department it was not difficult for him to work upon parallel lines, for apart from the colonies the business was comparatively light. Since the outbreak of war, diplomatic relations with France had ceased to exist, while the Mediterranean states were involved to a very small extent, and could be easily handled in isolation. Thus Spain alone remained, and here the lines to be adopted were plainly marked out by circumstances. There was thus no obvious reason for difference between the two secretaries. Pitt, however, did not regard diplomatic activity as his main task, or as the main occupation of his time and his powers. His real profession, for which he had long yearned, and upon which he thought he could now enter, was the conduct of the war. He hoped at least to be able to give full exercise to his military capacity and knowledge. The question now arose, How far had he a constitutional right to undertake this work?

In theory the conduct of the war belonged to the secretary of war, an office filled for the moment by Lord Barrington. This official, who was usually not a member of the cabinet, could not act independently, but was obliged to obey the orders of the state secretary in whose district the seat of war might lie. This state secretary instructed the commanders upon their general action, while the secretary of war was merely an executive official for the details of administration. Hence Holderness would have the German war in his hands, though not without Pitt's control, while Pitt conducted the struggles in the colonies.

As regards the naval war the position was different. The lord high admiral was a post that had long been vacant, and had been put into commission with one member acting as first lord; it was a cabinet office, and therefore independent. The first lord sent out orders to his admirals, though in agreement with the ideas of the prime minister. This arrangement again might have caused inconvenience to Pitt as regards German affairs, had not the occupant of the office been his brother-in-law, Temple. Temple was so imbued with his

ideas, and so completely in harmony with his views, that he was able to continue his work even during his friend's illness, and Pitt had no reason to apprehend any divergence from his own intentions. In considering the fresh vigour now inspired into the naval policy of the country, Temple's influence must not be underestimated. At any rate, responsibility for failures was afterwards thrown primarily upon him by his opponents.<sup>1</sup> It was chiefly his boundless activity which enabled Pitt's ministry to exist in view of the illness of its chief, who could neither appear before the king nor the Parliament during the early months, but it was also he who wounded the king's feelings and undermined the government's power by his domineering and over-confident action.

Such was the balance of power in the new ministry. Though the treasury had fallen to the Duke of Devonshire, Pitt had the practical leadership of the whole in his hands, and only upon matters of German policy was he forced to make any concession. His personal efforts were concentrated, apart from diplomatic correspondence with the southern countries, upon the organisation of the colonial struggle, while in naval matters he was supported by the help and sympathy of Lord Temple.

As regards income, Pitt was not so well off in his new office as he had been as paymaster.<sup>2</sup> He had a salary of £1850, with £830 for extraordinary expenses. On the other hand secret service money to the extent of £3000 a year was at his disposal. With these funds he had to meet all the expenses of his ministry, though he had many subsidiary sources of income.

No sooner had the government been installed than a new spirit of activity inspired the harbours and arsenals of the empire. Fleets had to be fitted out for various parts of the world, for North America and the West Indian Islands, and for the protection of the East Indian colonies. Before examining the administration of the admiralty, it will be advisable to devote some space to a comparison of the English and French marine, which will facilitate our task of explaining the measures of the admiralty and the events of the war.

Notwithstanding her scanty population, England had

<sup>1</sup> Reports of the Prussian embassy, April 19, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Chatham MSS.

brought her fleet at the outset of the eighteenth century to a higher level of efficiency than that of any other state, not excluding France. The defence of the country, however, was not thereby so entirely secured as might be supposed in view of the present-day situation. At that period a fleet could not provide such security; ships depending upon wind for their propulsion cannot meet at definite points at stated times. We have already seen how great a value was placed upon the land forces for coast protection; the fleet existed chiefly for foreign enterprise, for participation in continental wars, and for the protection and extension of the colonial empire. The sea power was therefore rather an offensive than a defensive force. England needed more ships than other states, simply because ships were the only means that would enable her to carry out her enterprises. Hence the efficiency of the fleet increased considerably when William III. and Anne took a larger share in continental policy and in the European wars of their period. Developments after that date were somewhat remarkable.<sup>1</sup> The condition of the fleet was marked neither by degeneration nor by stagnation, but by progress extremely slow as compared with former and later periods. From 1714 to 1752 the number of ships advanced from 247 to 291, 44 ships being thus added in 38 years, while from 1752 to 1760 the numbers increased from 291 to 412, an addition of 121 in 8 years. The tonnage, which is a better standard of progress, rose in the first period from 167,219 to 234,924, an increase of 67,705; and in the second period from 234,924 to 321,105, an advance of 86,181. Thus during the first period an addition was made only of 1782 tons, and in the second of 10,773 tons. The difference is still more striking if we consider the number of guns, and is not merely to be explained by the fact that the second period chiefly embraces years spent in warfare and preparation for war, for great wars also took place in the first period, which must have necessitated strong naval reinforcements; we are reduced to conclude that during the first period sea power must have been a neglected and unappreciated force. For us the important point is, however, that increased activity did not begin with Pitt's appointment as secretary of state; so early as August 1756 we find that the numbers of the fleet

<sup>1</sup> Ad. Fr. Geisler, *Gesch. u. Zust. der Königl.-Grossbrit. Kriegsmacht*, Halle, 1784; Chatham MSS.; reports of Prussian embassy.



had risen to 345 from the 291 to which it amounted in 1752.<sup>1</sup> Hence we must conclude that the increase was due, not to the influence of the prime minister, but to the pressure of foreign affairs. As soon as war with France threatened, and especially after the Mediterranean preparations against Minorca were begun, the dockyards must have shown extraordinary activity, for 125 ships of war were fitted out and upon service in August, whereas in April only 87 were mentioned as fit for service. Hence Newcastle and Anson cannot be accused of carelessness in this respect. As soon as they recognised the danger they did their best to secure complete superiority at sea. The difference between their action and the course followed by Pitt and Temple lies in the mode of employing the fleet, which we shall examine later.

The French fleet<sup>2</sup> could no longer compare with the English in point of size. Under Louis xiv. the numbers had been almost equal. The French king had then at his disposal no less than 277 warships, including over 100 ships of the line, to the equipment and completion of which seven arsenals and artillery departments were devoted. Since that date, however, the French sea power had grievously decayed. In the year 1747 the number of ships of the line had sunk to 31, at any rate according to English sources of information, as no statement is to be found in French records. Then began a gradual improvement, and at the outset of the war 66 ships of the line and 76 other vessels were able to take the sea, though not entirely equipped for action. Of these three men-of-war were lost in the engagement with Boscawen off Newfoundland before the declaration of war, and during the war itself the French losses were incomparably greater than the English. Moreover, the French equipment was far less efficient than that of their opponents; while the British arsenals were fully supplied with all necessities for the fleet, the French were lamentably deficient, though much improvement had been introduced since 1754 by the energetic naval minister Machault. Under these circumstances we cannot fail to feel some surprise

<sup>1</sup> The Chatham MSS. provide a detailed account of the naval strength, the numbers of the crews, and the distribution of the ships from October 1755 to August 1756 for every month.

<sup>2</sup> Lapeyrouse-Bonfils, *Histoire de la marine française*, Paris, 1845; reports of Knyphausen from Paris.—Berlin Archives.

at the respect with which the French fleet was regarded in England, as even Pitt observed in the speech from the throne, an impression that was increased both by the ill success of Byng and also by another event in this year. On May 17 an engagement took place off Rochefort between two French frigates and an English frigate and battleship, and the battleship was forced to retire after firing 1300 shots.<sup>1</sup> It can hardly be denied that the French sailors were better disciplined, and that their gunners were better shots. This advantage resulted from the French method of conscription; the English enlistment and pressgang methods produced crews of greatly inferior *moral*, though the extensive trans-maritime trade of England provided a far wider school for the acquisition of seamanship and naval experience.

We have now to examine on what principles Pitt's ministerial procedure was based, and how he developed his plans for the coming campaign.

The difference apparent between his present action and the principles he had formerly enounced is to be ascribed primarily to the greater accuracy of the information now at his command, information which no mere member of the opposition could procure, and which a minister could not venture to reveal to his opponents without strong reason. So far as we know, reports came into him from two quarters: from the former Prussian ambassador in Paris, Baron von Knyphausen, who had been obliged to resign his post in September 1756, and now communicated his observations to Sir Andrew Mitchell, the English ambassador at the Prussian court,<sup>2</sup> and also from an unnamed agent in Paris, two detailed reports from whose pen have come down to us.<sup>3</sup>

The references in these reports to German affairs will be discussed later. The immediate point at issue is the information thence acquired by Pitt concerning the maritime and colonial intentions of France. It was from Knyphausen that he received the first information of a projected attack upon Madras, and of the preparations for a great expedition with this object, which was to be placed under the command of

<sup>1</sup> Knyphausen's report of May 28, 1756.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Mitchell to Holderness, December 9, 1756; *Chatham Papers*, i. 206 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS. The reports are undated, but the date is obvious from the contents. They belong, at the latest, to January 1757.

Count Lally. This news must have induced Pitt to hasten the despatch of the East India squadron. He also learnt from the same source that half of the French fleet was stationed at Brest and Rochefort and the other half at Toulon and elsewhere; that isolated ships were constantly sailing with troops to America, starting from unimportant harbours, which commanders of the English squadrons were inclined to neglect. Thus it was necessary not only to blockade those great arsenals to prevent the exit of the enemy's fleets, but also to organise a more effective supervision of the whole Atlantic coast. For this purpose it was necessary to reduce the number of ships in home waters, and so to weaken the defence of the country, though further news seems to have relieved the prevailing anxiety on this account.

Knyphausen asserted that their successes in Minorca and America had inspired the French with a spirit of enterprise, and induced them to consider any project as within their reach; at the same time he expresses the opinion that any attempt at invasion was extremely unlikely. To throw a large force of 50,000 men into England would be a difficult and lengthy business, and no decisive result could be obtained with any smaller number. Marshal Belleisle, who had most strongly urged that concentration of troops at Boulogne, which had roused great excitement in England in the spring, declared that such attempts had been abandoned. He had informed Knyphausen confidentially, before the friendly relations of Prussia with France had been disturbed, that he would support a project of invasion only in the last resort, when it might be necessary at any cost to occupy England's power for a time in order to procure a breathing space elsewhere.

This view is discussed with closer reference to facts in one of the above-mentioned reports. Full details are given of the strength of the French army and of all the reinforcements added in the last year, and the troops required for the different seats of war were specified in accordance with the orders already issued. 'On this calculation,' continues the writer, '160,000 regular troops are on service; there remain about 40,000 men for garrison duty from Sedan to the Swiss frontier on the east, for Roussillon and Guienne on the south, apart from Flanders and the coast. We estimate that 20,000 men will be wanted for the line from St. Valerie to

Bergue (about the Pas de Calais), so that we have every reason to suppose that for the line from St. Valerie to Bordeaux (north-west and west) not more than 10,000 men will be available.' Under these circumstances the writer considers it impossible that the French government would hazard an army corps in an attempt at invasion, the more so as they required all the money they could raise for the enterprises in hand, and had very few ships of war available for the convoy of a transport fleet. These conditions would not be altered by the mobilisation of the militia, as the writer afterwards attempts to prove. Even if some small corps could be carried across, it would soon be in great difficulties as regards supplies, and might easily be kept in check by a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men with some cavalry regiments. Thus the sum and substance of his explanation amounts to this, that the invasion of England was made impossible by the organisation of an army intended for Germany. He showed that notwithstanding the quarrel between the German powers and the changes in the relations of the allied powers, the main strength of France would be turned, as before, from England upon Germany, which indeed had always been England's chief desire and the real reason for her alliance with Hanover.

This news confirmed Pitt in his resolve to leave the task of protecting the home shores to the land army and to the militia, and to place no limitation upon the employment of the fleet. The strength of the various squadrons was in August 1756 as follows :—<sup>1</sup>

	Ships of the line.	Frigates.	Other armed Vessels.
West Indies and North America,	32	22	26
East India, . . . . .	8	4	—
Home Waters, . . . . .	25	20	30
French Coasts and Bay of Biscay,	31	17	40
Mediterranean, . . . . .	29	16	30
Total, . . . . .	<u>125</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>126</u>

Of these ships the Mediterranean squadron under Admiral Hawke and the Atlantic detachment under Admiral Boscawen returned home at the beginning of November, as no provision had been made for wintering at their posts, a difficult under-

<sup>1</sup> Chatham MSS.



taking in any case.<sup>1</sup> Hence, when Pitt received this news of the intentions of the French government, he had at hand a very important force of some sixty ships of the line, together with their attendant frigates and some smaller vessels, which he could distribute over the world in accordance with his plans. He began, in accordance with a determination of the cabinet on December 27,<sup>2</sup> by despatching in January a detachment of four ships of the line under Admiral Stevens to the East Indies. In the middle of January his relation, Admiral Temple West, a cousin of Grenville, who had distinguished himself at Minorca under Byng, was sent out from Portsmouth with eleven ships to Port l'Orient with orders to intercept the French fleet sailing to the East Indies.<sup>3</sup> No new forces were sent to the Mediterranean, as both Pitt's predecessor and he himself were in receipt of information from that quarter which made the despatch of any further squadrons appear unnecessary.<sup>4</sup>

Lord Tyrawly, who was in command at Gibraltar, sent news towards the end of August that the French did not propose to make any use of Minorca, but were merely dismantling the fortifications, content with having wrested it from England's grasp. He also describes Gibraltar as a desolate post of no military value by reason of its configuration, and not worth any special attention. 'I take it,' he wrote to Pitt on February 1, 1757, 'to be a matter of great indifference to our neighbours by sea or land, whether we are at Gibraltar or settled upon the Eddystone in respect of the use this place is of to us or hurt to them, since we have made public proclamation to all Europe of the first, by sending for Sir Edward Hawke's squadron home to clean, because we could not do it here (in Gibraltar).' Thus that Mediterranean policy, for which Pitt's predecessors had been so bitterly reproached, was continued with even greater persistency during his ministry. He also neglected the important English possession in that sea, and even began to entertain projects of exchanging it for something else.

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, November 2, 1756.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, January 15, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>4</sup> Tyrawly to Fox, August 27 and September 20, 1756; to Pitt, February 1, 1757.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 202 ff., 217 ff.

The most important expedition was, however, that despatched to America. In a cabinet council of December 16, in which Pitt took part, it was resolved that a force of 8000 infantry, accompanied by an adequate fleet, should be sent to North America, and part of it, 2000 men strong, directly to Halifax, as soon as the necessary instructions could be issued.<sup>1</sup> In consequence, a squadron of 16 ships of the line, 4 fire-ships, and 50 transport vessels was fitted out and placed under the command of Admiral Holburne.<sup>2</sup> However, the equipment of the vessels and the mobilisation of the troops required much time, and as it was thought advisable to await the more favourable season for sailing, the departure of the force was considerably delayed.

Apart from these various squadrons, two more were despatched under Rear-Admiral Cotes and Commodore Moore, to convoy the merchantmen between England and the West Indies.<sup>3</sup> The productive trade with the Antilles, which was connected with the trade from the Spanish colonies, was to be preserved under any conditions, even during the continuance of the war.

The force which Holburne was to carry to America contained material which had hitherto never been employed in colonial warfare. To six regiments of the line were added two battalions of Scottish Highlanders.<sup>4</sup> These warlike people had hitherto displayed a persistent hostility to the Hanoverian dynasty, and the idea of enlisting them in the king's service and securing their loyalty to the existing government, while using their military strength, was no new one. The loyalist Duke of Argyle had broached the idea shortly after the rebellion of 1745,<sup>5</sup> but had met with no encouragement. In 1756 the project was again laid before the Duke of Cumberland, perhaps by Argyle, whose advice was at any rate asked in the execution of the idea. When Pitt began his government Cumberland submitted to him anonymously by means of Lord Albemarle this proposal and other military plans, perhaps under the pseudonym of 'Germano-Britan-

<sup>1</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, May 17, 1757.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 271.

<sup>4</sup> *The Whiteford Papers*, ed. Hewins, p. 133. Oxford, 1898.

<sup>5</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, art. Archibald Campbell, third Duke of Argyle.

nicus';<sup>1</sup> several projects of the kind existing among the Chatham MSS. are thus signed. Pitt was favourably impressed by the proposal, and a royal order for enlistment was issued on January 1, in the execution of which excellent service was rendered by Simon Fraser, the son of that Lord Lovat who was executed in 1746.<sup>2</sup> He undertook the command of one battalion and Archibald Montgomery, the brother-in-law of Lord Eglinton, that of the other.

The enlistment proved highly successful, and eventually each battalion was completed with 300 reserves.<sup>3</sup> As some hesitation was felt at bringing these redoubtable warriors into the neighbourhood of the English capital, the Irish town of Cork was made the starting-point of the expedition. Here the regiments of the line were concentrated, while the Scots were to be brought by sea from the Clyde.<sup>4</sup> The arrangement seemed the more advisable, as part of the line regiments were drawn from the Irish army.<sup>5</sup> Eventually the plan was altered for purposes of expediency, and the Scots were ordered to march by land to Port Patrick, whence they were transported to Donaghadee in the north of Ireland. Colonel Richard Lyttelton had been chosen commander-in-chief of the troops, probably at Pitt's desire, but the king declined to appoint him major-general, and this commission was given to his superior, Mr. Hopson,<sup>6</sup> while Holbourne commanded the fleet. A double command of this kind was usual when special expeditions were organised.

It was now of great importance for success in the American struggle that the colonies should themselves take a due share of the burden of the war, and this upon such a principle that uniform leadership might be secured, while the readiness of the colonists to help might be both stimulated and retained. Hitherto the English government had laid chief stress upon the first point. To facilitate the concentration of the military power of the colonies, the chancellor, Hardwicke, had advised

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 268.

<sup>2</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*, art. Sir Archibald Campbell. He commanded a company of Fraser's battalion.

<sup>3</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 242.

<sup>4</sup> Chatham MSS., Barrington to Pitt, March 16, 1757.

<sup>5</sup> Devonshire to Bedford, November 18, 1756.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 215.

<sup>6</sup> Rigby to Bedford, February 3, 1757.—*Ibid.*, ii. 230.

the conferment of exceptional powers upon Lord Loudoun.<sup>1</sup> He had gone out as commander-in-chief of the army in all the provinces, and also as governor of Virginia, the most populous colony; he had then attempted to secure the necessary supplies, war taxes, quarters for the troops, etc., in virtue of this authority, whence continual friction had arisen with the colonial population, with disastrous results to the efficiency of the expedition.

Pitt adopted different methods, for reasons which we shall examine hereafter; he attempted to enter into friendly relations with the provincial governors. Naturally he could not dispense with all provincial contributions, but he was careful not to impose these or to demand them through Loudoun: he preferred to advise the governors to request the necessary supplies from the several governments, and showed an anxiety to proportion the extent of these to the capacity of the respective provinces.<sup>2</sup> No general conclusions can be drawn from this fact concerning his principles of American and colonial government, for at the moment it was primarily important to maintain unity and to secure military help.

On February 4, 1757, a circular was issued to the governors of the northern provinces<sup>3</sup> in which Pitt advised them of the despatch of reinforcements, and requested them to ask their legislative bodies for troops, which were to be at least 'equal to those raised last year in excess of what was necessary for the defence of their own province.' The forces obtained by this means were then to operate under the orders of the commander-in-chief. As regarded the expense, the provinces were to bear the cost of enlistment, pay, arms, and clothing, while the commissariat and other military supplies would be the care of the government, which would organise magazines of stores for this purpose.

A second letter, of February 19,<sup>4</sup> requested the governors to see that Admiral Holburne received full support of every kind in his enterprise, and in particular full news of the enemy's movements. Apart from this the governors were to use all legal forms to enlist a sufficient number of sailors to recruit the fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Bancroft, i. 182 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. Hubert Hall, 'Chatham's Colonial Policy,' *American Historical Review*, v. 659-75.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 269 f.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 270 f.



As regards Pitt's diplomatic activity within the limits of his office, its importance for the moment was very small. The only great task before him was to secure the friendship of Spain, which, as we have seen, had hitherto resisted all the allurements of her opponent. Prospects appeared more favourable at the present moment, as Queen Barbara of Braganza, a Portuguese princess, was in sympathy with England, as also was Don Ricardo Wall, an Irishman by birth, who had recently returned from the Spanish embassy in London to take over the conduct of foreign affairs.<sup>1</sup> He, however, was opposed by the pacific attitude of King Ferdinand, and was obliged to avoid any betrayal of his English sympathies lest he should give his opponents an opportunity of securing his overthrow. Moreover, some small friction occasionally arose from the fact that French privateers were accustomed to find refuge in Spanish harbours. Pitt now attempted to maintain the best possible relations with the Bourbon power; through the ambassador Keene he gave the minister an assurance of his friendly feelings for Spain, and permitted his despatch upon the question to be laid before the king and queen.<sup>2</sup> This was the first step to those later measures which belong to his second secretaryship of state.

Thus we see that Pitt everywhere attempted to initiate a world-wide policy. But before he could build upon these foundations or reach success, a crisis set in which forced him to retire from the scene of action for a short time. To understand this event we have now to turn our attention to Pitt's handling of home and continental affairs, and to his action in Parliament upon these questions.

<sup>1</sup> Lafuente, *Historia general de España*, xiv.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 209.

## CHAPTER IV

### DOMESTIC POLICY AND DISMISSAL

CONTINENTAL affairs, and in particular the interests of Frederick the Great, seem to have suffered considerably from the change of ministry ; the powers of the new government were limited by public opinion and by Pitt's former declarations upon the Hanoverian question, while action was delayed by the process of change and by Pitt's long illness.

In September negotiations had been in full progress.<sup>1</sup> An army of 30,000 German troops from Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick, reinforced by 11,000 Prussians, which Frederick had undertaken to despatch from Pomerania, was to be held in readiness to oppose any French invasion. At Frederick's wish Holderness had given the supreme command to Prince Louis of Brunswick, the leader of the Dutch army. The federation was to be confirmed by further conventions. But in the confusion of English policy and the task of establishing the new government German affairs entered upon a period of complete stagnation. Pitt was ill and able to receive the foreign ambassadors only upon one occasion, December 14, while the other ministers were occupied for a considerable time with the organisation of domestic affairs, with re-elections, the conduct of Parliament, and the distribution of offices.<sup>2</sup> The only measure immediately decided was the despatch of the German troops to their home, as Pitt considered their services no longer necessary ; at the same time, as this might be a lengthy process, measures were taken for the improvement of their maintenance, for which it was now high time.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Waddington, *La guerre de sept ans*, i. 160.

<sup>2</sup> Michel to Frederick the Great, December 14, 1756.—*Politische Korrespondenz*, xiv. 176.

<sup>3</sup> Holderness to Mitchell, December 7, 1756.—Public Record Office.

In the middle of December the government brought forward a proposal in Parliament that the Hessian troops should be quartered upon the citizens until their departure. Pitt sent instructions to Legge and Barrington from his sick-bed, to make it clear that the proposal affected these and no other troops, as otherwise Fox might be able to credit him with the intention of often bringing troops to England thereafter, from which the opposition would be able to make capital.<sup>1</sup>

In the last days of the year Frederick the Great, who grew tired of waiting, began to regard the new minister as his opponent, and repeated his desires in more imperative tones.<sup>2</sup> He said that he could no longer calculate upon help from England, and that he was ready to act for himself by dismantling his fortress of Wesel and confining himself to the defence of his home provinces. The English ministers were thus induced to proceed to action, to begin negotiations for a subsidy treaty with Denmark, and to offer Prussia pecuniary help. Pitt, whose health had improved, now attempted to secure an understanding with King George upon these monetary matters. Through the Hanoverian minister, Münchhausen, he offered him the sum of £300,000 on condition that he would be responsible for the payment of the Hessian troops; however, the king, who had a good head for business, considered it more profitable to content himself with £200,000, and to leave the English exchequer to meet the expenses of the Hessians.

Pitt's sufferings now increased considerably, and on January 19 fears were entertained for his life. It was supposed that his head had been attacked by the malady, although his friends denied that fact, stating that only his feet and one hand were affected.<sup>3</sup> A week later he was able to go out, but he avoided any appearance at court, as the excitement of interviews with the king, of which he had as yet<sup>4</sup> had no more than two, generally affected his state of health.<sup>5</sup> This, however, was not the only reason for the stagnation of English and continental policy. King George had entered upon

<sup>1</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 187 f.

<sup>2</sup> Waddington, p. 173 f.

<sup>3</sup> Rigby to Bedford, January 20, 1757.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 223.

<sup>4</sup> Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 585.

<sup>5</sup> Rigby to Bedford, January 25 and February 3, 1757.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 226 and 230.

another line of policy for protecting his principality from the dangers of war. While Pitt had been unable to transact business his master began negotiations behind his back with Austria, to secure the neutrality of Hanover.<sup>1</sup> It was an artifice that he had used before, in the time of Robert Walpole, but on this occasion it proved unsuccessful. France, the most important party to the agreement, demanded a free passage through the province for her troops against Prussia, a condition to which the king-electors could not agree, as he would thus have delivered his country into the enemy's hands. He had no guarantee that the French would retire if they were once allowed to enter. Moreover, King Frederick in a letter of December 25 had placed before him the attractive prospect of securing the bishoprics of Paderborn and Osnabrück.<sup>2</sup> He therefore preferred to remain faithful to the old alliance.

Hardly had these secret negotiations come to nothing when George communicated the proposals of the hostile powers to the King of Prussia, with an assurance of his loyalty to the alliance,<sup>3</sup> and the question of the defence of the German provinces now came to the front. By the middle of February Pitt felt himself well enough to ask Parliament for the necessary supplies.

Pitt's first appearance as minister in the House of Commons took place on February 17, 1757,<sup>4</sup> two and a half months after his entry upon office; at the opening of Parliament his appointment had not been confirmed. The subject of the debate was the fate of Byng, and Pitt took part in the discussion. He then laid a message from the king upon the table of the House, which was known to contain a request for support for Hanover. The fiercest opponent of the Hanoverian policy then began his ministerial career by laying before the House a request for a subsidy for Hanover, a remarkable change which aroused considerable astonishment at the time. As the Saxon ambassador reports, everybody was greatly interested to see how Pitt's action would be taken by his enemies and by the nation.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Waddington, p. 177 ff.

<sup>2</sup> R. Koser, *König Friedrich der Grosse*, ii. 58 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Holderness to Mitchell, February 8, 1757 (secret).—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, ii. 312 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Wiedmarckter (Saxon ambassador) to Brühl, February 18, 1757.—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.



On February 18 the message was read to the House, that the answer might be discussed. The message ran as follows: <sup>1</sup> 'George R. It is always with reluctance that His Majesty asks any extraordinary supply of his people; but as the united counsels and formidable preparations of France and her allies threaten with the most alarming consequences Europe in general; and as these most unjust and vindictive designs are particularly and immediately bent against His Majesty's electoral dominions and those of his good ally the King of Prussia, His Majesty confides in the experienced zeal and affection of his faithful Commons, that they will cheerfully assist him in forming and maintaining an army of observation for the just and necessary defence and preservation thereof and to enable His Majesty to fulfil his engagements with the King of Prussia for the security of the empire against the irruption of foreign armies, and for the support of the common cause.'

Three points here deserve consideration; in the first place Pitt makes mention of other dangers than those threatening the Electorate, in order that the measure might not appear to be devoted solely to Hanoverian interests; these were dangers which threatened Europe as a whole with changes of territorial distribution or of the balance of power, and the King of Prussia, England's ally, in particular; either consideration affected England more than Hanover. The chief reason for the continuity of continental policy, and for the maintenance of the alliance with Prussia, was the necessity of confining the French army on the eastern frontier; of this Pitt made no mention, and it only became obvious to himself in the light of subsequent events. He further emphasised the obligation under which the Westminster Convention had laid the English government. He had not personally concluded this convention, but had found it existing when he came into office, and if he now fulfilled the conditions of the agreement, he was but carrying out his duty, and could not reasonably be charged with an inconsistent or unpatriotic policy. Nor could such action be regarded as approval of the Convention on his part. Finally Pitt characterised the proposed body of troops as an army of observation rather than as an offensive force. He thus attempted to express the fact that the troops were intended solely to fulfil the Convention, and not for any more

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 286.

extensive operations in furtherance of Hanoverian interests. Their work as a defensive power would begin only if France carried out her plan of invasion and thus provided a *casus foederis*.

Pitt's explanation of this document was thus an effort to excuse his attitude as far as possible and to show its consistency with his former statements.<sup>1</sup> To whatever extent he may have been justified in these efforts, the assembly was not greatly impressed by his arguments, as comparatively few would trouble to grasp their finer points. For those who were prepared to support him it was enough that his reasons should seem tenable, while those who were in opposition would accuse him of apostasy in any case. Pitt abandoned the main point and proceeded to discuss the position of different continental powers in an epigrammatic and rhetorical style. His power of enunciating catchwords was unsurpassed. He said of Maria Theresa that only by the blood and treasure of Great Britain had she been enabled to show her ingratitude to this country; by this he meant that had not England formerly helped her to retain her throne, she could not possibly have now turned upon her helper. He was prudent enough to eulogise King Frederick, for the respect and the friendship which he manifested to that king was calculated to provide a plausible motive for his conversion to the continental policy of Newcastle. We do not mean to imply that these feelings had no real existence or would not have been formed in the course of time; even Hester writes emphatically, '*Your king of Prussia*';<sup>2</sup> Pitt, however, certainly used them for the definite objects to which we have referred. He showed an exaggerated dislike of Russia, characterising her power as feeble, and referring to the poverty of her resources. Assertions of this nature, which needed no accurate proof, but merely bold statement and apposite illustration, were exactly suited to Pitt's genius, and, in the words of the Saxon ambassador, he made a brilliant appearance.

He was supported by Lord George Sackville, who enjoyed high prestige as the son of the king's friend, the Duke of

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs of George II.*, ii. 313; Wiedmarckter to Brühl, February 18.—Confidential Miscellaneous.

<sup>2</sup> Hester to Pitt, November 1757. '*Your king of Prussia's triumph was not what I felt the most sensibly.*'—Chatham MSS.

Dorset, and was afterwards of importance to Pitt's career. He had at first been an opponent of Pitt, but had afterwards joined the Leicester House party and changed his attitude accordingly.<sup>1</sup> He declared that the measure afforded good prospects of success, for instead of expending the subsidies upon petty princes, it was better to hand the money to the King of Prussia, who would be able to make full use of it. More important, however, was the fact that Fox refrained from opposition, though he could not resist the temptation of a small thrust at Pitt. He declared himself as little anxious to provoke altercation as he would be to avoid it if forced upon him; it was sufficient for him that his own part had been consistent (implying that this could not be said of Pitt). He had been told that the German measures of the previous year would be a millstone about the minister's neck; he hoped this German measure would be an ornament about the present minister's neck. Fox thus declined to concur in Pitt's effort to represent the measure as supporting English interests and English policy, but the fact that his opposition was no stronger, and that he agreed to Pitt's proposals, increased the general confidence in the new government. Pitt contented himself with stating that Fox's reflections were but an ugly presage of his kind wishes, and objected to the expression 'minister,' saying that he had neither ministerial powers nor ministerial influence, but only the means of saying 'This I will do, that I will never do.' By this he meant that as regards continental policy he had no real power of initiative, that he could merely approve and carry out the projects of the cabinet council, or secure their subjection by a threat of resignation.

Such being the attitude of the leading characters, Pitt supporting the measure and Fox declining opposition, the adherents of the old government, who were favourably inclined to the plan, were not in the least likely to object. The appointed sum of £200,000 was voted to the king with remarkable unanimity, no single adverse vote being given. It was not a remarkably large grant, as Pitt could not venture to reveal his intentions too entirely to his friends who objected to the Hanoverian policy. However, those behind the scenes were well aware that Pitt had promised the king a regular supply of money for military operations

<sup>1</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 105.

in Germany,<sup>1</sup> and with this prospect in view, the court might well be satisfied with the vote that had now been passed.

Thus Pitt was now committed to that course of action which he had formerly condemned, and the nation was obliged to make the best of the matter. It is not, however, to be supposed that his action was dictated solely by the wish to secure his position and to please the king. He was in possession of information which showed that no other course was possible. The first report from Paris which reached him at the beginning of the year explained, that apart from the 24,000 troops which France was pledged to use on behalf of Austria, she would also invade the lower Rhenish provinces with an army of 60,000 men, capture the fortress of Wesel, march through the Prussian provinces and conquer Hanover. The large supplies of war material in the fortress would facilitate the task of conquering the electorate, and it was hoped that considerable sums of money would be found in Stade, which, with the enormous contributions to be extorted from the province, would cover all the previous and future military expenses incurred by France. It had been stated in the king's council that Hanover was now to be treated as the palatinate had been in the days of Louis xiv., in order that the members of the German empire might understand the danger of insulting France, and be taught to realise her strength. At the same time France proposed to take vengeance on Great Britain for the losses which her subjects had incurred since the outbreak of the struggle. The result would then be that the German allies of England, especially Hesse, would decline to give further help, that the friends of France would come forward in their true colours, and that even Sweden might be drawn into the contest on a promise of the restitution of her old principalities, Bremen and Verden.

Such was the ominous news that Pitt received from reliable sources of information, which, in spite of some obvious exaggera-

<sup>1</sup> Wiedmarckter to Brühl, February 22, 1757: 'On n'a pas voulu demander trop à la fois pour ne pas effrayer le Parlement; mais je sais de bonne part, que le nouveau Ministère a promis au Roi, que l'argent pour les opérations militaires en Allemagne ne manquerait pas. On se contenta d'avoir fait ce premier pas.'—Confidential Miscellaneous.



tions, was clearly in harmony with facts. Under these circumstances it was impossible for him to abide by his old policy and leave Germany to herself. To do this would have been to give the enemy an opportunity of strengthening his financial and military power, and to cut off those sources of continental help on which England could rely. Utterly perverse and impracticable he must have thought his former proposals when he asserted the advisability of indemnifying the king after the war for the losses incurred in Hanover. It was very problematical whether even English wealth would be equal to the task, and whether the war would run so successful a course as to justify any demand for the restitution of the electorate in return for compensation. Pitt's policy upon these continental questions was thus clearly laid down, apart from the considerations dictated by his position as the King's prime minister.

Frederick the Great was highly delighted by Pitt's attitude and by the eulogistic terms of his speech. He had regarded, not without reason, the change of ministry as a blow to his interests and as depreciating the value of the English alliance to himself. Pitt was reputed to be opposed to continental entanglements, and the long hesitation of the English government had seemed to confirm the rumour. Frederick was thus the more delighted to find that not only did the minister support the obligations involved by the treaty, but also paid due recognition to himself. He immediately took steps to improve his personal relations with the minister, which Pitt appreciated for reasons known to us. Through the English ambassador, Mitchell,<sup>1</sup> he expressed his warm thanks for the compliments in Pitt's speech, and assured the minister of his entire confidence in the English government. Pitt's reply was couched in equally hearty terms. In the somewhat extravagant phrasing of the period he expressed his admiration and his readiness to help the great monarch 'who stands, the unshaken bulwark of Europe, against the most powerful and malignant confederacy that ever yet has threatened the independence of mankind.' He requested Mitchell to give the fullest and most suitable expression to his feelings of attachment and admiration for the king. The most remarkable point in this business is the fact that Pitt, like his predecessors, accepted Frederick's

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 224 ff.

interpretation of his desperate position by the emphasis which he laid upon the unworthy objects of the coalition.

Pitt also received a warm expression of thanks from another quarter—which he was equally unable to regard with indifference—the court of the Prince of Wales. The Hanoverian policy was by no means acceptable in this quarter, and some doubts may have been felt upon the attitude of the heir-apparent in view of Pitt's change of policy, which had brought him appreciably nearer to the reigning monarch. A letter from Lord Bute to Pitt on March 2<sup>1</sup> put an end to this uncertainty by its assurance of the continued appreciation of the future ruler and his adherents. Lord Bute wrote that he and his friends had always considered that ideas adopted after mature deliberation, and recognised as the best, the purest, and the noblest, should be pursued in whatever direction the fickle breeze of popular favour might change. He expressed his delight at the approval which Pitt had secured, and declared that had the opposite been the case, the minister would have been entirely consoled by the invariable support and favour of one 'who is some day to reap the fruits of my friend's unwearied endeavours for the public safety.' Thus we find the two men once more upon the best of all possible terms, and it was a matter of high moment for Pitt's future that their friendship at this critical moment was consolidated and not disturbed. How far these compliments were the honest expression of opinion must remain undecided, but their interests at this moment may be assumed to have run upon parallel lines.

The initiation of these operations on the Continent was a matter of which Pitt approved, and which he strove to hasten, though he was not the first efficient cause. Two other projects which were now carried out originated entirely with him: these were the organisation of the militia and the inquiry into the actions of the former ministry. We find, strangely enough, that though Pitt had formerly shown the greatest zeal for these objects, he now seemed comparatively indifferent to their accomplishment at the moment when rapid action might have been expected.<sup>2</sup> These matters were accordingly taken in hand with such dilatoriness that the one was only

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 223 f.

<sup>2</sup> Glover emphasises the blameworthy character of his attitude.—Glover, p. 84.

carried out after Pitt's retirement, and the other not at all. Both projects had been to Pitt only the means to an end. He had used the militia bill to discredit the continental policy of the former government by showing the unnecessary character of that policy, while the threat of an investigation had been intended to arouse the idea that the ministry then in power had a long category of crimes to its account. Now that Pitt's object had been fulfilled, these measures could be thrown into the background, if not entirely laid aside. As regards the militia bill Pitt was comparatively certain that no French invasion was to be feared; if any attempt of the kind were made, the effect of the new militia law would never produce an effective army to meet that crisis. It was thus unnecessary for him to devote his time and his powers to these matters, when many more important questions awaited his decision. The investigations would lead to no result, as many of the former officials had found posts under the new government, which was continuing the policy of its predecessor. However, some show of action was necessary, and the militia bill was therefore brought before the House on January 26 as drafted by George Townshend.<sup>1</sup>

As on the first occasion, the proposal encountered a vigorous opposition. Colonel Conway, an experienced officer, outlined another plan which threw the task of raising the militia upon the great towns, and was supported by Fox. The latter observed that the former bill had been already thrown out by the Lords, and therefore could not be revived in its old form, a theory strongly opposed by Charles Townshend. Lord George Sackville spoke against both proposals, and both were finally referred to a committee of investigation.

Pitt was ill at this time and unable to take the matter in hand. Hence in the middle of February, when the committee began its deliberations, George Townshend assumed that Pitt had heard nothing of Conway's counter project.<sup>2</sup> The result of the investigation was that Conway withdrew his proposal,<sup>3</sup> and left the way open for the adoption of the bill. But the matter, probably because Townshend fell in with Pitt's wishes, was put off until the prime minister had resigned his post. It

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 302.

<sup>2</sup> Townshend to Pitt, February 14, 1757.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 222.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 318.

was not until the period of interregnum that the bill was passed by a compromise between both Houses.

The proposal for investigation, which was to be brought before the House by a motion on January 21, was also put off at the last moment,<sup>1</sup> either because the tories, the strongest supporters of the proposal, did not wish to place difficulties in the way of the new government which might end in a resignation,<sup>2</sup> or because it was thought advisable to wait until Byng's case had been settled.<sup>3</sup> Pitt's illness was not regarded as a wholly genuine excuse, and no doubt he energetically advised his friends to let the matter drop. Hence this question also did not come up for discussion until after Pitt's retirement, and ended in nothing.

Pitt was thus able to shelve the questions he had formerly raised without exciting any particular discontent, but he was drawn entirely against his will into another matter which then caused great national excitement. This was the case of Admiral Byng, which was decided during his ministry.<sup>4</sup> We are obliged to discuss it in some detail, not only for its importance on Pitt's future career, but also because its different stages throw sidelights upon his character and upon the upper classes of society at that time.

We have already seen that after the loss of Minorca the government, especially Newcastle and Anson, did their best to hide their own mistakes by throwing the whole of the blame on the unfortunate admiral. Upon his arrival in England Byng circulated a pamphlet justifying his action and revealing the machinations of his enemies. A favourable impression was thus made, but the authorities delayed the investigation until this frame of mind had passed away and Byng's arguments had been forgotten. They were anxious to secure an unconditional conviction, as otherwise Lord Anson's position, as head of the admiralty, would have been impossible. Thus it was not until after the change of ministry, on December 26, 1756, that the court-martial began its sittings.

The court was under the presidency of Admiral Smith, a natural brother of Lyttelton, and among its members were Admiral West and Richard Lyttelton. As matters lay it was

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 302.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 223.

<sup>3</sup> Glover, p. 77.

<sup>4</sup> The main source of information is Walpole's *Memoirs*, II. chaps. viii.-xi.



in a difficult position ; it had not only to judge the case of the accused, but to decide, to a certain extent, in a quarrel between two great parties. To acquit the admiral would be to condemn the old ministry, which was an important force in Parliament, and in the enjoyment of the king's favour. The admiral's condemnation would imply a defeat for the heir-apparent and his following, as Leicester House had already declared its sympathy with the accused. It might certainly be asserted that these considerations did not affect the judges, who had merely to examine the facts and decide according to law. But in the first place the court was composed of officers whose military career might depend upon their present action, while the articles of martial law in question were so indefinite that it was possible to acquit or to condemn with equal conscientiousness.

Article 12 ran as follows, in the stricter form to which it had been reduced three years previously: 'Every person who through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection shall, in time of action, withdraw or keep back, or shall not do his utmost under the circumstances above stated, through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection, shall suffer death.' There was much room here for doubt, as it was impossible always to determine the motives of the party concerned with any certainty, while a human life depended upon the arbitrary decision of this point, as no provision was made for lesser punishment than death. Hence the article, regarded in isolation, appeared nonsensical, and could only be considered as intelligible in the light of the king's prerogative of mercy. The sense then appeared to be that every soldier or sailor was to be spurred to the utmost exertion by the menace of a death sentence, while the infliction of a lighter punishment was reserved, not for the judges, but for the king's prerogative. Hence the legislator must have assumed that the obvious severity of the law would be moderated by the royal favour. There were thus three, and not two, possibilities open to the judges: they might acquit the accused if his action did not come under the terms of the article; they might condemn him to death with the expectation that the sentence would be performed if he appeared worthy of death in the sense of the article; or, finally, he might be condemned with a prospect of a remission of the sentence if he were guilty under the article, but deserved a lighter punishment.

The court was soon divided into two parties, in view of the doubtful nature of the case: the severe party, who were chiefly adherents of the old ministry, demanded a death sentence; while the more moderate party, who were in relations with the new government, aimed at an acquittal. Hence the details of the investigation were, comparatively speaking, ineffective, and have little interest for us. The long duration of the trial was due less to difficulties of fact than to the balance of conflicting interests, and, under these circumstances, it was only natural for the court to choose the third possibility. Those who were inclined to severity were able to extort a death sentence from the milder party by permitting them to add a recommendation to the mercy of the king and the admiralty couched in their own terms. Thus, indeed, they avoided the task of solving the problem which had been placed before them, as this pronouncement did not amount to a definite decision between the rival groups. Moreover, the sentence was highly illogical, for its terms stated that two of the motives provided for by the law, cowardice and disaffection, were not in question, while the wording of the recommendation to mercy also excluded the third motive. In the letter to the admiralty Byng's action was ascribed to an error in judgment, so that the decision was tantamount to an acquittal.<sup>1</sup>

The king showed the utmost exasperation when the sentence was published on January 27.<sup>2</sup> He had been anxious to wash his hands of the whole business, and now the final decision, and the inevitable consequent odium, was thrown upon his shoulders. The moderate party in the court-martial had, however, omitted to observe one point. They either did not know, or had forgotten, that the king had bound himself not to exercise his prerogative of mercy. In reply to an address from the city, after the loss of Minorca, he had solemnly promised that the guilty person should be punished according to law. If King George had so desired, he could certainly have found means of clearing Byng from guilt, and so avoiding the obligations of his promise. The appointment of a new court, and a little pressure from the higher authorities, would certainly have sufficed for this purpose.

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Glover, p. 79 f.

<sup>2</sup> Rigby to Bedford, January 28, 1757.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 229.

But the king was entirely justified in referring to the pledge he had given, and declining, on that account, to exercise his prerogative.

His refusal, and the execution of the sentence was, however, not an easy matter. Great indignation prevailed in naval circles at the condemnation of an officer to a shameful death on account of an error in judgment. In that case no one was secure against condemnation. Admiral West demanded an alteration in article 12, and threatened to resign his post. Admiral Smith personally recommended the condemned man to the king's favour. Only Lord Lyttelton, who continued to support Newcastle, emphasised in a letter to his step-brother Smith<sup>1</sup> the unfavourable fact that Byng, though he had shown coolness enough in such danger as he had run, had none the less been careful to avoid any great risk. In any case the losses suffered by his ship had been remarkably scanty, and it was impossible to deny the fact that a condemnation could be justified, though the sentence of the court-martial was undoubtedly illogical and nugatory, as representing a compromise between two conflicting opinions.

The situation was now legally as follows: the admiralty could order the execution of the sentence by a warrant without reference to the king, while the monarch alone was able to hinder the execution by means of his prerogative. If he therefore refrained from action, Byng would be shot. Lord Temple, however, and his colleagues hesitated to sign the warrant, as they doubted the legality of the sentence. The admiral's friends began to hope that a revision of the trial would be ordered, but the king declined to endanger the decision which had been secured, and chose another way out of the difficulty, which left him free to act as he would. He submitted the sentence to the supreme judges of the kingdom for decision upon its legality, and after long consideration they declared themselves satisfied. The admiralty then had no reason for declining to sign the warrant, and the execution was fixed for Monday, February 28.

The question of the king's prerogative of mercy now returned to the front; the king, who wished to see the admiral defeated, would have been very glad to receive advice from his prime minister, dissuading him from the exercise of

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, ii. 587 ff.

his right. In any case it was necessary for Pitt to show his colours, and either to undertake the responsibility of the execution or to incur the odium of unpatriotic behaviour if he advised the king to mercy. Pitt, however, did his best to stand aloof. There is no doubt that he was anxious to save the condemned man, not only for reasons of humanity, but also to please the heir-apparent; at the same time he did not wish to shake his credit with the king or to undermine his popularity, as at this moment his position and his power of conducting the war were entirely dependent upon those two forces. Hence, if he did not wish to act upon the highest moral ground, entire neutrality was obviously his best policy, and, in order to preserve this attitude, he attempted to please the king as much as possible and to support his views upon other matters so far as he could. It was at this time that he supported the Hanoverian policy, passed the vote for the necessary money, and promised further supplies.

He may well have been confirmed in this attitude by an anonymous letter of a threatening nature, signed 'a friend,' of February 7,<sup>1</sup> which expounded all the dangers with which he would be menaced if he attempted to favour Byng's cause. The writer gave a vivid description of the national hostility to the admiral, and even asserted that if he secured Byng's acquittal, the abandonment of Minorca would be regarded as a matter pre-arranged between himself and Byng with the object of overthrowing the former ministry. The letter further explained that certain circles were anxious for an acquittal with the object of overthrowing Pitt and his friends, or of making the government unpopular, and begged Pitt not to throw the country into fresh confusion for the sake of a man like Byng, who was undeserving of consideration. It is possible that this cleverly written warning may to some extent have influenced Pitt's considerations, and the supposition becomes almost credible in view of the vacillation and timorousness which he displayed in this matter. At a later date he received other communications of the kind from either side.

In view of this situation, Pitt was somewhat disturbed by the fact that on the occasion of his first appearance in Parliament, when he was to introduce the king's request for a

<sup>1</sup> Chatham MSS.



subsidy, Byng's affair came up for discussion. The question was whether the admiral should be expelled from the House of Commons on account of his condemnation, a proposal which evoked a vigorous opposition and was finally rejected, as it would have been tantamount to a condemnation on the part of the House, and have diminished the accused's prospects of a reprieve. Upon this occasion Sir Francis Dashwood proposed to ask the admiralty to lay the letter from the court-martial before the House, and then it was that Pitt rose to speak upon the subject. He spoke briefly and seemed to approve the proposal, though he objected to the introduction of such methods into court-martial investigations, and expressed the hope that some change might be made in article 12. He also referred contemptuously to the anonymous letters which threatened him as one of Byng's supporters. Thus, by confining himself to minor details, he avoided any pronouncement of principle, and upon this occasion he was spared further questions. Dashwood's proposal met with no support.

However, Byng's friends redoubled their activity; neutrality became daily a more difficult position, while a dangerous opponent was already making preparations for the further embarrassment of the minister. Mrs. Osborne, the unfortunate admiral's sister, begged the minister in a letter of February 17 to incline the king to mercy, while three members of the court-martial, who were horrified by the results of their compliance, waited upon Temple to ask him to represent their desires for mercy once more to the throne, apart from other petitions which came into the ministry. It was hardly possible to disregard these numerous efforts. Then, on February 23, Dashwood proposed in the House of Commons an examination of the ominous article 12, after explaining the inconsistency of the court-martial's finding. In the resulting debate Pitt was provoked by a friend of Fox, a Mr. Campbell, and then by Fox himself, to make a speech upon the matter.

Campbell asserted that the sentence could not be completed without the concurrence of the admiralty, and if the admiralty regarded it as unjustified it was their business to petition for mercy; their silence must be considered as approval. Pitt replied with an open acknowledgment of his desire for mercy. He thought more good would come from mercy than from

rigour, but his majesty would be more inclined to mercy if he were left entirely free. As regards the article he did not wish to see discipline relaxed, but no article could be enforced but when it was intelligible. And this being proved so obscure, it was not for the honour of national justice that a sentence, issuing from its obscurity, should be carried into execution. . . . Of all men the commissioners of the admiralty ought the least to interpose. But what indeed could add weight in the prisoner's favour to the recommendation of his judges?

It is obvious that Pitt was extremely anxious to relieve himself and his friends of any obligation to interference and to avoid any collision with the king, but so soon as he declared his colours his adversaries declined to leave him alone. Fox pretended sympathy with the prisoner, and said that 'he could not comprehend the delicacy of the admiralty in not laying their scruples before the king; for he knew, from his experience as secretary, that the king was always disposed to lenity, and that on such occasions he would always ask "have you nothing favourable to tell me?"' If the lords of the admiralty thought the court-martial meant *error of judgment*, they ought to tell the king so.<sup>1</sup>

Pitt was naturally conscious of the underlying sarcasm, and of the object of the whole speech, and referred only to the existing relations between the admiralty and the king to support his contention that that body was the least suitable to act. He also openly declared that Fox was only anxious to cause him difficulty 'in another place.' At the same time he considered that he could not do anything less than express a desire for mercy. He advanced his plea on the following day, and met, as was to be expected, with a curt refusal, and with no reference to the possibility of extenuating circumstances. Temple also transmitted to the king the recommendation to mercy which seven members of the court-martial had repeated to him, and was received with equal disfavour.

Thus Pitt was drawn into this delicate affair entirely against his will. He was openly informed in the House of Commons that as Mr. Byng had been the means of turning out the old ministry, he would soon most certainly also be the means of expelling the new.<sup>1</sup> However, after Pitt had lost the king's

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. MSS. Comm., Tenth Rep., App.*, p. 312.

favour and had incurred the national anger, he felt no further need of restraint, and gave his full support to a last attempt which was now made to save the admiral. One of the judges, Admiral Keppel, requested leave to communicate certain details of the court-martial which would tell in favour of the condemned man. As the matter was brought up in the last parliamentary session before the execution, Pitt, against all precedent, arranged a sitting for Saturday 26. He also called a cabinet meeting, which resolved to postpone the execution until settlement of this new question. In informing the king of this resolve he took occasion to observe that the House of Commons wished to see the admiral pardoned, and received the stern answer, 'Sir, you have taught me to look for the sense of my subjects in another place than in the House of Commons,' by which the monarch implied that Pitt had constantly represented the will of Parliament as a mere parody of the will of the nation. He was so far correct that the mass of the people were opposed to a pardon, and no doubt he wished to remind Pitt that his efforts were opposed to the national desires.

Pitt drafted the message informing Parliament of the postponement and advising the examination of Admiral Keppel.<sup>1</sup> He was obliged in this composition to follow the sense of the king's words and to give clear expression to the resolve not to pardon the prisoner unless some new reason should appear, whereby he seems in some degree to have expressed his approval of this determination and to have assumed the moral responsibility. The attempt proved fruitless, for while the House of Commons was ready to pass a bill relieving the judges of their obligation to secrecy, the House of Lords threw it out. Here an event may be mentioned indicative of the attitude of the military judges. When Keppel was asked who was supporting his attempt, he mentioned several officers, who, however, declined to answer when they were questioned on the subject. One of them, Geary by name, when Richard Lyttelton reproached him for this behaviour, bluntly observed, 'My prospects would be injured if I said anything.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The draft existing among Pitt's papers is conceived in terms somewhat different from those of the message itself (printed in Thackeray, i. 275), whence it is likely that its final form was determined by the cabinet council. There are, however, no material alterations.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 342 f.

The admiral's fate was thus sealed, as the king declined to exercise his prerogative, and the sentence which the judges themselves had declared excessive was carried out on March 14, after the expiration of the respite. On this occasion Byng showed no lack of personal courage and coolness, and met his death fearlessly and calmly.

Upon a consideration of Pitt's attitude throughout this affair, it cannot be said that he came out of the business with any great credit; indeed it might be asserted that he was more to blame than the condemned admiral. Byng had acted only in the interest of the state, and his failure was due to want of judgment, to an anxiety not to exceed his instructions, and to adherence to traditional methods. Pitt, however, allowed a gross act of injustice to be committed during his tenure of office, and this for reasons inspired largely by selfishness and by the fear of losing his position. Had he been convinced of the necessity of the execution, or been doubtful of the proper procedure to adopt, he could have allowed formal justice to run its course. He, however, proclaimed his opinion that Byng's case was one for leniency, and he should consequently have thrown his whole weight upon this side and have attempted to stop the execution at any cost to himself. However loud the national outcry, a firm attitude would have secured him the respect of all whose opinion was worth having. The results of his vacillation were the loss of the king's favour and of his popularity to no less an extent than if he had stood firm, while his reputation for firmness was seriously endangered. We may ask what had become of that famous system of morality which he ventured to prefer to the tenets of Christianity. His ethical system was useless in this difficult dilemma, in which the Christian faith would have immediately pointed out the only true path of unselfish devotion to duty. He had been shortsighted enough to aim at a momentary advantage which he failed to secure, with the result that he endangered the very foundations of his power. It must have been deeply humiliating for a great statesman, standing far above his environment, to be driven into a corner by the vile intrigues of men like Fox, and to be repulsed with bitter scorn by his narrow-minded monarch. All this might have been avoided by a firm and consistent attitude.

Our judgment must, however, be corrected by a considera-



tion of that environment in which Pitt moved, and of the principles which he daily saw actuating the dealings of his fellow-men. There was hardly one of his contemporaries who was not sunk in the depths of political selfishness, or devoted to the ruthless struggle for money and power. Hence we cannot be surprised if Pitt occasionally ventured upon precarious courses, and it must be laid to his credit that as time went on he was able to conquer this weakness. The trial of Byng was obviously a useful experience, and we find that henceforward he displayed far greater determination.

None the less, this business had inflicted a damaging blow upon Pitt's prestige in spite of his attempts at neutrality. Henceforward he could make no progress in the king's favour, and could no longer count upon the national support. The collapse of the ministry seemed inevitable. At the same time the popular belief that Pitt was forced to retire before the superior forces of the old oligarchy is incorrect. Newcastle and his adherents still possessed very considerable influence, but they did not throw such difficulties in Pitt's way as to prevent him from carrying on the business of his office. Indeed, we find the representatives of Newcastle's party loyally supporting Pitt to secure the success of his government, while Pitt was always careful, as he afterwards admitted, not to break entirely with the former ministry, the more so as he began to recognise the insecurity of his own position. With these facts is connected the indifference he displayed to the question of the investigation. His real enemies were rather the members of the former war party, especially Fox and the Duke of Cumberland; however anxious Newcastle had been to retain his dominant position in domestic affairs and especially his patronage, he was not unwilling to leave the helm of state to other hands during these troublous times, whereas the other party aimed at placing themselves in power, as they believed themselves equal to its responsibilities. We have already seen with what ready zeal Fox attempted to embarrass his rival in the Byng affair, careless whether he ruined the chances of the unfortunate admiral, whom even Cumberland was anxious to save.<sup>1</sup>

The burning question of the moment was to whom the supreme command of the army of observation, now in progress

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 233.

of organisation, should be entrusted.<sup>1</sup> So early as the previous August negotiations had been begun with the King of Prussia on this point, though no decision had been secured.<sup>2</sup> On the English side the claims were advanced of the Duke Louis Ernest of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, who had seen service in Russia, and was now in command of the Dutch army and acting as guardian to the young stadtholder. It was hoped that his choice would improve the prospects of a Dutch alliance. Should the prince decline the post in view of the duties of his present office, King George had proposed his brother, Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, as the most suitable appointment. Frederick the Great was quite ready to agree to the appointment of Louis, but objected to that of Ferdinand, who was already a general in his service, and who could not only be spared with difficulty, but was also, in Frederick's opinion, unequal to the responsibility of so high and independent a post. At the end of September Louis declined,<sup>3</sup> and in October King Frederick requested the appointment of the Duke of Cumberland as commander-in-chief, asserting that the prestige of the army would be much increased thereby. He was also of the opinion that England would feel herself obliged by this appointment to send a contingent of English troops to the army.<sup>4</sup>

For the moment the matter was left undecided, as the formation of a contingent for foreign service and the grant of the supplies for its support were not carried through until February. When everything had been arranged, news arrived on March 9 that the army of Marshal d'Estrée was marching on the lower Rhine,<sup>5</sup> and a decision was therefore imperative. It was only natural to entrust the victor of Culloden with the command in accordance with Frederick's wishes, while the king supported the plan, believing that as Cumberland had once saved England, so he would now secure the preservation of Hanover.<sup>6</sup> The duke, however, was very reluctant to accept the position. In the former war he had undergone unpleasant experiences against the French with an equal body of troops

<sup>1</sup> Cp. on this point Koser, *Friedrich der Grosse*, ii. 60 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen*, xlii. 219. Holderness to Mitchell, August 20, 1756.—Public Record Office.

<sup>3</sup> Holderness to Mitchell, October 5, 1756.—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xiv. 577 f.

<sup>5</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, ii. 373.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 376.

at his command, while he was now expected to oppose the enemy with a far weaker force, and with no fortifications at hand for refuge. His prestige and military reputation were thus at stake.<sup>1</sup> His chief point of objection was the fact that he would become dependent upon Pitt. He had long regarded Pitt as an enemy, especially since Pitt had joined the Leicester House party;<sup>2</sup> now he was to take orders from him upon all questions of supply. Not only did he feel this a blow to his pride, but he firmly believed that Pitt, as a declared opponent of the continental policy, would purposely stint his supplies, and bring him into disrepute by his carelessness. Moreover, Pitt's broken health aroused his apprehension. He did not care to leave his father with a ministry, the leader of which had only been equal to six business interviews in four months, and to no more than fifteen attendances in Parliament.<sup>3</sup> Finally, if he were successful, it was to be expected that Pitt would reap half the credit, so that the reward would not be commensurate with the trouble involved. Thus the duke was persuaded by Fox to inform his father that Pitt's dismissal was an indispensable preliminary to his own acceptance of the command.

For a time the king had been favourably disposed to Pitt, who had appeared in a light in which he had not expected to see the fierce parliamentary orator and opposition leader. Pitt treated the king with the greatest respect, declining to sit down even when tormented by his gout, and kneeling upon a stool if he could not stand;<sup>4</sup> he gave full consideration to the king's every wish, and did his best to keep the monarch in a state of satisfaction; he proved by no means the stickler for principle which he had seemed to be in opposition; in short, the king was obliged to admit that it was quite possible, in certain circumstances, to work with the minister who had been forced upon him. On the other hand, some of Pitt's habits

<sup>1</sup> The Russian ambassador, Prince Gallitzin, wrote to Korff on February 22 saying that it was unintelligible 'comment Sa Majesté Britannique voudrait en quelque façon commettre la réputation du Duc de Cumberland son fils, pour être à la tête d'une troupe, qui doit être si inférieure à celle que les Français . . . enverront [*sic*] dans ces quartiers-là, sans avoir des places fortes. . . .'—Confidential Miscellaneous.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, i. 287.

<sup>3</sup> Prussian embassy reports, April 1, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>4</sup> Thackeray, i. 287.

were offensive to the king ; he was accustomed to harangue in the royal cabinet as though he were in the House of Commons, and to make stirring appeals to sentiment, whereas George preferred a short and businesslike handling of affairs and a terse answer to questions. He was himself very precise in his mode of expression. However, these disadvantages might have been overcome, and the two men have continued to work in harmony, had it not been for Pitt's association with Lord Temple, whose air of self-satisfaction and unconcern was intolerable to the king. We have already seen that Temple found it difficult to approve of the moderate and prudent action of his brother-in-law. To these facts must be added the results of Byng's affair, which had renewed the king's prejudice to Pitt, and had decreased the fears based upon his influence with the nation.

Cumberland thus found the king ready to meet his desires. The necessary agreement was speedily concluded and George requested his son to start. He, however, declined to go until Pitt had been actually removed from office, refusing to remain even for a fortnight under his direction. No doubt he also felt that upon his departure other influences might gain the upper hand and enable Pitt to retain his office. However, it seemed impossible to form a new ministry at such short notice. The task was attempted ; Newcastle made overtures to Fox, and Fox to the Duke of Devonshire, and afterwards to the Duke of Bedford, but in every case scruples and incompatible interests were encountered. Pitt and Temple were naturally fully informed of what was going on ; it was to their political advantage to await dismissal rather than resign ; they would then be secure of the halo of martyrdom. The king's anxiety for his electorate increased from day to day, until he was finally forced to dismiss his unpopular ministers, and leave the task of reconstruction to chance. As soon as a successor to the admiralty had been found, in the person of the industrious Lord Winchelsea, Lord Temple was at once informed that the king had no further need of his services. As Pitt did not resign he received similar information a few days later, on April 6. His immediate friends, Legge, George Grenville, and others, followed him into retirement. All this was done without any attempt to overturn the ministry as such. Devonshire remained for the moment at the head of a



fragmentary government, and attempts were made to fill the gaps provisionally.

Thus ended the experiment of an independent Pitt ministry, although the independence had by no means been complete. The failure of the experiment had shown that Pitt was incapable with the support at his disposal of sailing against the wind when such a course seemed desirable. He had been obliged to compromise and to secure accommodations, with the result that he had eventually succumbed to the intrigues of his opponents. Thus he was finally obliged to add other powers of propulsion to his vessel, of the kind then in vogue, and to abandon his efforts for the moment, for the purpose of recruiting his powers. Capacity, eloquence, and political purity might, at a later date, prove a sufficient foundation for power, but at the moment success could only be assured by the employment of other forces. Adequate power could only be secured by the oligarchy upon its basis of corruption or by the monarchy with its extensive prerogative, or, better still, by a union of both. With these forces Pitt was obliged to compromise, however great his reluctance. How this measure was carried out, and what were the results both to Pitt and to England, will be the subject of our next section. We shall then see that notwithstanding many delays the long-desired change for the better at last began, a change for which Pitt was very largely responsible.

## SECTION II

### *THE TURN OF FORTUNE*

#### CHAPTER V

##### THE INTERREGNUM

Pitt's position during his first ministry had been unusually difficult. Two possibilities had lain open to him, and both of these he had been forced to consider: he might succeed in maintaining his position, or he might be forced to resume the struggle for it. Either possibility demanded a different attitude. If he could count upon a continuance in office, he would be obliged to fall in with the king's wishes for Hanover, to disregard the prevailing corruption, which was of service to the maintenance of the government, and to avoid the introduction of measures which would embarrass the mutual relations of those in power; if, however, his overthrow was probable, it was advisable to appear as the champion of popular ideas, as the ruthless opponent of corruption and the stern critic of ministerial incapacity, in order that he might again be summoned to save the country, should the situation grow worse.

Pitt did not know what course things would take, and therefore attempted to steer a middle course, though it is obvious that his choice fell rather upon the first alternative. His inclinations were dictated by the fact that in case of his overthrow he might use his popularity as a means of recovering his power, though not as the actual basis of its foundation. He did not propose to await some favourable conjuncture of events, which might be long in coming, but to secure his object under existing conditions, which were by no means disadvantageous. His fidelity to his former principles was therefore limited by his desire to spare the feelings of the

king and of the most influential personalities. His administration is marked by a certain tendency to join Newcastle, many of whose adherents were members of his government, and it was difficult for him to act upon his own convictions against this party in the course of Byng's affair.

This behaviour naturally aroused indignation in many quarters; the nation felt themselves deceived when they found that Pitt made no material change; at the same time his government was too short to destroy all the hopes that had been placed upon him. The national patience was not yet exhausted, and when he was driven out of office by the unpopular Duke of Cumberland, the old popularity of the representative of reform and the great orator revived in full power.<sup>1</sup> It was supposed that he had not been given time to realise his projects, and his overthrow was naturally ascribed to the supporters of the old system of corruption, whose hostility threw a favourable light upon his own motives.<sup>2</sup>

Pitt's resignation therefore evoked a great desire to do him honour. The city of London voted him the freedom of the city, an example which was followed by many other towns, and in particular by Bath, at the instance of Ralph Allen.<sup>3</sup> Among these towns was also Oakhampton, the borough which he represented in Parliament. As he was again attacked by the gout, and could not use his right arm, it was a painful effort to sign the numerous letters of thanks which were required. His praises were sung in pamphlets and newspapers, and there was naturally no lack of counter-attacks.<sup>4</sup> The only displeasing feature was his association with Legge in all these honours, for this had a special and somewhat ominous significance. Legge and several other important persons, such as Francis Dashwood, Samuel Martin, and Richard Glover, belonged to the tory and more radical section of Pitt's following. They were more serious in their opposition to the old

<sup>1</sup> Chesterfield to Dayrolles, April 26, 1757: '[Pitt and Legge] were most impudently turned out before the end of the session, and are thereby become not only the most, but perhaps the only two popular men now in this kingdom.'—*Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1168.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Potter to Ralph Allen, April 27, 1757.—Peach, *R. Allen*, p. 159.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, April 19: 'Le peuple témoigne regretter le Ch. Pitt, et la jeune Cour le protège; beaucoup d'écrits et de feuilles périodiques paraissent en sa faveur, quoiqu'il y en ait aussi beaucoup qui paraissent contre.'—Berlin Archives.

system, and disapproved of Pitt's efforts to secure a compromise with his opponents. We have already seen, on the occasion of Pitt's first rise to office, that this group ran far beyond the limits which their master had placed before himself. If in these general honours Pitt's name was invariably joined with Legge's, the fact was emphasised that recognition was due to their common policy, and not to that which Pitt followed on his own account. The association of these names thus implied a veiled refusal of the coalition with Newcastle; in any case attempts of this nature were not regarded as redounding to Pitt's credit.<sup>1</sup> This fact was obvious to Pitt's opponents, who published a caricature<sup>2</sup> representing Pitt and Legge as Don Quixote and Sancho Panza riding upon a triumphal car with the inscription:—

‘ Et sibi Consul  
Ne placeat, servus curru portatur eodem.’—Juv.

It is somewhat remarkable that the monarch, to serve whom Pitt had abandoned his old principles, namely Frederick the Great, showed considerable satisfaction at his dismissal. He expressed the hope that England would now find more serious and energetic leaders than Newcastle and Pitt.<sup>3</sup> Pitt's power of action had been far too limited.

An attempt was now made to fill up the gaps in the cabinet and to form a new ‘duke's ministry’ (ministry of the Duke of Cumberland). Places were offered to Fox and Dodington, Robinson and Dupplin, but in every case they were declined, chiefly for the reason that no one was willing to pledge himself to the accomplishment of the proposed investigation. The admiralty alone, the most important office for the moment, was filled with members from the different parties, under Lord Winchelsea, who had formerly conducted that office. As soon as this was accomplished, on April 9, Cumberland left England for the Continent to take over the somewhat hopeless task of commanding the army of observation. His Hessian

<sup>1</sup> At a later date Legge was drawn into opposition to Pitt by intrigues with Newcastle; the duke did not keep his promise of silence upon the matter, which accordingly came to Pitt's ears. Legge's relations with the two men were consequently strained, but he was eventually obliged to accept the chancellorship under them.—Cp. Glover, p. 100 f.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Koser, *Friedrich der Grosse*, ii. 61.



troops, who had now been almost a year on English soil, were prevented by contrary winds from following him until the 28th of the month.<sup>1</sup>

Pitt's retirement had destroyed the life and soul of the ministry, but notwithstanding its incompleteness, it proved by no means incompetent. Its very character of indifferentism was especially suited for the task of despatching that business which had been declined by the party ministers, and included the proposed investigation and the militia bill, matters which at one time, at least, Pitt had vigorously supported, and in which he had afterwards lost his interest. It had been indispensable to lay aside the first of those measures in order to form that coalition ministry which alone offered Pitt any prospect of success, while the militia bill met with little response from the nation now that the danger of invasion had passed, so that it was a convenience to Pitt if another cabinet could induce Parliament to pass the bill, the value of which he certainly did not underestimate. As Newcastle had the same interest in the matter the ministry might calculate upon the success of their efforts, since there would be no need for party leaders to place themselves in any false position. It was necessary only to deny that influence had been exerted by emphasising the principle of parliamentary freedom and to represent the measure as expressing simply the will of the nation.

Thus on April 19 the House of Commons proceeded in committee to begin the farce of the investigation,<sup>2</sup> which was exclusively devoted to the affair of Minorca. A huge mass of letters, orders, and other papers were read, no connected explanation being given or asked for; eventually the House was almost emptied, and only filled again when the debate began. Interest was again concentrated solely upon Pitt's attitude, as he had formerly uttered the bitterest charges against the old ministry, while his opinions were known to have undergone a recent change. There had been some expectation that he would plead ill-health as an excuse for non-appearance, and thus escape the difficulties of the situation. Pitt, however, considered it advisable, in view of his present popularity, to make the greatest possible show of zeal. He therefore appeared in the theatrical guise of a helpless

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 7 ff.

invalid, closely wrapped up, notwithstanding the heat, and carrying his arm in a black sling. The sight of suffering was intended to produce a higher opinion of his care for the state and of his interest in the matter at issue. These intentions were hardly supported by his speech, which displayed moderation, almost amounting to non-committal. Upon one point he pronounced the ministry guilty, but attached the blame to the whole body, and not to any individual; punishment was thus out of the question, and his words served only to justify the dismissal of the ministry. On the next day he used stronger language, asserting that he was prepared to make a public protest in the event of an acquittal, but it was obvious that he meant less than he said.

The weakness of his support prevented those who honestly pressed the charges from securing any result. After a week of discussion the committee finally declared that it had been impossible to send any stronger force to the Mediterranean than that which Byng had commanded. Had not the majority upon the point been so small, the court party might have brought forward proposals for a vote of confidence in the old government. In any case, the voting showed that if Pitt had made a more serious effort he might have been able to secure a different result. Any one who supposed that the investigation would produce a decisive judgment upon the administrative capacities of one or the other party was no less mistaken than in the case of Byng's court-martial. Both the House of Commons and the court-martial, far from being capable of independent decision, were entirely subordinate to party interests. On the other hand, there was now no obstacle to prevent any one from entering the ministry should opportunity offer.

The other problem for solution was the militia bill, which with certain alterations was passed both by the Commons and the Lords, notwithstanding the opposition of some members of the Pelham party, and was finally confirmed by the king. The bill met with opposition in many quarters, as those who were bound to serve were not in every case ready to submit to training; in fact, the measure was never entirely popular. It had been greeted with enthusiasm during the period of opposition to the subsidy treaties, but the country was now disinclined to bear the consequence of its action.

These affairs having been thus satisfactorily settled, it was possible to begin serious consideration of the means for replacing the provisional administration by a permanent ministry; thus negotiations were resumed, which a few months before seemed to have resulted in a definite conclusion. The problem for solution was to secure the composition of a ministry which should best represent the balance of parties and the situation and needs of the state. The process of settlement lasted much longer than in the autumn, owing to a general refusal to acquiesce in an incomplete settlement. A number of nominations were taken, somewhat after the methods of the papal conclave, until at last a combination was discovered with which the great majority of officials and politicians could express real satisfaction.

Almost without parallel in history is the position of the Duke of Newcastle at this moment.<sup>1</sup> With the exception of his immediate friends and adherents, he was the object of general scorn and contempt, for almost every one had been victimised by his intrigues. The nation was convinced of his incapacity, for which he had already been brought before the tribunal of Parliament, and regarded him as the great originator of the system of corruption. The king himself tolerated him merely because he was useful to the royal policy, but bestowed on him no real confidence. Yet during this process of reorganisation the duke was the centre of observation, and was regarded as indispensable to the formation of a workable government. At the same time, however, his power was by no means supreme; it could not for a moment be compared with that of the monarch.

As forthcoming events were to show, the ultimate explanation of these extraordinary facts was the inability of the supreme power, that of the monarch, to develop its full energy; the monarchy was to some extent divided into two counteracting forces, the present and the future. As in Prince Frederick's time, the influence of the heir-apparent grew daily stronger, and so complicated the situation that Newcastle was able, by a clever use of his own power, to prevent the formation of any combination which did not correspond with his views. In adroit action of this nature he was unsurpassed.

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 6 f.

Newcastle's resolve to form a union with Pitt and Temple was conceived upon May 1, and was steadily kept in view throughout all successive changes. He discovered supporters who undertook to remove the obstacles in his way. Devonshire was ready to exchange his position as prime minister for that of chamberlain, as soon as the subsidy bill was passed; he undertook to persuade the king to recall the dismissed ministers, and advised that an understanding with Bute upon the point should be secured. He was also ready to urge upon the monarch the necessity of an understanding with Leicester House.<sup>1</sup>

Another person who helped to secure this solution, at any rate by his advice, was Lord Chesterfield. He urged a union under any conditions with Pitt against Cumberland and Fox. He further asserted that the new ministry would only gain the necessary support by an alliance with Leicester House, which should therefore also be secured under any conditions.<sup>2</sup> Though Chesterfield was ill disposed to all parties, he had the strongest objection to the old war party, and in order to crush them was ready to place his powers at the disposal of their enemies.

The third helper and intermediary was George Stone, the Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland, who was in England at the time, whose brother Andrew had long been Newcastle's confidential adviser. He had a special interest in securing an alliance between Pitt and the old duke, as such a result would damage the Duke of Bedford, who was a member of Cumberland's party, and to whom, as the new Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, the domineering archbishop was most strongly opposed.<sup>3</sup>

Through the good offices of Devonshire Newcastle now secured permission from the king to begin negotiations for the formation of a ministry with any whom he considered as

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 1, 1757: 'My Lord Duke assured him [Stone] that he would use his utmost endeavours with the king to take in Mr. Pitt and my Lord Temple into some Cabinet Council Place, if they would be reasonable, and also to bring about a good understanding with Leicester House, of which he saw the necessity.'—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>2</sup> Chesterfield to Newcastle, May 7, 1757: 'You must agree with them [Leicester House] upon the best terms you can, but upon any terms rather than not agree.'—Ernst, *Memoirs of Chesterfield*, p. 489.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 14.



likely to be useful for this purpose.<sup>1</sup> If Pitt had not been mentioned by name, he was, on the other hand, not excluded, and the duke was therefore able to pursue the manifold advice he had received, though, for the moment, without calling Bute into the matter. About May 11 a 'chance' meeting of Pitt and Hardwicke took place at which Pitt was induced to declare his conditions. These were distinctly onerous, as he tried, as far as possible, to secure himself against Newcastle's intrigues and interference. He demanded chiefly unlimited power of action as secretary of state, and full authority over the admiralty, which he wished to make entirely dependent upon himself in order to get the conduct of the war in his own hands. Finally, he insisted upon the reinstatement of all his adherents in their former offices.<sup>2</sup>

Newcastle did not know what to do. Agreement with Pitt's demands implied an absolute surrender; an alliance with Fox would procure him more favourable terms, and the king was inclined to this solution of the problem. On the other hand, success in this quarter would produce an alliance between the Pitt group and Leicester House, which would make the successful accomplishment of his task utterly impossible.<sup>3</sup> The duke's hesitation lasted for some days, and was finally decided by the attitude of the king, who proposed to give Fox the paymastership and to exclude Temple<sup>4</sup> from the cabinet, conditions to which Pitt declined to agree.

Pitt was thus entirely free to act when proposals for subsidy payments amounting to a million were laid before the House of Commons on May 20, and he did not neglect the opportunity to secure respect for himself by a renewal of his opposition.<sup>5</sup> His speech, however, was chiefly marked by a reserve of power. It was obvious that he had at his disposal a wealth of shattering arguments, which he was keeping in reserve for the entry of any new ministry, in the formation of which he should have no share. His remarks upon the government action were like the gusts of wind heralding an on-coming storm; at the same time he was careful not to

<sup>1</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 109.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of the Duke of Newcastle under date May 12, 1757.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum.

<sup>4</sup> Newcastle Papers.

<sup>5</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 16 ff. ; Glover, p. 98.

express his absolute condemnation of their measures, as he might soon find himself obliged to continue and to support their policy; indeed, he had himself followed this course during his ministry.

He offered no objection to the grant as such, but demanded guarantees for the proper expenditure of this large sum, as it was impossible to tell to whose hands it would be entrusted. He was perfectly ready to support the measure if the money was to further English interests in the defence of the country, or in the American war, but he feared that a further portion would be expended upon the Hanoverian troops, and he considered that the £200,000 already voted to this object was a fully adequate sum. Thus he was careful to leave two issues open. Should he return to power it would be possible to represent every kind of expenditure as furthering English interests, even if it were devoted to continental policy. If he were excluded from the government he could make his present assertions the basis for beginning a violent attack upon the measures of the new ministry. This desire to make himself safe in either event induced him to give some measure of approval to the continental policy which he had himself inaugurated. On the morning of that day, May 20, news had arrived of a great victory of the King of Prussia at Prague; Pitt seized the opportunity of delivering a second eulogy upon England's heroic ally, the king, who saw everything, did everything, and knew everything, who never asked for a subsidy, and yet did more than any one else towards the restoration of peace, and this by a bold offensive action, calculated to revive all drooping spirits. Do not think, he cried, that all these trivial measures, the support of many unimportant princes, can adequately replace a king of Prussia. His mighty power must be supported, and ministers who urge the Hanoverian policy must be overthrown with the object of repairing the carelessness of which they had been guilty. Hence he preferred to support the war in Germany instead of playing at war in Flanders.

The idea here announced was that the Electorate, which England had hitherto supported, should oppose the French army in alliance with Prussia, though Pitt failed to consider the possibility that Frederick might be unable to give the necessary help. Whether he wished to do without the con-

tingents of the small princes, or merely to stop further payments of subsidies, is not clear.

The speech naturally provoked a reply from the opposition side, but even Fox was unable to place his finger upon the weak points, and confined his attacks to side issues. The result was naturally the passing of the motion, which Pitt indeed was not seriously concerned to prevent.

The news of the victory of Prague opened the second act in the negotiations for the reconstitution of the ministry. Every one was conscious of the necessity for a capable government, able to profit by the improvement in the situation, and the desire to enter into office increased.<sup>1</sup> Hence Newcastle, who had already pondered the possibility of a ministry of his own without Pitt or Fox, resumed his attempt to secure an agreement with the former. On Hardwicke's invitation, Pitt called at Lord Royston's house on May 25 between eight and nine o'clock, and there had an interview with Newcastle in Hardwicke's presence.<sup>2</sup>

The first points for discussion were the wishes of Cumberland's friends Fox and Lord Granville, who were anxious for part of the million that had been voted for to be sent to Germany. The duke declared that he had pledged his word to nobody in this matter, but showed himself inclined to favour the idea, while Pitt asserted that he had promised his friends not to agree to this use of the money. Thus it seemed that agreement on this point was impossible, but Hardwicke clearly saw that Pitt would break away from his friends to any necessary extent if circumstances should so dictate, and advised that the matter should be dropped for the moment. The discussion then turned upon the personnel of the new ministry, and the question of the appointments to the chancellorship of the exchequer and the admiralty aroused disagreement. Pitt wished to see the former post given to one of his friends; Newcastle, however, felt that he would then be subjected to limitation and supervision within the treasury, which was his special province; he was anxious to retain his

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, May 20, 1757: 'Lord Holdernessee s'en est expliqué ce matin, tout pénétré de joie [about Prague] en m'ajoutant que cecy servirait aussi à accélérer la formation de la nouvelle administration . . . et à établir une bonne fois les rênes du gouvernement sur un pied solide, pour aller en avant avec d'aussi heureuses circonstances.'—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 227 f.; Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 21 f.

independence there if nowhere else. As regards the admiralty, Pitt insisted upon his former demands of complete control, as otherwise he would be unable to conduct the war; the duke, however, in accordance with the king's wishes, was anxious to retain Lord Winchilsea in his post. Negotiations broke down at this point, which was certainly of great importance to Pitt's supremacy. It became obvious that Newcastle's power was by no means so far broken as to necessitate his submission to Pitt's demands. Though he had indeed promised his adherents to show full moderation, he declined to be a party to discussion, and indeed used the failure of the negotiations to improve his own prospects. Upon his showing, there was no material difference of opinion between Pitt and himself upon the policy to be followed, but Pitt had unduly insisted upon his own views upon personal questions. This attitude was bound to discredit Pitt in the eyes of all patriots. He was reproached for preventing the formation of a ministry and the inauguration of a strong policy for the sake of such minor points. Bute had a meeting with Newcastle after this conference,<sup>1</sup> and no doubt the duke attempted to represent Pitt's action in this unfavourable light, in order to clear the ground for himself.

As a matter of fact Pitt's friends, who held a meeting at the house of Sir Francis Dashwood on May 27,<sup>2</sup> were highly dissatisfied with his behaviour. On the one hand they blamed him for beginning negotiations of any kind, as they objected to a coalition with Newcastle; on the other hand for breaking off negotiations upon personal questions which were not of vital importance, as he would thereby damage the prestige of their party. At the bottom of their hearts their dissatisfaction was due to the fact that the attempt at coalition had failed, and that they had themselves been deprived of office in consequence.

Pitt felt himself deceived by Newcastle. He had helped the duke out of the difficulty of the investigation in the hope of finding him more compliant in consequence; the duke, however, now showed himself unexpectedly intractable, and had used Pitt's conciliatory attitude as a weapon to shake his credit. The situation from Pitt's point of view had moreover grown more unfavourable, for the reason that Newcastle could

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 227.

<sup>2</sup> Glover, p. 99.



now make his proposed attempt to found a ministry of his own. On May 27 he visited the king at Kensington,<sup>1</sup> and discussed the outlines of the new organisation. The general idea was that he and his adherents should hold the power, while the friends of the Duke of Cumberland should be given lucrative subordinate posts. Fox was to be paymaster of war. Newcastle then retired for three days to his country seat of Claremont, to discuss the matter with his advisers.<sup>2</sup>

This change in the situation remained no secret; Pitt learned of it the next day through the Archbishop of Armagh, while Bute was informed by Lord George Sackville.<sup>3</sup> The prince and princess, who were by no means satisfied with Pitt's exclusion in spite of Newcastle's intrigues, now proceeded to decisive action.<sup>4</sup> Lord Chesterfield was not himself a candidate for office, and had no interest in the matter, but was an adroit diplomatist; he was therefore commissioned to act as intermediary. He wrote a letter to Newcastle explaining the necessity of an understanding with Leicester House, and promising that Pitt would behave sensibly. Newcastle was well aware by whom Chesterfield had been commissioned, and could not disregard such a communication. On June 3 he returned to London, and on the 4th, the prince's birthday, a third attempt at agreement was arranged.<sup>5</sup> The prince proposed to celebrate his birthday by restoring domestic peace to the country. The duke succeeded in overthrowing the king's opposition, and securing his sanction to a meeting with Bute and to negotiations with Pitt,<sup>6</sup> though he had very little confidence in Pitt's willingness to act, and Newcastle was obliged to promise that he would form a ministry himself in the event of a failure.

Bute, at the instigation of Prince George, had persuaded Pitt to abandon his demands with reference to the chancellorship of the exchequer;<sup>7</sup> thus, when the conference began on June 4 between Pitt, Newcastle, and Bute, the chief obstacle had already been removed. Newcastle and Pitt were divided

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 22 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 229 f.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 24 f.

<sup>4</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 130 f. Letter of the king to Newcastle under date

June 4.

<sup>7</sup> Chesterfield to Newcastle, June 3, 1757.—Ernst, *Memoirs of Chesterfield*, p. 490.

<sup>2</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 110.

<sup>4</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 110 ff.

by no serious differences, and the main question at issue was the extent of the concessions to be made to the king. The duke considered that the king's consent could only be secured by retaining Winchilsea in office and appointing Fox to some subordinate post, while Pitt insisted upon Temple's appointment, and wished to consult his friends upon the proposal for Fox. A definite agreement was not secured, but some satisfactory course was bound to present itself if either party showed but a moderate readiness to make concessions. Here, however, Newcastle in characteristic manner proceeded to overthrow all calculations, apparently under the influence of his secret advisers. He obviously wished to prevent the execution of the plan and avoid the responsibility of its failure. On June 7 he suddenly handed the king a list of ministers, drawn up in accordance with Pitt's desires, telling the monarch that this was the result of the negotiations, and must be accepted without alteration. George II. was naturally angry to find that his wishes had been so completely disregarded, that Winchilsea and Fox had been set aside, while a cabinet office was provided for Lord Temple, his pet aversion.<sup>1</sup> In deep anger with Pitt, to whose obstinacy he could not help ascribing the result, he rejected the whole of the proposal, expecting that Newcastle, in accordance with his promise, would undertake the formation of the ministry alone. The duke, however, had no inclination for so dangerous an experiment. He merely wished to show that no combination was possible without his aid, and thus to secure favourable conditions from Pitt. Hence, in spite of his promise, he declined to undertake the ministry, and refused to have any share in the administration without Pitt's help. The king was furious—requested, threatened, and finally demanded that the duke should give his parliamentary support to the formation of a Fox ministry. Newcastle naturally declined to give any promise to that effect. He left the cabinet in apparent disgust, as if he proposed to have nothing more to do with the business.

The king in desperation now resolved to try the experiment of a Fox ministry, in which he proposed to unite all the true patriotic and loyal characters.<sup>2</sup> As nominal prime minister

<sup>1</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> See Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 25 ff.; and especially Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 115 f.

and leader of the treasury he chose Lord Waldegrave, on whose loyalty and obedience he could count, and explained his resolutions to him on June 8. Disinclined as Waldegrave was to undertake so ungrateful a task, he did not refuse to obey the express command of his king. The problem of distributing the various offices was easily solved, as the present occupants could retain the more important posts. Apart from Fox, who gladly seized this opportunity of becoming prime minister, and Waldegrave, the king had at his disposal Holderness, Winchilsea, Bedford, Granville, and Cumberland's other friends. The new ministry had reasonable hopes, if they secured some success in foreign policy and in war, of maintaining their position in Parliament.

Lord Waldegrave was so innocent as to explain the whole project in detail to Newcastle, who had no sooner heard of it than he proceeded to use all possible leverage to upset the new arrangement. One of Fox's friends brought forward a motion for the prorogation of Parliament until the new ministry had been completed; this was thrown out by the House of Commons, so that the new ministry incurred a defeat even before it had entered upon office. More serious still was the wholly unexpected resignation of Lord Holderness, the king's favourite, on June 9. There is no doubt that the first event is to be ascribed to the influence of the duke, but another explanation is usually given for the second. The Prussian ambassador Michel, who seems to have been the best informed of all the continental representatives, explains the resignation as dictated by Holderness's anxiety to avoid the disfavour of the heir to the throne, a feeling which was universal among the English nobility.<sup>1</sup> This explanation may be correct, but it is not the whole truth. Holderness may have been decided by his regard for the young court, but

<sup>1</sup> Report of June 10, 1757: 'L'âge avancé du roy, et l'espérance qu'ont bien des gens de lier mieux leur partie avec la jeune cour, sont la source réelle de ces divisions. Ceux qui voudraient servir le roy présentement, voudraient tâcher de se conserver en même temps des espérances d'être employés dans le règne futur, et c'est pourquoi qu'ils refusent d'entrer, à moins d'avoir ce but en perspective réelle; aussi est là un des motifs pour lequel le Duc de Newcastle avait voulu se lier avec les partisans de la jeune cour, et que le Lord Holdernesne était dans la même idée; mais le Roy n'ayant pas voulu se prêter à de pareilles mesures, ils préférèrent d'être sans employ et à ne pas servir leur patrie et leur maître, plutôt qu'être revêtus présentement, dans la crainte qu'à la mort de ce prince ils ne fussent obligés d'en sortir. . . . '—Berlin Archives.

Newcastle was at that time in close connection with Bute,<sup>1</sup> and was able to represent the wishes of the heir-apparent with considerable force to those whom he wished to influence. When Newcastle was interrogated by Waldegrave upon his action with regard to the resignation of Holderness,<sup>2</sup> he began by a denial, asserting that he had nothing to do with it; eventually, however, he referred complacently to his prophecy of the retirement, and boasted that his power enabled him to procure as many resignations as he liked. That these assertions were not unfounded is confirmed by the action of Lord Halifax, who admitted that he was unable to accept any office without Newcastle's permission.<sup>3</sup> In his case the duke had undertaken to reconstitute his position as first lord of the board of trade and of the colonies, in the form of a third secretaryship of state, which would have enabled Halifax to carry out a long-cherished desire for full control of American affairs. The promise, however, was not fulfilled, nor could it be. It was but one of many of the devices employed by the dexterous duke to make Fox's ministry impossible.

Thus we see that Newcastle was able to bring every force into play, and in particular the influence of the heir-apparent, to secure his ends. He turned more precisely towards the rising sun, and even risked the king's anger in his efforts to please the prince, although he was afterwards careful to throw the blame upon others. However great Pitt's credit at Leicester House, Newcastle's power of intrigue and the more important forces at his disposal made him a formidable rival even in this quarter.

The experiment of the Waldegrave-Fox ministry soon came to an end. The appointments were made on Wednesday, June 8, and Holderness announced his resignation on the 9th. The sharp-sighted Fox had no doubt whose hand had dealt the blow, and abandoned all hopes, though at a party meeting on the same evening his views were overruled by the optimism of Granville, Winchilsea, and Bedford. They hoped that their power was strong enough to enable them successfully to confront Parliament until the autumn. On

Correspondence between Newcastle and Bute on June 11.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>1</sup> Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 123 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 249 f.



Friday Waldegrave had an audience with the king, who expressed his indignation with Newcastle in somewhat hopeless terms; Waldegrave attempted to explain that a show of firmness would at least enable them to impose important conditions upon their opponents as the price of their future concurrence. In this frame of mind he supported the resolute party at the evening meeting, although Newcastle had previously attempted to dissuade him by boasts and threats. Consequently it was resolved to accept the seals on the following day, and to complete the change of ministry.

On Sunday the 12th a remarkable scene took place in the king's presence at Kensington.<sup>1</sup> The new ministers had assembled in the antechamber to kiss hands and to receive their insignia. Lord Mansfield then appeared, who had provisionally held the chancellorship of the exchequer, for an audience with the king. The king had summoned him upon the formal excuse of receiving back the seals, which Fox was then to take over; in reality the king wished to hear his views upon the situation. Mansfield asserted with great decision that the whole plan was impracticable, and would only throw the country into greater confusion. The king, who was equally dissatisfied with the project, could not resist his arguments, and ordered him to retain the seals for the moment, and to begin negotiations with Pitt and Newcastle. The most important point, which considerably increased the chances of success, was that the king definitely formulated his own demands, upon which subject Pitt and Newcastle had been unable to agree at their last meeting. Probably Mansfield had explained the limits to which he could go. The king demanded, on the one hand, that Temple should not be given an office which would necessitate his constant appearance in the royal cabinet, and on the other hand that Fox should be appointed paymaster of war.

Provided with these instructions, Mansfield forbade the return of the seals, which Devonshire and the others were ready to hand over, and thus the ministers-elect found themselves obliged to retire as they had come. The most determined among them, especially Bedford, displayed great

<sup>1</sup> See Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 131 f.; Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 29 f.; *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 245 f. (letter of Fox of June 14); Waldegrave, *Memoirs*, p. 122 ff.

indignation and overwhelmed Fox with reproaches for his want of devotion to their common cause. Waldegrave, on the other hand, who had been originally involved in the matter only by his sense of duty and devotion to the king, not only agreed to the change, but attempted to support the new project by his advice. Before the king announced his final decision he applied to Waldegrave for an unprejudiced opinion, and the information he received not only contributed to the successful conclusion of the crisis, but also largely determined the king's future attitude towards his new ministers, upon whose character and positions Waldegrave had several very apposite observations to make.

He asserted that such a ministry as the king had desired would never be able to hold its ground, owing to the hostility of two men, Newcastle and Pitt, one of whom possessed a majority in the House of Commons, while the other was supported by public opinion. Newcastle certainly hated Pitt as cordially as Pitt despised the duke, but on one point they were agreed, that no state business should be carried through until they were in office. The nation were as blindly afraid as ever of any undue support to Hanover, and this was Pitt's strongest basis of power, as he enjoyed the reputation of an opponent to the Hanoverian policy. Hence it was impossible to get on without him, at any rate in times of war. Waldegrave therefore advised, as delay was dangerous, that the king should resolve to summon Pitt and Newcastle at once.

As regards the king's rooted objection to Pitt, Waldegrave advised him to forget former annoyances, and to receive Pitt with a show of kindness and affability, when this notorious statesman would prove far less intractable. Pitt might be capable of anything if his ambitions, his pride, or his anger were aroused, but he was by no means unamenable to kindness. In any case he was bold, resolute, and no friend of half-measures. Once in office he would be more ready to make advances than any one in the country. His declared objection to Hanover would form no obstacle, for he had often shown his capacity for changing sides when such action seemed advisable, and was able to deny his own assertions with imperturbable calm.

As regarded Newcastle, Waldegrave asserted that whatever the independence he had shown, or whatever cause of offence

he had given, his appointment would deliver him into the king's hands, for only the king could support him against his dreaded rival Pitt, in whose hands or under whose influence the most important offices would be.

These observations did not exhaust the subject, nor were they entirely to the point. Waldegrave, probably for cogent reasons, had omitted to refer to the influence of the young court, and his remarks upon Newcastle were not wholly correct. Pitt had far more need of the king's support than the duke, if his popularity diminished by reason of the inevitable change of front. Much of his advice, however, was entirely true, and the effect of his words is noticeable in the king's future behaviour to Pitt. The case, however, must be unparalleled for a statesman, who had been chosen prime minister, to speak on behalf of the ministry that was turning him out of office and successfully to pave the way for their approach. The grant of the highest decoration rewarded him for his unselfish behaviour and testified to his permanent enjoyment of the king's favour.

The negotiations between the parties, which were now begun for the fourth and last time, were not left in Mansfield's hands, who was on friendly terms neither with Pitt nor with Newcastle.<sup>1</sup> Lord Hardwicke was entrusted with the task on June 15. The king had summoned him to an audience through the Duke of Devonshire,<sup>2</sup> in the course of which Hardwicke was able to solve as he wished the most important problem at the moment, the appointment to the admiralty. Hardly any other points of difference remained, as the prince had induced Pitt to make concessions, and the king had limited his desires to an acceptable minimum. They could not, however, resolve upon retaining Winchilsea, a concession upon which the king no longer insisted, and it was necessary therefore to find some one to take his place. To offer the post to Lord Temple would have been to contradict the king's express wishes, while Anson was an appointment regarded with much misgiving, as the Minorca disaster had happened under his rule. Pitt was an especial enemy of his, and had declared his opinion in the most uncompromising

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 252.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 134 ff. Letter of Hardwicke to Lord Anson under date June 18, 1757.

terms.<sup>1</sup> None the less, Hardwicke, relying upon his own prestige with the parties concerned, ventured to propose Anson, who was his son-in-law, for the admiralty. When he discussed the matter with the king Winchilsea was already in the antechamber, waiting to return his seals, and an opportunity of discussing the point was thus afforded. Hardwicke mentioned Legge as the most suitable successor, and only when the king rejected the proposal did he mention Anson's name. George appeared not only willing, but delighted with the idea, and Hardwicke was thus able to represent his own wishes as those of the king at an evening meeting with Newcastle, Pitt, and Bute. Newcastle naturally agreed at once, while Pitt waited until Bute had declared himself. When he had agreed with the duke, Pitt gave a general consent, though he proceeded to propose certain conditions, upon which the further struggle turned.<sup>2</sup>

If Pitt were to have the conduct of the war it was of high importance for him, as we have already observed, to secure control of the admiralty. Lord Temple, the former occupant of this post, had always been ready to carry out Pitt's views. If, however, a member of the Newcastle group was to be placed in charge, some other means of securing control must be devised. Pitt, therefore, demanded nothing less than the conduct of the entire correspondence of the admirals and commanders, the admiralty being left only in possession of its executive functions. The office was thus to be deprived of its military and strategical character. Hitherto the first lord had taken his orders and instructions from the cabinet, and was concerned merely with their transmission and with the elaboration of the necessary details, but even in this fact Pitt saw, with full justification, a possible danger to his own freedom of action. He knew only too well how Newcastle was able to use such weapons for the furtherance of his own plans. The duke naturally declined this new demand, and a second crisis was brought about. Pitt found himself obliged to explain his wishes to the king, with the result that a compromise was adopted. The new secretary of state was to write out his instructions and to secure the signatures of three

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Pitt was loud in his praise.—Thackeray, ii. 218.

<sup>2</sup> Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*, p. 227.



members of the admiralty.<sup>1</sup> In this way the old methods were retained in outward appearance, but in reality Pitt gained full control of every naval expedition, and sent instructions to the commanders of squadrons exactly as he did to generals, ambassadors, and governors.

Thus the last difficulty had been set aside. No other point of controversy arose, and on June 18 Hardwicke was able to hand the list of ministers to the king, which now met with ready acceptance. The appointments were not entirely complete, for the reason that there was a difficulty in finding a suitable candidate for the post of keeper of the great seal, or chancellor.<sup>2</sup> The two lords justices declined, and with some trouble the attorney-general, Sir Robert Henley, was at length induced to accept the post in return for a promise of important concessions. This was to be regarded as a success for Pitt. He had made a place for his former schoolfellow and legal adviser, Charles Pratt, who now became attorney-general, and, on the other hand, the parliamentary seat of Bath became vacant, which Pitt wished to represent.<sup>3</sup>

From the king's point of view it was high time to secure a ministry which promised some permanence, for on June 24 news arrived of King Frederick's utter defeat at Kollin, which was thought to have sealed the fate of that bold hero. Had the news arrived at an earlier date new difficulties might have arisen if Pitt had increased his demands in the certainty that he was indispensable. At the present moment it served merely to accelerate the conclusion of arrangements, and on June 29 the new ministry was admitted to kiss hands.

The effect of the new coalition was to secure Newcastle and his friends in occupation of a number of high offices, which gave them important influence upon domestic affairs and extended their powers of patronage, while their influence upon foreign policy and the conduct of the war was correspondingly diminished. The duke's powers in Parliament were in no way to be decreased, but were intended to be at Pitt's disposal and to form a foundation for his strong government. Thus, while Newcastle was placed at the head of the treasury,

<sup>1</sup> The story that Pitt kept them uninformed of the contents of documents, and caused a blank sheet to be placed over the text when they signed, as Almon relates, is an obvious myth.—Cp. *Quarterly Review*, lxxvi. 231.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 232 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 144.

the other treasury posts were given to Pitt's adherents, the second place falling to Henry Legge, who was appointed chancellor of the exchequer, and the fourth to James Grenville. The two secretaryships of state were occupied by Pitt, who took the south, and Holderness, who took the north. Temple became lord privy seal, and Halifax took the board of trade and the colonies. Lord Granville continued to act as president of the council, to the Duke of Devonshire fell the lord chamberlain's staff, while Bedford retained his position as lord-lieutenant of Ireland. We have already observed that Anson entered the admiralty, and that Fox gained the paymastership. Of Pitt's relations and friends it remains to mention George Grenville, who was treasurer to the navy, Boscawen and Temple West, who became lords of the admiralty, appointments intended to make Pitt's influence decisive in naval administration. Lord Barrington remained at the war office.

Thus the government came into existence, the life and soul and the most powerful member of which was certainly Pitt. So concentrated and firmly founded an administration has seldom been seen in England. The vigorous and uniform guidance, which was a necessary consequence of its nature, gave England a vast advantage over her opponents, and was the reason of her later success. Even in monarchical France the prime minister enjoyed no such independence as Pitt secured, and was to secure to an even greater extent. He was not merely supported by a majority opposed to the attacks of a minority; all groups worthy of mention were satisfied and were content to accept his leadership, provided that they were allowed to continue in existence. Pitt's friends, adherents of Newcastle, and followers of the Duke of Cumberland either met in the cabinet or had secured lucrative posts. Pitt had thus secured one rare advantage for a statesman: he was freed from all anxiety, at any rate for a long time to come, concerning the maintenance of his power, and he could devote his entire strength to the full use of it.<sup>1</sup> It is true that any heavy defeat might

<sup>1</sup> In 1759 the Bavarian ambassador wrote: 'Autrefois les choses se faisaient avec lenteur et langueur et on croyait toujours que la constitution du gouvernement en était la cause, mais il [Pitt] nous désabuse par l'activité avec laquelle tout se fait aujourd'hui.'—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

cost him his position, and he could not, like Frederick the Great, after some crushing overthrow, retain his predominance and continue his policy. But such an eventuality could be best avoided by the energetic conduct of the war, so that military success was but another term for continuance in office.

This domestic struggle, the complications of which I have attempted to explain, may be regarded, to a certain extent, as one act of the great war. It was, too, a most important act, impossible to omit or to describe with undue brevity, the more so as it provides an explanation of many later and important events. Now, however, we have to turn our attention to the situation abroad, which at that moment became extremely gloomy in every quarter of the world, and made the position of the state appear almost desperate.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE CRISIS

WHEN Pitt had been formerly appointed secretary of state, he was obliged to look for a parliamentary seat, as his own seat, which Newcastle had provided, was vacated by his appointment. On this occasion there was no such necessity. As his office had been unoccupied during the interregnum, his appointment was not regarded as the acceptance of a new office. Pitt, however, was anxious to represent his beloved Bath, and he therefore secured his appointment to an unimportant subordinate post, thus losing his seat for Oakhampton.<sup>1</sup> The former member for Bath, Henley, had been appointed lord keeper, and the election followed on July 9,<sup>2</sup> when Pitt's cause was zealously espoused by Ralph Allen, who made himself responsible for the not inconsiderable expense. As Pitt could not be present he entrusted Mr. Potter<sup>3</sup> with the task of his representation, and, in accordance with Allen's precise instructions, he wrote a letter of excuse to the mayor and corporation of the town. The Oakhampton seat was now given to Potter, who had hitherto represented Aylesbury,<sup>4</sup> a little town near the estates of Stowe and Wotton, and under the influence of the Grenville family. Aylesbury was represented by a man who was afterwards to play a considerable part in English history, and who owed much of his advancement to Lord Temple. This was John Wilkes, a versatile personality, and somewhat of a demagogue, who now placed his powers at Pitt's service.<sup>5</sup> There was no claim upon his parliamentary energies at the moment, as Parliament was pro-

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 144 f.

<sup>2</sup> Ralph Allen to Pitt, July 2, 1757.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> J. Grist to Pitt, July 9, 1757.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>4</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 237, note. Cp. *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 260.

<sup>5</sup> Wilkes to Pitt, July 14, 1757.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 237 f.



rogued for a short time when the ministerial change had been completed, and the session then came to an end.

Pitt undertook the conduct of affairs at a most unfavourable time. We have already seen that immediately upon the conclusion of his agreement with Newcastle the news of the defeat of Kollin had arrived and had caused great depression in England. The immediate result was more peremptory action on the part of Austria, with whom any actual breach had been so far avoided. The ambassador, Count Colloredo, suddenly left the country at this moment after sending a curt notice of his departure,<sup>1</sup> and the prospect of using Austria's influence upon France, to protect Hanover in the last resort, was correspondingly diminished. All hopes of saving the king's province now depended upon Cumberland and his army.

In June news of other misfortunes arrived,<sup>2</sup> which directly affected England and stirred the nation to its depths. This came from Bengal in the north of India, and requires a brief explanation.<sup>3</sup>

The situation in the Ganges delta was as it had been in previous years, wherever European factories were erected. The settlements were entirely dependent upon the native prince, the Nabob of Bengal, and were confined to commerce within the boundaries and under the limitations conceded. Calcutta, indeed, had been fortified, but only sufficiently to secure the town against the Mahratta invasions, for which purpose the nabob had given his permission. These works were inadequate, and had not been completed by the summer of 1756. Those good relations with the ruling prince, on which previous development had been based, were disturbed in April, when a new ruler, Surajah Dowlah, ascended the throne. This prince, a cruel character and ill disposed to the English, was irritated by the fact that they began to repair their fortifications in preparation for the impending French war. The nabob regarded this action, not merely as a piece of disobedience, but also as showing a want of confidence in his will and power to keep the peace in his own country. Although the work upon the fortifications was immediately stopped, the nabob, attracted by the treasures which he

<sup>1</sup> Correspondence with Holderness, June 27-28, 1757.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Orme, *Military Transactions in Hindostan*, III. book vi. London, 1803.

assumed the town to possess, proceeded to the attack in June 1756, excusing his action on the ground that the inhabitants had protected an outlaw within their walls.

The inadequate garrison and fortifications of Calcutta were unable to hold out against the superior forces of the enemy, the less so as the commander, with a number of officers and militia, treacherously deserted the town in the ships and boats destined for the women and children. On June 20 the nabob stormed the place, and the remnant of the defenders together with the authorities were taken prisoners. They were brought into the fort and, for want of a better place of confinement, were shut in for the night by the nabob's subordinates in that narrow dungeon, the Black Hole, which has gained a dismal notoriety from the appalling consequences. In the burning heat of summer one hundred and forty-six persons, including a woman, were confined for the whole night in a low chamber some twenty feet square, with only two little windows. Survivors have given full details of the harrowing scenes which continued throughout those hours; by morning all but twenty-three had succumbed to their frightful sufferings. No doubt the nabob had not issued orders for the perpetration of this atrocity, but the indifference which he showed after the event and the severity with which he treated the few prisoners that remained, showed that the action of his subordinates was far from distasteful to him.

This news reached London in June and aroused the deepest depression. The public attitude was marked rather by horror and indignation at the atrocity than by anxiety for the Indian colonies, this being a matter which concerned the company rather than the nation. The government was therefore content to await the effect of the measures it had taken in December, and to leave the rest to the company and its Indian representatives.

In this situation it was absolutely necessary for Pitt to give clear proof of his capacities and to find some means of removing the general depression; otherwise there was a risk that the timorous Newcastle might shatter his plans by persuading the majority of the cabinet to the conclusion of a despairing peace. There was, however, no opportunity or prospect of any enterprise which would produce immediate result. In Germany Cumberland was in control of affairs; he would accept support

but would not submit to instructions, and any victories won in that quarter would redound entirely to the reputation of the duke. As regards America, all possible measures had been taken, and nothing could be done but to await the result, which might be a lengthy process. Prospects in India were equally hopeless; years might pass before any news of success arrived. For Pitt's purpose the sole remaining possibility was a direct attack on the French coasts, for only here could he achieve some rapid and brilliant success, if not of permanent importance. He has been blamed for his recklessness in expending the forces of his country on an ill-prepared and somewhat hopeless enterprise; however, his measures were certainly not actuated by ignorance of the risk involved, but by respect for the difficulties of his own position and for the temper of the nation.

His plan of attack on the French coasts was conceived immediately after his entry into office, for as early as July 7 orders for that purpose were issued to the admiralty,<sup>1</sup> and negotiations with the Duke of Argyle were begun for the enlistment of Scottish troops.<sup>2</sup> His information upon the disposition of the French forces<sup>3</sup> led him to conclude, that after the departure of the armies intended for Germany the defence of the Atlantic coast would be considerably weakened. At first he thought that 3000 men and 6000 tonnage of transport ships would suffice, and he issued orders for their concentration, with provisions for three months. His demands then increased week by week, until by July 26 the force had risen to 8000 men, the transport fleet to 10,000 tons, together with a ship for the staff and a hospital-ship, while provisions were taken for four and a half months. The reasons for this increase seem to have been due to the fact that Pitt's plan of attack was only gradually formed and that he required time to elaborate the details. His measures were largely decided by the report of a Scottish lieutenant, Robert Clarke, which was handed to Colonel John Ligonier on July 15<sup>4</sup> and immediately received Pitt's consideration. In 1754,

<sup>1</sup> Colonial Office Records, America and West Indies, No. 69, Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Barrington to Pitt, July 9, 1757.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. p. 80 f.

<sup>4</sup> Chatham MSS. Cp. Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 43; and Dodington, p. 393. The report is to be found in the Public Record Office, America and West Indies, No. 69.

when returning from Gibraltar, Clarke had made a short stay in Rochefort, a harbour situated at the mouth of the Charente, with the express object of examining its fortifications, in view of a possible English descent upon that spot. He was received, as he relates, by the commandant, to whom he applied in uniform, with great affability, and was allowed to visit the warships in the harbour and to examine the town. Accompanied by an engineer, he had gone round the place and observed the many deficiencies of the fortifications. The works were inadequately protected on the flanks, there were no covered ways nor trenches along whole lines of front, and there was no wall on the river bank, the defences in that quarter consisting of shallow muddy ditches. Batteries were also lacking at important points, and it seemed an easy task to secure possession of the place. The engineer asserted that the fortifications had been in this condition for seventy or eighty years, a statement confirmed by the examination of an old map.

Relying upon this somewhat antiquated description, Pitt immediately resolved to make Rochefort his objective. He can hardly have failed to consider the possibility that the fortress might have been placed in a posture of thorough defence during the intervening years, especially after the outbreak of war; he hoped, however, that a rapid surprise would disclose a lack of preparation, or that some other success might be secured if Rochefort proved too strong. His instructions to the commander were thus somewhat indefinite<sup>1</sup> and left him considerable freedom of action. It is obvious that Pitt was only anxious to inflict the greatest possible damage upon the enemy, no matter in what quarter. Rochefort happened to be the nearest and most promising point of attack, but was not stated to be the only possible point. Pitt justified the enterprise as based upon a policy that was to be important throughout the war, explaining that France would be forced by this attack to withdraw some portion of her troops from the seat of war in Germany, by which means the situation of the duke of Cumberland would be relieved. It is doubtful whether he regarded this argument or motive as really decisive, for it was highly improbable that France, who possessed some 90,000 troops to guard her coasts, would weaken her German army in order to repel a few thousand invaders.

<sup>1</sup> Instructions to Lieutenant-General Mordaunt, Chatham MSS.



Pitt met with little opposition in the cabinet council.<sup>1</sup> At the decisive sitting at the beginning of August he produced a captured pilot, Joseph Thierry by name,<sup>2</sup> who had been attached for a considerable time to the man-of-war *Magnanime*, recently captured by the English, and had often taken this ship into Rochefort harbour. He gave a very favourable description of the possibilities of entry between the islands at the mouth of the Charente, and developed a complete programme of action for the conquest of the town, which was afterwards partially carried out. He proposed that the island of Aix should first be captured, and described its fortifications and defences; a landing was then to be made north of the river mouth on the point of Fouras, which might easily be taken with the support of a vigorous fire from the ships; thence it would be possible to march upon Rochefort by a good dry road. His description of the fortifications of the town corresponded with Clarke's, and the cabinet council were convinced that the enterprise offered no great difficulty. Pitt's arrangements were consequently approved, but there was some difficulty in finding a capable general. George Sackville declined, regarding the project as impracticable, and General Conway showed much misgiving. Eventually the supreme command of the troops was given to General Mordaunt, a brave soldier who had, however, lost some of his nerve, while Admiral Hawke undertook the command of the fleet. The force was to consist of sixteen ships of the line with some frigates and transport ships, with ten battalions each of 700 men, and 100 cavalry, and the necessary artillery. The warships were ordered to concentrate at Spithead off the Isle of Wight,<sup>3</sup> and the troops at Portsmouth, with the object of putting to sea upon the first favourable wind. Hawke and Mordaunt received full instructions, and sealed orders were also given to their subordinates, General Conway, Lord Cornwallis, Vice-Admiral Knowles, and Rear-Admiral Brodrick, in case the command should devolve upon them.<sup>4</sup> All was ready by August 10, but at the moment of weighing anchor

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 44 f.

<sup>2</sup> Protocol of the sitting with Thierry's evidence.—Colonial Office Records, America and West Indies, No. 69, Public Record Office.

<sup>3</sup> Pitt to the Admiralty, July 20, 1757.—Colonial Office Records, No. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Instructions of August 5.—Colonial Office Records.

unfavourable and stormy winds arose, preventing the departure for three weeks.<sup>1</sup> To this long delay is chiefly to be ascribed the failure of the enterprise, and for Pitt personally it was not only displeasing but also dangerous, as the situation grew appreciably worse during the interim.

The Duke of Cumberland had concentrated his army towards the end of April at Bielefeld, with the object of covering Hanover, while abandoning the western Prussian territory. He had some 40,000 men at his disposal, while his opponent, the Marshal d'Estrées, could place 80,000 in the field. Upon the advance of the French in June, Cumberland retreated beyond the Weser to take up a strong position at Hameln, and here his fate was decided on July 26, 1757. The marshal had crossed the Weser further up stream and attacked the duke upon the south of his position, which was based upon the village of Hastenbeck. It cannot be said that the fierce battle which ensued ended in any decisive defeat for the army of observation; Cumberland, conscious of his numerical weakness, possibly abandoned his efforts too early, but in any case the allies retreated and did not stop until they had placed the Elbe between themselves and their very dilatory pursuers. The defeated troops concentrated upon the little fortress of Stade, thus surrendering the capital and the whole of the Electorate.

The news of this portentous disaster, which in a sense completed the defeat of Kollin, and seemed to conclude the failure of the continental policy,<sup>2</sup> reached London on August 4. The king and court and Cumberland's friends were naturally completely depressed by the news, though the nation showed no special anxiety, but even a certain satisfaction at the defeat of this unpopular prince. The king fell into complete despair. His years of effort had been spent in vain and his worst forebodings seemed about to be fulfilled. Hence his first idea was to stand aloof from the continental war and secure the neutrality of his province at any cost. This had, indeed, ever been his chosen policy and that of the Hanoverian

<sup>1</sup> Report of Prussian embassy, August 30, 1757: 'L'armement de Portsmouth ne peut point partir non plus et y est toujours retenu par les vents orageux et contraires qui règnent ici depuis près de trois semaines.'

<sup>2</sup> Chesterfield to Dayrolles, August 15, 1757: 'Besides the war must soon now be at an end, for it is evident that neither we nor our only ally, the king of Prussia, can carry it on three months longer.'—*Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1171 f.

ministers, though it could only have been realised at the price of severe conditions. But the king was now ready for anything.<sup>1</sup>

At this point, however, Pitt intervened with an energetic veto. He felt little personal interest in the affair; Cumberland was not his friend, and he had had little to do with the organisation or leadership of the army of observation. The collapse of the Hanoverian policy would in no way injure his position; he had not introduced it, and had, indeed, derived much advantage from his reputation as its bitterest opponent. Now, however, his personal interests were overshadowed by his responsibility for the welfare of the state. The defeat was a misfortune for the state, for it implied an increase of power and reputation for the enemy. Hence it was necessary, regardless of sympathies or antipathies, to recover this heavy loss, and not, as the king desired, to confine all efforts to securing what remained. Hanover's neutrality would enable France to concentrate the whole of her forces upon England's ally, Prussia, which would then be crushed, with the result that there would be no obstacle to the subjugation of England by the formidable power of her neighbour. The necessity of the Hanoverian policy was made the more obvious by this failure, and farsighted statesmen were therefore bound to support it with greater vigour.

Pitt and the other ministers under his influence rejected the king's plans, and gave him the sum of £120,000 from the million that had been voted in the spring to spend upon the army of observation,<sup>2</sup> a measure which brought down upon Pitt some veiled criticism from his brother-in-law, George Grenville.<sup>3</sup> The majority of the cabinet were anxious that the force destined for Rochefort should be sent to Germany to help the duke, but to this Pitt would not agree. When he demanded that his objection should be stated in the report to the king, the other members abandoned their proposal upon the condition that Pitt would himself inform the king of his refusal.<sup>4</sup> They may have hoped to delay the departure of the squadron by this means. In any case, Pitt's action was

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, August 5, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 153; Dodington, p. 405.

<sup>3</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 243 f.

<sup>4</sup> Dodington, p. 404.

dictated by the fact that he did not wish to hand over to the duke the force which he had collected with such difficulty. Even he was not able to realise the full extent of the disaster of the battle of Hastenbeck.

The king, who was unable to secure either peace for his province or adequate reinforcements for its defence, went his own way, in accordance with the news which came in to him from Germany, while Pitt made efforts to improve the desperate situation by diplomacy and hoped for favourable news from the colonies.

A number of diplomatic and military attempts followed, which were almost invariably unsuccessful, and which ended in a series of misfortunes disclosed to the despairing nation within the space of a few weeks during that autumn; to have faced and overcome the resulting crisis is not the smallest part of Pitt's claims to fame, though the state was eventually brought past the dead centre by the impulse of an event entirely outside Pitt's control.

Austria had made one fatal mistake; after the breach with England, she should have placed her Belgian harbours of Ostend and Nieuport at the disposal of the French, who would then have been able to threaten the English coasts with a new and serious danger. Pitt immediately attempted to turn the circumstance to diplomatic account. In a cabinet council of August 18 he carried a proposal for suggesting an alliance with the Spanish government<sup>1</sup> to meet the danger with which the balance of power in Europe was menaced by France; the object of this alliance was to be the reconquest of Minorca, and its price the surrender of Gibraltar to Spain, with the English settlements in Honduras. How this important and striking resolution was secured our sources of information do not tell us, but there must have been a vigorous struggle between Pitt and the Newcastle group, for we have two letters from Bute to Pitt,<sup>2</sup> in which Bute attempts to console him for the treatment he had received from Newcastle's party, and reminds him that the former government had been able to secure peace by the sacrifice of half America. It is probable that Pitt was only attempting to avoid the danger of a

<sup>1</sup> Protocol in the Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Of August 25 and undated, but clearly belonging to those days.—Chatham MSS.



premature peace by advancing the prospect of an alliance with Spain and consenting to the sacrifice of Gibraltar, to which fortress he was led, by the reports which had come to him, to attach very little importance.<sup>1</sup>

On August 23 Pitt therefore sent a wholly secret and confidential communication to the ambassador at Madrid,<sup>2</sup> Sir Benjamin Keene, in which he informed him of the cabinet's decision. The ambassador was commissioned to explain the danger of the situation to the minister Wall, and especially to emphasise the grievous consequences of an Austrian domination in Italy; hence he was to deduce the necessity for an Anglo-Spanish federation, for the realisation of which the proposed concessions of territory were to be brought forward. He was also to hint that English help would be available to secure the succession in the kingdom of the two Sicilies in accordance with the king's desire. At the same time he was instructed to advance the offer of Gibraltar very tentatively, and to give no basis for a claim until England was secure of her advantage.

Keene received the despatch on September 10, and, notwithstanding his shattered health, which ended in his death in that year, he undertook personally this thankless task, the hopelessness of which he recognised from the outset. In a private conversation with Wall he expounded the ideas of the cabinet. We have already seen that Wall could not venture to show any partiality to England. In the present case, in view of the constant annoyances which the Spaniards had suffered from English privateers, traders and smugglers, he considered it advisable, not only to reject the proposal, but to do so with some show of abruptness. He complained that the English government had deprived him of all possibility of supporting English interests by their unrighteous behaviour, and straightway declared that he could not support the proposals or even venture to transmit them to the authorities. He saw no particular danger in the progress of France, and from past experience he would consider the situation almost worse if England were to gain the upper hand and lay her yoke upon the other states. Pitt, moreover, had been mistaken in his reference to the Sicilian succession, for a suggestion of making

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 82 f.

<sup>2</sup> Correspondence in the *Chatham Papers*, i, 247 ff. and 263 ff.

this question an international affair was bound to offend Spanish pride. Keene did not venture to carry out this part of his commission, but informed his superior that the matter had been already settled between the two related kingdoms. Some days after the conversation Keene received a written answer to his proposal definitely and repeatedly stating a refusal under thinly veiled threats. The ambassador's report of this failure reached Pitt's hands on October 14, while the diplomatic body became aware at the same time, through private letters, of the unfavourable temper of the Spanish court.<sup>1</sup> There was no need to regard the threats as serious,<sup>2</sup> for the pacific character of the Catholic king was well known, but all hopes of Spanish help were abandoned. Whether Pitt had ever cherished hopes of the kind, or was merely anxious to revive the courage of his colleagues for the moment, must remain doubtful.

While Pitt was attempting to raise a new enemy against France in the west, he was also making efforts to free the rear of his Prussian ally by a reconciliation with Russia. The English ambassador in St. Petersburg, Hanbury Williams, seemed to him unequal to his task, for he did not succeed in restraining the empress from entering upon her alliance with Austria and France. Hence an order was issued for his recall on July 15.<sup>3</sup> This was hardly justified, for when King Frederick had taken up arms, the most dexterous ambassador in the world could not have prevented the alliance. Nothing but a series of successes by Prussia could have made this possible. When the king withdrew his army from Bohemia in the winter, the war party gained the upper hand, and the ambassador had some trouble in maintaining a good understanding with England. The Prussian advance upon Bohemia in the spring of 1757 and the battle of Prague somewhat improved the prospect.<sup>4</sup> Though the majority of the council, out of respect for the empress, continued to support the war, it was a considerable success to have induced a minority to entertain the idea of peace and to have necessitated the issue of a special note to secure the continuance of the former

<sup>1</sup> Bothmer (Danish ambassador) to Bernstorff, November 16, 1757.—Confidential Miscellaneous.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 282.

<sup>3</sup> Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> Report of Hanbury Williams of May 24, 1757.—Public Record Office.

policy. In June the czarina herself began to contemplate peace, and it seemed that the fall of Prague would determine her attitude.<sup>1</sup> The battle of Kollin then shattered the hopes of the English ambassador, and shortly afterwards he received his recall, which so depressed his genial character that, as we have previously mentioned, upon his return in October his depression ended in insanity. He died in 1759.

As Russia seemed upon the point of beginning hostilities against Prussia, the question then arose whether England, in accordance with King Frederick's urgent desires, should send a squadron to the Baltic to turn the Russians from aggressive measures by threatening their coasts. Pitt had already resolved not to pursue this policy, not only from the difficulty of sparing ships,<sup>2</sup> but because he feared to provoke Russia, and even more Sweden, which was then making preparations. He thought he could do more for Prussia by remaining on good terms with these powers than by taking a direct share in the war. He had also to consider England's great interest in the Baltic trade, which was to be supported by a renewal of the commercial treaty. The St. Petersburg court was highly apprehensive of the English naval power, and the greatest excitement was caused at the end of August when the Russian ambassador in London, Prince Gallitzin, announced that he had been threatened with the despatch of a squadron. The ambassadors of the foreign powers immediately seized the opportunity of inciting the empress against England. However, a few days afterwards, Gallitzin reported that no fleet would be sent that year, and Elizabeth's despatches became more friendly.<sup>3</sup> Eventually, however, the English government was hoodwinked by the half-friendly and half-threatening attitude adopted by Russia throughout the war, who was able to use her whole power against Prussia, while keeping England in check. Nor could England secure anything more than a provisional treaty.

While Pitt was prime mover in this affair, another matter came to a very disastrous conclusion without his interference.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Report of June 10, 1757.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 259 f. D'Abreu (Spanish ambassador) to Grimaldi, July 19, 1757.—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

<sup>3</sup> Report of Hanbury Williams on August 20, 1757.—Public Record Office.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 57 ff.

Upon the retirement of the Duke of Cumberland with his defeated troops to Stade, the king became extremely anxious for the fate of his abandoned Electorate. Not only was he afraid that the province might be stripped of its resources, but he was particularly apprehensive that France might return to her Swedish allies, the principalities of Bremen and Verden, which had once belonged to Sweden. He therefore ordered the duke to enter into negotiations with the French commander, the Duke of Richelieu, informing the Hanoverian ministers of his intentions, but concealing them from the English government, whose objections to this step he well knew. He ordered his son-in-law, the King of Denmark, to act as intermediary, and the settlement of the conditions was therefore entrusted to the Danish ambassador, the Count of Lynar. In accordance with the imperative desires of George II. the ambassador was able on December 8 to secure the passing of that somewhat inglorious convention known by the name of Kloster Zeven.

Meanwhile Frederick the Great had been informed of these negotiations. He immediately complained to the English ministers, who were absolutely ignorant of the whole affair, and proceeded to make the most vigorous representations to their king. George II. was induced, probably by the promise of full and adequate support, to abandon his plans, and sent orders to Cumberland on September 16 to delay the conclusion of the negotiations. He was of course too late, for on the following day the news of the signing of the convention arrived in London.<sup>1</sup>

The king, who had drawn fresh hopes from the kindly overtures of his ministers, displayed the utmost indignation at this disgraceful convention, and immediately attempted to represent it as the work of his son, and as completed against his own will and pleasure. His theory was that fear and vacillation had led the duke to exceed his instructions. Of this there was indeed no positive proof, for the letters which the king laid before the council through Münchhausen, and which are only a selection of the correspondence on the point, merely stated the terms of the duke's commission. The ministers, however, were convinced, and it was Pitt who,

<sup>1</sup> On this and the following, see *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 277 ff., and *Walpole*, iii. 60 f.



with noble generosity, now came forward on the side of his old opponent, whose influence had deprived him of his position as minister some months before. On this occasion, secure of his own strength, he did not hesitate to oppose the king's wishes. He plainly declared that the letters proved exactly the contrary to that which they were supposed to represent, and when the king told him that he had given his son no orders for the conclusion of the treaty, Pitt replied firmly, 'But full powers, sir, very full powers.' The case, however, was represented even to the continental courts in the light which the king desired.

Cumberland returned to London on October 12 at the king's orders, and met with an insulting reception from his father. However, he retained a cheerful consciousness of the fact that he had acted strictly in accordance with his instructions, which he had in his pocket, as he told his friends, though he refrained from publishing them out of respect to the king. He was himself proposing to renew the struggle, as is proved by a plan for the reorganisation of his forces which he submitted to the secretary of war immediately after the battle of Hastenbeck.<sup>1</sup> He had now resolved upon his course of action. The king would do nothing for his justification, and could indeed do but little in the face of his representations to foreign powers, and Cumberland therefore resolved to exercise the sole power that remained to him of clearing his character. On October 15 he resigned his post as commander-in-chief, and even declined to continue in command of his regiment of Life Guards, notwithstanding the persuasions of the king through the mouth of Bedford. Thus the duke disappeared from the political scene, in which he had for so long played an important part.

Pitt's position was greatly strengthened by this affair. The duke could not fail to mark his sense of gratitude for Pitt's noble behaviour, and when the cabinet ministers waited upon him he showed special attention to Pitt, a fact which was correctly interpreted as a sign of complete reconciliation. Hitherto Cumberland had been the only force threatening any serious danger to the new government. It had been supposed that he would do his best to turn out the coalition

<sup>1</sup> Appended to a letter from Barrington to Pitt of August 4.—Chatham MSS.

ministry as soon as possible after his return,<sup>1</sup> and this he would probably have done had he returned in triumph. Any attempt of the kind was now out of the question;<sup>2</sup> but as Pitt had been astute enough to display such kindness to him, no secret intrigues or opposition were to be feared from his agency. The last and the most powerful of the malcontents gave in his unconditional approval to the new situation, and placed no obstacles before those of his friends who were willing to serve the man who was more obviously than ever the leader and the motive power of the ministry. The only person who showed any signs of disaffection was the king, at whose expense, to some extent, the last compromise had been secured; his power, however, had been broken since all parties gathered round Pitt, and for this he had largely himself to blame. His grandson, the successor to the throne, came to be regarded as the true representative of the monarchy, as it was under his ægis that the all-powerful ministry had been formed.

The terms of the convention of Zeven imposed neutrality upon the Hanoverian army, and confined it to the district of Stade, on the right bank of the Elbe, the other contingents being obliged to return home. The convention still lacked the ratification of the respective governments, and was never entirely completed, as this was withheld, until it was finally broken by a fresh series of events. The French, however, were able to occupy the principality without hindrance and to avail themselves of its resources.

Meanwhile the expedition to Rochefort had come to an unexpected and inglorious end.<sup>3</sup> It was not until the beginning of September that the storms which had hindered the departure of the squadron ceased, and Pitt now energetically urged departure. The messenger whom he despatched to Hawke and Mordaunt on September 8 had strict orders not to return until he could bring final news of departure. The

<sup>1</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1176.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, October 18: ' . . . un événement dont ils [Pitt and Newcastle] ne sont pas fâchés puisqu'il rendra leur système plus solide et leurs délibérations plus unanimes.'—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Upon the expedition, see the official despatches, protocols, and reports in the Colonial Office Records; Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 48 ff.; some remarks in a pamphlet, 'Another Answer to the letters of . . . Pitt to Ralph Allen,' London 1763, which attempts to connect the failure with the convention of Kloster Zeven. A journal of the expedition is also to be found in Dodington, p. 398 ff.

ships therefore weighed anchor on September 8, but unfavourable winds, fog, and calms<sup>1</sup> so delayed their voyage that they did not arrive off Rochefort until September 20. On the voyage they learned from the neutral ships they met that the French were everywhere preparing for an English descent,<sup>2</sup> which was naturally the result of the delays both in starting and on the voyage. The secret had indeed been well kept, for even in England people believed till the last moment that the fleet had some other objective, such as Brest, Martinique, or San Domingo.<sup>3</sup> It was, however, impossible to conceal the fact that a great enterprise was on foot, and the French therefore had full leisure to reorganise the entire defence of their coasts.

Mordaunt's instructions,<sup>4</sup> after explaining the purpose of the expedition, ran as follows: ' . . . Our will and pleasure is, that you do, in the most vigorous and effectual manner, attempt, as far as shall be found practicable, a descent on the French coast, at or near Rochefort, in order, if practicable, to attack and force that place; and to burn and destroy to the utmost of your power all docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping that shall be found there; and make such other efforts as you shall judge most proper for annoying the enemy.' Then, after the successful or unsuccessful execution of this task, Mordaunt was ordered, 'Should the condition of our force and fleet and the season of the year permit further operations, with a prospect of success,' to attempt to force Port l'Orient or Bordeaux, or any other point north of Bordeaux that seemed practicable. In every case, however, he was ordered not to establish himself in the country, but to confine himself to the destruction of all works and material of any military value. The return of the expedition was arranged for the end of September.

The form of these instructions, together with the wholly inadequate information upon the enemy's forces and means of defence, was calculated to invite failure. We do not know how the orders were drawn up,<sup>5</sup> or who was responsible for

<sup>1</sup> From the resolution of the council of war of September 25, 1757.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Resolution of the council of war.

<sup>3</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1180.

<sup>4</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>5</sup> Pitt once declared at a later date that he had often been outvoted in the cabinet during his tenure of office.

the many conditions they contained, but the fact is undoubted that to these limitations failure was largely due. Under the existing conditions, energetic action could only have been secured by strict orders, to which the chief could have appealed in case of a bad catastrophe. Vigorous offensive measures could alone offer any prospect of success in the present case, and these were practically excluded by conditions which provided that the officers should answer a question upon which they had no information, namely, whether the enterprise was practicable before they proceeded to action.

A general acting under a far-seeing government with a reputation for justice and military knowledge would probably have made light of these limitations and taken his measures on the principle of 'Nothing venture, nothing have,' convinced that his action would be approved even in case of defeat. Nobody was likely to venture upon this course of action when confronted by a government which was ready, in case of failure, to give ear to popular and partisan outcry, and which had already shot one admiral for mistakes never entirely proved. The government was now in the hands of Newcastle, who had largely contributed to Byng's condemnation, and in those of Pitt, who had done nothing to prevent it. Thus it is obvious that the severity exercised in Byng's case had produced an opposite effect to that intended. Irresolute officers were made no bolder, while the resolute and the vigorous, in which class must certainly be placed the leaders of this expedition, became more timid and more careful to adhere to the strict letter of their instructions. Byng himself had been somewhat paralysed by the influence of an earlier court-martial. The case at this moment was even worse; no one was afraid of falling before the enemy, but the possibility of a criminal execution was enough to appal the boldest.

Rochefort lies some miles from the sea on the river Charente, in the broad lower reaches of which the harbour is situated. Before the mouth are the two large islands of Oléron on the south, and Rhé on the north; the north bank of the Charente projects far into the sea, and its head is occupied by Fort Fouras. Near this point is the little island of Aix, which was fortified and garrisoned. It was not until September 22 that the ships sailed between the islands.



At this moment the frigate *Viper* arrived with an order from Pitt, dated September 15, removing the time limit from the enterprise, an extension being necessitated by the delays which had taken place.<sup>1</sup> The commanders, in accordance with the proposals of Thierry, began by devoting their attention to the island of Aix. On September 23, at ten o'clock in the morning, a squadron of five men-of-war and some smaller vessels, guided by Thierry on the *Magnanime*, approached the fort, which bombarded them for more than an hour. The fire of the ships then gained the upper hand, and thirty-five minutes later the forts were silenced and capitulated. Six hundred prisoners and thirty-six guns fell into the hands of the victors,<sup>2</sup> and the forts were then blown up. Instead, however, of following up the victory, and immediately attacking Fouras as Conway demanded, the commander of the squadron, Admiral Knowles, ruined the whole of the enterprise by postponing further action until the next day.

Mordaunt was anxious to avoid responsibility and to secure proof of the impracticability of further operations. He had no liking for Pitt, and considered that in this case the entire blame would fall upon the minister<sup>3</sup> who had inspired the undertaking. He therefore sent several officers to reconnoitre carefully the whole of the coastline about the mouth of the Charente. This operation lasted until the 24th, and on the 25th a council of war was held in the style of a court-martial, in which all the chances of a successful landing and an attack upon Rochefort were discussed, and the evidence upon the points was heard. A thousand objections were naturally brought forward, and in the end an attack was declared impracticable. In any case the advantage of a surprise had been entirely lost by the long delay, and as practically nothing was known of the enemy, it was likely that a landing would be a dangerous operation, the more so as Hawke declared that the wind in its present quarter would prevent a speedy embarkation in the event of a defeat. Witnesses also asserted that the trenches of Rochfort could be filled with water by means of sluices. These considerations should not, however, have deterred an energetic commander from attempting an enter-

<sup>1</sup> Hawke to Pitt, September 30, 1757.—Colonial Office Records.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of October 7, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 49.

prise to which the minister attached such great importance. Conway, who showed the greatest determination, at length persuaded his superiors to make an attack upon Fort Fouras, a project which was confirmed in a second council of war on the 26th. The landing body entered the boats in the evening, accompanied by several officers who wished to make some proof of good faith. However, at one o'clock at night, Hawke was informed that the landing was postponed until the morning, as it was impossible to see, and eventually the whole plan was abandoned, as the task of re-embarkation offered too many difficulties.<sup>1</sup> The council of war met once more and the debates were resumed.

The chief point at issue was now the question of responsibility. All were willing to fight or to risk their lives, but no one was willing to bear the blame of failure. Mordaunt demanded that Conway should officially advise him to land, when he would be willing to act accordingly; Conway, however, declined to give any order unless he received advice to that effect from two officers. The apparent absurdity of this business is to be explained by the inborn tendency to parliamentary procedure prevailing even among military officers. Eventually Hawke grew weary of the affair and sent a letter to Mordaunt asking for a definite answer to his question, whether the generals had any military enterprise to propose, as he could no longer keep the squadron waiting to no purpose. The council of war thereupon unanimously voted for a return to England, and the fleet reached Portsmouth on October 3. At a later date a French prisoner, the Chevalier de Rohan,<sup>2</sup> stated that the French might have been surprised by an immediate attack upon Rochefort, but that a few days later all had been prepared for defence; three thousand five hundred men with two batteries were stationed behind the sandhills impatiently awaiting the landing, and deeply disappointed at the departure of the English. What truth there may be in this statement I cannot say. Pitt remained to the last convinced that the enterprise was practicable. News reached him from France by

<sup>1</sup> Mordaunt's report is here in contradiction with facts. On September 30 he informed Pitt that the project of a landing by night had been abandoned, as the disembarkation from the boats would have lasted till daybreak, owing to the prevailing winds and currents: the report to Hawke at 1 A.M. on the 27th states that the landing was postponed till dawn, that it might be possible to see.

<sup>2</sup> Dodgton, p. 399.

way of Holland that troops had been sent from Paris to Rochefort, which had not arrived until the middle of October, whence he concluded that the town was but weakly occupied at that time. This news he sent to Hawke and Mordaunt at the beginning of October, with orders that, after accomplishing the undertaking upon Rochefort, they were to conquer the isle of Rhé and provide for its permanent occupation,<sup>1</sup> but when the order was written the expedition had already returned.

General indignation ran throughout England, as may well be imagined, at the miserable result of this great enterprise, and the inglorious return of the 'invincible armada,' as Chesterfield called it. Nearly half a million of money had been spent upon the failure,<sup>2</sup> which seemed inexplicable upon the known facts of the case; the officers engaged were reputed brave and determined men, nor could Pitt in any way be blamed. Public opinion, therefore, began to find a connection between this disaster and the convention of Kloster Zeven,<sup>3</sup> which had been published a short time previously. The theory was that the Duke of Cumberland had secretly induced General Mordaunt, one of his adherents, to remain inactive in order that Pitt might not acquire success during the time of his own failure. Pitt could not explain the connection of events or entirely disabuse his mind of some such suspicion.<sup>4</sup> That there is any truth in these suspicions is extremely unlikely; there is not the smallest evidence in their favour, and the course of events is perfectly explicable independently of such theories.

As soon as the fleet had returned Mordaunt was naturally called to account by the ministers, and attempted to prove the impracticability of the whole expedition. Upon this occasion the government, including Pitt, refrained from demanding a judicial inquiry, which might easily have proved inconvenient to themselves. Pitt knew very well that he had acted somewhat precipitately in the hope of securing a success with which to please the nation, and under these circumstances 'practicability' was not a point to be pressed. As no party interests

<sup>1</sup> Letter of October 5.—Colonial Office Records.

<sup>2</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1180; report of the Prussian embassy, October 7, 1757.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*; *Chesterfield Letters*; report of the Prussian embassy of October 18.

<sup>4</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1186.

were involved, it was better to let the matter drop. Pitt merely published his orders of September 5 and 15 (the latter, as we have seen, had been sent out by the frigate *Viper*) in order to show that he had insisted upon vigorous action, and had recalled his former order for return at the end of September. Mordaunt, however, was irritated by the cold and contemptuous reception he had received, particularly from the king, and induced Pitt to lay proposals before the king for an investigation.

Accordingly, on November 1, a commission of several high officers, including the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville, and General Waldegrave, proceeded to examine the question of the necessity for an investigation. They came to the conclusion that the commander's reasons for abandoning the attempt upon Rochefort were insufficient, and upon the basis of this judgment a court-martial was begun upon Mordaunt alone. Pitt was obliged to give evidence, as also were Clarke and the pilot Thierry, from whom he had derived his information upon the condition of Rochefort. The result was favourable to Mordaunt but highly unpleasant to the minister, for the expedition was denounced as imprudent and precipitate, and the general was therefore exonerated of all negligence. Thierry, to whose reports Pitt had trusted, was characterised by Hawke as a boaster, whereupon General Cholmondeley sarcastically observed that there must be two Thierrys, as this boaster could hardly be the man whom Pitt had so loudly praised.

Thus this unlucky enterprise came to an end, and it was certainly fortunate for the English military power that the end was not more disastrous. Henceforward the leaders of expeditions were able to follow their own judgment unembarrassed by the apprehension of severe punishment.

Equally displeasing to Pitt, though here again he could hardly be blamed, was the course of events during this summer in America.<sup>1</sup> Under the leadership of the Marquis of Montcalm the French had shown great vigour since the winter, and the only obstacle to their action was the jealousy between Montcalm and the Governor Vaudreuil, and also between the native Canadians and the French troops. They had gained the

<sup>1</sup> See Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 1. chaps xiv. and xv. Boston, 1884.



support of a number of Indian tribes, who were indispensable for the war in the interior amid forests and swamps, and compensated to some extent for the inferior numbers of their white allies. Nothing more than neutrality could be secured from the natives inhabiting the disputed territories, who did not wish to lay themselves open to the vengeance of England. The actual warriors came from the far west, fierce, cruel, and lawless bands, incapable of discipline in battle or of self-restraint after victory. In March the regular troops were increased by reinforcements to six thousand men, to which were added the Canadian militia. With these forces, and with the advantage of moving upon interior lines, Montcalm was enabled to deal unexpectedly severe blows against the English. The most important point was that he should not be attacked during this time at the centre of his power, Quebec, as no conquests could compensate for the loss of that stronghold, and until he was perfectly sure upon this point he was obliged to suspend his operations.

Pitt would certainly have been glad to direct his attacks upon Canada proper, but during this year he had been unable to make the necessary preparations for the initiation of this enterprise. During his first ministry he had not possessed the necessary freedom of action, partly in consequence of his illness and partly as a result of opposition within the cabinet, nor had he been able to gain a clear conception of American affairs. Hence, notwithstanding advice to the contrary from many reliable quarters, in preparing his plan of campaign he consulted Loudoun, who throughout this summer remained in command. Loudoun proposed to remain on the defensive upon the inner boundary-line, and to concentrate all available force for an attack upon Louisburg in order to gain a dominant position at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. From that point he proposed to attack Quebec.

For the support of this plan the expedition of Admiral Holburne had been already fitted out in the winter of 1756-7. The commander received instructions dated February 19,<sup>1</sup> in order that if all went well operations against Louisburg might begin as soon as navigation was possible in those northern waters. The departure of the squadron was, however, continually delayed, to the vexation of Pitt, who saw the possible

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 418.

advantage of rapid arrival disappearing in consequence.<sup>1</sup> Despatch had not yet become a habit, and Pitt, who was tormented by illness, was unable as yet to inspire officials and officers with his own spirit of rapid and cautious action. His ministry came to an end before Holburne could weigh anchor, and it was not until May 5 that the departure from Cork took place, where the troops, including the Scottish battalions, had been concentrated.

The admiral's instructions, which had been issued by Pitt and remained unchanged after Pitt's resignation, ran as follows: he was to join Loudoun in Halifax, the starting-point of all Canadian expeditions, to hand over the troops he was carrying, and then to accompany the whole force of the commander-in-chief to Louisburg in order to support the siege operations on land with the fleet. Should the season afterwards demand a conclusion of operations, he was, whatever the issue, to return home with the main body of the fleet, but to leave ships enough in America to cope with whatever part of the enemy's naval force might remain. With these orders Holburne sailed, and during the eleven weeks that Pitt was out of office it was impossible for him to send those additional instructions demanded by the change in the situation. Pitt knew that three successive French squadrons had put to sea, presumably for Louisburg,<sup>2</sup> the last on May 5,<sup>3</sup> but he had not the power to order reinforcements or to send fresh instructions.

At first the enterprise proved comparatively successful. Holburne was fortunate enough to capture five French ships on the voyage, with a force of one thousand men,<sup>4</sup> and arrived at his destination without disaster in July, where he found Loudoun awaiting him. The latter had meanwhile attempted to strengthen his army, and even before the arrival of Pitt's orders for enlistment had secured bodies of troops, though in scanty numbers, from the provincial authorities, which bodies

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, April 1, 1757: 'L'armement d'Amérique est toujours également retardé . . . et cela est d'autant plus fâcheux que pour peu qu'il diffère de partir on perdra bien des avantages qu'on aurait pu espérer s'il était actuellement en route comme on s'en flattait depuis longtemps.'—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt to Holburne, July 7, 1757.—Thackeray, ii. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Report of Prussian embassy, May 17, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, August 9, 1757.

he then brought up to the strength required.<sup>1</sup> Where this process proved too slow he ordered the militia to be held in readiness. Troops were also raised in the southern provinces, to which Pitt's orders did not refer.<sup>2</sup> These new contingents were not, however, destined to participate exclusively in this expedition. A large number of them were stationed to guard the frontier in the interior, where French attacks were feared and had indeed already begun.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Loudoun withdrew all troops that could possibly be spared from the northern frontiers for his attempt upon Louisburg, and consequently weakened the English forces in those districts for a long period, with results that were speedily disastrous.

The captain-general, who had concentrated his troops in New York, accordingly advanced to Halifax upon Holburne's arrival, where was now quartered a force of some twelve thousand men, with sixteen ships of the line and smaller vessels. Pitt had proposed a continuance of the voyage after a few days' rest, but Loudoun proceeded upon his preparations with traditional and pedantic accuracy, drilled the young troops, and re-embarked eventually, after four weeks' delay, at the beginning of August. This long delay naturally excited suspicion, as we saw in the case of the Rochefort expedition. When the ships were on the point of weighing anchor news arrived that the squadrons sent out from France in the spring had reached Louisburg, and had increased the force in that town to some twenty thousand men, with twenty-two ships of the line. Loudoun therefore declared a siege impracticable, disembarked Holburne's troops, and returned to New York with his own without making any attempt.

Meanwhile Pitt had returned to office, and immediately endeavoured to anticipate any failure of his American enterprise. On July 7 he sent out four men-of-war to restore the balance of power with new orders. He requested Holburne to prosecute his object with the utmost energy, and demanded an immediate account of the state of affairs. The admiral was further ordered, so soon as the French fleet returned home

<sup>1</sup> Governor Fitch of Connecticut to Holderness, July 20, 1757.—Thackeray, ii. 414 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia to Pitt, June 20, 1757.—Thackeray, ii. 412 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Dinwiddie's letter.

at the end of the season, to despatch a quick sloop with the news to England, in order that a squadron might be sent out to catch them, while he himself was to follow them closely with the main body of his ships to co-operate in the task of their destruction. Further orders followed on July 18 and September 21, exhorting the admiral not to desist from his attempt as long as any prospect of success remained, and giving additional instructions for the pursuit of the enemy's fleet.<sup>1</sup>

Orders, however, were useless when the commander of the troops, the trusted favourite of the old ministry, had shattered all prospect of success from the outset. Holburne did his best. Upon the arrival of the four ships, which brought his fleet up to twenty ships of the line, he sailed about off Cape Breton to try and secure meeting with the enemy's fleet. For weeks he cruised off Louisburg, but the French admiral, who had only eighteen men-of-war, was satisfied with averting an attack upon the town, for which purpose he had indeed been sent out.<sup>2</sup> He did not propose to run any risk with his fleet, but remained quietly in harbour. On September 25 a fearful hurricane arose, and the English fleet was severely damaged. Two ships were destroyed, and eight others so shattered that they could no longer keep the sea. Holburne consequently started home with the remainder, and reached England on November 8 without further disaster, sending a rapid vessel in advance with the bad news, which arrived on October 31.<sup>3</sup>

A few days previously Pitt, supposing that the French fleet would soon return, had despatched Admiral Hawke with a strong squadron to the Bay of Biscay to intercept them.<sup>4</sup> His supposition was correct. The French ships had also suffered severely during the hurricane in their harbour at Louisburg, and returned home immediately after the departure of the English. Hawke, however, was unable to catch them; only three frigates fell into his hands, the remaining ships reaching harbour unmolested. The admiral was recalled about the middle of December.<sup>5</sup> At the same time Pitt hastily equipped seven or eight large men-of-war to reinforce the squadron in America. Unfortunately there was a great scarcity of crews for the

<sup>1</sup> The three orders are printed in Thackeray, ii. 416 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, August 30, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, November 1 and 8, 1757.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, October 25, 1757.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, November 2 and December 16, 1757.



numerous ships which were now despatched in all directions, and for their completion it was necessary to draw upon the land troops, and also to place an embargo upon the whole of the English mercantile trade in order to secure an adequate number of sailors.<sup>1</sup>

While the attention of the English government was thus entirely directed upon Louisburg and the movements of the fleet, a disastrous struggle had taken place upon the northern frontier of the colonies inland. The energetic Montcalm had been careful to avail himself of the moment when Loudoun's action had weakened the garrisons on this frontier. He immediately conceived a plan for dealing a vigorous blow against the English on the route from Montreal to New York. Between the wide extent of Lake Champlain and the upper Hudson river lay the smaller lake of St. Sacrement, also known as Lake St. George; on the northern extremity of this the French possessed the Fort de Carillon, while on the southern shore the English had erected the Fort William Henry. This latter post, which Montcalm proposed to attack, was defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Monro with 2200 men. In July Montcalm concentrated at Carillon a force of no less than 7600 men, including 1600 Indians of different tribes. On August 1 the expedition started, partly in boats upon the lake and partly upon the shores.

Monro was expecting assistance from General Webb at Fort Edwards, a few miles to his rear, and therefore determined to stand the siege. Webb, however, was afraid to attack, and sent to New York for reinforcements, which could not possibly arrive in time. Monro was therefore forced to capitulate on August 9, after a week's siege. He was granted permission to depart unmolested, but Montcalm was unable to restrain his Indians, who declined to be deprived of the expected scalps, with the result that a dreadful massacre took place, and in spite of repressive measures, all perished save one hundred persons, including women and children. Pitt received this sad news at the outset of October,<sup>2</sup> exactly at the moment when the country was disturbed by the results of the Rochefort expedition and the capitulation of Kloster Zeven.

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of November 1, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Sackville received the news directly from Monro and communicated it to Pitt on October 12.—Chatham MSS.

Thus, within a short space of time, a number of disasters had been reported which were calculated to reduce the most resolute spirits to despair, and did not fail to depress the whole country. The defeats of Calcutta, Kollin, and Hastenbeck were followed on August 18 by the surrender of Ostend and Nieuport, on the 30th by the news that Louisburg was impregnable, on September 17 by the capitulation of Kloster Zeven, on October 7 by the return of the Rochefort expedition, on the 12th by the news of Fort William Henry, on the 14th by the abrupt refusal of Spain, and, finally, on November 1 by the announcement of Holbourne's disaster at sea. Apart from this, disturbances were caused in September by the carrying out of the militia bill, which necessitated the interference of regular troops, while Pitt was also worried by the unfavourable result of the Mordaunt investigation. Against all these misfortunes only one cheering piece of news could be set. On September 23 word arrived from India that Colonel Clive, who had been sent from Madras to Bengal, had succeeded in conquering Chandernagore, the French station on the Hooghly, an occurrence that will be recounted afterwards in connection with the other Indian affairs.

There is no doubt that England's fortunes had sunk to the lowest depth; Pitt had great difficulty in restraining his colleagues from adopting the counsels of despair, though he could himself discover no consolation. On October 15 he writes to Lord George Sackville:<sup>1</sup> 'Total inexecution of plan in America and the unhappy retreat from the coast of Rochefort, *re intentata*, have on various accounts sunk me into little less than despair of the public. I shall abstain from giving, and indeed from finally forming, an opinion concerning the conduct of any in a matter so serious till full information enables and compels me to declare one: in the meantime I see no end of the train of mischiefs following such events.' Evidence of the desperate nature of the position, of which perhaps Pitt was thinking when he wrote, was the fact that the Irish Parliament, which had hitherto proved compliant, showed signs of revolt, and demanded full relief for its finances from the burden of pensions and sinecures.<sup>2</sup> A pension of £6000 per annum for the wife of the Landgrave of Hesse had provoked

<sup>1</sup> *Historical MSS. Commission, Ninth Report*, part iii. p. 10 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, vol. ii., letters from November 12-24, 1757.

this outburst. To avoid increasing the embarrassment of the country, as the Irish House of Commons threatened to reject the financial measure, Pitt was obliged to make a compromise, though no material change was effected. The ultimate settlement of the matter was left to the Duke of Bedford.

Notwithstanding this series of misfortunes, the national prosperity had not as yet suffered. While French trade was hopelessly depressed and her merchants had to pay an insurance premium of 70 per cent. upon ships for America, the commerce of England remained prosperous under the protection of her strong sea power. The finances of the state were also in a sound condition, thanks to the facility and the cheapness with which loans could be effected.<sup>1</sup> These conditions, however, might easily change for the worse, if the war did not speedily take a turn for the better. Thus a general sigh of relief went up when the cheering news arrived of the victory of Rossbach, where the heroic King of Prussia had defeated the Austrians, if not his most dangerous enemy, at any rate England's adversaries. This was the first gleam of light upon the horizon, and was greeted with extravagant joy. 'The nation,' wrote the Prussian ambassador, 'has never been so united or so favourably disposed to any ally as it now is to your majesty'; and again, 'This event has given the king new life, and his immediate attendants never remember to have seen him so cheerful or so well pleased for a long time. The Prince of Wales and the whole royal family are no less delighted, with the exception of the Duke of Cumberland, who rarely appears at court.'<sup>2</sup>

Thus the immediate problem was to turn the hopeful enthusiasm of the nation and the improvement in the situation to the best advantage, to accomplish some achievement, and thus to effect the desired reaction. This was the task which now confronted Pitt.

<sup>1</sup> Reports of the Prussian embassy, August 2 and November 8, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, November 18 and 22, 1757.



*Horace Walpole.*

ALLEGRI, 1717. 10. 18. 18. 18.





## CHAPTER VII

### PREPARATIONS AND TREATIES

HORACE WALPOLE informs us in his *Memoirs* that at the time of his first ministry Pitt had said to the Duke of Devonshire, 'My lord, I am sure I can save this country and nobody else can.'<sup>1</sup> We do not know the circumstances or the connection in which these words were uttered, and we must not therefore venture to regard them as the proud, self-conscious, not to say conceited utterance which they might appear. The phrase might have referred to the relations of party politics, which prevented any other capable personality from occupying that dominant position which alone could save the state. At any rate this certainty of his vocation cannot have been very strong either in Pitt or in other people during the critical months before the battle of Rossbach. Chesterfield wrote on August 15 that the war must soon come to an end, 'for it is evident that neither we nor our only ally, the King of Prussia, can carry it on three months longer.'<sup>2</sup> We have seen in the course of the Spanish negotiations to what resources Pitt was reduced in his attempts to gain help against France. The situation, however, had grown even darker since that date, and further disasters would make it probable that the Newcastle group would conclude peace without consulting Pitt, and that his chance of saving the country would be gone.

It must now be noted that the change in the situation was introduced, not by Pitt's action, but by the effect of wholly independent circumstances. Prussia's negotiations with France had been watched with anxious eyes, for they might deprive England of her only ally. On October 14 an earnest request was transmitted to Frederick not to conclude peace without

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 84.  
VOL. II.

<sup>2</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1171 f.  
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due consideration of English interests.<sup>1</sup> Here we have plain evidence of the desperation of England's king and his ministers; they had regarded Frederick as reduced to the last gasp; they had nothing to offer him, indeed they had deeply wounded him by securing the neutrality of Hanover (Frederick made no essential difference between England and Hanover),<sup>2</sup> and now they ventured to look to him for consideration for their interests and for an improvement in their position. It was indeed the Prussian king who brought about the favourable change in a different and wholly unexpected manner. He defeated the French with such rapidity and decision as not only to repulse every attack upon Prussia's central province, but to shatter their military reputation to its foundations. This was a great piece of good fortune for England; as the French power had been considerably weakened, English courage rose with hopes of recovering the lost Electorate, but this was not the doing of the English minister. Only Lady Hester could not refrain, in the joy of her heart, from crediting her beloved husband with some part of the success of Rossbach. 'What I felt most strongly was not the triumph of your King of Prussia,' she writes.<sup>3</sup> 'It was my own triumph arising from the reputation and the happiness of my beloved husband which moved me most powerfully. How I bless Heaven for this treasure, presented by a man who combines every amiable advantage that man can have with every high capacity that makes a hero and a statesman.'

Immediately after this great event both parties proceeded to take measures for the resumption of their former policy for the liberation of Hanover. This policy is generally regarded as the only possible course of action open to Pitt; as a matter of fact the case was somewhat different. There was in England a numerous party which would gladly have seen the minister pledged to his former anti-Hanoverian action, and was highly irritated by the compliance he had shown to the king. While enthusiasm for the victor of Rossbach was at its height they did not venture to express their views; at a later date, however, when the tide had turned, their displeasure and opposition

<sup>1</sup> Holderness to Mitchell, October 14, 1757.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen*, xvi. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS.

came to light in pamphlets,<sup>1</sup> which are of considerable value for the full appreciation of Pitt's policy.

In the opinion of this party the convention of Kloster Zeven had forcibly directed English policy upon the true path, and henceforward all interference in German affairs was to be avoided. They regarded the German empire as a state, to the laws of which both the King of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover were subject; as England would not permit the interference of a foreign power in her own affairs, so the empire should insist upon the conduct of its own business. Moreover, the protection which was guaranteed to the Electorate and to the very properly outlawed King of Prussia, was of no real advantage to either. Hanover, in any case, was not likely to be permanently occupied by the French; the empire would never permit the establishment of a foreign power within its own boundaries, and Prussia would find French menaces far less dangerous if she dissolved her alliance with England. It was this alliance which induced France, against her true interests, to attempt an overthrow of Prussia, and so to clear the way for an Austrian supremacy in Germany. If King Frederick were left in isolation, the court of Versailles would very soon abandon its hostility to this ruler as being impolitic. Moreover, it was morally indefensible to support a king whose unjustifiable aggression had begun the war, an aggression which had on one occasion been severely criticised even by the Hanoverian ambassador at the Reichstag of Regensburg. The question might well be asked, as one pamphlet asserts, whether England could defy her French neighbour in isolation, but this doubt did not essentially change the situation. An affirmative answer would make other alliances unnecessary, while a negative would necessitate the conclusion of conventions with some other powers than Prussia. Prussia was the worst possible ally that could well be found, as King Frederick had not only been proscribed, and with justice, by the empire, but was also at enmity with the whole of Europe. Friendship with him necessitated a breach with powers whose good offices were of vital importance to England. This much was obvious to every one, but Pitt, like many others, had been dazzled by

<sup>1</sup> 'A letter from the Duchess of M—r—gh [Marlborough] in the shades to the Great Man.' London, 1759; and 'Things as they are.' London, 1761 (January 20). In the British Museum.



the momentary, though transitory, successes of the King of Prussia.

These pamphlets contained a vast amount of falsehood and exaggeration, especially when discussing details concerning Pitt and Frederick the Great. At the same time it would be entirely untrue to regard the general argument as irrational or as refuted by fact. On the contrary, they are a timely reminder to ourselves of the necessity for approaching the criticism of all measures from a contemporary point of view, without the bias of later events or changes of policy. Frederick the Great at that moment was involved in a war of unexpected difficulty. He was surrounded by enemies, and though he had succeeded in defeating one, fresh armies were advancing upon other sides. Gloomy indeed were his prospects, and they seemed more desperate to distant spectators of his struggle than to himself, who alone knew his own power of resistance. Spectators considered it hardly conceivable that he could survive the storms which burst upon him one after another. How could it be the duty, under these circumstances, of a prudent and conscientious statesman to involve the fortunes of his own country with those of this tottering power, friendship with whom would speedily lead to nothing but disaster? Was it not better to break with Prussia so soon as a suitable opportunity arose? If in the year 1756 England clung to the Prussian alliance, notwithstanding Frederick's unwelcome appeal to arms, her action was dictated by the not unreasonable expectation that Austria would soon be defeated, and that Russia would not advance. These hopes had not been fulfilled. Instead of overrunning the enemy's country the diminished armies of Prussia had great difficulty in defending their own frontiers against the growing forces of their enemies. Hence the true policy seemed to be to withdraw from the continental struggle by strict adherence to the terms of the convention of Zeven, and to employ the time, while France was still engaged with Prussia, in dealing a decisive blow against the French at sea and in the colonies. There was no moral obligation to continue the alliance, as it was against England's repeated advice that Frederick had plunged into the hazards of war, and as the Westminster Convention had been fulfilled only under *force majeure*.

Notwithstanding these arguments Pitt proposed to resume

the continental struggle, not because he was ignorant or careless of these apprehensions, or from romantic enthusiasm for the heroic King of Prussia, but simply because he hoped to derive some advantage from a Prussian alliance, while avoiding the possible disadvantages which it might involve. The salvation of Frederick was not his object, nor did he regard this task as obligatory upon England. This is plain from the negotiations which began after the battle of Rossbach. England is always the party that demands, and has but little to offer, and what Frederick most earnestly required was denied him, as Pitt did not propose to arouse new enemies or to expose himself to personal embarrassment. Naturally he did his best to increase the popular enthusiasm for King Frederick, as he was thus saved from criticism of his new Hanoverian measures, the execution of which was correspondingly facilitated. The favour which he gained with King George owing to this policy must also have been a prime factor, and indeed he would have found it difficult to secure the king's approval by any other line of action.

Upon their first meeting after the victory King Frederick and the English ambassador were both anxious to place Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick at the head of the army of observation, which was still concentrated at Stade.<sup>1</sup> Hence this point offered no difficulty; the prince retained his rank as a Prussian general, and was lent to the English merely as commander-in-chief of their troops, though with the same supreme powers as the Duke of Cumberland had formerly possessed. At Frederick's express wishes Prussia was responsible for his personal expenses, while England undertook to provide for the needs of his troops. These matters having been settled, Ferdinand, at the invitation of the Hanoverian government, made his way to Stade on November 19, though his commission had not yet been made out in London. His first act was to forbid the departure of the Brunswick troops, who had proposed to return home in accordance with the convention. This prohibition was issued in contradiction to the orders of their duke, who, as Ferdinand knew, had been acting under pressure from France. King Frederick declared himself ready to take full responsibility for this measure. When the Duke

<sup>1</sup> For this and the following see *Politische Korrespondenz*, xvi. (Index: England -- Hanover).

of Richelieu demanded a strict adherence to the convention, and threatened, in the event of a refusal, to ravage the Electorate, the king replied by threatening a similar treatment of Saxony, which was then entirely in his power.

The English government, however, was not yet satisfied with the appointment of the general. In their anxiety for Hanover they bombarded the king with requests for help and support, as if he were an imperial monarch with abundance of troops at his disposal. They demanded that Frederick should first drive the French out of Hanover himself, and when the necessities of Silesia forbade this action, they asked that he should at least despatch Field-Marshal Lehwaldt with his corps, which had just driven the Swedes out of Pomerania, or that the Prussian troops should make a diversion from the direction of Halberstadt. Prince Ferdinand also felt himself too weak to cope with the enemy, and besought the king for reinforcements of troops and guns. Eventually Frederick was induced in January to place fifteen squadrons, under Prince Holstein, at the disposal of the army of observation, together with the guns from Wesel, which were then lying in the fortress of Tönning in Gottorp. He could not understand why Pitt did not send to Germany an adequate number of English troops which were unoccupied at home, and amounted to more than 50,000 men,<sup>1</sup> and complained that they were ready to ruin him in their efforts to save Hanover. Nor were his complaints entirely unjustified, for Pitt proposed to draw what advantage he could from the Prussian alliance, while risking as little as possible himself. If at a later period his ally seemed to be reduced to his last gasp, it would be time to consider what diplomatic efforts might be made on his behalf.

In consequence of the battle of Rossbach the opening of Parliament was postponed from November 15 to December 1, to give time for the necessary alterations in the king's speech, which was drafted by Hardwicke, under Pitt's directions.<sup>2</sup> After a reference to the unsatisfactory progress of the war

<sup>1</sup> The Bavarian ambassador reported on December 20, 1757: 'Le nombre de troupes de terre est de 52,000 hommes dans la Grande Bretagne, 14,000 en Irlande, et 6000 en Amérique, pour la marine 50,000 matelots et 10 régiments de Marine à 1000 hommes par Régiment.'—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 102. Printed in Thackeray, i. 312 f.

the speech continued: 'It is my fixed resolution to apply my utmost efforts for the security of my kingdoms, and for the recovery and protection of the possessions and rights of my crown and subjects in America and elsewhere, as well by the strongest exertion of our naval force as by all other methods. Another great object which I have at heart is the preservation of the Protestant religion and the liberties of Europe; and in that view to adhere to and encourage my allies.'

These words give the general outline of Pitt's policy. The English forces were to be employed for the safety of the realm, that is to say, the militia and some regiments of the standing army were to be kept under arms in England for the recovery of the American provinces, which implied an energetic prosecution of the colonial war, and for the recovery of territory elsewhere, for which the continental war against France was to be resumed. The euphemism 'elsewhere' referred to Hanover, a name the direct expression of which was avoided in English state documents. The mention of the defence of Protestantism and of European freedom referred to the alliance with Frederick the Great, and gave a legal basis to it according to English ideas. Frederick's opponents were, in fact, with the exception of Sweden, Catholic powers, and from the time of Louis XIV. it had been an article of faith in England that the triumph of France upon the Continent implied European slavery. It is noteworthy, however, that there is no mention of any support for Frederick, but only of an intention to adhere to him and encourage him. It was thus hinted that no troops or ships were to be sent out, and that no fleet was to be despatched to the Baltic, while, on the other hand, a subsidy (for his encouragement) was proposed.

A reply, approving the speech from the throne, was carried through both Houses without difficulty, and no debate of importance arose until December 14, when Barrington introduced a discussion upon the state of the army.<sup>1</sup> Lord George Sackville seized the opportunity of defending Lord Loudoun, whose negligence had brought about the disastrous result of the American campaign, and who had consequently incurred the national displeasure. Sackville was anxious to see him retained in his command, fearing that he himself might be entrusted with the supreme command in the colonies. Pitt

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 88 f.



replied in a long speech, declining to admit his excuses, and confirmed in his resolve to recall the incompetent general. He blamed Loudoun, not only for the failure in America, but also for the lack of effort which had lost England the possession of all the important waterways, under which expression were included Lake Ontario, the river Ohio, Lake George, and the mouth of the St. Lawrence. The main point of the speech was, however, that Pitt regarded the complete subjection of the army to the civil power as the essential condition of any success. Loudoun had carried on the American war as an independent commander with disastrous results; Cumberland had acted in Germany in complete independence, and had been beaten; while Mordaunt's failure was due to disregard of his instructions. Hence it was obvious that some central authority supervising all operations was necessary, and this supervision must naturally lie in Pitt's hands. In this he was certainly correct; individual generals could not gain a comprehensive view of the military situation or judge of the means at their command, and were also prone to be swayed by personal considerations. 'Unfortunately,' writes Lord Chesterfield,<sup>1</sup> 'the point of profit is of more importance than the point of honour with our military dignitaries. Provided they can avoid defeat, they are ready also to avoid victory, as either event would deprive them of their incomes. Lord Loudoun, a disgustingly avaricious character, has perhaps thought, indeed I may say actually did think, that a victory would be disadvantageous to him, as likely to put an end both to the war and to his enormous receipts.' So keen a judge of human nature cannot have been entirely wrong. Apart from this, Pitt's speech contained a eulogy of George II. and a strong reference to the unity of the ministry, observations which were intended both to strengthen and to conceal the supremacy of his position.

This supremacy now began to initiate a series of very diverse measures, which were, however, directed and carefully calculated to secure their great object. Not until this moment had Pitt been able to show what he really was and what he could do. He certainly did not appear in that character which the nation had hitherto attributed to him, a reformer of domestic affairs and the opponent of the Hanoverian

<sup>1</sup> Chesterfield to his son, January 7, 1758.—*Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1205.

policy; he was the energetic and careful administrator of a world-wide war, able to evoke the uttermost forces of the state and to apply them at the right point. It is indeed marvellous to observe how he was able to create armies and fleets and send them into action at a distance or close at hand, at a moment's notice or with long preparations, and with due regard to all known and all possible conditions; how again he was able to abolish the carelessness, the want of initiative, the selfishness and red tape, which seemed permanently to have shackled English military power, and had hitherto prevented all decisive success. He first showed the world and the more despondent of his own nation that England with her comparatively small population was able, through her economic prosperity, triumphantly to sustain a duel with the mighty power of France, and that there was no need for the great coalitions by which she had formerly attempted to repel the attacks of her powerful neighbour. It was not, indeed, English troops who checked the main force of the enemy in Germany, but her allies there were maintained with English money, and their action was, in the ultimate resort, the expression of the power of England, if only of her economic power.

An important condition for the success of the whole undertaking was the fact that Pitt was able to disregard the system of stringent economy, under which his colleagues of the older school had laboured; he was able to treat financial matters with a certain indifference. It was absolutely necessary at this crisis to make the best use of the excellent credit which England enjoyed, and to regard the expense of military undertakings only so far as might be necessary to secure their effective execution. Thus the economic strength of the future was made available for the moment, and was indeed strengthened and increased by this method; the advantage to trade and commerce of a successful war would be bound so to increase the national prosperity and the productivity of taxation as to make the burden of the interest upon loans and of their repayment inappreciable. The national debt was increased by seventy-five millions during the Seven Years' War, a mere trifle in comparison with the nine hundred millions expended during the struggle with Napoleon, which the nation bore without economic disaster.

It is highly improbable that Pitt knew very much of the

economic resources of the nation. It was not his special subject, and he avoided reference to the matter in Parliament. But his own intelligence and the appreciation of what was great and important must have told him that military success was worth far more than the few millions staked upon the issue, and he did not hesitate to proffer continually increasing demands for supplies.

During the first years of the war the main items of the budget were as follows :—<sup>1</sup>

	General Demands.	For Purposes of War.	Total Amount voted.
1756	£9,919,117	£6,203,561	£7,389,367
		(Of this 1 million not expressly for military purposes)	
1757	£8,330,906	£6,810,058	£9,176,080
1758	£10,471,007	£8,487,193	£11,041,848

From the military expenditure are excluded the subsidies paid to the different colonies and to the East India Company for military help. These amounted in 1756 to £146,032, in 1757 to £80,000, and in 1758 to £70,718.

It appears from these figures that there was no important difference between the military expenditure of 1756 and 1757, but that in 1758 there was a sudden increase of £1,600,000, which can only be ascribed to Pitt's greater energy. The totals show a somewhat irregular advance, accounted for by various financial operations, but a regularity of increase will be disclosed by an examination of the actual expenditure.

There was thus no want of money. Pitt had no hesitation either in asking or in spending, and the compliant Parliament, in accordance with the will of the nation, gave all that was asked, and was able to tap the necessary sources of supply. The sinking fund, which painfully reduced the debt by several millions in time of peace, was now so heavily burdened that the advantages of this institution became quite illusory, and it was necessary to face a considerable increase of this burden.

Pitt regarded the successful accomplishment of the war in America as his main task ; all else was to him of secondary

<sup>1</sup> See T. Cunningham, *The History of our Customs, Aids, etc., to 1764*, p. 109 ff. London, 1764.

importance, and was either left to others or performed somewhat summarily. The question now arises how he conceived the plan of war which we shall find him following in the coming years.

We know that he gained the idea of an attack upon Louisburg from Loudoun; the plan did not originate with Loudoun himself, but had been actually carried out by the colonists of the northern provinces during the war of the Austrian Succession. Loudoun had regarded the capture of this stronghold as his sole objective, and had remained on the defensive elsewhere. Pitt, however, proceeded to take the offensive at the same time in other quarters, and even entrusted the commander-in-chief with a land expedition, which seemed to him more important. Other modifications of the original plan appeared, in which we may see the effect of other influences.

Among Pitt's papers are to be found two letters from the American Dennys de Berdt of Chiswell Street, Artillery Court;<sup>1</sup> at the instance of the late Horace, Lord Walpole he had given the minister advice upon American affairs, had had several conversations with Horace, and at his desire had composed a memoir expressing his views; this Walpole was unable to examine in his then state of health, but ordered that it should be handed to a secretary of state. Dennys sent it on to Pitt with the first letter explaining the occasion of its composition.

The statements of the memoir display a thorough knowledge of American affairs, and refer chiefly to the enlistment of troops and to the plan of operations. On the first point Dennys advised that the forces of the colonists should be used to the utmost possible extent; if regular or foreign troops alone were employed, the expense would be enormously increased, apart from the fact that these troops were of little use in forest warfare. The colonists, however, could not be enlisted like foreign soldiers; such a proceeding would only bring in the scum of the population, which would be useless for any practical purpose; an attempt must be made to gain volunteers for special-expeditions or for a special period, and to secure for them such conditions of service as members of the upper classes would demand. In particular they must be

<sup>1</sup> Under dates February 12, 1757, and January 16, 1758.—Chatham MSS. Dennys is mentioned in Bancroft, vi. 93.



officered by their own countrymen, subject only to such martial law as was confirmed by the colonial governments, and receive pay from England.

As regards the course of operations, Dennys energetically opposed all attempts to drive the French out of the interior by means of attacks upon their many forts; in case of failure, such attempts were wasted, while success would scatter the English forces in the task of garrisoning the conquered forts and expose them to the constant danger of capture. He strongly advised an immediate advance against the centre of the enemy's position, namely Quebec; the fall of this town would be speedily followed by the surrender of all other forts. A force of some twenty thousand men, consisting of regular troops (for open fighting and siege work), and colonists (for forest fighting), might be landed in Cascade Bay to the south-east of Quebec, and pushed forward against the fortress along the line of the river Kennebec, which flows into the sea, and of the Chaudière, which joins the St. Lawrence. The expedition, however, must be begun so early in the year, that at the outset of the siege river navigation should still be impossible, as then the help of a great fleet would not be necessary from the outset to complete the blockade. Hence it would be necessary to start from England in February, with a view to beginning the enterprise in April.

Dennys further directed attention to the southern provinces Virginia, Carolina, etc., to which he refers as the most important corn-growing districts. It was absolutely necessary to protect them from foreign invasion, and for this purpose five or six thousand men must be levied, who would be given arms, ammunition, supplies, and grants of land instead of pay.

An examination of Pitt's measures plainly shows that he was influenced to some extent by this advice. During his first ministry in the spring of 1757 he was unable to avail himself of it. When the letter arrived in February preparations were so little advanced that an early commencement of operations was impossible, as his instructions to the governors had already been issued. In the following year, however, a modification of his measures is to be observed, which must certainly be ascribed to the sound advice of Dennys. Naturally Pitt would not confine himself merely to following such advice; many

ideas, however, he seriously adopted and attempted to realise in modified form.

He began by making a change in the supreme command. During the past summer, and indeed during his tenure of supreme command, Loudoun had done nothing; this fact might have been excused on the ground of insufficient force, the lateness of Holburne's arrival, and other circumstances of the kind; Loudoun, however, had grown far too independent to conform to Pitt's ideas. Strict obedience was the minister's first demand, and this Loudoun had not shown by his abandonment of the attempt against Louisburg. Pitt did not choose a man of greater capacity than Loudoun, as such a one might easily have proved obstinate and inconvenient in the important position of commander-in-chief; he merely appointed the next officer in rank, General Abercromby, who was recommended by his position as an adherent of the young court, but had as yet done nothing to distinguish himself.<sup>1</sup> Outwardly he held the same position as his predecessor, but in reality was merely Pitt's subordinate, rather on an equality with than superior to the other generals. It was perhaps well for Pitt, and cannot have been displeasing to him, that Lord Sackville, who should have been entrusted with this task, provided himself with a refusal by accepting the high office of Master of the Ordnance. He entirely dominated the old Marshal Ligonier,<sup>2</sup> the commander of the land army, and afterwards came into collision with Prince Ferdinand, so that he would probably have proved troublesome to Pitt. In general, Pitt's principle was to exclude leaders of the old school, especially those who were responsible for the failure of the Rochefort expedition, and to employ young and capable men, from whom he could expect both strict obedience and greater energy. The objects of his choice will appear when we come to discuss his projects in detail.

The plans for 1757 had been restricted to the attempt upon Louisburg; Pitt now had larger forces at his disposal and proposed an advance in several directions.<sup>3</sup> He clung to the former plan in spite of its previous failure, in so far as he

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 91; Parkman, ii. 48.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 107.

<sup>3</sup> For Pitt's instructions to the officers and governors, see Thackeray, i. 322-35, and ii. 419-22.

sent a strong force on board the fleet to the mouth of the St. Lawrence. He then, in accordance with the proposals of Dennys, began land operations against the central districts of Canada. He did not, however, choose the shorter, but less known route to the north, which Dennys had advised, but the old route by the way of Lakes George and Champlain. This was the better alternative, as navigation was easier upon the lakes than upon the little waterways of the north, and as it obviated the possibility of a French advance upon the rear of the English force while the movement was in progress. Dennys's plan would have necessitated the detachment of a strong force to defend the Hudson route, in order to prevent a possible invasion of the northern colonies and the cutting off of the expedition. Exactly, however, as Dennys had proposed, Pitt arranged the departure of the squadrons for February and the commencement of operations for April 1758. Any other plan would have failed to secure the object proposed by Dennys, the investment of Quebec or Montreal before the St. Lawrence was open to navigation.

Pitt also paid attention to the task of protecting the southern provinces, as Dennys had advised, though his path was here marked out by the news from the governor of Virginia which had reached him in the summer. The centre of danger in this quarter was Fort Duquesne on the Ohio, which the French had held since 1754. Pitt thus provided for an attack upon this post, though his directions for an expedition to that district were issued in less detail.

Such were the three great tasks which Pitt imposed upon his generals in America. The colonists in general, as Dennys with great judgment had advised, were to be employed upon the protection of their own settlements, that their forces might not be scattered in fruitless enterprises. However, the most interesting point, and that in which Pitt's greatness is most clearly apparent, is the method by which he prepared and guided these different expeditions. This was done by means of instructions and orders transmitted simultaneously to the commanders-in-chief, to the governors of the colonists, and to other authorities whose co-operation was essential for any definite purpose.

As regards Pitt's general form of procedure, he began by requesting the governors of the northern provinces, that is, of

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the colonies of New England, New York and New Jersey, to secure the consent of their assemblies to the mobilisation of troops in forces deemed proportionate to their respective populations; these troops were then to be placed at the disposal of the captain-general. The appointment of officers and the regimental organisation were to be left in the hands of the colonial administrators, England assuming responsibility for the munitions of war and commissariat, and for due supplies of artillery and transport ships; thus the colonies had to cover only the expense of enlistment, clothing, and pay. It was only in order to stimulate the zeal of the colonial governments that this portion of the expense was thrown upon their shoulders, for Pitt promised to procure an indemnity from Parliament which would be paid to the different provinces in proportion to the readiness they might show and the sacrifices they might make. That there might be no lack of weapons for an unexpectedly strong levy of troops, Pitt ordered that all guns fit for use in war should be collected throughout the colonies and put in good repair, it being impossible to order additional weapons from England in view of the distance. The mode of enlistment was left entirely to the colonial governors, but Pitt wished to see a preference given to hunters and trappers, as these were unusually well represented among the French forces, and were naturally a most valuable arm in forest warfare. He asked for at least six hundred troops of this kind for Louisburg.

The naval armament was prepared as early as possible. As commander of the fleet he appointed his friend, Admiral Boscawen, a personal relative, who had previously done good service in India, America, and elsewhere; the land army was placed under Colonel Jeffrey Amherst, an energetic but prudent commander, distinguished for obstinate tenacity, who was not likely to agree to the premature abandonment of any enterprise. He was promoted to the rank of major-general. With him was associated, as a kind of counterpoise to his prudence, the impetuous Colonel James Wolfe, who had represented the aggressive policy in the Rochefort expedition, and had vainly attempted to persuade his superiors to adopt his plan. His precipitate daring disinclined Pitt to trust him with the supreme command, but in a subordinate position he might contribute largely to success.



General Abercromby, who had hitherto been under Loudoun's orders, was already in America; letters-patent were sent to him, dated September 28 and 29, together with instructions for his conduct to the end of the year. These instructions contained full details for the conduct of the several expeditions, and strongly emphasised the necessity of maintaining good relations and co-operating with the colonial governments. Pitt detailed the regiments of the line which were to take part in the siege operations, and permitted alteration of his orders only in case of urgent necessity; even then the regimental numbers were not to be diminished. Including the colonial troops some 14,000 men were to be employed against Louisburg; most of these were the troops who had been sent out for that purpose in the previous year, together with two fresh battalions to be despatched from England. The siege-train, artillery, and other requisites which had formed part of Loudoun's expedition were not to be used for other purposes, but to be kept together in a state of immediate efficiency; any deficiencies were to be made good from England. The whole train, together with part of the artillery regiments and of the sappers, was then to be sent over to Halifax as soon as possible, where all preparations for the siege would be completed before the arrival of the troops. The troops were expected to arrive as nearly as possible on April 12, so that operations could begin punctually on the 20th. Adherence to this date, April 20, was the central point of all these instructions; Pitt's measures provided for all possible obstacles, so that even the most unforeseen circumstances might not destroy his plan. He knew from experience how much time could be wasted if no definite date were settled beforehand.

Next to the enlistment of the troops, the most important point was the provision of transport vessels, as Loudoun's ships had probably been dispersed long ago, or had returned to England. Pitt prepared a sufficient number of transports in England and sent them out to New York forthwith; he also proposed to utilise those vessels which were then carrying some supplementary companies of Highlanders to America. As it was possible that these transports might be delayed or fail to reach port, Pitt gave orders for the colonies to hold ships in preparation, amounting to 6000 tons, for use as transports in case of need. If necessary an embargo was to be

laid upon trade to secure the success of the undertaking. If all these measures failed to provide a proper supply of transports the troops were to be carried to Halifax in successive bodies. Individual governors naturally received the same orders couched in the most vigorous terms, and calling for their energetic co-operation. Thus we see the invincible determination with which the minister proposed to attain his object upon this occasion; yet he did not succeed in securing the commencement of operations on the appointed date.

Admiral Boscawen was to sail from England at the beginning of February with his fleet of warships and transports; at the beginning of January a small detachment under Vice-Admiral Hardy preceded him to blockade Louisburg and to cut off any reinforcements that might arrive. Boscawen was also instructed to provide for this possibility in case Hardy should be unsuccessful, and in general to help the colonists as far as he could until the embarkation in New York was concluded. Both admirals started at the appointed date. When the secretary of war, Barrington, desired to delay their departure on the ground that the uniforms for the American troops were not ready, Pitt curtly informed him that operations could not be delayed for such trifles, and that he would forward the clothing 'in such manner as it must have gone provided that no transport vessels had been ordered for those ports.'<sup>1</sup> As it was possible that the fleet might make some lengthy stay in those northern waters, Pitt issued orders to the admiralty in January to erect wharves in Halifax and docks for naval repairs in Cornwallis Island.<sup>2</sup>

Pitt also attempted to improve the prospects of his American enterprise by his measures in Europe.<sup>3</sup> He sent a squadron under Admiral Osborn to the Mediterranean to prevent the departure of the French Admiral de la Clue from Toulon. (As a matter of fact the French admiral did not venture to force the Straits of Gibraltar. The only conflicts which took place were between individual ships; thus the *Monmouth* of sixty-five guns, under the audacious Captain Gardiner, defeated and captured a French eighty-four-gun ship of far greater size and with twice as numerous a crew, the *Foudroyant*. The victorious

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Barrington, January 23, 1758.—Thackeray, ii. 423.

<sup>2</sup> Communication of the order to the lords of the treasury, January 27, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Parkman, ii. 49 ff.

captain was killed in the action. Another squadron of seven men-of-war and three frigates under Admiral Hawke sailed to Rochefort and drove the French transport fleet with its convoy into the harbour, most of the French vessels running on shore. In April the *Dorsetshire* of seventy guns captured the *Raisonnable* of sixty-four guns,<sup>1</sup> commanded by the Prince of Monbason. So, on this occasion, a considerable number of reinforcements for the Louisburg garrison were successfully intercepted.

At the same time most careful preparations were made for the expeditions to Montreal and Quebec. Abercromby himself was to hold the supreme command, but as Pitt had no great opinion of his capacities, he associated with him in the command the brigadier, Lord Howe, one of the most capable officers in the English army. He hoped that Howe would soon secure the practical direction of affairs. The commander-in-chief was ordered to collect for this expedition all the imperial troops which were not intended for Louisburg, together with the main body of colonial troops, which Pitt thought might be estimated at 20,000 men. These troops were to be embarked on Lake George, and after capturing the outlying forts, especially Crown Point, the general was to cross Lake Champlain and proceed to attack either Montreal or Quebec, as he might deem best, or both towns in succession.

An indispensable condition of success was to secure the help of the natives, and Pitt therefore ordered that communications should be opened with the English agent for the northern troops, Colonel Sir William Johnson, with the object of securing the adherence of as many chieftains as possible. It is to be noticed that on this occasion Pitt recommended the employment of the Indians in warfare, a proceeding which he afterwards stigmatised as barbarity.

A further anxiety was the provision of boats for transport across the lakes. The governor of New York was entrusted with this matter, and ordered to hire all available labour at the king's expense for the construction of boats to carry 25,000 men; work was to be begun simultaneously at every spot within easy access of Lake George or of the parallel stream, Wood's Creek, in order that the flotilla might be concentrated upon those waters on May 1 or a little later.

<sup>1</sup> Cleveland to Newcastle, May 11, 1758.—Newcastle Papers.

The governor was also to build upon the lake itself some larger armed vessels for the protection of the boats; should this be impossible, he was to build the several parts of these vessels in the immediate proximity of the lake, that they might be sent forward and put together at the required moment. For the direction and supervision of all these works Pitt sent out an expert, Captain Loring; to him the general and the governor were to express their wishes regarding the number and construction of the boats, and also to show him a suitable spot for the work of building.

For the protection of the northern frontier during the period that the whole force of the northern province would be engaged upon these expeditions, a force under Brigadier Stanwix was to be placed at suitable points upon the line of retreat, in Fort Edward, Albany, or New York.

As regards the expedition arranged for the south, Pitt's orders formed a compromise between the different views entertained by those best qualified to judge. The representative governor of Virginia, Dinwiddie, together with the majority of the different colonial representatives, were anxious to remain upon the defensive; George Washington, the commander of the local militia, had had much trouble in defending so wide a stretch of frontier line, and regarded an attack upon Fort Duquesne as indispensable. Pitt did not venture to decide between these conflicting views at so great a distance; hence, as we have observed, he issued orders for one expedition intended to defend the frontiers, the choice of which he left to the general in command. At this time also, Dinwiddie was relieved of his post, as he was too closely connected with Loudoun to retain the government of Virginia after that general's retirement. Troops were levied for the south as in the north, and were placed by Pitt under the command of John Forbes, a Scotsman, and a remarkably capable soldier, whose affability speedily made him popular with the colonists. He was appointed brigadier-general for America, though this did not imply promotion in home rank. Apart from the colonial troops at his command, Abercromby was ordered to place a few companies of regulars at his disposal according to his requirements, and with these he was to start for the south forthwith.

A general view of all these arrangements will make it plain



that Pitt had an extremely difficult task in directing the war in those distant countries of which he had no personal experience, and which were indeed but inadequately known; and yet direction at a distance was inevitable, for the war was being waged in several quarters of the globe, and it was necessary that the whole organisation of armies and fleets should work in connection upon some uniform plan. We shall not be wrong in asserting that Pitt took the best measures possible. He determined the great objects which must be attained without unduly hampering his commanders by detailed instructions. He indicated the methods which he considered most advisable without absolutely excluding all other measures. His prudent arrangements provided the necessary supplies at the proper time and place. Above all things, he stimulated every one concerned to the most vigorous activity. Upon occasion, indeed, he ran the risk of asking too much, owing to ignorance of the circumstances; the tasks which he proposed often appeared considerably easier upon the map in his study than they proved upon the stormy sea or in the forest wilderness; in view, however, of the tendency of the superior officers to magnify difficulties, and apart from any possibility of such good fortune as mistakes on the enemy's side, it was a highly advantageous circumstance that so ruthlessly energetic a minister then held the reins of power.

While Pitt was thus summoning all his forces at sea and in the colonies for the enemy's overthrow, he was attempting, as we have seen, to secure his purpose in Germany at the smallest possible expense. He would do no more for Hanover than support the army of observation. If that proved insufficient, King Frederick would have to send additional troops, an effort demanded by his own interest in the defeat of the French. At the same time, England owed something to the king; had it not been for his victory at Rossbach, Hanover would have remained in the enemy's hands; Pitt also recognised that it was important for Frederick to continue the war and make headway against his enemies as long as possible. Pitt was well able to make use of his friends at the proper moment, though less inclined to support them, confining his efforts to encouragement, to use the terms of the king's speech, that is, to subsidy payments.

As early as July, after the defeat of Kollin, Frederick had

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sent an earnest request for the despatch of English reinforcements to the army of observation and of a squadron to the Baltic, which, however, was refused.<sup>1</sup> Pitt offered him subsidies instead, under the condition that he should give what support he could to the Hanoverian army. In his desperation the king was inclined to accept, but wished to delay the agreement until the conclusion of the campaign, in order not to limit his own freedom of action. After the battle of Rossbach the question was brought forward again, and Frederick once more advanced his desires, though not as indispensable conditions.

We know that Pitt declined at any price to send out a squadron; he was equally unable, with the best will in the world, to despatch reinforcements of troops. The official reasons which he gave to the Prussian ambassador<sup>2</sup> were his apprehension of a possible invasion and the necessity of keeping troops in reserve for America. He asserted that he could not strip the defences of the British coast, as the French were making important preparations in Dunkirk, and the English militia were not yet as efficient as he could wish. In reality his attitude was dictated by very different motives. He personally would have had no objection to the despatch of a contingent if Frederick had urgently insisted, but to this project the court of Leicester House was most violently opposed.<sup>3</sup> The prince was afraid that his grandfather would seize the opportunity, if English troops were despatched to Germany, of replacing the Duke of Cumberland in his position as commander-in-chief, and so repair the injury which he had inflicted on the duke in the attempt to shield himself. As a matter of fact the king was well aware that his son had only retired before superior force, and had afterwards executed his

<sup>1</sup> For the negotiations with Prussia see especially *Polit. Korresp. Friedrichs des Grossen*, xvi.; A. Schäfer, *Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Kriegs*, i. 546-566; Koser, *König Friedrich*, ii. 163 ff. I give only the fundamental reasons for Pitt's attitude and the main facts. The diplomatic details are valueless, as the full truth is concealed by every party.

<sup>2</sup> D'Abreu (Spanish ambassador) to Wall, March 3, 1758.—*Chatham Correspondence*, i. 294 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Michel's report of February 24, 1758: 'Or, comme cette majorité et la jeune cour à leur tête qui est ce qui forme le soutien du présent ministère, sont tout à fait contre l'envoi des troupes anglaises sur le continent et qu'ils ne restent attachés aux ministres qu'en vertu des promesses positives que ceux-ci leur ont données. . . .'—Berlin Archives.

orders to the letter; he felt more confidence in him than in the German prince, upon whose military powers King Frederick himself was highly doubtful, and who had never yet been tested as Cumberland had been. Though his first surprise of the French force had been successful, this was no sufficient guarantee for the future. Thus under the pressure of the young court, upon which the ministry was dependent, Pitt most decisively declared at the opening of Parliament that he would not send a single man from England to Hanover, and the mass of the people were delighted to see that the minister remained thus far faithful to his old principles. This promise, however, might well have been evaded. Pitt only needed to bring forward a motion, without appearing in person, empowering him to send out troops, and his action would then have been legally necessary. The prince, however, demanded a full assurance upon the matter, and Pitt therefore declined the demand of the King of Prussia. He even desired to add an article to the convention, pledging Frederick to a provision of 10,000 men,<sup>1</sup> but in this he was unsuccessful.

Frederick did not know how to understand the situation. Pitt's reasons seemed to him entirely inadequate; as long as the French armies were in Germany, there could be no question of an invasion of England, and the English troops on American service were not so numerous as Pitt's arguments implied. Fifty thousand men were under arms in England, standing idle, while troops were urgently wanted at the most important seat of war. He proposed to send a memorial to the English king, but was dissuaded by the English ambassador, Mitchell, who regarded the violence of its language as impolitic; in this document he asserted that England seemed to him like an unusually strong man with one arm paralysed. His London ambassador, Michel, was unable to provide any satisfactory explanation of the circumstances, and the king therefore conceived that he was incompetent to secure the due performance of the terms of the convention, or to explain the situation with sufficient exactitude to the English ministers, as otherwise they would not have turned a deaf ear to such decisive reasons.

Relations had become so strained at the beginning of

<sup>1</sup> Mentioned by Bute in a letter to Pitt of the middle of July 1758.—Chatham MSS.

January that Frederick suspended the signing of the convention to which he had agreed on the 22nd, and refused to accept the subsidies, asserting that he was not in such urgent need of them, and that he did not wish to be a burden upon his ally.

The English minister was greatly disturbed by this step. The victor of Rossbach had been the hero to whom all the weak and timorous turned, and these he was now threatening to abandon; there was no doubt that the king would leave England, and come to an agreement with France, his old ally, with whom he was suspected to have been in secret communication. In that case England would be entirely isolated, at war with France, at enmity with Austria, at variance with Spain, with the northern powers, and now finally with Prussia. What, then, would be the end of a state that was so weak as not yet to have recovered its colonial losses, a fact which Frederick strongly emphasised in his memorial? A storm of indignation arose against Pitt.<sup>1</sup> He must be forced to make concessions that the alliance with Prussia might be maintained. The king applied to Newcastle and Mansfield to induce the obstinate minister to permit the despatch of troops, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Lady Yarmouth threw herself at the feet of the princess and begged her in the interests of the state to use her influence to change Pitt's intentions; George II. suddenly displayed great amiability towards his daughter-in-law, who coldly replied that she could not persuade the secretary of state to break his word. Her friend, Lord Bute, on the contrary advised the secretary to stand firm.<sup>2</sup> He reminded him that Newcastle had also promised to avoid any further complications in continental politics, and that the despatch of troops was inconsistent with the whole of the ministerial professions. Pitt gave the applicants to understand that they could take those measures if they pleased, and that he would then resign in their favour.<sup>3</sup> Naturally no one was inclined to run this risk.

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 294 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 301.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 298 ff. Pitt informed Michel, as the latter reported to Frederick, that he proposed to resign, and allowed the ambassador to dissuade him; this was merely a diplomatic device, and is not to be regarded, with A. Schäfer, as a serious intention. The same is true of Pitt's feigned suspicion that Frederick's obstinacy was inspired by Hanoverian influence. Side-issues of this nature serve only to complicate and obscure the narrative.



Thus Pitt maintained his own attitude; moreover the old duke, who could not afford to lose the favour of Leicester House, was obliged to persuade the king into agreement with Pitt's policy, instead of persuading his colleague to give way to the king. In this task he was successful, as he was able to show that on all other points Pitt was doing his best to support their Prussian ally and to allay his vexation. Pitt suspected that his ambassador Mitchell had shown a want of tact in dealing with the King of Prussia; he therefore proposed his recall, and entrusted his ambassador at the Hague, Sir Joseph Yorke, the son of Hardwicke, with an extraordinary commission to Berlin and to Frederick's camp. Pitt promised to try and procure a contingent from Denmark and a large increase for the Hanoverian forces.

Meanwhile King Frederick had perceived that it was impolitic to demand the impossible, and thus to surrender the numerous advantages which were offered.<sup>1</sup> In a despatch of March 3, even before Michel had fully explained the difficulties of Pitt's position, he abandoned his demand, and sent Baron Knyphausen as extraordinary messenger to London to conclude the convention. The baron's instructions, dated March 8, reaffirmed however the absolute necessity for the despatch of a squadron to the Baltic. When Frederick met with the same invincible resistance upon this point, he finally consented to be satisfied with a vague promise of the despatch of a squadron as soon as one should be available. Thus on April 11 the subsidy convention was signed, by which the relations of the two powers were established for the remainder of the campaign. King Frederick received a subsidy of £670,000, which he was to use in support of those forces employed in the common interests of the contracting parties, while both monarchs pledged themselves not to make any convention or peace with belligerent states except in common; King George also promised to support an army of 55,000 men, and to raise a fleet to be despatched for the protection of Emden, declaring that he was at the moment unable to send any men-of-war to the Baltic.

The convention only held good for one year, as provision had only been made for one payment, and it was believed upon either side that the war would be concluded by this

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Koser, *Friedrich der Grosse*, ii. 165.

campaign. When these hopes proved impossible in the autumn, a new arrangement was concluded upon similar terms, and so on until the year 1760. Yorke's mission thus proved fruitless, as matters had been settled before his arrival; however, he remained in Frederick's camp until June, conducting negotiations upon other matters, when he returned to the Hague. Knyphausen remained with Michel, as second Prussian ambassador, throughout the whole of the war. England laid a heavy financial burden upon herself by this convention; apart from the unusually high subsidies, she was also responsible for the expenses of the German army. Newcastle calculated these at £1,800,000 a year, and incurred a violent rebuke from Pitt,<sup>1</sup> who was anxious as far as possible to depreciate the burden of the continental war in the interests of his popularity and of his position towards the young court. Newcastle, however, proved that the estimate could not possibly be reduced.

Though Pitt showed a lack of compliance upon this occasion towards the Prussian king, he did not wish it to be supposed that the English government was lacking in energy, a supposition which seemed not unreasonable at a time when the English forces were carefully withheld and no success had as yet been obtained. At the beginning of February King Frederick had already inspired the English ambassador with the idea of attempting a second landing on the French coast with the regiments available for service.<sup>2</sup> He promised great results from such an attempt, which perhaps his own genius would have been able to carry out, though it was beyond the energies of the English leaders, who had become unduly cautious. The plan was to land some twenty or twenty-five thousand men in Calais, Boulogne, or Port l'Orient, devastate the surrounding country, and advance if possible to Paris and pillage the enemy's capital. Pitt's views were not so ambitious, for he knew more of the difficulties that were to be encountered; at the same time he readily considered the proposal, notwithstanding his unfortunate experience of the previous year. He hoped on this occasion to avoid the errors that had been committed, and to entrust the enterprise to leaders upon whose energy he could rely. In this way he would be able to

<sup>1</sup> See this correspondence in the *Chatham Papers*, i. 302 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xvi. 230.

use English troops in the interests of the German war, and satisfy the King of Prussia without incurring the opposition of the heir to the throne. On April 7 the Prussian ambassador announced with delight<sup>1</sup> that troops and vessels were being concentrated, doubtless for an expedition against the French coast.

The forces were concentrated off the Isle of Wight, and not a word transpired regarding their destination. It was a far more powerful force than that which Pitt had previously employed.<sup>2</sup> No less than 14,000 men and fifteen warships, together with their complement of frigates and other vessels, were intended for the descent itself, while twenty men-of-war were to cruise off Brest to anticipate any interference on the part of the French fleet. The Duke of Marlborough was placed in command of the French army. He was the uncle of that John Spencer who stood between Pitt and the vast inheritance for which he had so long waited in vain. His last hopes of the reversion disappeared at this moment. John Spencer had married in 1757, and his first son was born in the following year.<sup>3</sup> Any dislike to Pitt on the part of the duke, as the nearest relation to John, may have been removed by this event, together with any possible obstacle to his appointment. Lord George Sackville was subordinated to him as lieutenant-general, and was thus given the first opportunity in this war of displaying his capacities. The squadron was under the command of Captain Richard Howe, a brother of the brigadier engaged in America, and enjoying an equal reputation for capacity. The main fleet, which was not directly connected with the expedition, was placed, strangely enough, under the command of Lord Anson, the first lord of the admiralty. No other course remained open, as Hawke felt himself injured by Howe's appointment, and would not accept the task.<sup>4</sup>

Such were the preparations made by Pitt for the campaign of 1758. The seed had been carefully sown with lavish hand, and it only remained to reap the fruit.

<sup>1</sup> Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, i. 338 f.; Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 123 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Dictionary of National Biography*.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 124.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE FIRST VICTORIES

AFTER the conclusion of the convention with Prussia, Pitt's position was stronger than ever. His power was founded as before upon the court of the heir-apparent, with whom he remained upon the best of terms, as he carefully followed his wishes. Lord Bute took a large share in all his actions, heartily wished him every success, and consoled him upon every failure, always pointing to the happier future, when Pitt would be able to realise his favourite ideas in co-operation with the young king.<sup>1</sup> He was thus secure against any attempts on the part of Newcastle to regain the command, while the parliamentary influence of the prince was entirely at his disposal, and he could act without any apprehension for the security of his predominance. The relations of Pitt and Newcastle were somewhat extraordinary; their views upon many points were wholly divergent, but neither could do without the other. Chesterfield humorously compared them to 'man and wife who jog on, seldom agreeing, often quarrelling, but by mutual interest upon the whole, not parting.'<sup>2</sup> The duke was somewhat restless under the yoke, and attempted at times to shake it off, as, for instance, upon the occasion of a quarrel with Holland,<sup>3</sup> whose ships had been carrying supplies and munitions of war to the French, and had been attacked in consequence by English privateers. Pitt proposed to send a curt answer to the complaint which had been lodged, but Newcastle, who was especially anxious to avoid any breach with the States-General, instructed the ambassador, Yorke, without Pitt's knowledge, to promise compensation to the governor at the Hague. This Newcastle was able to do,

<sup>1</sup> See *Chatham Papers*, i. 316 f. and 318 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1221.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 139 ff.  
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as Holland did not belong to Pitt's secretaryship, and Yorke was one of the duke's friends as the son of Hardwicke. When Pitt issued his orders he was informed that other arrangements had been made, and could not now be altered. This treatment naturally excited his anger. On another occasion, when he requested information from Hawke concerning the possibility of a landing on the French island of Belleisle, the admiral's unfavourable opinion was submitted to the king<sup>1</sup> before it reached himself. Pitt, who was anxious to carry out the landing, was thus unable to represent the project to the king from his own point of view. This affair also led to a violent dispute between the ministers. The duke's great wish, even during this summer, when prospects had changed for the better, was to secure peace at any price. This contemptible character was ready, as Bute asserts,<sup>2</sup> to sacrifice half America in order to secure his own restoration to power. 'Was I not right?' Bute writes again to Pitt, 'can we carry on war with such advisers?' and again, 'I lament the scenes which my worthy friend is so often obliged to bear.' Newcastle was thus attempting to gain secretly an influence upon foreign policy, but for the most part he was obliged to content himself with second place. Pitt's behaviour to him, and indeed to most of his colleagues, was domineering, violent, and severe. His impatience broke out at the least opposition,<sup>3</sup> and the duke was obliged to put up with it. On one occasion he induced the king to give vent to an expression of dissatisfaction with Pitt, and upon this he built hopes that George II. would gladly be rid of so unaccommodating a minister.<sup>4</sup> In this idea, however, he was mistaken. Upon the proposal of the new budget, Pitt did not hesitate to utter strong criticism of the treasury taxation proposals, but no breach resulted.<sup>5</sup> Even Legge, who was the chief object of his attack, remained at his post.

Pitt had arranged his course of policy with such dexterity as to please not only the heir-apparent, but also the nation,

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, October 25, 1758.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>2</sup> In an undated letter to Pitt. The references make it tolerably certain that the date must lie between July 20 and 30.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 261.

<sup>4</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 16, 1758.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>5</sup> Phillimore, *Lyttelton*, ii. 606 ff.

and upon most points the king.<sup>1</sup> This policy was most completely expressed in the subsidy convention with Prussia. The king was satisfied, because England undertook the expense of a great army of 50,000 men, to which, as Elector, he was only obliged to add 5000 at his own expense, and this for the immediate object of expelling the French from Hanover. Public opinion was satisfied because this army was not officially characterised as a protective force for the electorate, but as a support to their heroic ally, the King of Prussia, who was the idol of the whole country. The liberation of Hanover would appear as nothing more than a secondary result of the policy of alliance with Prussia. Thus since the battle of Rossbach the situation had entirely changed. Earlier alliances with Prussia had been undertaken to secure Hanover. Even when Frederick had taken up arms he had been supported, as he was expected to help Hanover in spite of this unlooked-for step. Now that the Prussian king had won the affections of England by his victories, and especially by those over the French, the alliance was continued for the mutual overthrow of France. The limitations of a defensive convention were merged in the wider possibilities of an offensive alliance.

This was the change in policy that Pitt announced to the House of Commons on April 19, when he undertook the defence of the subsidy convention.<sup>2</sup> Avoiding reference to Hanover, he asserted the necessity of supporting the King of Prussia and of making common cause with him. He undertook that the operations of the army should be directed only to this common object, that is to say, to the prosecution of Anglo-Prussian and of Hanoverian interests. He delivered a glowing eulogy of King Frederick in order to inspire the belief that the convention would only promote closer relations between the two countries. He emphasised the opposition between Austria and England, and the ingratitude of the Vienna court to the court of St. James, in order once again to show the identity of English and Prussian interests. He explained the despatch of a British battalion to Emden as

<sup>1</sup> Chesterfield to his son, May 18, 1758: 'The latter [Pitt], I am told, gains ground in the closet, though he still keeps his strength in the House, and his popularity in the public. . . .'*—Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1221.

<sup>2</sup> Schäfer, *Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Kriegs*, i. 567.

a measure taken for the support of Prussia, to which East Friesland belonged, and 'hinted that other causes might arise when he would not be disinclined to send English troops over seas provided that they could be recalled at any moment, and were despatched not merely for the purpose of protecting petty states [a direct reference to Hanover], but for the promotion of common interests, and for the decision of the war as a whole.' Thus he did not announce the abandonment of the Hanoverian policy, but rather its incorporation in a more comprehensive policy, by means of which the continental power of France might be restrained if not destroyed. This was a project which differed in no essential point from Carteret's earlier plan. Carteret also had regarded Hanover merely as a pawn in the game, and the humiliation of France as his main object. The only difference was that Austria had then been on England's side instead of Prussia. In whatever direction Pitt might turn he was bound to advance upon some path which he had formerly condemned as dangerous. Thus he proved that the so-called Hanoverian policy was a necessity provided it was not regarded in isolation. George Lyttelton in the House of Lords was able admirably to expose the inconsistency of these views with Pitt's earlier opposition, and to deduce the conclusion that the king's attitude had been justified.<sup>1</sup>

Pitt's parliamentary work at this time was but scanty. Apart from the subsidy question we need only mention a bill brought in by his adherents for the more punctual payment of the sailors, and another bill for limiting the operation of the pressgangs and extending the Habeas Corpus Act, which was thrown out by the House of Lords.<sup>2</sup> In the latter case Pitt's party interests were at variance with those of the state. The measure was highly popular, but it threatened to impair the capacities of the fleet. Pitt therefore did his best to promote the bill by entrusting the drafting of it to his legal friend Pratt, and supporting it in the House of Commons. At the same time he did not use his influence to secure its success in the Lords. The Lords had considerable difficulty in finding a plausible excuse for rejection. The entire ingenuity of the supreme judges,

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 111 f.; Phillimore, ii. 109.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 100 ff.

especially of Mansfield, was applied to this purpose, and in return for their efforts they were hooted and insulted by the city mob at the instigation of Pitt's friends.<sup>1</sup> With this Pitt had certainly no concern, but now that he had the state welfare more constantly at heart, it was often difficult for him to restrain the zeal of his adherents, which was inspired solely by party principles.

The annulling of the convention of Kloster Zeven and the appointment of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick had renewed the struggle against France in Europe, which in this year was carried on from two bases of operations—Hanover and England. Although there was no actual interdependence of English and Hanoverian operations, yet they exerted a certain influence upon one another, and it therefore seems advisable to treat of them in common, in order to gain a clear view of Pitt's action. With military details he had nothing to do, and we need not obscure the main points at issue by detailed explanation of these matters.

Ferdinand's successes during the winter had been unexpectedly brilliant; he succeeded in restoring the efficiency of a depressed and a greatly reduced army, and did not hesitate to operate during the winter season; on the other hand his task was largely facilitated by a lack of discipline and an outbreak of disease that threatened the French army with utter dissolution. By November and December 1757 Richelieu had been driven back to the Aller; the allies were able to take up winter quarters at Lüneburg, and the advance began on February 15. In a few weeks Ferdinand was able to cross the Aller and the Weser, to relieve the towns of Bremen and Hanover, and to force the capitulation of Minden. The French general, whose right flank was also threatened by 8000 troops under Prince Henry of Prussia, became convinced that the districts on the right bank of the Rhine could only be maintained by reorganising his army; accordingly he withdrew to the left bank about the beginning of April, maintaining only his hold of the bridges. On the south, on the line of the Main, stood the army of Prince Soubise, which had been beaten at Rossbach. These forces had been driven to evacuate Hesse, whose landgrave, an ally of England, was able to return to his capital. In the north the Austrian General

<sup>1</sup> Phillimore, ii. 108.



von Pisa was obliged to avoid the danger of being cut off by retiring from Emden, then menaced by an English squadron; shortly afterwards, on April 21, this town, by the terms of the subvention treaty, was occupied by an English garrison, and henceforward its harbour provided a means of communication between England and the German army.

Ferdinand's further advance depended primarily upon the support he might receive from the English and Hanoverian governments; it was necessary that his army should be brought up to the strength provided by the convention while he was now entering districts where he could easily be supported by English help or English influence. Pitt's interest in the German campaign was largely increased by these initial successes; he did his best to satisfy the prince's demands, urged on the process of enlistment, and made large purchases of corn for the army in Holland. While he thus provided the means for continuing an offensive attitude, he suddenly interfered in the strategical measures in a manner which was calculated to place operations upon a wholly different basis. On April 28 King George despatched a document, naturally inspired by Pitt, to the prince,<sup>1</sup> recognising the value of his successes and advising him to send a body of six or seven thousand men across the Rhine.

This advice, proceeding from so high a quarter, must have had a special significance. We find its explanation in the mission of Yorke to the Prussian court. Yorke had procured full powers from King Frederick to use his name with the queen-regent of the united Netherlands in submitting to her consideration a plan for united effort against France, which plan she was in turn to urge upon the States-General.<sup>2</sup> The princess, and in particular the commander of the Dutch army, Prince Louis of Brunswick, were entirely well disposed towards England, so that at this moment the prospect of adding the Netherlands to the Anglo-Prussian alliance was especially favourable. The princess had already exerted herself to secure an increase in the numbers of the Dutch troops.

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 309 f.

<sup>2</sup> Holderness to Yorke, June 27, 1758: 'You are now authorised by His Prussian Majesty to explain to the Princess Royal and the Dutch Ministers of confidence, his thoughts upon the present situation of affairs, and his plan for forming a system for resisting our common and constant enemy, both now and hereafter.'

Hence it was most important at that moment that the allies should use their power upon the Dutch frontier and drive the enemy from that boundary. In 1756 sedulous efforts had been made to induce Frederick to concentrate troops in this western province, with the object of encouraging the Dutch to join; Frederick, who was fully occupied with his attack upon Austria, declined to agree. At the present moment the prospect seemed more favourable, and Pitt proceeded to use Ferdinand's successes for this purpose; he had, upon an earlier occasion during the war of the Austrian Succession, asserted union with Holland to be an indispensable condition of effective action in Flanders. Yorke was sent back to the Hague to watch over the project; if it succeeded, Pitt hoped to be able to secure proper co-operation between the expeditions to the coast and the allied armies in Flanders.

Prince Ferdinand began by remonstrating energetically and enumerating the disasters which these new orders might bring forth;<sup>1</sup> he was, however, appeased by the concentration of troops at the Isle of Wight when he learned of their destination.<sup>2</sup> He therefore applied to the King of Prussia for consent, who agreed the more readily as he hoped thereby to secure the reconquest of Wesel, and it was now possible to begin the enterprise.<sup>3</sup> The limits of neutrality were not very scrupulously regarded by the Dutch government. With the knowledge of Prince Louis pontoons were provided in Holland and sent to the frontier; the engineers, however, declined to build a bridge outside their frontiers, and Ferdinand was therefore obliged to send his troops over the river on June 2 on Netherland soil, to which proceeding the government again offered no objection. The enterprise began with extraordinary success. After gradually collecting a considerable force in the north the prince travelled southwards, and here Count Clermont, the French commander, was compelled by the strict orders of Belleisle, the new minister of war, to give battle. On June 23 Ferdinand was able to win a complete victory over the French army at Krefeld.

The expedition which Pitt had planned against the enemy's coasts was executed simultaneously with this advance beyond

<sup>1</sup> Ferdinand to George II., May 14, 1758.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Ferdinand to Newcastle, May 14, 1758.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xvii. 16 and 129.

the Rhine. It was a project regarded in England with little approval after the experience of Rochefort, and the nation were unable to understand the minister's enthusiasm. The king's consent was given in very lukewarm terms,<sup>1</sup> a circumstance bound to exert a depressing influence, although the young court strongly urged this method of warfare.<sup>2</sup> Marlborough and Sackville were far from enthusiastic about their task,<sup>3</sup> which promised much difficulty and little honour. The expedition sailed from the Isle of Wight on June 1;<sup>4</sup> much was projected, for it was intended to advance upon Paris, but the prospects of success were scanty. For two days it was detained in the Channel Islands by calms, and did not cast anchor till June 5 in the Bay of Cancale, on the easterly coast of north Brittany. There a number of vessels were destroyed, and the landing party spread great devastation. This strong force of 14,000 men did not, however, venture to attack the fortified town of St. Malo, which was reached on June 7, as their siege materials were insufficient, and false reports were raised of a concentration of French troops. The result of the undertaking would have been entirely negative had not a number of ships been found beyond gunshot, and a quantity of supplies in the suburbs. These were destroyed or confiscated, and the leaders were able to report the infliction of heavy damage upon the French. A few small ships of war were also captured.

Pitt's adherents were delighted at the receipt of this news, and asserted that even if St. Malo had not been captured the attack upon the important harbour of Granville on the west coast of Normandy would destroy the Newfoundland fishery, for which that place was a starting-point and centre. Fox, on the other hand, asserted, with some reason, that to gain such success was to use guineas to break windows.<sup>5</sup> Pitt despatched fresh orders, obliging the commanders to continue their enterprise upon the north coast, between St. Malo and Boulogne. Meanwhile, however, sickness had broken out among the troops crowded upon the transport vessels, and the spirit of enterprise was correspondingly diminished. The

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 311.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 323.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 125.

<sup>4</sup> See for the expedition Thackeray i. 339 ff.; Dodington, p. 408.

<sup>5</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1227.

expedition sailed by Granville, as troops were noticed in the neighbourhood, and after a short stay off Havre de Grace, to agree with the letter of Pitt's orders, they cast anchor off Cherbourg, which Pitt had pointed out as a suitable place for attack. It was resolved to land and to attack the forts erected for the protection of the town. The wind, however, was unfavourable, and made transport in flat-bottomed boats a dangerous proceeding. The plan was therefore abandoned, and on July 1 the great expedition, after accomplishing practically nothing, ran into the Bay of St. Helens.

This was a failure almost more disgraceful than that of the preceding year; a far larger number of troops had been employed, and the closer neighbourhood of their base, from which reinforcements could be expected in case of need and had already been sent, should have enabled a bolder advance. The generals, however, who were of sufficient importance to be able to disregard the possibility of a court-martial, merely performed the barest minimum required by their orders, and regarded any obstacle as an excuse for avoiding energetic measures. At the same time an enterprising element was present, as a number of volunteers from the upper classes had accompanied the expedition, but Sackville's soldierly capacities were here displayed in a somewhat remarkable light. He was, as Walpole says, not one of the first to court danger.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile news had arrived of Ferdinand's victory at Krefeld, and had determined Pitt to send a contingent of English troops to the prince. He had induced Ferdinand, by his despatch of the royal letter, to cross the Rhine, and he could not now abandon him when he had a prospect of succeeding in his difficult task of maintaining the Rhine frontier, the more so as the army of Soubise had already begun to advance from the Main. The difficulty had been that the heir-apparent apprehended the reappointment of Cumberland if a British force was sent across. Hence in May Pitt proposed to grant the despatch of the troops only upon condition that King Frederick should arrive in person with the Prussian army and command the whole force.<sup>2</sup> Cumberland could naturally have taken no place by the side of Frederick. However, after the brilliant successes of

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, vii. 24.



Ferdinand, the duke's reappointment was equally out of the question, and all apprehensions were now removed.<sup>1</sup> Pitt found the young court ready to support his plan, and was definitely informed of this fact by Bute;<sup>2</sup> the consent of the court secured that of his friends. Lord Temple was somewhat afraid of the consequences, but declared his readiness to give way to Pitt's views.<sup>3</sup>

As the minister was determined to continue the coast expedition under all circumstances, the question arose what general and what troops should be sent to Germany. The general was speedily found in Bligh, a man of long experience, who was commander in Ireland. Bute recommended the employment of part of the standing regiments in Scotland, the withdrawal of which had been strongly opposed by Cumberland.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile Pitt, who was aware of Ferdinand's want of cavalry, resolved to diminish the numbers of the expedition by despatching cavalry and a few infantry to Germany.<sup>5</sup> Marlborough and Sackville thus gained an opportunity of claiming the command for themselves. They were wholly averse to continuing the thankless task with which they were now entrusted, and Sackville offered his resignation if his wishes were declined.<sup>6</sup> Pitt thus found himself obliged to give way before one who was in high favour with Leicester House, and to make a change in the command, though the king himself was strongly opposed to Sackville's appointment. In a conference with the generals on July 4,<sup>7</sup> in which he would have been justified in overwhelming them with reproaches, Pitt was obliged to yield to their desires. On the next day he was able to defend the strategy of his expedition in the cabinet council, and to secure the continuance of the proposed enterprise with its diminished forces.<sup>8</sup> Lord Gran-

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 325.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 320 f.

<sup>3</sup> Temple to Pitt, June 29, 1758: 'Undoubtedly we have never sworn by Styx or Toryism or Patriotism, never, in no case whatever, to send a man to the Continent, and the Emden regiment is a proof of it, but that of sending these squadrons to reinforce the Hanoverian Army at this time must wholly depend upon circumstances and objects of which you are the judge, and of which success will be the best vindication.'—Chatham MSS., cp. *Chatham Papers*, i. 324.

<sup>4</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 323.

<sup>5</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 244.

<sup>6</sup> Sackville to Pitt, July 3, 1758.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 326 f.

<sup>7</sup> Pitt to Hester, July 4, 1758: 'The Duke of Marlborough and Lord G. Sackville just announce their arrival, and the clock strikes eleven.'—Chatham MSS., cp. *Grenville Papers*, i. 247.

<sup>8</sup> Dodington, p. 409.

ville urged the advisability of concentrating all forces in Germany, to which Pitt replied that the previous failure of these expeditions was entirely due to the vacillation of the leaders, for the expeditions had always offered admirable prospects in themselves. The final result was that a force of five regiments of cavalry, including the Blue Guard, to which Pitt had once belonged, and six regiments of infantry, with some artillery, in all 8540 men, were transported to Emden under Marlborough's command. On August 15 they joined Ferdinand's army, which had meanwhile retired beyond the Rhine. The coast expedition set sail again at the end of July under General Bligh.

Prince Ferdinand had gained some further successes on the far side of the Rhine. His nephew, the crown prince, penetrated into the Austrian Netherlands, reduced the little fortress of Roermonde on June 27 and advanced to the gates of Löwen, exacting contributions wherever he went. Düsseldorf, which belonged to the Elector of the Palatinate, surrendered on July 7 after a short bombardment. However, the main object of the struggle remained undecided, as it seemed impossible to transfer the seat of war to Flanders. On July 4 Yorke informed Holderness<sup>1</sup> that the Netherlands were strongly inclined to join England, but that the alliance could only be accepted if England was ready to make a new and definite agreement with the States-General concerning the right of search at sea and privateering. Various complaints concerning the confiscation of Dutch ships were laid before the English government, but were in no case deemed worthy of answer. The London government was disinclined to tie its hands in this respect, and the prospects of a union with Holland were therefore cut short. Ferdinand's expedition on the left bank of the Rhine was also left in the air, as he could not count upon the success of the distant expeditions on the coast. He was obliged to try and fall back upon his old base; he made an attempt to force a battle upon the French, as a victory might well have brought a further change in the situation, but the enemy's commander was able to decline. Meanwhile Soubise was advancing in Hesse; his vanguard under Broglie occupied Cassel and defeated the little force of Prince Ysenburg on July 23. Ferdinand thus

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office Records, Holland.—Public Record Office.

felt himself threatened upon the rear, and was obliged to withdraw his army to Westphalia for the protection of Hanover. Fortunately General Imhof drove back the French at Rees on August 5; otherwise the bridges across the Rhine would have been destroyed. On August 10 his army was again upon the opposite bank, and the rest of the campaign passed with no great incident. After the arrival of the English reinforcements Ferdinand was able to make head against the enemy's armies on the Lippe, while Hesse was abandoned to the French. The latter, after a series of petty operations, withdrew behind the Rhine and the Maine in November to their winter quarters, the allies occupying positions in Westphalia and Hesse.

Pitt was again unfortunate with the continuation of the Malo expedition. The cavalry general Bligh<sup>1</sup> showed more enterprise than his predecessors, and began operations with excellent goodwill, but he obviously was inexperienced in landing operations and ill acquainted with the coast. His advisers, Lord Fitzmaurice and Clarke, who remained in Pitt's favour, were no better informed than himself. The initial attempts were successful. On August 6 the fleet arrived off Cherbourg, concerning which some information had been gained on the previous visit. On this occasion the wind was not unfavourable to landing, though on the other hand the French were better prepared since the enemy's first appearance, and had thrown up earthworks along the shore, which were defended by some 3000 men. Bligh, however, ordered out the landing parties, and the operation was successfully performed under the guns of the men-of-war. On the next day the town and the fort were occupied without opposition, and the work of destruction began. Cardinal Fleury had formerly constructed a dry dock with its appurtenances in Cherbourg, which he regarded, by reason of its outstanding position on the north coast, as the best starting-point for privateering and for attacks upon English harbours; though the works had recently been neglected, they might easily be restored and used. These constructions were now destroyed as far as possible, together with the forts. A great quantity of munitions of war and of guns fell into the hands of the English; twenty-four of the pieces were sent to London, inspected in

<sup>1</sup> For his instructions see Entick, *History of the Late War*, iii. 177 ff.

Hyde Park, and then transferred in solemn procession to the Tower. From Cherbourg the army advanced to Valognes, where small skirmishes took place. As a large body of troops was reported in the neighbourhood, Bligh considered it advisable to re-embark and to find another opportunity of damaging the enemy. On August 18 the squadron left the coast and was driven back to England by the wind, where the general gave his troops a fortnight's rest.

Unfortunately, Bligh considered that his task was not yet performed, and that it was his business to repair the previous failure of the attempt upon St. Malo. At the end of August he put to sea and sailed to the bay of St. Lunaire to the west of St. Malo; here he landed his troops on September 5 and advanced to the neighbouring port of St. Briac, where he expected to find hundreds of vessels. Only a few unimportant ships fell into his hands, and he also perceived that he was divided from St. Malo by a long and well-fortified arm of the sea which it was impossible to cross or to march round. He therefore sent his fleet westward to St. Cast and marched into the interior in that direction upon Matignon, where some fighting took place. Meanwhile, however, the governor of the province, the Duke of Aiguillon, had collected the troops for coast defence, a force reported to be much superior to the English. Bligh in consequence ordered a retirement to St. Cast at three o'clock in the morning on September 12, and immediately proceeded to re-embark, beginning with the artillery and horses. The duke was informed of these movements by the incautious manner in which the signal to retreat was given; he followed with the whole of his forces, occupied the heights which bordered the shore, and proceeded to attack the detachment which was covering the embarkation. As the naval guns were masked by their own troops, the duke was able to rout the force and drive it into the sea, the English losing no less than a thousand in killed and prisoners.

Such was the dismal end of this second coast expedition, of which Pitt had conceived such high hopes and from which Ferdinand and King Frederick had expected much advantage to the German war.<sup>1</sup> They had all forgotten the disproportion between England's military weakness by land and the

<sup>1</sup> See Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 126.



great force which France had at her disposal upon her own soil, notwithstanding her armies elsewhere. Only comparatively unimportant marauding expeditions could have succeeded, and even here the price was likely to be high. Sackville was not so entirely wrong when he expressed his disinclination to such piracy.<sup>1</sup> In America these conditions were reversed; England could rely upon the solid strength of a strong and numerous population, while France was reduced to wait for reinforcements from home which came in slowly, owing to England's maritime supremacy. As the French were in possession of the great system of waterways, they were able to maintain their ground for a considerable period in the thick forests and in the interior, notwithstanding their smaller and more scattered numbers; they were able, also, upon occasion to make successful advances and raids, and at times to check the progress of the English settlements, but whenever the English advanced with a definite object and with the whole of their power, the French were sooner or later forced to retire. Pitt, who was now beginning a definite advance to this end, was entirely correct in choosing the centre of the enemy's position as his objective, for thus he would most quickly arrive at a final decision. However, so many unforeseen obstacles arose, that the completion of this task was still considerably delayed.

Pitt's careful plans for the conquest of Louisburg were disturbed by the inordinate time which Admiral Boscawen expended upon his voyage. He left London on February 2 and did not arrive in Halifax with his great fleet until the end of May.<sup>2</sup> This fleet consisted of 23 men-of-war, 18 smaller vessels, and more than 100 transport ships, carrying 13,600 soldiers, almost entirely regular troops. Amherst, who had concentrated his troops in New York, was equally unable to keep the appointed date (April 12 in Halifax). Whether his troops were not ready, or whether the transports did not arrive from England, is uncertain. In any case he did not leave New York until May 2, while his voyage was equally lengthy, so that he arrived at Halifax on May 28. Boscawen, in accordance with his instructions, had already sailed out

<sup>1</sup> Dodington, p. 410.

<sup>2</sup> On this expedition cp. Parkman, II. chap. xx.; Bancroft, iv. 234 ff.; and the reports of the Prussian embassy.

without him, and the forces met at the mouth of the harbour. They reached the harbour of Cap Breton on June 1, where Admiral Hardy had been cruising for some days. Operations thus began nearly a month later than Pitt had proposed, but for this the officers could hardly be held responsible. It was thus obvious that Pitt's demands had been excessive in view of the many unaccountable obstacles in the way, though had he demanded less he would perhaps have attained nothing.

Pitt had received a full report<sup>1</sup> upon the fortress of Louisburg from Major Murray, who had been cruising there in a former year with Holburne; this report provided himself and General Amherst with information upon many valuable points. Louisburg lay on the eastern side of the Ile Royale du Cap Breton, or, shortly, Cap Breton, a deeply indented point divided into halves which forms a north-eastern continuation of Nova Scotia. The town occupied the eastern extremity of a peninsula which advances into the sea eastwards with a bend to the north-east; outlying reefs and islands and a tongue of land stretching out from the north-east enclosed a very considerable harbour. The channel between the east islands and the opposite point was about 800 metres wide, the harbour from north-east to south-west being 4000 metres in length. To the west of the Horn outside the harbour was the low-lying Gabreuse Bay. From the northern bank of this bay some cliffs projected into the sea, behind which the surf could most easily be crossed in boats. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the fortifications of the town had been improved in view of the disastrous experience of the previous war, and Louisburg was now regarded as a stronger town than any in French or English America. It was well named the American Dunkirk. As a fortress, however, it was inferior to those of Europe. The walling of the trenches was incomplete and had been replaced in many spots by fascines, for lack of other material, while the plan of fortification had not been entirely completed. The town, of 4000 inhabitants, was chiefly composed of wooden houses, so that in case of siege the danger of fire was very great. At the same time its powers of resistance were not to be despised, and on the land side in particular it was

*Hardy from  
Cable  
C. B. Breton*

<sup>1</sup> Of August 23, 1757.—Colonial Office Records, America and the West Indies.

especially strong, defended as it was by four strong bastions and a wide stretch of swampy ground, which made advance difficult. The higher ground upon either flank alone held out any prospect of success to an assailant. A primary condition of defence, however, was an adequate number of ships to obviate any attack upon the sea side, this being the weak point of the whole situation. A general who secured the harbour might regard himself as master of the town.

It may be said without exaggeration that it was not so much the energy of the besiegers as the measures of Pitt, apart from the mistakes of the French, which brought about the fall of Louisburg. By closing French harbours and capturing French ships, Pitt had secured that there should not be at Cap Breton an adequate force for the security of the island at the right moment. It is true that he had not been able entirely to cut off reinforcements. Notwithstanding all his watchfulness individual ships of war crossed over from France and from Quebec in some cases with supplies, so that the threatened harbour contained a force of 12 ships, five men-of-war and seven frigates; this, however, was hopelessly overpowered by Boscawen's fleet, and if it might delay, it could not prevent, the fall of the town. Had Pitt shown less energy, the situation might have remained as in the previous year. The English leaders might have doubted their prospects of success had the fleet in the harbour been equal to their own.

The English land force was no less overwhelming than the fleet. Amherst had 15,000 men, including over 10,000 regulars, to which the French could only oppose 3000 and some hundred regular troops, together with armed colonists and a few natives. To these advantages must be added a superiority in guns and a far better provision of munitions of war, which Pitt's forethought had provided. Especially valuable were the bold Highlanders, whom Pitt was ever ready to use in this war, and also the sharpshooters whom he had enlisted in the colonies. Appearances may have been against these latter,<sup>1</sup> but their skilful marksmanship inflicted heavy losses upon the defenders.

<sup>1</sup> Wolfe to Sackville, May 12, 1758: 'About 500 rangers are come, which to appearance are little better than *la canaille*.'—Doughty, *Siege of Quebec*, vi. 74.

Under these circumstances the French commander Ducour, a man of great penetration and strength of mind, could hardly have hoped to do more than to protract the siege until help came from France or Canada, or until the winter season drove the enemy home. It would also be a considerable advantage if the English were occupied so long in the conquest of the place as to have no time for further enterprises.

On June 1 the English fleet came into sight, and on the following day anchored along the coast out of gunshot. Now came the critical moment to which one can almost point as marking a change in the whole colonial war. The coastline was explored in boats, with the result that a strong surf was found in every quarter, and wherever the configuration of the coast permitted a landing—especially at outlying headlands—strong defensive works, batteries, entrenchments, and stockades had been erected, which seemed to make landing almost impossible. Admiral Boscawen as a seaman was obliged to decide upon the operation of landing, and became doubtful as to whether he dared venture upon so unpromising an undertaking; he proposed, in accordance with general custom, to call a council of war. There was danger in delay. The moment the leaders began to consider and to debate, and the irresolute elements were able to make themselves heard, affairs, as we have seen in other cases, ended in ill-advised attempts and retreat. On this occasion matters did not go so far. An old naval officer, Ferguson by name, advised the commander to assume full responsibility, to call no council of war, but to begin the enterprise at any cost. This was the right word at the right moment, and seemed to break the spell which had so often bound the British military power. Boscawen took his advice, declared his intention of following his instructions to the letter, and the fate of Louisburg was sealed.

The task was by no means easy, for some 3000 men were distributed along Gabreuse Bay, and the coast was rocky. Not until June 7 did the foggy weather clear sufficiently to make the commencement of operations possible. The plan was to make two feints at points lying close to the town, while the actual landing was to be carried out far to the west in the so-called Fresh Water Bay, under the command of their boldest officer, General Wolfe. The energetic co-operation of this



man is especially worthy of mention, as his constitution entirely unfitted him for the sea, and this voyage had seriously injured his health.<sup>1</sup>

On June 8, at three o'clock in the morning, the boats were lowered all along the line and approached the appointed spots along the shore under the protection of the frigates, apparently concentrating their attacks upon the eastern points, while only Wolfe at the west was intended to force a landing. The reception of the boats from the masked batteries and the guns was so warm that Wolfe gave the signal for retreat in order to avoid useless waste of life. Fortunately his hand-signal was intentionally or unintentionally misunderstood on the right wing more outside the bay, where the firing was less violent. A few officers with their men reached the coast and began to climb the heights. Wolfe observed their success and hastened to their help; in a short time the whole detachment, though suffering considerable loss, had landed and was charging the nearest batteries. While the battle was raging here and the enemy's attention was drawn off, other divisions were enabled to land, and any further maintenance of the coastline was out of the question. The French retired within their walls, the defence of which, against the overwhelming forces of their enemy, was their next business. The English then pitched a camp, and were for the moment entirely occupied with the task of landing their material of war and their heavy guns in the intervals of fine weather in boats from the open roadstead, an unusually difficult business.

The eastern side of the harbour soon fell into the besiegers' hands. Wolfe undertook an expedition round the whole basin and got possession of a point of land opposite the entrance. There, upon Lighthouse Point, a battery was erected which could sweep the whole of the isthmus and the opposite batteries on Goat Island. These were soon silenced, and the enemy's ships were now forced to anchor by the town, to avoid the fire of the above-mentioned battery and of others

<sup>1</sup> Wolfe himself afterwards criticised the manoeuvre in strong terms. He writes to his friend Captain Nickson, on December 1, 1758: 'Amongst ourselves, be it said, that our attempt to land where we did was rash and injudicious, our success unexpected (by me) and undeserved. There was no prodigious exertion of courage in the affair; an officer and thirty men would have made it impossible to get ashore where we did.'—Doughty, *Siege of Quebec*, vi. 26 ff.

that had been erected. Ducour was, therefore, obliged to close the harbour; otherwise the English ships would have sailed in unimpeded, and have destroyed the French squadron. This object was obtained by sinking several ships in such positions that only smaller vessels could sail in and out. 21

This is not the place to describe the several stages of the siege, the central point of which was a height confronting the western part of the southern front. A covered way was constructed from the camp to this point, and parallels were then driven round the height against the fortifications. The work was exceedingly arduous, and was constantly disturbed by a French frigate, the *Arethusa*, which succeeded in taking up a flanking position in an outward bend of the harbour; this it retained with the utmost obstinacy until its final recall and despatch to France with requests for help. This was the only ship which escaped the watchfulness of the English fleet and reached its destination.

It was not until the middle of July that the besiegers began to gain the upper hand and were able to approach the glacis. Several important buildings in the town were set on fire, and on the 21st one of the French men-of-war was blown up and set fire to two more, which burned to the water's edge. Then one bastion after another was destroyed by outbreaks of fire. On the 24th some hundreds of English sailors entered the harbour in boats and destroyed the two remaining men-of-war, the crews of which were already on land. The guns of the ramparts had now been silenced and a considerable breach had been made. On July 26 all was ready for the storming party. The French commander, after a council of war, then determined to surrender, raised the white flag and asked for conditions. These were severe; the islands Royale and St. Jean, together with all supplies, were to be surrendered to England, the garrison were to be prisoners of war, the inhabitants might return to France, and the general must consent within an hour, otherwise the town would be stormed. This ruthless severity which refused the smallest concession to the bold band of defenders aroused exasperation, and was met with a refusal, but the civil authorities secured the despatch of a second messenger with an affirmative answer. Ducour accepted the conditions, and on July 27 the English marched into the town, which was for the most part in ruins. Since that date,

under English rule, its importance has ceased : as a harbour it has been outstripped by Halifax.

Thus the first and most important task which Pitt had placed before Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst was successfully carried through. The rest of their instructions were of a more conditional nature, attempts and choice of details being left to the generals. Pitt's instructions directed them either to turn against Quebec or to destroy the settlements on the river St. Lawrence on Fundy Bay (between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) and on the St. John river (which empties itself into Fundy Bay on the west); they might also send a squadron to the settlements at the mouth of the Mississippi and Mobile (Louisiana). In the latter case Pitt had already instructed the governor, Lyttelton of Carolina (the brother of George), to make a simultaneous attack on the east on Fort Alabama.<sup>1</sup> Wolfe was anxious to begin operations immediately upon Quebec, to which Amherst was at first inclined; Boscawen, however, decided against the project after consideration, and Amherst agreed; news had arrived in the meantime of a defeat suffered by Abercromby, and he therefore considered it more important to go to the help of that general. The attempt upon Louisiana seemed impracticable, as they had heard that there was a lack of pilots for those difficult waters, and the generals therefore resolved to undertake the minister's second proposal, and informed him of their intention in a joint despatch dated August 9. Ducour thus attained one object at least of his long defence: an attack upon Canada's central point was averted for this year, and a longer respite given to the French power in America.

General Wolfe was accordingly entrusted with the not very honourable business of confiscating the property of the settlers on the banks of the lower St. Lawrence, and driving them into the forests, an order which he executed with no great pleasure, but with the thoroughness which duty demanded. Another officer, Lord Rollo, attempted to remove the white settlers from the island of St. Jean, which was included in the capitulation, but with very little success. The island was of special importance to Canada, as Quebec was almost exclusively provided with corn and meat from this spot.<sup>2</sup> Other detach-

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Lyttelton, March 7, 1758.—Colonial Office Records.

<sup>2</sup> Boscawen to Pitt, September 13, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

ments were sent to Fundy Bay. Amherst himself went to Boston with six regiments in order to effect a junction with Abercromby from thence.

Full preparations had been made in accordance with Pitt's orders for the second expedition arranged for this year. The provincial authorities of the north had done their best to collect the necessary troops, and the colonists had willingly undergone the expense, which was a considerable burden upon their resources. In Massachusetts and Connecticut the taxation was especially severe, as these provinces were disinclined to effect loans. The small vessels and boats in which the army was to be transported over the lakes had been collected in large numbers in the colony of New York. Here again, however, it proved impossible to keep to the date arranged, and it was not until the beginning of June that the troops began to collect upon Lake George, the south bank of which was covered with tents. The enemy offered no opposition; after the destruction of Fort William Henry, Montcalm had withdrawn to the northern end of the lake. Abercromby's army amounted to over 15,000 men, including 6367 regulars and 9034 provincials; 900 skiffs and 135 larger vessels were at their disposal, together with the necessary flat-bottomed boats for the artillery. General Howe, in whose hands the real leadership lay, as Pitt had desired, had done his best to reduce the baggage of the troops, and so to increase their mobility.

On July 5 the great fleet at last started over the lake in the most hopeful temper, and landed without difficulty at the northern corner, to the west of the overflow leading to Lake Champlain; this overflow reaches the lower lake in a succession of rapids bending to the west. At its junction with the lake, which runs from south-east to north-west, the overflow forms an acute angle, and upon the tongue of land thus formed lay the French Fort Ticonderoga, where Montcalm had taken up his position with his main force, some detachments having been posted on Lake George and at its overflow. The general's entire force amounted only to 3300 men; he was, however, expecting the Chevalier de Lévis with reinforcements, and this leader arrived in time for the struggle with his advance-guard of 300 men.

As the bridges had been broken down, Howe proposed to go round the left of the overflow, and thus to reach the



enemy's position. However, in the thick forest bearings were soon lost, and the forces happened to collide with a retreating French detachment of 350 men. A panic nearly broke out, as it was impossible to determine the strength of the enemy, but the provincial sharpshooters held their ground, and the French were eventually surrounded and for the most part captured. The English, however, suffered a loss which ruined the whole undertaking and destroyed Pitt's calculations. At the very outset of the skirmish General Howe was killed by a bullet, and the whole responsibility of leadership devolved upon Abercromby, whom Pitt had wished to retain only nominally in the supreme position. The minister, however, could hardly have imagined facts so disastrous as those which actually occurred in consequence of this misfortune.

The English army returned to Lake George, with the object of restoring the bridges and advancing to Ticonderoga by the direct route; Montcalm availed himself of this delay to protect his position by a powerful abattis, which was erected on some rising ground to the west of the fort, and to clear the foreground within gunshot, the felled trees and thorny undergrowth forming an admirable obstacle to advance. Abercromby, however, was foolish enough to advance without artillery, and to throw himself upon this defence without attempting a flanking movement.

On July 8 the march began from Lake George. Towards midday the English troops emerged from the forest and proceeded to advance upon the stockade under the enemy's fire, struggling with other great difficulties presented by the entanglement of fallen trees; a violent struggle began which lasted until nearly six o'clock in the evening, and in which the English lost heavily. Superiority of numbers could here produce no effect. Only upon two occasions was Montcalm seriously threatened; at the outset of the fight Abercromby sent some twenty boatloads of soldiers across the river to attack the defenders in the rear, but the guns of the fort were able to hold them in check. About five o'clock the Highlanders advanced upon the weaker right wing, and threatened to effect an entrance, but Montcalm flung himself into the breach in person with the remaining reserves, and maintained his ground. The Highland leader, John Campbell, lost his life in this attempt. Towards six o'clock the battle ended,

and the task of carrying off the wounded was successfully accomplished under the protection of the well-directed fire of the sharpshooters. These troops continued their fire for an hour and a half, and enabled the beaten force to complete their retreat with comparatively few losses. Thus those arms of the service, the Highlanders and the American sharpshooters, who owed their employment to Pitt's initiative, proved themselves also the most capable in the course of this battle.

The worst feature of the affair was the fact that Abercromby now gave up the attempt as hopeless. He had indeed suffered severe losses. Of his 15,000 men nearly 2000 were dead, wounded, or prisoners, while the French had only lost 377, but his superiority was yet so great, 13,000 against 3200, that a second and more carefully planned attack upon the wearied enemy could not have failed to succeed. However, the general completely lost his head, returned in a panic to the landing-place on Lake George, and embarked with his whole army to return to Albany. Great was the astonishment of the French battalions on July 9 to find the large fleet already under way. Thus for this year the whole of the great enterprise against Montreal and Quebec, together with Pitt's careful preparations and the sacrifices of the colonies, ended in nothing, owing to the panic of the general, or rather to the premature death of the man whom Pitt had destined for the command. Montcalm soon received the necessary reinforcements, so that he was able to feel himself comparatively safe in his position, and was also able to inflict many losses upon the English by raids, the cutting off of transports, etc.; in this he was helped by the Indian tribes, whose confidence in the French cause had been increased by the victory.

This defeat, however, was to some extent balanced by an enterprise which Pitt had not prescribed, but which proved of particular value. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradstreet, a bold officer who was serving with Abercromby's army, had long planned an attack upon Fort Frontenac, which was situated on the other shore of Lake Ontario, opposite the ruined settlement of Oswego; this fort enabled the French to maintain communications between Canada and the Ohio districts and to command the lake. Loudoun had agreed to the attack, but Abercromby, probably in view of Pitt's instructions, had declined as yet to consider it. Now he gave his

consent, and Bradstreet therefore started in August with 3000 men and the necessary boats. By the rivers Mohawk and Onondaga he advanced from Albany to the site of Oswego, crossed the lake and landed in the neighbourhood of the fort, where he proceeded to throw up earthworks. The French garrison numbered only 110 soldiers, who were unprepared for any attack of the kind; they capitulated on the following day, and the conquerors thus gained possession of the whole of the Ontario flotilla, consisting of nine armed vessels, together with many guns and large supplies intended for Fort Duquesne. It was necessary to raze the fort and destroy most of the plunder, owing to lack of means of transport, but the expedition was important for the reason that it cut off the Ohio fort, against which another expedition was in progress, from its rearward communications. To preserve this advantage a new fort was erected at the crossing from the Mohawk to the Onondaga river, and garrisoned with 1000 men. At the beginning of October Amherst with his six regiments reached Abercromby's camp, but the season was too far advanced for further offensive measures, and both armies went into winter quarters.

At the third seat of war, in Pennsylvania, the final decision was much longer delayed; General Forbes was there in command, and was commissioned to recover Fort Duquesne for the English. The southern provinces showed far less readiness to provide money and troops, and it was not until the end of June that an army, in many respects most inadequately equipped, was gathered in Philadelphia. It numbered 6000 or 7000 men, including 1200 Highlanders and the so-called Royal American regiments, which largely consisted of German settlers in Pennsylvania. The incursions of Louis XIV. into the Palatinate had driven many of the inhabitants to this colony; in contrast to the Quakers, they formed the aggressive element, and regarded the French as their natural enemies.

In view of Braddock's fate in the year 1754 the advance was made very slowly and systematically. At the beginning of July the army under Lieutenant-Colonel Bouquet took up a position at Rayston, some 125 kilometres from Duquesne; here Fort Bedford was built to serve as a future base of operations, while Forbes, whose activity was checked by a severe internal disease, followed slowly, making the most

careful preparations for the expedition. He began negotiations with the different Indian tribes of those districts, the Iroquois, the Delawares, and the Shawnees, and after infinite trouble he was able to withdraw them from the French side, if he did not secure their entire co-operation. That he was able so entirely to obtain his object was again due to Pitt's measures; the naval blockade, which Pitt zealously and successfully continued, deprived the French of the opportunity of making the usual rich presents to their allies, without which it was impossible to calculate upon the fidelity of the natives. Had they not remained neutral the advance upon Duquesne would hardly have been possible. The convention was concluded at Easton in October.

The question now arose whether the expedition should follow the direct but unsurveyed route from Bedford to Duquesne, or should follow Braddock's former path, which made a circuit to the south by way of Fort Cumberland. The latter route united Virginia with the valley of the Ohio, while the choice of the former would give the province of Pennsylvania entrance to that valley. Colonial jealousy thus influenced strategical considerations. Against Washington's view Forbes decided for the direct route, although much time would be lost in the construction of a road. In the end he proved to be right, for it was the lateness of his arrival that secured his success. Vaudreuil, the governor of Canada, had sent reinforcements from every side to the threatened fort, which seemed secure against overthrow in October; in November, however, the numerous troops could no longer maintain their position in the wilderness owing to want of provisions, while the Indians were not accustomed to remain upon the warpath for long.

In September the army had advanced about 40 miles to Loyalhannon Creek, where magazines of stores were laid down to form a base of operations. From this point Major Grant made a reconnaissance towards Duquesne and suffered a severe defeat, which at any rate betrayed the strength of the garrison. At the beginning of November, however, the French forces began to melt away, chiefly because the supplies expected from Frontenac failed to arrive. The militia of Louisiana and Illinois went home, the Indian allies disappeared, and the Commandant Ligneris was forced to dismiss most of his garrison owing to lack of provisions. When Forbes arrived in



the neighbourhood of the fort on November 18 with 2,500 men, he was greeted by a series of explosions as the retreating French forces blew the works into the air. Thus this dangerous post, which had long threatened the frontiers of the southern colonies, fell into his hands as the fruit of his many negotiations and operations; at the same time the conquest of Frontenac and the consequent blockade of French navigation were important factors in his victory.

Duquesne was so far restored, fortified, and provisioned, that a small garrison of 200 men could hold out there for the winter. This garrison was in a somewhat dangerous situation, as the French might easily return in superior force, but the critical period passed without accident. In the following year General Stanwix built a new and stronger fort on a more scientific plan near the old site, which was named Fort Pitt, in honour of the minister to whose arrangements the capture of the place was due. This name survives at the present day in the town of Pittsburg, the industrial metropolis of the upper Ohio district. Forbes did not live to see this new foundation. With great difficulty this faithful officer was carried back to Philadelphia, and there, after long suffering, he died in March of the following year.

All these successes in America had been anticipated by a victory in a wholly different quarter of the globe, which crowned an expedition promoted by Pitt during his first ministry. A Quaker, Mr. Thomas Cumming, who was well informed upon West African affairs, had then advised Pitt to make an attempt upon the French station at the mouth of the Senegal,<sup>1</sup> but in 1757 this could not be executed. On March 9, 1758, a small squadron of two ships of the line and four smaller vessels sailed for that point under the command of Captain March.<sup>2</sup> On April 24 they arrived off the mouth of the Senegal, drove the few armed vessels up the river, and landed a force of troops with artillery. As soon as they prepared to besiege Fort St. Louis a deputation from the council appeared to negotiate, and on May 1 a capitulation in favour of the East India Company was concluded: 232 prisoners and 92 guns fell into the hands of the English.

When this news reached England at the beginning of June

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Cumming, February 9, 1757.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 221 f.

<sup>2</sup> Report of Prussian embassy, June 10, 1758.—Berlin Archives.

Pitt immediately sent out a second squadron of five ships of the line and two frigates<sup>1</sup> with 600 men to conquer the island of Goree, lying to the south of the Senegal off Cap de Verde, the centre of the French slave-trade. This expedition, which was placed under the command of Commodore Keppel, though it did not start until November 1758, very speedily reached its destination.<sup>2</sup> On December 24 the squadron appeared off the island, and proceeded to attack the forts and batteries on the 28th. After a vigorous bombardment the garrison proposed to capitulate on condition that they were allowed to retire, but after a second attack they were forced to surrender unconditionally. On the 29th the place fell into the hands of the English with 300 prisoners and 94 guns. Thus in every direction was manifest the effect of that naval supremacy which Pitt had secured for his country by constant and energetic preparation, by obstinate pursuit or blockade of the French squadrons.

Pitt spent this summer partly in London and partly in Hayes for reasons of health. In May he had so severe an attack of gout that a long interruption of his ministerial activity was feared,<sup>3</sup> but he soon recovered. On April 18 his second daughter was born and named Harriet after her grandmother. At the end of June Hester went to Stowe to recover her strength, but returned to Hayes in August, as Pitt was unable to leave London, owing to the continuous arrival of important news. Hitherto the strain upon Pitt must have been very great, as he was expecting important information from every part of the world. Prince Ferdinand was in an exposed situation beyond the Rhine while Frederick was besieging Olmütz, and the success of his Moravian expedition depended upon the result; in America three expeditions were in progress, and a squadron was fighting on the African coast, apart from the struggles in East India and the expedition to St. Malo. On the whole, however, his Louisburg expedition caused him most anxiety; success seemed very doubtful when it was announced in July that a number of French ships had succeeded in reach-

<sup>1</sup> Galitzin to Kauderbach, September 26, 1758.—Confidential Miscellaneous.

<sup>2</sup> Berlin Archives. Entick, *History of the Late War*, iii. 271 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Lyttelton to his brother, May 5, 1758: 'Pitt had a very bad fit of the gout. Some physicians, who know his constitution, declare that if he continues a minister, he will not live long.'—Phillimore, ii. 612.

ing the American harbours. The first consolation was the news of the capture of the Senegal fort, which arrived on June 10; after this followed two months of uncertainty, relieved by the news of the victory of Krefeld, though this was followed by Ferdinand's retreat, and by the news that King Frederick had been forced to abandon the siege of Olmütz on July 1.

On the morning of August 18 Captains Edgecomb and Amherst, a brother of the general, arrived in London with the joyful news of the fall of this long-disputed fortress,<sup>1</sup> and the storm of enthusiasm which rang through England may be better imagined than described. 'My dear Louisburg Pitt,' wrote Lord Temple in joy,<sup>2</sup> 'a hundred thousand million of congratulations to you upon this great and glorious event—the salvation of Europe. . . . Nothing but congratulations to you, my dear brother Louisburg. I shall never call you by any other name except by that of Quebec in due time.' Newcastle also shows in an outburst of joy how great a weight had been lifted from his mind.<sup>3</sup> Pitt immediately sent a mounted messenger to Hayes to inform Hester, and received from her an enthusiastic letter of congratulations which may well be reproduced in full as showing the temper of the times:<sup>4</sup> 'My joy upon the news sent me by you, my Dearest Life, was inexpressible, so truly so that I have been obliged to take a whole hour to compose myself in, before I could find words to tell my Adored Man the infinite delight which I receive from this most glorious and happy event. Happy and glorious for my loved England, happy and glorious for my most loved and admired Husband. I feel all your joy, my Life, the joy of the dear brothers, the joy of my friend Mrs. Boscawen, and the joy of the people of England. This is enough to be overpowering. Every various, happy, pleasing sentiment inspired by this great success, is accompanied with the devoutest gratitude and most unfeigned praise to the Almighty Disposer of every event, who hath poured his blessing on us. I shall pass this glorious day in the delightful contemplation of this truly happy circumstance, and with a heart filled with the pleasure of acknowledging the goodness of God to us. To this I shall

<sup>1</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 258.

<sup>2</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Temple, August 19, 1758.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 259 f.

<sup>4</sup> Hester to Pitt, August 18, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

add the care of making our dear sweet Hayes testify by every outward mark of the inward joy with which its inhabitants are possessed. If my dearest Love can escape from the numbers that will congratulate his glory, upon this occasion, I propose the brightness of our joy should reach him as soon as he gains Bromley Hill. . . . No words can thank you enough, my Angel, for having forwarded the messenger of this news to me, but a thousand kisses shall express my gratitude when I am blest with the happiness of receiving you in this joyful place made so by you, my glorious Love. Our bells are going to answer the guns, which just now speak their joy.<sup>7</sup>

This joy was somewhat checked a few days afterwards when the news of the defeat of Ticonderoga arrived on August 22; Pitt was somewhat despondent in consequence,<sup>1</sup> though he had no knowledge or suspicion of the general's grievous mistake. He assumed that every one had done his duty and that the task had been too severe. Bute also attempted to console him with this theory.<sup>2</sup> It was not until later that he learned the true condition of affairs, when the conquest of Frontenac had already revived his spirits. On September 7 a great festival, in imitation of that which Queen Elizabeth had formerly instituted upon the destruction of the Spanish Armada, took place. The trophies of Louisburg were carried through the town in solemn procession, and a great thanksgiving service was held in St. Paul's Cathedral.<sup>3</sup>

Thus by Pitt's promotion, by his vigorous preparations and by the successes of this year, England's position had been entirely changed; prosperity had now definitely set in; the state could advance upon the path of glory. The successful period of the war and of our hero's life had begun.

<sup>1</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 262.

<sup>2</sup> Bute to Pitt.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 335.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 174.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 265.



## SECTION III

### THE PERIOD OF SUCCESS

#### CHAPTER IX

##### PREPARATORY MEASURES AND STRUGGLES

THE curtain now rose upon a further act of this great military drama and disclosed the two principal actors in somewhat feeble health. The king's illness, in consequence of a cold, aroused general sympathy upon his birthday celebration on October 30 and prevented him from opening Parliament in person.<sup>1</sup> Pitt was again suffering from the gout, and was obliged to remain in the country during November.<sup>2</sup> The speech from the throne dealt chiefly with the necessity of greater taxation and a vigorous prosecution of the war, and was composed as before by Pitt with Hardwicke's help; press of business forced him to leave the drafting of the address to his brother-in-law, George Grenville.<sup>3</sup> Thus the new session began on November 23 and passed with unusual peacefulness, notwithstanding the great issues at stake.<sup>4</sup>

Great indeed were the sacrifices, according to the ideas of the time, which the nation was called upon to make for the continuation of the war. The extraordinary budget, with increased naval and military expenses, amounted to no less

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Hardwicke*, iii. 176.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Hessian embassy of November 3, 1758.—Confidential Miscellaneous.

<sup>3</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 276.

<sup>4</sup> Chesterfield to his son, February 2, 1759: 'There never was so quiet or so silent a session of Parliament as the present. Mr. Pitt declares only what he would have them do, and they do it *nemine contradicente*.'—*Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1247.

than £12,705,339, as against £10,471,007 of the previous year.<sup>1</sup> Pitt accompanied these demands with an earnest speech, urging the necessity for these great efforts.<sup>2</sup> ‘Millions upon millions,’ he said, ‘must be provided to turn the needs of the French to full advantage.’ And with one of those bold transitions which characterised his oratory he summoned all opponents of his policy to meet him; in a tone of threatening challenge he called to the assembly, ‘Is there an Austrian among you? Let him stand forward and reveal himself. I invite him now to speak out instead of dispersing anonymous pamphlets among the people.’ This definite menace, representing every supporter of another policy as devoted to foreign interests, did not fail to make its due impression. The bill was passed not only *nemine contradicente*, but even *nemine quicquid dicente*.<sup>3</sup> The House of Commons placed itself entirely at the disposal of Pitt’s plans.

These plans were of so comprehensive a character and so thoroughly prepared and provided that the expense was not surprising. Preparations for America were highly necessary and entirely effective, but also extremely expensive. The numerous transport ships which it was necessary to charter or build for forwarding the troops, with the hundreds of boats and skiffs built upon the spot, the siege-trains constructed and sent across the sea—all these preparations were made at England’s expense, the colonies undertaking only a few definite contributions. Large sums were swallowed up by the war in Germany, for the maintenance of the great army and the subsidies to Frederick the Great. In all, England had 91,000 of her own troops under arms at the beginning of the year apart from the militia, who also required subsidies. The chief items of extraordinary expense for 1759 are as follows:—

For Naval Service and Greenwich			
Hospital,	.	£3,568,491	9 8
„ Payment of Naval Debt, .	.	1,000,000	0 0
„ Land Army, .	.	5,137,221	6 9½
„ Extraordinary Expenses of War,	.	1,000,000	0 0
„ Transport Service in 1758,	.	667,771	19 7

<sup>1</sup> Cunningham, *Taxes*.

<sup>2</sup> *Chesterfield Letters*, iii. 1248.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, iii. 149 f.

For Indemnification of the North American Colonies for Military Expenditure, . . . . .	£200,000	3	1
To the East India Company for the Withdrawal of the King's Troops, . . . . .	20,000	0	0

To this must be added a number of expenses arising from smaller military and other necessities.

Pitt was also projecting further great expenditure for purposes of the war. He offered the Russian ambassador, Lord Keith, large supplies to be used for bribing the Russian court to neutrality, and gave him permission to offer a yearly subsidy to the extent of £100,000. He was also making similar approaches about this time to the Elector of Bavaria, where England had formerly been outbid by France. France had concluded a convention for six years, by the terms of which Bavaria was to place her troops at the service of the great coalition in return for a yearly subsidy of 900,000 livres;<sup>1</sup> at the moment, however, relations between Bavaria and the court of Versailles were somewhat strained. Pitt therefore sought to use the opportunity, if not of winning over the Elector, at any rate of securing his inactivity.<sup>2</sup> His offer included, together with a subsidy, nothing less than the imperial crown of the Roman Empire. To the ambassador Haslang Pitt fully explained at the outset of December that a change of front on the part of Bavaria would end in the overthrow of Austria and the desertion of the Hapsburgs by the other great imperial princes; the electoral votes might then be easily secured for the son of Charles VII., and if the war were brought to a successful close, a rich grant of land to the new emperor for the maintenance of his dignity was very probable. The English minister was careful not to give any binding promise, and to leave his retreat open. He strongly emphasised the fact that the election of the emperor was a domestic affair of the Germans, with which England had nothing to do, and only hinted that he would be prepared to

<sup>1</sup> The English representative Burrish to Holderness, April 12, 1757.—Foreign Office Records, No. 106, Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Bavarian ambassador, Haslang, to his court, under date December 8, 1758.—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

act in favour of Bavaria. He declared that premature stipulations concerning territorial changes would arouse jealousy and injure the common object, and that a proper opportunity must be awaited. It was not to be expected that Bavaria would change sides on the strength of such vague proposals unless Austria suffered some serious defeat, but it was sufficient if the Elector was dazzled by the prospect of the crown and refrained for a time from any participation in the struggle.<sup>1</sup> In any case good service had been done to the Anglo-Prussian cause at a critical moment.

Pitt was able by a clever move considerably to increase the confidence of his allies and of those whom he sought to win over to his cause.<sup>2</sup> On December 6 a motion of thanks was brought forward in the House of Commons to Admiral Boscawen and General Amherst for the conquest of Louisbourg. In the course of a debate one member, Sir John Philips, expressed the hope that no minister would ever resign these conquests. In this he was seconded by Beckford, who regarded the success as superior to those of the great Duke of Marlborough. Pitt then declared that it was too early to decide what should be restored or what should not, for the preponderance which Marlborough had secured for the English nation had been surrendered by the peace of Utrecht. He, however, would not sacrifice any fraction of the interests of the allies to secure a peace in favour of British claims. This remark aroused great excitement among the foreign ambassadors, who reported it to their several courts. Frederick the Great, who was to sign the new subsidy treaty for 1759 on the following day, was delighted, for he now thought he might hope that England would secure him against loss if the worst came to the worst. He therefore sent assurances of his gratitude to his friend Pitt through the English ambassador.<sup>3</sup> 'The King of Prussia,' writes Mitchell, 'admires the firmness of your behaviour in replying instantly and in the manner you did, and he said to me that the declaration you made on

<sup>1</sup> Frederick the Great to his ambassador, March 14, 1759.—*Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of December 8, 1758.—Berlin Archives. Haslang to Champigny, December 8, 1758.—Confidential Miscellaneous. Campbell, *Lives of the Admirals*, vi. 413.

<sup>3</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 393 f.



that occasion was like a great statesman and an honest man.' He concluded with these words: 'Enfin, c'était un coup de maître.' The Prussian ambassadors also induced their master upon this occasion to write a flattering letter to the minister with reference to his parliamentary action.<sup>1</sup> The Bavarian ambassador, to whom Pitt reaffirmed the policy he had stated in the House of Commons, was impressed by the event, and his report displayed increased confidence in Pitt's intentions.

Pitt's assertions are naturally not to be regarded as the expression of nobility of thought; he was concerned exclusively with the needs of English policy, and had no intention of making concessions to any foreigner unless he was obliged. He was simply advertising the English alliance and making fine promises to attract fresh members, especially Bavaria. The fulfilment of these promises was a later question and could be reserved for after-consideration. The occasional assertions of a minister were not necessarily binding upon the state. At the same time Pitt further secured his own position, for the confidence of the allied powers in England depended upon his retention of office. He had merely taken upon himself the moral obligation to guard the allies from loss. Frederick the Great saw the inwardness of his policy to some extent when he said, 'Enfin, c'était un coup de maître.' We can only conjecture how he arrived at this view. My own opinion is that he regarded Pitt as entirely honest, but anxious at the same time to secure his own position. There was, moreover, another side to the question. Pitt may have been morally pledged to the allies, but should the interests of the state at a later period demand a rejection of the obligation, the obvious course was to dismiss the minister who had so pledged himself.

At this moment, when Pitt expressed himself thus strongly, the beginning of his overthrow may be dated. We already know that the old oligarchy led by Newcastle endured the despotic power of their colleague reluctantly and made continual petty attempts at revolt. They were always conspiring for the restoration of peace, which would enable them to dispense with Pitt's outstanding capacities. Other groups also, who had furthered his promotion and largely supported him, began to doubt their wisdom when they found the state

<sup>1</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 10 and 12.

expenses rise to such unprecedented heights.<sup>1</sup> They asserted that such administration must inevitably bankrupt the state and destroy all the advantages that had been gained. The tories, who chiefly represented the petty landowner classes, were ever ready to support economy of administration, and regarded great expenditure with misgivings. They were especially angry at the advantage derived by the whigs from the prevailing system. These great landowners and rich manufacturers bought up the state loans under advantageous conditions and increased their wealth; they undertook important contracts for war material, and divided among themselves the numerous lucrative offices created to deal with the increased military forces and their administration. In a word, what the state raised and what the country was forced to pay in fresh taxation fell into the hands of the whigs. Pitt was obliged to abandon this plunder to his colleagues and their friends to secure freedom for executing his own great plans undisturbed. In order, however, to keep the tories on his side he repeatedly protested against the financial administration of the treasury. We have previously noted a similar case. On this occasion he again declared the estimates for the German war to be exaggerated, and invited the tory members to examine the budget by a circular letter. He thus attempted to represent to the tories that the responsibility for this great expense lay upon his colleagues in the treasury; to some extent he was right, for a more disinterested administration would have carried out many operations at less expense.

Pitt's most important business during this winter was the preparation for the North American campaign, which will be described in the next chapter in connection with the events to which it belongs. Even German business was set aside for the moment. However, the struggle continued also in other quarters, and produced successes in the spring which formed an excellent introduction to the great triumphs of the summer.

One quarter of the world in which the two conflicting nations held possessions had not yet become the scene of war; this was the West Indian Islands. Hitherto the war had not been extended to that quarter, as the profits to be gained

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 173 ff.

seemed unlikely to compensate the expense that would be incurred.<sup>1</sup> Either party was content with occasional raids, and left the conduct of the war to the colonists themselves, who showed no great zeal in its pursuit, as they were anxious not to disturb their trade. Pitt was now induced to begin a more vigorous policy in the case of the West Indies, and this was the work of William Beckford, a city merchant and member of Parliament of no great talent or social parts, but a lively character of wide experience and great influence.<sup>2</sup> He had already placed his knowledge of foreign countries at the minister's disposal, and given him advice for the conduct of the war, which was not wholly disregarded. Upon the West Indian question he could speak with far greater authority, as his property was chiefly situated in Jamaica,<sup>3</sup> and as he had served in the last war as a volunteer in those districts. He urged that the island of Martinique depended entirely upon importation for its foodstuffs, and could therefore easily be forced to surrender by a blockade; moreover, the wares there collected represented very considerable sums, while the task of conquest would be facilitated by other circumstances which he undertook to explain in the audience for which he asked. His information was entirely to the point, for as the production of the island was limited to such valuable commodities such as sugar, cocoa, coffee, etc., Martinique, like the other islands, was dependent for its staple food-supplies upon North America. Moreover, the planters were very dissatisfied with the French government and their system of taxation, and an English invasion would not meet with any obstinate resistance, the more so as a protracted struggle would threaten damage to the valuable plantations. The conquest, however, as Beckford insisted, must be carried out at one blow, lest the army should be decimated by the diseases peculiar to that climate. On the basis of this enlightening information Pitt arrived at a determination, which had many consequences, to break with previous methods and to send a large expedition to those waters. The expense troubled him but little, as he hoped it would be covered by the wealth to be secured. His gratitude to Beckford was expressed by his

<sup>1</sup> C. E. Meinicke, *Versuch einer Geschichte der europäischen Kolonien in Westindien*, p. 207. Weimar, 1831.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 352 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 177.

opposition in the House of Commons to an increase in the sugar tax,<sup>1</sup> which the treasury demanded. This proved impossible, but at any rate he secured that rum should remain free. He also delivered an extraordinary eulogy upon Beckford, which astonished all who heard it, praising him as a man who had done more to support the government than any minister in England, by his disinterestedness, his knowledge of trade, his solid worth, and went so far as to call him a second Sir Josiah Child.<sup>2</sup> Hence we may suppose that Beckford continued to give him advice in this affair.

There is in existence an undated memoir concerning the attack upon Martinique,<sup>3</sup> which may perhaps be regarded as a reduction to writing of what Beckford had explained by word of mouth. In any case it certainly influenced Pitt's measures. This memoir recommends the island of Barbadoes as a starting-point for the expedition by reason of the prevailing winds, which blow from the east in the district of the Antilles, so that while the voyage to the Caribbean Sea is easy, a direct return to the ocean between the islands is extraordinarily difficult. Barbadoes is the most easterly island, and was therefore in a favourable position, as it was possible to sail anywhere from thence with the wind. This prevailing wind, as the memorial asserts, brought the further consequence that the east coasts of the islands were bare and inhospitable. Hence it was advisable to land upon the west side, where the main towns were situated, the more so as a march through the broken ground of the interior offered great difficulties, especially in Martinique. Reference is also made to the want of provisions, and the recommendation is given that Commodore Moore should be advised forthwith, by the despatch of a rapid ship, to cut off the imports of the islands to be attacked. At that moment the supply of provisions in Martinique had run very low, and another French report, which was naturally exaggerated, asserts that two bushels of sugar were given for a peck of beans. Beckford's memorial further advises a northward voyage, should the conquest fail, with the object of inflicting all possible

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 117 f.

<sup>2</sup> Chairman of the East India Company at the end of the seventeenth century. Cp. i. 23 f.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS.



damage upon the French islands one after another, and finally putting in for repairs to Hispaniola or North America.

Pitt was able to use all this advice, if he did not follow it to the letter. At that moment Bligh's expedition had returned from the unfortunate descent in L'Anse-au-Loup Bay. He was thus glad to find some new employment for this force,<sup>1</sup> which might be set off against the defeat of St. Cast. A concentration of ships and troops at the Isle of Wight was also advantageous, as forcing the French to provide against a new descent upon their coasts. For the expedition he appointed six regiments of infantry, 800 marines, and some artillery, under the command of Major-General Peregrine Thomas Hopson.<sup>2</sup> He was ordered on October 18<sup>3</sup> to make his way to Portsmouth, where the embarkation of the four regiments there stationed was to take place at once. A number of empty transport vessels were to go immediately to Plymouth and take on board the two regiments in that port, joining the squadron as it sailed by. The expedition was accompanied by six ships of the line, four bomb ketches, and a corresponding number of frigates, under the command of Commodore Robert Hughes. He was to be met in Barbadoes by John Moore with his four ships of the line and some smaller vessels, who would then assume command of the whole fleet.

Notwithstanding Pitt's exertions the expedition was unable to put to sea until the end of October, and before it reached Plymouth a violent storm arose which scattered the fleet, drove part of it on shore, and caused much damage. Again a number of days passed until all could be put in order and a definite start made. As west winds prevailed for some days, the ships waiting in Plymouth were ordered to Portsmouth, whence the whole force started together. In the middle of

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, September 26, 1758: 'La première [expédition] concerne une descente dans l'isle de Martinique, pour laquelle on se propose de faire usage d'une partie des troupes qui campent dans l'isle de Wight . . . les forces . . . seront embarquées . . . sur les mêmes bâtiments de transport, qui ont servi aux diversions . . . en France.'—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt drew up a list of candidates for this post, and the king chose this general, a capable officer, though somewhat advanced in life: the appointment was not entirely to the minister's satisfaction.—Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 169 ff.

<sup>3</sup> The various instructions are among the Colonial Office Records, Public Record Office.

November Pitt sent seven companies of Highlanders, conveyed by the warship *Ludlow Castle*, to Barbadoes.

At first everything went according to programme.<sup>1</sup> Moore joined the force at Barbadoes, and immediately continued the voyage to Martinique; the expedition arrived off Port Royal on January 15. Hopson had orders from Pitt to seize the two main places on the west coast, St. Pierre and Port Royal, together with any others that might be important for the conquest of the islands or for inflicting loss upon the enemy. He was thus given a comparatively free choice, and made the more southern Port Royal his first objective. Here no preparations had been made, notwithstanding the fact that the intentions of the English had been known for some time.<sup>2</sup> There were only 236 regular troops in Port Royal, and practically no provisions. In the harbour was a warship, the *Florissant*, and two frigates: the latter weighed anchor when the English fleet appeared, and succeeded in reaching the open sea and evading pursuit. One of these, with the brother of the Governor Beauharnais, was taken by a privateer in European waters, and thus involuntarily brought the news of the landing to England<sup>3</sup> on March 2, which caused great delight.

In the neighbourhood of Port Royal there were two points especially suitable for landing, Pointe de Nègres and Cas Navire. Batteries had been erected here, which contained only two or four badly placed guns. On the 16th four ships of the line were placed off one battery and three off the other, and against this overwhelming force the batteries naturally could not hold out. As soon as they had been silenced a portion of the troops was landed at Pointe de Nègres. The Governor Beauharnais now proposed to surrender the whole town; it was commanded by the outlying position of Morne Tartenson, and this he felt himself unable to defend. He therefore gave orders to evacuate the place, which were fortunately not carried out; he was anxious to blow up his works, but for this no preparations had been made, and the retreat was therefore delayed, for if the enemy established himself in the

<sup>1</sup> Entick, *History of the Late War*, iv. 142 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the events upon the French side information is given by a 'Journal of what passed at Martinico from 15 to 18 January, 1759,' written in French and preserved among the Chatham MSS. It was written by an inhabitant of Port Royal and apparently intercepted.

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of March 2, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

town the whole island was untenable. In this dilemma the only possibility was to defend Morne until the forts could be blown up. For this purpose all the militia, some of whom had been called in from a distance, were assembled on the heights. They were an ill-trained and undisciplined crowd, of which not much could be expected.

When the English advanced on the 17th, in two columns, with two field-guns, the governor thought it advisable to order a retreat. The militia, however, did not obey, but in scattered order attacked the close formation of the enemy, on whom their practised shooting inflicted considerable loss, as they took cover behind the broken ground and bushes. It was a new method of fighting which was entirely natural on this occasion, and was to be universally recognised in the following century. The result, highly astonishing to all concerned, was that the well-trained English grenadiers were driven off the field with heavy loss by these disorganised rebels.<sup>1</sup> The advancing reserves, also, did not venture to cross the ravine in which the fugitives had with difficulty taken refuge. Meanwhile an artillery duel had begun in the harbour between some of the English ships, the fort and the *Florissant*, which ended in no result. Hopson must have considerably over-estimated the powers of his enemy after this failure, for he immediately abandoned the undertaking, and re-embarked his ships on the following night. The fleet now sailed to St. Pierre, exchanging a few shots with the batteries, and capturing a number of merchantmen. Hopson and Moore then agreed to leave the strong defence of Martinique, and to sail for another French island, Guadeloupe, which was a prosperous centre of the sugar trade, and an important base for the French privateers.

The report of these occurrences reached London a few days after the news of the successful landing, and naturally aroused great despondency. Pitt's knowledge of the situation was too incomplete to enable him to control the movements of the leaders by express orders; he therefore agreed to the enterprise upon Guadeloupe, and despatched two men-of-war to reinforce the expedition, directing Hopson upon the conclusion of this attack to turn upon the so-called neutral island of

<sup>1</sup> The Journal states: 'Les Européens disent, que la chasse est l'image de la guerre; notre guerre ce jour-là était plus exactement l'image de la chasse.'

Santa Lucia, which was occupied by the French.<sup>1</sup> He apparently did not expect that the whole of Guadeloupe would be conquered, and considered that Hopson might be satisfied with the possession of the western fortress of Basseterre, for in his orders he emphasised the importance of Lucia on account of the greater security of this harbour, to which the fleet could put in during the stormy months. Guadeloupe, however, could provide harbours equally commodious.

This latter consists of two islands divided only by a narrow arm of the sea. In the more westerly of the two lay the capital of Basseterre with Fort Royal. This was the object of the first attack, and a concentrated bombardment obliged the Governor Nadeau to surrender the place, as the town was reduced to ashes. The French, however, constructed a fortified camp in which they were able to maintain their position. The detachment now sailed to the eastern portion, Grandterre, and after effecting a landing captured several places, and attempted to reach the rear of the French position. The force, however, was attacked at Trois Rivières by a body of troops despatched to meet it, and the English army now fell into a desperate situation. Disease had broken out among the troops in consequence of the length of the operations, while an attack from Beauharnais was to be expected, as he had been reinforced in the meantime by a fleet of nine men-of-war and three frigates under Bompard. Fortunately Beckford's prophecies were realised in one respect. The planters showed such little disposition for war that they forced the weak-minded governor to abandon resistance. On May 2, when Beauharnais arrived, the governor had already capitulated on terms of retirement, and the relief force was obliged to return to Martinique, having accomplished nothing. The valuable island was conquered, and the planters willingly submitted to the new administration which freed them from many oppressive burdens. Hopson did not survive the success, but died shortly after the capture of Basseterre. He was succeeded by General Barrington, a brother of the secretary of war, who completed the conquest. Shortly afterwards Marie Galante and three smaller islands fell into the hands of the victors.

Apart from this expedition, which thus ended successfully,

<sup>1</sup> Holderness to Pitt, March 8, 1759, informing him of the king's consent.—Chatham MSS. Pitt to Hopson, March 9.—Colonial Office Records.



many other enterprises were begun, and the admiralty was extremely busy throughout the winter. In November some squadrons returned home, including the triumphant detachment of Admiral Boscawen from Louisburg, which, by Pitt's orders, had left ten men-of-war with their frigates in Halifax. In the English Channel Boscawen succeeded in capturing the French man-of-war *Belliqueux*, of sixty-two guns, the twentieth capture of the kind in this war.<sup>1</sup> Admiral Saunders then returned from Brest, where he had continued Anson's task of cruising, though he had been unable to hinder the escape of some men-of-war.<sup>2</sup> Thus, not including the fleet in the West Indies, Pitt had at his disposal a force of forty-nine men-of-war and fifty-three frigates, though all of these were not fit for immediate service, and the crews were in many cases defective. His present task was to bring this power to the highest point of efficiency in view of the threatening news which arrived from France in the middle of December.

A change of ministry had taken place in that country on October 9. Cardinal Bernis, who had held the conduct of foreign affairs since 1757 was removed from office on account of his pacific tendencies, and replaced by the warlike Duke of Choiseul.<sup>3</sup> Under him a new convention was concluded with Austria, which cancelled the proposed cession of the Netherlands, after the conquest of Silesia, and relieved France from further subsidy payments; in return the court of Versailles undertook to continue the war in Germany with 100,000 men. The office of minister of marine, which had many times changed hands, was entrusted on November 1 to René Berryer de Ravensville, a man who, whilst he was not credited with any particular knowledge of maritime and colonial affairs, was all the more appreciated for his remarkable energy.<sup>4</sup> It was asserted that France, alarmed at the danger which threatened her colonies, proposed to act upon the defensive in Europe, and to concentrate her forces upon the defence of her colonies and the improvement of her fleet. It was said that thirty millions of livres were to be saved in subsidies. News arrived in December that eight

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of November 3, 1758.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, October 27, 1758.

<sup>3</sup> Cp. Koser, *König Friedrich der Grosse*, ii. 208.

<sup>4</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of December 19, 1758.—Berlin Archives.

men-of-war and several frigates were ready at Brest, and were only prevented from putting to sea by lack of crews.<sup>1</sup>

Spurred by this news Pitt hastened on naval preparations with the utmost rapidity, and on January 16 the fleet intended for North America was able to sail; this consisted of fifteen men-of-war and ten frigates under Admirals Saunders and Holmes, whose instructions will be the subject of later discussion. Thirty-four men-of-war and forty-three frigates remained,<sup>2</sup> and for these new tasks immediately arose. Pitt was anxious, as in the previous year, to close the French harbours and cut off all help from Canada, where the most extensive preparations had been made for the conquest of Quebec.<sup>3</sup> He therefore issued orders on February 22 to the admiralty,<sup>4</sup> referring to the great preparations on foot at Toulon, Brest, Rochefort, and elsewhere, and ordering all men-of-war to be ready for sea as soon as possible, and the work in the dockyards and wharves to be urged on. The first ships ready for service were formed into a squadron for the Mediterranean under Boscawen, who was to keep the French Admiral de la Clue in Toulon, and to defeat him if possible. The addition of the ships stationed in Gibraltar brought up the squadron to twenty-two ships of the line.<sup>5</sup> The admiral's departure was not carried out according to programme; he did not leave the capital until April 14, and left a letter of complaint<sup>6</sup> for the angry minister, asserting that the fleet was weaker than had been arranged, as all the ships had not been got ready, and that his instructions were unduly vague. He succeeded, however, in fully accomplishing his task.

Meanwhile France had conceived a plan of invasion as in 1756. The opportunity seemed favourable, for the English power was known to have been greatly weakened by the constant despatch of squadrons on foreign service. While formerly England's weakness seemed to lie abroad, at the moment it was the mother-country which appeared open to attack. Moreover, such an invasion would be the best answer to the many unsuccessful attempts on the French coast. A success-

<sup>1</sup> These 'nouvelles' are appended to the ambassador's report.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of February 20, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Admiralty naval lists of February 19, 1759.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>4</sup> Abstract in the Chatham MSS.

<sup>5</sup> Reports of the Prussian embassy of March 2 and 6, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>6</sup> Chatham MSS.

ful landing would show how much stronger France was by land than England, for it was proposed to bring over 50,000 regular troops, against which the scanty forces of the militia would hardly make a stand. Marshal Belleisle, who had formerly declined to listen to the plan, now gave his consent, considering that every means must be used to check the English advance, and that the menace would produce a favourable effect at the other seats of war. Once again flat-bottomed transport ships were built in the northern harbours and troops were concentrated in camps, while the fleet in Brest prepared to sail out.

Very different was the attitude of the English government under Pitt compared with its behaviour a few years before when Cumberland and Newcastle were conducting the war. At that time they did not venture upon so necessary a measure of defence as the despatch of an adequate fleet for the protection of Minorca, in their apprehension of a hostile descent upon their own coasts. Yet they had foreign troops enough for the work of defence. Now the situation was equally threatening, and though large fleets and numerous forces were engaged abroad, the government did not hesitate to send a second important squadron into the enemy's waters and to continue its offensive policy undisturbed, although upon this occasion it was impossible to utilise foreign help. England might claim the help of a Dutch corps of 6000 men by the terms of an old convention, should the Protestant succession be endangered; but this claim was now excluded, as France declared at the Hague that she wished merely to exact retribution for the English descents, and not to threaten the dynasty.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, the danger of invasion tended to modify Pitt's plans. As the Prussian ambassador very truly explained, the diminution in Boscawen's squadron was certainly not due to the carelessness of the admiralty.<sup>2</sup> Pitt proposed to use the ships he had retained for coast protection. The obscurity of the admiral's instructions may also have been intentional. It was supposed in London that he was ordered only to Biscaya,<sup>3</sup> and Pitt may well have made alterations to meet any emergency. He did not, however, care to explain his

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 185.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of April 17, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 297.

meaning, lest he should be thought unduly timorous, and therefore declined to grant the admiral a final interview for sufficient reasons. At the same time he could not venture to retain this squadron at home, as it was far too important for his American plans.

At the beginning of May new and more threatening news arrived from France, which left little room for doubt as to the seriousness of the enemy's intentions; the cabinet council held several sittings at which Pitt was present, when full measures of defence were discussed.<sup>1</sup> The lead in this matter was naturally taken by Pitt, as he was conducting the war.

The twenty-four men-of-war which were left fit for service after Boscawen's departure were immediately provided with full complements of crews, 1600 being withdrawn from the 10,000 sailors in service upon the frigates and transferred to the line-of-battle ships. The gaps thus left were to be filled up with new enlistments. This war fleet was placed under Admiral Hawke and stationed at Torbay to the east of Plymouth on the west of the south coast, so that the wind which made exit from Brest possible would also facilitate its departure. The fleet was to keep the French coast under inspection by cruising in the Channel. Thus upon this occasion Pitt attempted to secure the blockade of Brest harbour, not as formerly, by stationing a squadron off the coast, but by posting an overwhelming fleet at a greater distance, which might immediately begin the work of pursuit. His object was to have this fleet at his disposal for coast defence if necessary.

The most important point was naturally to secure timely information of all the enemy's movements. For this purpose Pitt formed three lines of frigates starting from Torbay; every ship was given the responsibility of guarding a certain area, cruising within that area, maintaining its communication with its neighbours, and reporting any approach of the enemy to Torbay. One of these lines extended along the south and east coast of Great Britain to the north of Scotland, a second

<sup>1</sup> Bedford to the Archbishop of Armagh, May 22, 1759.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 373 ff. The Duke of Bedford, who was then in England, was obliged to postpone his return, as the defence of Ireland was under discussion. After this he was to return to his post, but without undue haste, to avoid arousing any panic. As regards the conclusions of the council, see protocol of the sitting of May 11 in the Chatham MSS., report of the Prussian embassy of May 18, 1759.—Berlin Archives and *Bedford Correspondence*, p. 373 ff.



secured the whole of the Irish coast, from St. George's Bay westward and round to the north, while a third extended from Torbay to the western promontory of Brittany, towards Brest. Apart from these measures regular troops were encamped in the Isle of Wight, the outlying bastion of the English coast, and a transport fleet was held in readiness that help might be brought to any threatened point. All these carefully planned measures were immediately begun, and were complete on May 18. In this work the English naval forces were employed to the very last ship, but every effort was made to complete those vessels which were still at the wharves and in the docks.

These measures did not provide absolute security, as the sailing vessels of the time were subject to many unforeseen chances, and the defence of the country was therefore organised as well as possible. On May 30 a royal message was delivered to Parliament,<sup>1</sup> officially announcing the possibility of a French invasion and the projected mobilisation of the militia. The reply to the address was introduced by Pitt with a brilliant speech, in which he explained the reasons for the announcement.<sup>2</sup> He admitted that there was reason to fear invasion; but there was not now the pitiable anxiety of former days, but a courageous fear not soliciting foreign help, but urging preparation and action, a new catchword which produced its natural effect upon the assembly. No opposition to the measure was offered in debate, but two members proposed a further address, praying the king, upon the occasion of the mobilisation, to remind the somewhat careless lord-lieutenants of their duty. This measure was so far justified in that many of the lord-lieutenants, especially the tories, were anxious to be free from the work of mobilisation, in view of the approaching hay harvest. Pitt agreed, but at the same time he secured this object by more effective means. He threatened, if any resistance were offered to his orders, to propose the repeal of the militia bill in the next session, which would deprive the lord-lieutenants of the income accruing to their offices. The effect was decisive. The battalions were concentrated at the proper date, notwithstanding the popular objection to mobilisation.

All possible means were employed to meet the growing want

<sup>1</sup> Printed in Thackeray, i. 397.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 184 ff.; *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 382 f.

of soldiers and sailors.<sup>1</sup> A proclamation was issued, promising increased enlistment money to all who presented themselves before July 3, and granting full pardon to deserters who returned before that date, while others were threatened with severe punishment. The magistrates were ordered to support the pressgang in every way. Subscriptions were also opened, to which the capital, the trading companies and rich private individuals paid large sums, to facilitate enlistment with increased recruiting money. Thus the disinclination of the population to military service was to some extent compensated by their readiness to undergo financial sacrifices.

The result of all these efforts became apparent in a few weeks. On June 22 two additional smaller squadrons had been formed, one of which had been stationed at St. Helens in the Isle of Wight, and the other off the Downs. They were to watch the straits at these points and to prevent the departure of ships from the opposite French harbours. A number of privateers were also hired to damage the enemy's trade. Powerful warships were posted at the mouth of the Thames to protect its harbours and arsenals. The militia regiments were kept under marching orders, and 12,000 regular troops were posted in camps upon the coast.<sup>2</sup> Pitt no longer confined himself to defensive measures; at the beginning of July he despatched the Commodore George Brydges Rodney, the famous admiral of later days, to Havre de Grace<sup>3</sup> with a squadron, where preparations for the invasion were in progress. Rodney began a bombardment and set the town on fire in several places, but was unable to reach the flat-bottomed ships with his guns, which had been the main object of the undertaking.<sup>4</sup> The bombardment lasted for two days, and Rodney then returned after accomplishing nothing of material importance. About that time a French flotilla under Thurot, with 1300 men on board, left Dunkirk; reinforcements were immediately hurried to Dover and Chatham, but Thurot was soon forced to recognise the hopelessness of attempting a landing and returned to his base.

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 397 f.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of June 22, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 186 f.; report of the Prussian embassy of July 6, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>4</sup> Egremont expressed very divergent views upon the effect of the bombardment in a letter to Lyttelton.—Phillimore, ii. 613.

While the energies of the English government were thus concentrated upon the defence of the coast, Boscawen had sailed to the Mediterranean with fourteen men-of-war and two frigates. In accordance with his instructions, he began the supervision of Toulon, in which harbour Admiral de la Clue was waiting with twelve men-of-war and three frigates. Boscawen would have been very glad to give battle on the open sea, but it was impossible to induce the French to leave the harbour. Eventually he sent three ships to the entrance of the harbour<sup>1</sup> to destroy two of the enemy's vessels which were lying there. The assailants, however, were received with so vigorous a fire from the land batteries that they were speedily forced to withdraw; but this disaster produced a fortunate result. The shattered condition of the three ships forced the English admiral to retire to Gibraltar for the moment, and de la Clue seized the opportunity to take the sea. Boscawen, however, had stationed frigates to give him timely news of the enemy's approach, and on August 17 he proceeded to pursue the scattered French fleet through the Straits of Gibraltar to Algarve on the Portuguese coast, where the final conflict took place on the 19th. Three men-of-war were captured by the English and two destroyed; de la Clue saved himself by flight to the coast. Portuguese neutrality was thus infringed, as the two ships were destroyed upon the coast itself; the result was an interchange of diplomatic views,<sup>2</sup> in the course of which Pitt showed all possible readiness to make concessions, without in any way disavowing the action of the victorious admiral. Thus Portugal's valuable friendship remained unimpaired. On September 10 Boscawen arrived with his captures in good condition at St. Helens, after sending a portion of his squadron back to the Mediterranean.

Notwithstanding the successes of Pitt's military administration and the vigour and caution with which he met all menaces of danger, his position at this moment was by no means undisputed. His enemies' hands were strengthened by the great expenditure involved; they drew profit from every failure, and many of them, in particular the defeated Duke of Newcastle,

<sup>1</sup> On Boscawen's enterprise see Campbell, *Lives of the Admirals*, vi. 413 ff., and reports of the Prussian embassy of September 18 and October 23, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> The documents are printed in Mahon's *History of England*, iv. Appendix.

secretly attempted to produce disasters of this nature. It was thus a surprising and also a highly unpleasant event for Pitt when the English funds suddenly fell no less than ten per cent. in the middle of April. The fact may be explained by the danger of invasion, which was prominent at this moment. But it is remarkable that the Prussian ambassador, who was certainly well informed, was able to provide a wholly different explanation.<sup>1</sup> The embassy reported that the fall was brought about by the failure of a financial operation on the part of the treasury, which Newcastle conducted. The confidence of the public had been strained, and the interest on the last loan had been placed too low. The loan had indeed been taken up, but the market was dull, and its fall had discredited the stocks and state loans as a whole, and had even caused apprehension upon the soundness of the finances in general. This event was naturally an admirable weapon for Pitt's opponents and for the friends of peace. They could explain it as the obvious result of the military policy and of thoughtless military expenditure;<sup>2</sup> nor was there any difficulty in securing credence for their charges, the most sensitive part of the ruling classes being their pockets. To this could be added the fear of invasion and the burden of the militia mobilisation, which laid an encumbrance of personal service upon the peaceful citizen, who had been accustomed hitherto to give but his money and his enthusiasm; all these matters tended to diminish confidence in the minister of war. The king too, who had shown himself extremely gracious to the successful minister, became apprehensive in this year as new dangers were threatening his Electorate, and Newcastle and his friends had therefore a prospect of securing his attention to their views. There was a real danger that negotiations for a separate peace might continue behind Pitt's back, in which little attention would naturally be paid to the claims of the allies; there were even signs that the old oligarchy with Cumberland's adherents were aiming at an alliance for the overthrow of Pitt.

Knyphausen and Michel, the Prussian ambassadors, were aware of the situation and attempted to anticipate it. They

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of April 17, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> On Pitt's position see the reports of the Prussian embassy of June 8, 1759.—Berlin Archives. Extracts are printed in the *Polit. Korresp.*, xviii. 337 ff.



earnestly begged their king to begin negotiations for peace of his own accord, not with the hope of reaching any definite object, but in order to strengthen the hands of Pitt, the friend of Prussia. It would then be possible for Pitt to represent himself and the Prussian king as inclined to peace, and thus to turn aside the efforts of his opponents. If the stream could not be blocked, it might be turned in a harmless direction. The means proposed was a European congress; if this came to pass, Prussia might take a better position at the side of victorious England than she could do in war, where her allies gave her little help. Moreover, a proposal issued by the two powers in common would place the understanding between them upon a footing above all doubt.

Frederick the Great had long been anxious to secure an agreement with France, which would have enabled him to employ the whole of his strength against Austria and Russia. At an earlier date he had himself negotiated with the court of Versailles, and now that he was in closer connection with England, and Pitt seemed inclined to his views, he was anxious to see a peace between the two western powers which would include himself. Pitt had declared in Parliament that he would permit his allies to suffer no detriment, and Frederick might therefore hope to retain his western provinces in their full extent. His ideas upon the point were explained in a conversation with Sir Andrew Mitchell on May 19, which the ambassador reported to Pitt as follows:<sup>1</sup> 'After that monarch had expressed his warmest wishes for peace and expatiated on the dangerous situation in which he was, he asked me, "But can your ministers make a peace? are things yet in that situation?" I answered I was sure they wished for peace—"And," says he, "I hope I shall not be forgot." My reply was prevented by the king's adding immediately: "No, I am in no danger, Mr. Pitt is an honest man and firm; my interests are safe in his hands." I took the liberty of saying that, from a very long acquaintance, I was firmly persuaded his majesty in the end would find you really was [*sic*] what he now thought you to be.' We thus see that the king was anxious for peace with France, and also that he was attempting to keep Pitt to his word by denouncing any possible disregard of Prussian interests as a breach of honour

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 407 f.

on Pitt's part. With this assertion he had anticipated the ambassador's answer, which he had thus modified in his own favour. Mitchell, however, was careful not to pronounce upon the main question whether Pitt was pledged to hold Prussia free of loss, and merely emphasised the noble character of the minister.

The advice of Frederick's London ambassadors was not in accordance with his own aims. A congress which would have brought about a general pacification was of no use to him, for he had by no means given up the hope of crushing Austria and emerging from the war with some increase of territory. He agreed, however, to the ambassadors' wishes with the object of supporting Pitt in his office, but in his reply of June 20<sup>1</sup> he strongly emphasised the fact that he pledged himself to nothing, and that if any negotiations of the kind came to pass he should regard himself as the more important of the contracting parties, without whose previous knowledge and influence nothing could be settled, which facts the ambassadors were most carefully to notice, should cause arise. He had no apprehensions that Newcastle's wishes would be realised, as they could only be secured in the case of mutual advantages, that is to say, when those possessed by one party corresponded to those of the other; these advantages were to be realised by an inclusion of Prussia, but not if one only of the parties held the upper hand. Thus he considered that France would not be able to conclude a separate peace with England at the present moment, as she would be forced to suffer great colonial loss, and that such a peace would only be possible if it included Prussia, when France would secure the restoration of her colonial possessions in return for the Prussian provinces. He regarded Pitt's idea, or his own conception of that idea, as alone possible of realisation.

On June 20 Frederick therefore wrote the desired letter to the King of England<sup>2</sup> urging him to call the powers to a peace congress, and thus secured the effect which his ambassadors had desired and foreseen. King George was delighted by the pacific intentions of his ally, and renewed his assurance of fidelity to the alliance. Pitt was satisfied by a step which enabled him to demonstrate the futility of his enemies' outcries and to clear himself from the suspicion of involving

<sup>1</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 339.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, xviii. 341.

England in an alliance with an insatiable military power in order to secure himself in office. The prospect of peace thus provided increased the readiness of the nation to make further sacrifices for the war. Newcastle found that his plans had been thwarted, and could discover no further excuse for urging a separate peace with France.

Though we have no evidence of the fact, there is little doubt that the Prussian ambassadors had been induced by Pitt or his friends to adopt this course of action. They dared not inform the king in writing of the fact, for the results might have been most dangerous to Pitt, if their letter had fallen into the hands of the English officials and been deciphered, a circumstance by no means unprecedented. The definite and urgent manner in which they gave their advice (a second letter brought it even more particularly to the king's notice) must have sufficed to show their master that they had received high authorisation, and King Frederick showed that he understood their action by the readiness with which he followed their counsel. He was ready to do a favour to Pitt, although he did not himself place so high an estimate upon the dangers to be feared from Newcastle's plans.

Thus Pitt survived another crisis in his ministerial career, just at a time when his wife had also passed a critical moment. On May 28 his second son was born,<sup>1</sup> who was given his father's name, William, a name which he was afterwards to make no less famous. The event took place at Hayes, where Pitt was staying at that time. Though the minister had recovered his security for the moment he could not be certain of its permanence, unless some great successes resulted from the sacrifices to which he had urged the nation. Such successes the present year was to provide in abundant measure.

<sup>1</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 301.

## CHAPTER X

### MINDEN AND QUEBEC

PITT had now little direct concern with the German war after the final settlement of the principal questions: the size and object of the army, its relation to the Prussians, the payment of subsidies, the supreme command, and the participation of English troops. The conduct of the war was Ferdinand's business, and he naturally preferred to take the advice of his old master, to whose army he still belonged and to whose operations his own must conform, than to be instructed by the English minister under whose directions he formally was, but whose attention was concentrated upon wholly different seats of war. At the time of the battle of Krefeld it was a doubtful point whether the prince was acting as an English or as a Prussian general. If the war was fought out in the Netherlands he would hold the former position. Pitt's action in turning the British forces upon the western province of France had forced Ferdinand to retreat beyond the Rhine and to join hands with the Prussian army, of which his own henceforward formed the right wing. Connections were steadily maintained by detachments issued from either side. There was much apprehension in England that the prince might be acting rather in Prussian than in English interests,<sup>1</sup> and the misgivings thus aroused were visited upon Pitt, whose policy had led to this situation. There was some dissatisfaction in the English forces sent to support the federal army at their subordination to a German general, who was winning reputation with English help and using English troops for the purposes of the Prussian king. From the very outset Pitt had much trouble in allaying the jealousy caused by questions of rank,<sup>2</sup> the proud Lord George Sackville in particular being extremely

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 189.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 337.  
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difficult to satisfy. He had attempted to draw the Duke of Marlborough over to his views, and the fact that Ferdinand had anticipated him in this object brought about the initial friction. In November 1758 the duke died and his command devolved upon Sackville, who used every opportunity to assert his independence, though his efforts were impeded by the fact that most of his subordinates, especially the young Lord Granby, the second in command, supported the prince.<sup>1</sup> The eventual catastrophe was of importance to the domestic policy of England.

Operations in this year began at the end of March 1759. Ferdinand proposed to attack the main army of the Duke of Broglie at Frankfort with a portion of his own forces, and to drive him out of this town. From his winter quarters in Westphalia he advanced to Fulda, where a force of 22,000 had been concentrated, and continued his march to Frankfort on April 10. Meanwhile Broglie had taken up a strong defensive position at the village of Bergen, to the north-east of the town, where he awaited his assailant. On April 13 the prince made a somewhat premature attack and was repulsed, but avoided complete defeat by inflicting a blow upon his French pursuers. At the same time this was a failure, which meant a backward movement all along the line. Ferdinand returned to Westphalia, and the French main army under Marshal Contades advanced from the Lower Rhine, while Broglie proceeded through Hesse. Cassel fell on June 11, after the landgrave had fled for a second time to Hamburg, and Minden capitulated on July 9, before Prince Ferdinand, who was advancing by way of Osnabrück, could reach the town. Meanwhile the two French armies had united, but their superiority in numbers was by no means excessive, as many detachments had been left behind to guard the magazines and the lines of communication. Ferdinand's troops proved successful in two smaller enterprises, and inflicted much damage on the enemy. Their efficiency and discipline was far superior to that of the French, as was constantly proved in action. At the same time, the position was dangerous enough to explain the depression prevailing in England, where fears were entertained of a French invasion, and to inspire the above-mentioned machinations against Pitt.

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 191.

The situation eventually developed as follows: Ferdinand was stationed some miles to the north of Minden, on the left bank of the Weser, where he secured his communications with the right bank by the construction of bridges; Contades pitched his camp near Minden itself, behind the wide stretches of swampy ground at the mouth of the Bastau. The position of the French was secure in itself, but its communications with the rear were difficult (a range of hills lay along the south), and it might easily be taken if these latter were cut. Contades had orders to risk a battle, and Ferdinand was anxious to force one, so that a conflict was inevitable from the outset. Ferdinand manœuvred the marshal out of his position by threatening his rear, and the battle took place on August 1 in a triangle of land at the north of the Bastau, lying between it and the Weser.

A detailed description of the battle would be out of place here.<sup>1</sup> It is enough for our purpose to explain what the English force did and what it failed to do. The armies fell into position at dawn in a thick fog, which entirely veiled the movements of either side. Contades was under the impression that he was confronted only by the advanced guard of the allies on the Weser, which he proposed to attack and drive back. Ferdinand, on the other hand, was aware of the enemy's advance, and had himself proposed to attack, but was uncertain of the disposition of the French forces. Thus, when the fog lifted both parties were surprised, but chiefly the French, who unexpectedly discovered the allied army in a semicircle, and prepared for attack. Ferdinand's only mistake was to weaken his right wing, which rested on the swamps of the Bastau; the 15,000 men of Guerchy were here opposed only by a picket of 1000 men, and by Lord George Sackville with 3000 English and Hanoverian cavalry. To the left of these troops, forming the right centre of the allies, was the Spörken division, composed of two German and six English battalions. These had to bear the whole burden of the battle; for while on the side of the Weser the enemy contented themselves with a cannonade, and the western wings remained idle, the right wing was repeatedly attacked by the whole force of the French cavalry, which was supported, as the struggle

<sup>1</sup> A good description with a plan is given by E. Daniels, *Preuss. Jahrb.* 79, p. 299 ff.

developed, by bodies of infantry brought up from the east and by the artillery fire of Guerchy's corps. Fortunately the attacks were delivered so unmethodically that they ended in total failure, but the situation was critical enough for this division during a considerable time. The English battalions suffered heavy losses, but fought with heroic bravery. While they were being attacked by a French division brought up to the left flank, the Prussian cavalry leader, the Prince of Holstein, intervened, charging the flank of the wavering battalions and scattering them.

After a few hours the French army was forced to retreat with heavy losses, but throughout the battle the English cavalry made a miserable show, thanks to the incompetence of their leader. During the previous night Sackville had for hours together neglected the orders to saddle, and not until late did he take up a position, the exposed nature of which was strongly repugnant to him. On his right was the village of Hahlen, occupied by the picket, and on his left a small copse offering no great obstacles, dividing him from Spörken's division. When the first French cavalry charge had been defeated and the squadrons were retiring, Ferdinand made the bold but justifiable resolve of sending the Anglo-Hanoverian cavalry against the flank of the retreating enemy to complete their rout, notwithstanding the weakness of his own right wing. Before Guerchy's corps arrived other measures of defence could be taken. Sackville, however, declined to execute the movement in the face of a superior force, and treated the repetition of these orders as sheer folly. This was an intelligible attitude, provided he had really considered the movement as suicidal, though he should have left the responsibility to the general in charge. But even when reinforcements arrived which secured the wing, and while the Spörken division was being more heavily pressed, Sackville still declined to take part in the battle. He declared that the copse was impassable, and did not order the movement to be executed, at any rate by the English cavalry, until Ferdinand had summoned him to a personal interview. Even then he did not execute his orders, but needlessly wasted time in calling up the Hanoverian cavalry and changing their formation. He expressly forbade Lord Granby, who had advanced at Ferdinand's direct orders, to obey any commands

but his own. Lord George Sackville maintained this attitude of unparalleled disobedience to the end of the conflict, so that the prince finally exclaimed in desperation, 'In Heaven's name, is there no means of getting that cavalry to advance?' Not until the French had evacuated the field did Sackville proceed to follow them, without taking any part in the fighting. The victory was thus gained without his help, but much loss might have been saved if he had handled his troops according to orders, and the defeat of the enemy would have been far more severe.<sup>1</sup> An especially bad impression was made by the fact that the English troops had been the chief sufferers from Sackville's reluctance.

No completely satisfactory explanation of this man's behaviour has as yet been given, in my opinion. Mere cowardice cannot adequately account for it; though doubts of his bravery existed, he might as leader of the whole English forces have easily sheltered himself from personal danger without impeding the action of his troops. He might have been convinced that the proposed movement was inadvisable, but this would merely explain his refusal to execute his orders and not his avoidance of any attack whatever. That personal enmity to Ferdinand induced him to act in a manner so obviously culpable and dangerous to his reputation seems to me absolutely impossible. These different motives may have combined to influence him, but there was without doubt some more important factor, which can only be explained by a consideration of other facts, and the key as usual is to be found in English party spirit and controversy.

In the first place, it is remarkable that the heir-apparent from the outset so warmly defended the obvious offence of the general, in spite of universal condemnation, that even Pitt was forced to take notice of his action.<sup>2</sup> The minister did not hesitate, in a letter to Bute, to represent this haughty leader, who had voluntarily brought himself into this position, as the victim of fortune, and declared himself ready to deal gently with him as far as the state welfare allowed.

<sup>1</sup> Stanley to Pitt, June 3, 1761: ' . . . It was the opinion both of the generals and all the other officers at Calais, and I find it the same at Paris, that the defeat at Minden would have been decisive if the French army had not been saved by Lord George Sackville's cowardice.'—Thackeray, i. 512.

<sup>2</sup> Bute to Pitt and his reply, August 7 and 15, 1759.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 416 ff.



When George III. was king, he went so far as to send his excuses through Bute for his inability to do anything for him.<sup>1</sup> It must also be remembered that Sackville had gone to Germany against the express desire of George II., but with the good wishes of the young court, to which Pitt was forced to bow.<sup>2</sup> He was also in correspondence with Bute upon military affairs,<sup>3</sup> but unfortunately only a few inconsiderable remnants have been published. The important point, however, is that the Prince of Wales, a short time before the battle of Minden, had attempted<sup>4</sup> to gain from the king the position of commander-in-chief and the virtual control of the English land army (he could hardly have taken a subordinate post), which was nominally in the hands of the aged Lord Ligonier.

By consideration of these main factors and of a number of subordinate circumstances, it is possible to reconstruct the development of this affair, which was not unimportant for its influence upon Pitt's future. My theory is but hypothetical, but as it explains much and has high antecedent probability, I prefer to submit it to the reader's consideration. It may be that some day fresh material will be produced, throwing a clearer light upon the occurrence, and my theory may then become useful as a working hypothesis for the examination of such evidence.

When Sackville went to Germany with Marlborough, he felt himself to some extent the representative of the Prince of Wales, whose pacific English policy it was his business to assert against that of the German commander-in-chief. The prince's court had always suspected that the English forces might be used in foreign interests, and the prince cherished a certain hatred of the ducal line of the House of Brunswick,<sup>5</sup> to which Prince Ferdinand belonged. Sackville was thus to act as a

<sup>1</sup> Bute to Sackville's confidant, H. Erskine, April 8, 1763: 'The king . . . even added that he had flattered himself with the hope of showing him at this period strong marks in his favour, but though the time was come, it was attended with too many untoward circumstances for him to venture taking a step that to his knowledge would revolt numbers about him, and greatly disturb the union now more than ever necessary. . . .'—*Historical MSS. Commission, Ninth Report*, part iii, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> *Historical MSS. Commission, Ninth Report*, part iii, p. 11 f.

<sup>4</sup> Harris, iii. 182 ff.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>5</sup> Walpole, iii. 256.

supervisory and controlling force, though not necessarily as an impediment. The effort was a failure, as Ferdinand was able to win over to his own friendship and ideas first of all the duke, and upon his death the subordinate commanders. When Lord George Sackville took over the command of the English contingent, he was not given the full powers of his predecessor, and was deprived of the right of making appointments to vacant commissions.<sup>1</sup> At this he was extremely angry, and Ligonier made vain efforts to ameliorate the position, but Bute wrote to him: 'I observe with indignation that the command is given by halves, but you will easily guess where the hitch was, as Ligonier shows me every method was taken by your friends to make it complete.' It is possible, if not certain, that the word 'hitch' refers to Prince Ferdinand. Sackville was thus placed in the background, and forced, with extreme reluctance, to play a secondary part. The heir-apparent then proposed to lend him a helping hand; if he himself were appointed chief of the English land forces, his favourite would be able to make head even against the commander-in-chief, and the English corps would gain the character of an independent auxiliary army, with whose leader Prince Ferdinand would have to discuss all measures proposed, if that leader were not removed altogether and replaced by Sackville.

Thus, on July 20, at the time when the most unfavourable news from Germany arrived, Prince George sent a letter to his grandfather asking for a command, in view of the threatening invasion for which the nation was arming. The king handed the letter to the Duke of Newcastle for perusal, who, with his usual cunning, advised a polite and non-committal answer. The prince and Bute naturally calculated upon Pitt's help, in whose hands the decision lay; if he made the matter a cabinet question, he would be able to carry it through. The king could not do without Pitt until he was certain of peace. The commission was thus entrusted to the minister, who accepted it with apparent readiness.<sup>2</sup> At the time of the battle of Minden, Sackville therefore believed, aware as he was of Pitt's

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle, Bute, and Ligonier to Sackville, October and November 1758.—*Historical MSS. Commission, Ninth Report*, part iii. p. 11 f.

<sup>2</sup> An inference from Bute's letter to Pitt of August 7.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 416.

subservience to the young court, that he might calculate upon the realisation of the plan within a short time, if it had not already become an accomplished fact. He thus regarded himself as entirely secure, and his pride rose to such a degree that he thought he might act as he pleased towards the commander-in-chief.

We have, however, a letter from Sackville to Newcastle of July 24, 1759,<sup>1</sup> written shortly before the battle, which does not seem in full harmony with our theory. After remarking upon the somewhat hopeless position of the army, the letter continues: 'Our chief consolation is that every one is convinced of the capacity of our Commander-in-chief, and we all have full confidence that he will do all that is possible for the general welfare.' It must, however, be remembered that Sackville would not reveal his innermost thoughts to the old duke, and that under the circumstances described it might have been to his interest to display a kindly feeling to the prince. His action, at any rate, is inconsistent with this statement. Even if he did not actually intend to thwart the arrangements of his superior, yet the strong support which he believed to be at his command inspired him with the idea of showing his independence, and the somewhat inconsistent orders of the prince gave him an opportunity. Instead of executing these orders according to their spirit and pursuing their obvious purpose, he utilised their vagueness as an excuse for doing nothing. Granting his suppositions to have been true, his action was extremely foolish. It was impossible for him to remain at the head of the army with such a stain upon his honour. Ferdinand's treatment of his behaviour was not lacking in severity. He strongly censured the disobedient general in his orders to the army without mentioning his name, sent a full report to England, and exposed his incompetence before the assembled officers. When Sackville had the effrontery to appear at table, the prince observed, 'Voilà cet homme, autant à son aise comme s'il avait fait des merveilles!'<sup>2</sup> Sackville was obliged to return home on furlough.

The supposition under which he had acted proved incorrect. For the first time the policy of the heir-apparent became

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 197 f.

seriously opposed to that of the prime minister. Pitt had always been ready to consider the wishes of the Prince of Wales, even when they did not coincide with his own, as his position was largely based upon the prince's influence. But upon one point compliance was impossible. He would not allow the direction of the war to be taken from his hands, even by the heir-apparent, as would have happened if the Prince and Sackville had secured supreme command of the land army; the German war would no longer have been conducted in accordance with his principles. He therefore made some effort to secure the appointment of the Prince, but none to overcome the obstacles which naturally arose, and regretfully reported his failure to Lord Bute. The latter was naturally not deceived. In a coldly worded letter beginning once again with the formula, 'Dear Sir,' he lamented the prince's fate on August 7, and hinted a threat of reprisals: 'at the same time, however,' he wrote, 'I will not be responsible for the consequences of this treatment.' Thus a breach had opened between Pitt and the young court,<sup>1</sup> and it was obvious that Pitt declined to act as the tool of the future king, whose influence he regarded merely as the foundation of his own power.

Shortly after the decision upon this question of appointment, news arrived of the battle of Minden, and the king was nearly beside himself with joy.<sup>2</sup> His province had again been saved. The success of the machinations directed against the present conduct of the war was now out of the question, the more so as the report of Sackville's behaviour evoked a storm of indignation at court and among the nation. The young court had been defeated, and all that could now be done was to secure an honourable retreat. Pitt did his best to cover this retreat as far as possible; he had no inclination to break entirely with his previous patron, as this would have left him at Newcastle's mercy. Ferdinand demanded that Sackville should be recalled to London,<sup>3</sup> but Pitt secured that leave should be given him to return home at his own request, and hastened to inform Lord Bute of the results of his efforts, at the same time expressing his sympathy with Sackville's misfortune. Sackville also thanked him personally for his intervention, and asked for his further support to his efforts

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 237.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, iii. 184.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, iii. 186.



to secure a court-martial, before which he hoped to justify his conduct. He hoped that, as in former cases, Pitt's power and the influence of the prince would decide the matter in his favour. Pitt was careful to reply to this despicable officer with exaggerated politeness,<sup>1</sup> but could not avoid depressing his hopes, declaring 'my infinite concern at not having been able to find, either from Captain Smith's conversation or from your own statement of facts, room, as I wished, for me to offer my support with regard to a conduct, which perhaps my incompetence to judge of military questions, leaves me at a loss to account for.' Pitt was thus careful to avoid any attempt to excuse what had happened, and limited himself to providing some small satisfaction for Sackville out of sympathy, as he said. The further course of the affair will be considered later, as the court-martial could not be assembled during the campaign, in which the witnesses were occupied. Sackville for the moment was relieved of his command by his own request and replaced by the Marquis of Granby, who was on excellent terms with the commander-in-chief.

After the battle of Minden the French army retired southward on the right bank of the Weser, as the direct path of retreat was closed by the Crown Prince of Brunswick, and the allies were now able to liberate Hesse. Meanwhile the dismal news arrived that a few days after Ferdinand's victory King Frederick had suffered the severest defeat of his life. On August 12 his army had been almost annihilated at Kunersdorf. The prince's adjutant who carried the report of his victory to the king took part in the disastrous struggle, and returned with the news of it as his answer. The chief event of the rest of the campaign was the siege of Münster, which capitulated on November 21. No greater result could be secured, for the reason that it was necessary to act in view of King Frederick's desperate situation. He was further weakened by the capture of General Fink and his division at Maxen, and Ferdinand was obliged to make a diversion in Saxony to relieve the pressure. It was fortunate for the Prussians that the western army was not in the hands of Sackville, or under his influence, otherwise little regard would have been paid to their interests. This possibility had been averted by the battle of Minden and by Pitt's firmness.

<sup>1</sup> On September 9, 1759.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 423.

Pitt's power rested upon three foundations: the influence of the Duke of Newcastle, the favour of the heir-apparent, and military success. The first had always proved utterly untrustworthy. A breach had been made in the second, which might easily increase, but the third was now stronger than ever. Decisive results were soon to follow in America, and to these we must now turn our attention.

It was in the autumn of 1758 that Pitt developed his plan of campaign for 1759, so far as he had been able to examine the results of the former year. This plan was dictated by the position of affairs. In Canada itself the chief task still remained unachieved, and must be attacked in the new year. Pitt, therefore, determined to concentrate his forces primarily upon the siege of Quebec, the strongest town of New France, the fall of which would decide the fate of the whole colony. As in the previous year, he planned an invasion from two sides: by way of the river St. Lawrence, where the conquered town of Louisburg would serve as a base of operations, and by way of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, where he hoped to secure better results by more vigorous and experienced leadership. The conquest of Frontenac had also led him to suppose that there would be no difficulty in obtaining the entire command of Lake Ontario, and here he proposed to conclude the work of Bradstreet, which that general had been obliged to leave incomplete for lack of means. As regards the south, Pitt was forced to await the result of the enterprise in progress: when he was informed of the occupation of Duquesne in January, he could give no more definite orders for the conduct of affairs in the south than the building of a new fort. Operations in that quarter were for the most part necessarily defensive.

The most important preliminary to these tasks was naturally the choice of commanding officers who should realise Pitt's ideas, and here again the experience of the previous campaign provided the best means of decision. The commander-in-chief, Abercromby, had shown himself unreliable by his ill-considered advance upon Ticonderoga and his precipitate retreat. As soon as Pitt had heard full details of the affair he removed Abercromby from the command and recalled him to Europe. His place was taken by the conqueror of Louisburg, General Amherst. However, on this occasion the

commander-in-chief was not entrusted with the expedition on which Pitt laid most stress, the attack upon Quebec from the mouth of the St. Lawrence, but with the conduct of the expedition by way of Lake Champlain. The reason given was that Amherst would then be in the centre of operations and in close connection with the provincial governors, but the truth was that Pitt considered another man more competent for this great task. Colonel Wolfe was universally reported to have done admirable service before Louisburg and to have proved himself a leader of unequalled penetration, indefatigable energy, and high intrepidity, and Pitt regarded him as the man whose character was most suitable for his own plans. Moreover, Wolfe had returned to England in the autumn, and Pitt therefore had an opportunity of discussing the whole affair in person. The only doubtful point was Wolfe's health, which had suffered severely by the long sea voyage, but a course of the waters at Bath restored him so far that he declared himself ready to take the command.<sup>1</sup> The appointments for the interior were left in the hands of Amherst, who would also be obliged to supply the place of Forbes in case he proved incapable of service, and the only remaining problem was the command of the fleet. On this occasion Boscawen had been sent elsewhere, as we have seen, and we may therefore conclude that Pitt had been informed of the vacillation he had shown before Louisburg. Not only had Boscawen discussed the abandonment of the plan before the siege had begun, but had also opposed the advance upon Quebec after the capitulation. Pitt rightly regarded vacillation of this kind as useless at the critical point of the whole operation, where rapid action and boldness were essential. He therefore chose the younger Admiral Saunders, who was known to be not only modest and honourable, but stedfastly courageous. His capacity and experience were perhaps inferior to those of his predecessor; on the other hand Pitt had no apprehension that he would oppose his authority to the general's enterprising spirit.

To secure as far as possible the success of these different enterprises, and especially that of the attempt upon Quebec, Pitt, as in the previous year, made the most comprehensive preparations, which were elaborated in large part upon a

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 370.

similar system, and were in many cases merely repetitions. Our account of them may therefore be considerably shortened. The first necessity was to cut off all help from Quebec. Pitt had learned from a trustworthy source<sup>1</sup> that the town was very badly provisioned, and that the colonists had been prevented by their military preparations from continuing their agricultural work. The harvests were rotting in the fields, as there was no one to gather them. It was, therefore, necessary to send out full supplies every year from the mother-country if the city was not to be reduced to the extremity of want; hence, if attempts to cut off the supplies were successful, the work of conquest was half done. For this reason Pitt had arranged,<sup>2</sup> before receiving the news of the fall of Louisburg, that Boscawen on his return to England should leave ten men-of-war under a suitable commander in Halifax, where he had built wharves, provided other facilities for naval repairs, and stored the necessary materials, provisions, and munitions of war. As soon as navigation was possible in the following year, this squadron was to sail to the St. Lawrence and close the river to the enemy's ships. Pitt had proposed that the squadron should cruise in the lower courses of the river, which is many miles broad, but Wolfe advised otherwise in December upon information which he had gained in Louisburg. Boscawen had entrusted Captain Durell with the command, of whose capacities Wolfe had a somewhat low opinion. The navigation of the St. Lawrence was regarded as extremely dangerous, on account of sunken reefs and constant fogs; sailors were disinclined to navigate the stream without pilots, and it was possible that disasters might occur if the cruising continued for long. Wolfe, therefore, advised<sup>3</sup> that the squadrons should cast anchor at the island of Bic half-way to Quebec, from which it would be perfectly easy to patrol the whole breadth of the river. From that base frigates and sloops could sail to the great Isle d'Orléans off the town of Quebec

<sup>1</sup> The journal of Lieutenant Pell, who had been captured at Oswego in 1756, and had spent much time in the chief Canadian settlements.—Chatham MSS. His statements were confirmed by the descriptions of one John Veysey, who was captured by a privateer on the voyage to America in 1758, taken to Quebec on the French vessel, and imprisoned in the town for a considerable time.—Chatham MSS., see Appendix ii.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt to Boscawen, July 28, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Wolfe to Pitt, December 24, 1758.—*Chatham Papers*, p. 378 ff.



to examine the channel and train suitable pilots, who would later be able to guide the great transport fleet to its destination. Apart from this, the closing of the river at that point would necessitate the employment of only a few men-of-war to accompany the besieging forces to Quebec; the main forces would remain nearer Louisburg and protect that town against the attack of any hostile fleet. It was most unlikely that any such fleet would appear before the arrival of Admiral Saunders.

Pitt accepted the advice, and ordered Captain Durell, in a letter of December 29,<sup>1</sup> to take up his quarters at the island of Bic at the appointed time, till he received further orders from Admiral Saunders. Four men-of-war, preceding the main fleet, would be sent to his support in April. These orders, however, were not followed to the letter, as more accurate information<sup>2</sup> in the meantime appeared to the admiral to justify a departure from them.

For the other preparations in America Pitt gave full instructions to Amherst in a document dated December 29.<sup>3</sup> The army for Quebec was to consist of 11,605 men, and to be under the command of James Wolfe, who was appointed major-general for this campaign. Orders for the attack were given, and were only to be modified in case of necessity and without diminishing the forces engaged. Six hundred sharpshooters were to be provided by the colonies as in the previous year, together with eighty carpenters, who were to come immediately to Louisburg to help in the preparations. The embarkation could take place as seemed advisable, in New York, Boston, or Halifax, and at a date which would secure the concentration of the army at Cap Breton on April 20, whence the advance would be continued on May 7. The orders were entirely arranged in view of these dates. The 28th regiment, which garrisoned Louisburg, was ordered to serve with the besieging army, and the battalion of colonial troops, numbering at least 1000 men, was ordered to undertake the defence of that place. Measures were taken to secure the safety of Halifax and Nova Scotia, whence the 43rd regiment under John Knox had been ordered to join the

<sup>1</sup> Pitt's MS. correspondence.

<sup>2</sup> The above-mentioned descriptions of John Veysey. See note <sup>1</sup> on preceding page.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 364 ff.

besieging army. Full supplies were ordered for all these troops, imperial and colonial, but under the same restrictions as in the previous year, to the effect that no demands for later supplies could be entertained. The siege train and other munitions of the kind had been provided in the previous year, but additional material was prepared in England for later despatch. The arrangements for transport were nearly the same as those of the previous year. Twenty thousand tons were sent out from England, and in case of necessity 6000 were to be provided in America, for which purpose Pitt laid an embargo upon navigation until the departure of the fleet. An innovation was the order for forty schooners and sloops and seventy whaleboats for service upon the St. Lawrence, which were to be built, as the skiffs had been in the previous year, by the state of New York, the governor of which received direct orders upon this subject from Pitt.<sup>1</sup> Nor did Pitt forget to order the timely engagement of capable boatmen.

Parallel with these orders intended for America, which were issued at the end of December, ran the instructions to Admiral Saunders, which were drawn up on January 12.<sup>2</sup> They were chiefly concerned with the embarkation of supplies and artillery in England, and with the departure and destination of the fleet. As already explained to Amherst, a transport fleet of sixty ships, with a tonnage of 20,000, was to sail for New York, convoyed by six men-of-war and nine frigates, the whole being under the command of Admiral Holmes. They took provisions for 10,000 men for six months, together with the necessary bedding, etc. An experienced officer accompanied the convoy, to direct the work of embarkation in New York. Apart from this a second smaller transport fleet was formed in the Thames, which was to take part of the supplies directly to Louisburg, in order that the ships destined for the transport of troops might not be overloaded. This fleet was convoyed by nine men-of-war and six frigates. Saunders and Wolfe, with their respective staffs, were to embark upon the flagship *Neptune*.

The special instructions for Wolfe, issued on February 5,<sup>3</sup> contained nothing materially new. The general was to accompany Saunders to Louisburg, and was there to await the army

<sup>1</sup> Under date December 29, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 429 ff.

or to accelerate its departure, and proceed to the work of the conquest of Quebec with all vigour. Upon the conquest of the town, the works were to be secured by garrisoning and by the construction of defences; further enterprises might be attempted in conjunction with Saunders, and if necessary with Amherst; these orders were never carried out, and are merely evidence of the minister's great expectations. Special emphasis was laid upon the duty of the fleet and army to supply mutually any deficiencies in personnel.

Such were Pitt's arrangements for the main enterprise upon Quebec, and in care and foresight they could not easily be surpassed. At times he was obliged to go deeply into detail; he could not entirely trust to the initiative of subordinate officials, who were accustomed to far more careless methods of conducting war, while on minor points the co-operation of different officers who could not meet for discussion was advisable. It was necessary that the whole of this complicated organisation should be issued from the central office in one distinctive form, and be set in motion once for all; supplementary orders, questions, and demands were possible only in very limited measure on account of the great distance.

At the same time Pitt began his preparations for a land expedition to Canada. On December 9 he sent orders to the governors to provide a number of provincial troops equivalent to that of the previous year, as the majority had returned home during the winter. The troops of the northern provinces were intended for the struggle on Lakes Champlain and Ontario, apart from those employed upon Quebec, while the southern troops were to undertake the protection of their own frontiers. Amherst was instructed in his orders of December 29 to add as many of the king's troops to the colonial levies as he thought advisable, without in any way weakening the main expedition. Apart from this his orders were a repetition of those given to Abercromby. He was to advance upon Lakes George and Champlain, and to turn either upon Montreal or Quebec or upon both in succession. The necessary boats were in existence, and needed only to be repaired and completed by new constructions. The beginning of operations was fixed for May 1, so that the attack might coincide as nearly as possible with that upon the St. Lawrence, and the French be obliged to divide their forces. The most

important novelty in the instructions was that respecting the Ontario expedition. Amherst, with the help of the governor of New York, who had already received instructions upon the point, was to repair Fort Oswego, and thence to send an expedition against Fort Niagara at the western end of the lake. As we have stated, Pitt had no special orders to give for the south. The commander in that quarter was to inflict damage upon the enemy, and to protect the frontiers as he might deem best.

In all these orders Pitt had done his utmost, at a great distance and with no personal knowledge of the seat of war, to guarantee success. He had avoided, to the best of his ability, the two mistakes of binding his commanders to over-elaborate instructions, or of leaving them so much liberty of choice as to make neglect of his main objects possible. That he had been entirely successful in this effort can hardly be asserted, notwithstanding the great results. The orders were not entirely in accordance with the circumstances, and therefore tended to hamper the commanders' actions; in this respect they might have proved disastrous, had not the enormous mistakes and deficiencies of the enemy acted as a counterpoise. Pitt is not here to be blamed, but rather the general conditions of the problem. The vast extent of the war, which eventually spread to both hemispheres, made it necessary to conduct operations from home, though as a rule any military leadership is best concentrated in the camp. This was a disadvantage to be reckoned with, and it was fortunate for England that she enjoyed the guidance of a leader whose insight was able to limit the consequent disaster to the smallest possible extent.

The state of affairs in Canada was extremely gloomy.<sup>1</sup> The prevailing corruption continually nullified the honest efforts of the home government to secure the prosperity of the colonies. Millions were expended every year, only to disappear into the pockets of the rapacious officials, especially those of the Intendant Bigot. The governor, Vaudreuil, was neither capable nor inclined to change these established customs. Incapacity and pride induced him to maintain the best possible relations with his subordinates, and he was continually forced to wink at their dealings. The natural result was dissatisfaction

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Parkman, II. chap. xxiii., and Dussieux, Appendix.



among the colonists and friction with the Indian tribes. Montcalm asserted that had these grants of money been expended upon their proper object, every Indian in North America might have been secured to France. At the same time the inherent strength of the colonies was not to be despised. While these peculations impaired home finances, they did not necessarily prevent either the existence or the development of the colonies, which contained military forces of high capacity, while their loyalty to the existing government and to the French organisation was unconditional. Their defence might thus become extraordinarily obstinate. A serious source of weakness, however, was the fact that Vaudreuil conceived an unworthy jealousy of the intelligent and energetic Marquis of Montcalm, and continually placed obstacles in the way of this general's best plans. He had been ordered by the ministry to avoid any interference in military affairs, but he even withheld the necessary support, and attempted to represent every success as due to his own arrangements, and to make the marquis responsible for every failure. His reports are full of declared or hinted accusations of Montcalm.

The winter of 1758-9 was unusually long and severe, and the supplies of provisions sank very low. The towns had always been dependent upon home supplies to a certain extent, for which, however, navigation was indispensable. An English attack was regarded as impossible; the dangers of the St. Lawrence were well known, experienced French pilots faced them with anxiety, and the town itself afforded every possibility of defence. An attempt at siege seemed sheer madness unless the superiority of the assailants was enormous. The authorities had received orders to call up all their forces for the defence of central Canada, as this point might easily be made a base for the reconquest of what had been lost, but in view of the improbability of a hostile attack in the immediate future no preparations had been made during the winter. Vaudreuil and Montcalm were in Montreal with most of the troops. Not until May 15 did an officer, M. Bougainville, arrive from France with the news that the English were preparing an enterprise against Quebec, and might soon arrive with a strong force. Montcalm immediately made his way to Quebec, where he took full measures for

defence, and concentrated all the colonial forces at his disposal. The governor followed a few days afterwards; and fortunately full supplies arrived almost at the moment of the alarm.

Pitt's orders were at first carried out precisely to the letter.<sup>1</sup> In the middle of February the second fleet sailed to America, Admiral Holmes starting for New York on the 14th to convoy the army thence to Louisburg, while Admiral Saunders started direct for Louisburg on the 17th. The latter, however, had an unusually bad passage, which lasted no less than eleven weeks. A succession of contrary winds, storms, and calms obliged him to run southward as far as Madeira, the Canaries, and Bermuda, and eventually to put in at the inhospitable Sable Island, south of Cap Breton. Wolfe wrote that there had been no such passage since the days of Columbus. He again suffered greatly from sea-sickness, though he occupied two commodious cabins upon deck with his adjutant, Barré. Eventually the fleet arrived off Louisburg on April 30, but even then landing proved impossible; the harbour was closed by masses of ice, and Saunders was obliged to return to Halifax. There he found Captain Durell, who, thanks to Pitt's foresight, had repaired his ships during the winter (he had only eight, however, instead of the ten which Pitt had ordered), had completed his crews with American sailors, and in other respects had done his best to promote the success of the enterprise.

At last upon May 4 Durell ventured to begin the passage of the St. Lawrence, but a storm kept him at Mangers Beach two days longer, and eventually he arrived too late to fulfil his task. A French transport fleet of nineteen sail had passed the Straits of Belle Isle between the northern point of Newfoundland and Labrador, which had become the regular route since the conquest of Louisburg; passing the great island of Anticosti to the north the fleet reached the river mouth and arrived at Quebec undiscovered by the English. It brought all the supplies which the mother-country could expend for that year upon the colonies, which were then in a position to begin the

<sup>1</sup> On the siege of Quebec and the struggles in the interior see especially Parkman, ii. chaps. 24-28; W. Kingsford, *The History of Canada*, iv. 217-355; Dussieux, Appendix. On Quebec in particular the great work of A. Doughty, *The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*, 6 vols., Quebec, 1901. The last three volumes give original documents.

struggle with renewed strength.<sup>1</sup> Durell was only able to capture three ships from the smaller transport fleet, the remaining five of which also arrived safely at Quebec.

The captain was now better informed than Pitt had been upon the passage of the St. Lawrence. The above-mentioned report by John Veysey<sup>2</sup> contains accurate information concerning the route which he had then traversed in a slow-sailing French ship; it explained in particular that the fairway led between the Isle des Coudres and the north coast, as the main stream was too dangerous at that spot. At this narrow passage two pilots were stationed and were usually summoned by hoisting the French ensign and by gunshots. Durell was able to use this information. Instead of remaining on the south coast on the island of Bic, he advanced considerably further to the Isle des Coudres, hoisted French colours at the appointed spot and gave the signal. The pilots who put out were made prisoners with the object of compelling their services. The squadron then guarded the passage at this point, and patrolled the rest of the route as far as the Isle d'Orléans.

Durell's advance had been begun considerably later than the date appointed by Pitt, but the main body waited longer still. The fleet was to have sailed from Louisburg on May 7, and it was not until the 14th that Saunders left the harbour of Halifax. On the way he met Admiral Holmes, who was coming from New York with some ships of war, and accompanied him to Louisburg. There the troops ordered for service gradually came in from New York and from other points of the continent, and at the beginning of June it was at last possible to move upstream. On June 6 all the transport ships, seventy-six in number, had left the harbour. The voyage upstream was a slow business, but was by no means so dangerous as the French had maintained and had doubtless believed, and the pilots had probably exaggerated its difficulties for purposes of self-interest. Misguided by these ideas upon the dangers of the passage, the French had taken no measures for defence or for closing the stream. They had regarded the reefs and

<sup>1</sup> Remarks upon the present situation at Canada by Major Grant (in Canada), November 1759: '... at the same time that they received an account by Mr. Bougainville that Quebec was certainly to be attacked, there arrived nineteen vessels from Bordeaux with 19,000 liv. of flour, 8000 liv. of pork, a considerable quantity of wine, brandy, etc., and five vessels from Rochelle entirely loaded with all sorts of military stores, of which the colony was in great want.'—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. p. 251 note.

shallows as sufficient protection, and were considerably surprised when the great fleet passed without misfortune. The dangerous passage round the Isle d'Orléans, which was reached on June 21, was successfully accomplished with the help of the captured pilots and by means of continual sounding. The fleet then cast anchor on the southern shore of the island off the south-west point.

Meanwhile Montcalm had had five weeks in which to complete his fortifications and arrangements for defence, a work greatly facilitated by the favourable nature of the ground. The fortress of Quebec lay upon a rocky peninsula on the northern river bank, running in an easterly direction and formed by the junction of the St. Lawrence and the St. Charles river, which here enters from the west. The river above and below reaches an average breadth of two English miles, but at this point is narrowed by the peninsula to less than a mile. Hence the town could be brought under the fire of guns from the opposite shore, and the fortress artillery would command any ships that passed the straits. Upstream the northern bank is steep and rocky, presenting hardly a practicable opening, but downstream, below the St. Charles, is a stretch of low and swampy ground for two miles, extending to the little river Beauport. Here the steep wall of rock rises once more, ending about six miles to the north-east of the St. Charles with the deep gorge of the Montmorency river. Opposite this latter portion lies Point d'Orléans, the south-west point of the Isle d'Orléans; opposite the former part is the flat and curving peninsula of Point Levy.

The French forces consisted of more than 16,000 men; of these about a third were regular French and colonial troops and the remainder Canadian militia. Montcalm had determined not to confine himself to the defence of the town, which was too small to contain these numbers, while its works were deficient; he proposed to guard the whole of the river bank, and therefore apportioned his troops, apart from a garrison of fifteen hundred men, along the river, from the mouth of the St. Charles to the Montmorency, fortifications being thrown up at every point. The river bank was lined with trenches, the important points protected by batteries, and a strong fort was erected on the left bank of the St. Charles to secure the bridge of boats which spanned that river. The village of Beauport was used as headquarters in the centre of these defensive works and of the regular troops. On the



wings the masses of the militia were encamped. The position was thus admirably defended: the front was almost impregnable; the left wing was covered by the Montmorency, which could easily be defended, and the right by a fortress which could sweep the stream with its guns; the river St. Charles was also closed by a floating battery.

Against so strong a position, defended by 16,000 men, Wolfe could only lead 8635 troops, although Pitt had arranged for a considerably higher figure. This reduction of his forces might easily have ruined his chance of success, and demands complete explanation.

The first cause of the deficiency was the fact that all the contingents ordered for service were more or less incomplete; the numerous gaps had not been filled, or only partially completed. The extent of the difference may be observed from the following list, the first column of which represents Pitt's estimate,<sup>1</sup> as confirmed by the cabinet council:—

Contingents.		According to Pitt's Estimate.	Actual Figures. <sup>2</sup>
15th Regiment.	Maj.-Gen. Jeffrey Amherst (Halifax)	1034	594
28th	„ Lieut.-Gen. Bragg (Louisburg)	815	591
35th	„ Lieut.-Gen. Otway (Fundy Bay)	1145	899
43rd	„ Maj.-Gen. Kennedy (Fundy Bay)	815	715
47th	„ Lieut.-Gen. Peregrine Lascelles (Continent)	1145	679
48th	„ Col. Daniel Webb (Continent)	1145	842
58th	„ Col. Anstruther (Halifax)	815	616
60th	„ (2nd Battalion). Gen. Robert Monckton (Fundy Bay)	895 <sup>3</sup>	581
60th	„ (2nd Battalion). Col. Lawrence (Fundy Bay)	895 <sup>3</sup>	617
78th	„ Col. Fraser (Continent)	1601	1269
6	Companies of Sharpshooters (Nova Scotia)	700	576
	Royal Artillery	300	107
6	Williamson <sup>4</sup>		223
3	Companies of Grenadiers	300	326
Total		11,605	8635

<sup>1</sup> Proposals for the expedition to Quebec, November, 1758.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> See Doughty, vol ii.

<sup>3</sup> These battalions were fixed at 1145 men each, but were to contribute in common 500 men for the defence of Halifax. Doughty has overlooked this and gives the force proposed by Pitt as 12,105.

<sup>4</sup> This force is unknown to me and must have been ordered subsequently.

The numbers actually engaged were thus some 3000 less than the estimate. It must not, however, be supposed that Pitt had flattered himself that the contingents would appear in the field in absolute completion. Pitt knew the actual conditions only too well. He had taken measures to bring the force up to its proper numbers at the outset of the operations. General Hopson, who had been sent out to the conquest of Martinique in 1759, had received orders,<sup>1</sup> upon the completion of his task, to send 1000 men to North America to reinforce the contingents there stationed, and to increase this number to 2000 if his attempt proved unsuccessful and he found nothing further to do in the West Indies. Seven companies of Highlanders which had been sent after him were also to be placed at General Amherst's disposal immediately after the attempt upon Martinique, whether successful or unsuccessful.<sup>2</sup> Apparently Pitt had underestimated the diminution in Wolfe's army,<sup>3</sup> as he thought 1000 men sufficient for his purpose; for the Highlanders were probably claimed by Amherst, to whom Pitt's orders had assigned them.<sup>4</sup> The despatch of these reinforcements was then delayed by the long duration of the operations in Guadeloupe. When Hopson had decided upon attacking this island, he had received permission from Pitt<sup>5</sup> to retain all his troops as long as they were required in the West Indies and to despatch only the Highlanders as soon as possible. As the execution of this latter order was delayed, Wolfe had to do without the help he expected from the West Indies, and his army was limited to the inadequate force of 8635 men. Wolfe did his best to supply the deficiency. He applied, for instance, to the governor of Louisburg, Brigadier Whitmore, asking for two companies of light infantry in exchange for a body of less capable troops, but was met with a flat refusal. The brigadier appealed to Pitt's instructions, which referred him to Amherst's orders, but made no mention of Pitt's additional clause, that he was to obey Amherst's

<sup>1</sup> Of October 16, 1758.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Instructions of November 13, 1758.—Public Record Office.

<sup>3</sup> Wolfe to Whitmore, May 19: '... as several regiments are much weaker than they were thought (in England) to be.'—Doughty, vi. 37 f.

<sup>4</sup> 'In order to their joining the forces there under the command of M.-G. Amherst.'

<sup>5</sup> Pitt to Hopson, March 9, 1759.—Public Record Office.

orders, 'or those of any other superior officer,' which referred to Wolfe.<sup>1</sup>

The troops were divided into three brigades under General Monckton, George Townshend,<sup>2</sup> and James Murray, together with several bodies directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief, of whom the most important were the colonial sharpshooters, who numbered 400 instead of 600. It proved impossible to use the naval crews for land operations, as the difficulties of navigation in the St. Lawrence permitted no reduction in their numbers. The rocky bottom provided very insecure anchorage,<sup>3</sup> while the flow of the ebb-tides, constant storms, and the attacks of the enemy demanded continual watchfulness. It was, moreover, necessary to be prepared for the approach of a hostile fleet, and to watch for this possibility outpost ships were stationed as far as the island of Bic.

In view of the limited numbers of the armies, Montcalm should have taken the offensive against any landing force, and so have brought his own superior numbers into play. This, however, was not done. On June 22 fireships were sent out against the fleet, but this, the only attempt, proved a failure; the ships were set on fire too early, and were carried out of their course to be guided to the shore by English sailors, where they burnt themselves out. Thus in July Wolfe was able not only to occupy the Isle d'Orléans, but also Point Levy, to erect batteries opposite the fortress, and on the 8th to post a body of 3000 men on the north coast below the Montmorency river; the position of this force, broken by the arm of the St. Lawrence, was extended along the whole of the French line, outflanking it on the north-east. On one occasion only was an attack proposed upon the English west wing, but was given up before the action began. Montcalm's behaviour is to be explained by the fact that the Canadian militia, who formed his main force, were by no means reliable. In the open field or in an attack upon a fortified position he considered the Canadians far inferior to the trained English troops; on the other hand they were valuable behind earthworks and on the defensive, where their officers could keep

<sup>1</sup> Kingsford, iv. 237.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt had chosen Townshend in preference to Colonel Burton; see his 'proposals' in the Chatham MSS. He may have suspected possible jealousy between him and Wolfe.

<sup>3</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 429: Wolfe's report.

them in hand and where their good markmanship could be turned to account; moreover, it was important to give the English no opportunity for securing a success, which would have greatly depressed the courage of the besieged, while if the siege could be sufficiently prolonged, the enemy would be forced by stress of weather to leave this inhospitable district. The English were bound to run some risk if they wished to secure any result, while the French policy was to avoid any risk whatever.

With the object of making some impression Wolfe proceeded to bombard the lower town from the south bank as far as his guns could carry; this was laid in ashes, and some moral effect was produced, though no damage was inflicted upon the actual defences. The inhabitants retired to the upper town or to the interior. At the same time the general issued proclamations warning the colonists to observe neutrality, as otherwise their property would be destroyed. As no effect was thereby produced, he proceeded to ravage the surrounding country, to confiscate property, and to imprison women and children. This was certainly a breach of international law, but Wolfe attempted to justify his action by a reference to the cruelty inflicted upon the English colonists by the raids of the French Indians and scouts. The progress of operations was greatly increased by the success of an attempt on July 28 to bring a man-of-war and a number of similar vessels upstream past the town. The numerous sloops and boats which Pitt had sent to accompany the expedition proved highly serviceable upon this occasion and throughout the siege. By degrees a considerable number of ships were collected above the fortress, and when it was too late the French recognised the mistake they had made in sending their few frigates to Montreal in order that their crews might be available for land service. An advance from the right wing, where Wolfe had his headquarters, across the Montmorency proved impracticable in view of the watchfulness of the French, notwithstanding the existence of a ford.

July 31 was an important but almost a disastrous day for the English. Wolfe ordered Monckton's brigade to make an attempt to land from the Isle d'Orléans on the coast to the west of the Montmorency outflow, the point selected being the flat strip of coast before the steep and wooded heights,



which was of considerable breadth at ebb-tide. At the same time Townshend and Murray crossed the mouth of the Montmorency below the falls by a ford which was passable at ebb-tide. Protected by the fire of several warships, they were able to reach the bank and to conquer the redoubt, though they suffered much under the fire from the heights. In consequence of a misunderstanding Monckton's force advanced prematurely and in bad order upon the heights before the troops crossing the Montmorency were able to arrive. Had they reached the plateau they would certainly have been driven back with heavy loss, if not annihilated by the far superior forces of the enemy. It was therefore fortunate that a storm of rain made the paths slippery and wet the powder, forcing the assailants to give up the attempt. They retired, and as the ebb-tide had nearly passed owing to the great delay in the landing operations, Wolfe was obliged to order a general retreat, in the course of which he lost considerably. This important enterprise thus failed, a result as depressing to the English as it was encouraging to the French. The conquest of Quebec now seemed only possible if help should come from another side, and this was to be expected only from Amherst, of whose operations no news had yet reached the besiegers.

Pitt had ordered two expeditions to operate in the interior. The commander-in-chief was to force a passage to Montreal or Quebec by way of Lakes St. George and Champlain, while another body advanced to Fort Niagara by way of Oswego. This arrangement was a mistake to which Pitt had been committed by Bradstreet's success in the previous year. The attack upon that distant fort was a dangerous undertaking, as the detachment might easily be cut off from Oswego by an advance from the St. Lawrence; moreover, it withdrew a considerable proportion of the northern troops from their main task, the conquest of Canada. Had the troops in question been sent by way of Oswego against the forts on the upper St. Lawrence, they would at least have drawn off a considerable portion of the enemy's forces and have facilitated the siege of Quebec; as things were, a wholly unnecessary relief was given to the southern provinces, the forces of which were entirely idle during that summer. The success of the undertaking may be considered a special piece of good fortune; it might easily have ended in a great catastrophe.

While Amherst was concentrating his troops on Lake George, Brigadier Prideaux, whom at Pitt's orders he had entrusted with the command, started at the end of June with 5000 men upon the old route to Oswego, where he left a strong garrison under Colonel Haldimand, which fortified itself as well as possible upon the site of the ruined fort. As soon as the main body had continued its advance, a Canadian detachment approached of equal strength under Saint-Luc; fortunately this leader displayed neither energy nor perseverance, but retired after a short struggle. Meanwhile Prideaux arrived without mishap at the fort, situated at the influx of Niagara to Lake Ontario, which was defended by the brave Colonel Pouchot with 600 men. Prideaux immediately began a siege, but was killed on the first day of the bombardment; the command then devolved upon the Indian agent, Johnson, who continued the work with good success.

Pouchot had, however, taken measures to secure help. He knew that a considerable force would be on the way from Detroit, Illinois, and other western points to Duquesne, with the object of wresting this place, now occupied by Fort Pitt, from the English. He sent a message to this force, a savage band but little more civilised than the Indians themselves; instead of landing at Presqu'île, the force sailed down Lake Erie, and hastened from its eastern extremity past the mighty falls and the deep gorge to relieve the threatened fort. On July 24, when a bridge had already been made and the besieged were at their last gasp, this body appeared in numbers reported to amount to 1100 men and 200 Indians. Johnson could only oppose some 800 men to this enemy, as he was obliged to maintain his supervision of the fort and the boats. None the less, after fierce forest fighting, he succeeded in scattering the badly disciplined bands and making many prisoners, the remainder returning to their homes. The fate of Niagara was thus decided. Pouchot capitulated on the same day, and, though not permitted to march out, was allowed military honours. At the same time Fort Pitt was relieved of the danger which these western forces had threatened, and the work of construction was completed without disturbance. After Prideaux' death Amherst had sent Brigadier Gage as commander-in-chief to Lake Ontario, and now ordered him to attack the French on the upper St. Lawrence. The force,

however, was so reduced by the task of occupying the different forts, that Gage, to the general's vexation, reported the impracticability of any such enterprise.

On Lakes George and Champlain no real success had been secured during these events, as the French voluntarily evacuated their exposed positions. Amherst was not able to concentrate his army on Lake George without great delay, at the end of June instead of April. The force, which numbered 11,000 men, half of these being regular troops, started by the usual route on July 21. When they reached Ticonderoga the French General Bourlamaque had already retired beyond Lake Champlain to take up a strongly defended position on the Isle aux Noix, at the northern end of the lake. The fort was blown up by the rearguard. Amherst also found that Crown Point had been abandoned. His further advance was prevented by the presence of four armed vessels upon the lake, with which his flotilla was unable to cope. He therefore waited more than two months, expending the valuable time in constructing roads and fortifications, while his naval engineers, with the help of a sawmill which they found, built some larger vessels and a floating battery. It is difficult to say what else he could have done. Without the command of the water he could not conquer the Isle aux Noix, and as long as the enemy was there stationed he could not use the waterway. A march through the forest, with the object of going round the lake and the enemy's position, would have involved the greatest difficulties. Nor did Amherst suppose that the work would have taken so much time; the sawmill broke down on several occasions. Not until October 11, when the fate of Quebec had long been decided, though he had had no news of the victory, did the flotilla of boats set out under the protection of the armed ships. The enemy's gunboats were driven ashore. An autumn storm then demanded a further delay of five days, and eventually on October 17 the lateness of the season forced Amherst to order a retreat.

Thus the help that Pitt had intended for the bold assailant of Quebec did not reach him from this side. The whole burden of the enterprise remained upon his shoulders, and in the event of a failure all his capacity would not have saved him from censure. Pitt's reputation was possibly involved with his own, for there were enemies enough in readiness to

use defeat for their own purposes. The alliance with the hard-pressed King of Prussia and the whole system of the war would come to nothing if the peace party gained the upper hand and Pitt's influence disappeared. The fate of Pitt, of England, and of Prussia was at stake when Wolfe made his last effort to overcome the obstinate defence, an effort that seemed in all human probability to offer scarce the barest prospect of success. Autumn was approaching, and Wolfe had not even secured what he had conquered at Louisburg at the outset, the country surrounding the fortress. The conquest of this by no means implied the speedy surrender of the town. The siege might be protracted until the autumn storms drove the English fleet homewards. The numerical proportions were here infinitely less favourable than at Cap Breton.

At the end of August his prospects were at their worst. News arrived that Amherst had stopped his advance; Wolfe himself was ill, and was obliged to leave the conduct of operations for a time in the hands of his brigadiers, while Saunders was talking of departure. Under these circumstances some decisive action was necessary, or all prospect of victory must be abandoned. On August 29 Wolfe sent a letter to his brigadiers from his sick-bed,<sup>1</sup> proposing three methods of attack, the objective in every case being the occupation of the Beauport plateau. The brigadiers replied objecting to all three proposals, and advising that the troops should be withdrawn from the Montmorency bank and landed at the north side of the St. Lawrence, far above the town. The enemy would then be forced to give battle, and a victory would involve the fall of the fortress. The generals urged that this plan carried the further advantage that the town would be cut off from communication with the troops acting against Amherst. They appended a detailed plan of operations, from which it appeared that the landing was to be carried out some twelve English miles above Quebec, where no great resistance need be expected. Wolfe at once accepted the proposal of his subordinates, and proceeded to make preparations for its execution. A few days before the attack on September 10,

<sup>1</sup> As regards the origination of the plan of attack see especially Doughty, II. chap. xi., where the question is examined in the light of the documentary evidence.



when he was reconnoitring the coast in person, he conceived the idea of landing in the immediate neighbourhood of the town, in a little bay, the *Anse du Foulon*, where only a weak outpost was to be seen, and a path led to the summit. The main body of the troops posted on this side were stationed under *Bougainville* considerably further upstream, so that a landing would cut them off from the town. Thus the plan of the brigadiers, which in all other respects was successfully achieved, was modified on this most important point.

At the beginning of September Wolfe had given up the position on the *Montmorency*; he quietly withdrew all available troops to the left wing, where he concentrated 4800 men with the necessary boats. Every boat above the town was loaded with every soldier it could carry. The night of September 12/13 was selected for the enterprise. Wolfe attempted to draw off the attention of the enemy by a manœuvre of the fleet off the coast of *Beauport*, where he embarked the first landing body, which he led in person, and crossed the stream. The captain of an English guard-boat, anchored in the middle of the river, took him for an enemy and nearly fired upon him; he then gave him information derived from French prisoners, that a provisioned transport was expected above. Wolfe was able to use this information, and while sailing along the other shore replied to a challenge as though he belonged to the transport in question. The boats thus reached the landing spot without raising the alarm. The troops were disembarked, a number of daring spirits were sent up the cliffs to take the guard posted on the path in the rear; thus the way was speedily cleared, and by degrees the first and the following detachments climbed the heights. By dawn the whole army was ready for battle on the plain of *Abraham*, so named from its owner, which extends between the river *St. Lawrence* and the lower *St. Charles* river. The line of battle was drawn up facing eastwards, whence the attack might be expected. Not until all the troops had been carried over and had taken up their positions did *Montcalm*, who was immediately informed of the event, arrive with as many forces as he could gather upon the *Beauport* side. It would have been better for him to have delayed his attack until *Bougainville* could take the enemy in the rear, but he wished to hurl his assailants into the river as quickly as possible, and was perhaps afraid of the

interference of Vaudreuil. He therefore resolved to give battle with insufficient forces.

The attack upon the English line was begun in open order, the forces taking cover, in which operation the marksmanship of the Canadians proved effective. The contest, however, could not be decided by this mode of warfare. At about ten o'clock the columns concentrated for a charge and advanced resolutely upon the English right wing. Wolfe allowed them to approach to a short distance and then delivered volley after volley, inflicting appalling slaughter. The bold advance was succeeded by a wild flight, while the conquerors pursued at a moderate pace under the fire of the sharpshooters, who were posted in the bushes and broken ground. It was at this moment that General Wolfe met his death. Two wounds obliged him to leave the battle line and a third in his breast proved fatal. He was informed that the enemy were in retreat, and ordered the regiments to seize the bridge over the Charles river in order to cut off the French retreat. Then he breathed his last. Almost at the same moment the French commander fell. Montcalm had been carried away by the stream of fugitives, and was mortally wounded near the walls of the fortress. He was carried into the town, but nothing could be done, and he died the same evening.

The French had lost a battle, but the siege was by no means at an end. The English were now where they had been at Cap Breton after the first few days; they were masters of the surrounding country, but the struggle for the fortress might be of long duration, as the French were still numerically superior. It was also possible that a clever manœuvre might drive the besiegers from the position they had won. There were forces enough under General Lévis in Montreal, and those of General Bourlamaque in the Isle aux Noix would soon be available. At this point, however, the greatness of the Marquis of Montcalm and the incapacity of the governor were clearly demonstrated. Vaudreuil in his perplexity ordered the destruction of the bridge of boats over the St. Charles, which was still in his hand, and only the interference of more capable officers prevented this suicidal action, which would have delivered the fugitives to the mercy of the conquerors. The governor then gave a wholly unnecessary order for the army to retreat round the enemy's position to Trois Rivières,

and empowered the Commandant Ramesay, who was left behind with a few hundred men, to capitulate.

General Lévis, who was horrified by the governor's grievous mistakes, now interfered. He persuaded his superiors to countermand the commandant's instructions, and to order a return to Quebec. The march was begun, and was joined by Bougainville, who had remained in the English rear; when, however, they approached the town, news arrived that the commandant had concluded a capitulation on the evening of September 17. The English generals had brought their ships up to the town, occupied the valley of the St. Charles, and threatened to storm the place. Colonel Ramesay had been instructed not to wait for an assault; he could not resist the earnest requests of the citizens, and began negotiations. The English generals were wise enough to offer favourable conditions, and in a few hours terms were arranged. The garrison received permission to return to France, and the strongest fortress of Canada was handed over to the English. Preparations were immediately made to strengthen the fortifications and to make the town impregnable, so that Lévis did not venture upon the task of reconquest, and found himself obliged to retreat, and to delay reprisals until the following spring. Fortunately for the English the autumn was unusually mild, and the fleet was able to remain until the middle of October, and to help the garrison over the dangerous period of weakness. It was then possible to leave the conquered town in the hands of the garrison, and the fleet proceeded on the homeward voyage with the greater part of the army.

Thus the great task had been successfully accomplished, though the manner of its inception had offered no prospect of success. Strict adherence to Pitt's arrangements would have given some ground for hope, but on many points adherence was impossible.<sup>1</sup> The long winter had delayed operations, a great transport fleet had reached Quebec, and Wolfe's troops were far below their proper strength, while the enemy were unusually strong and the position of Quebec seemed almost impregnable; again, Amherst's force was concentrated two months too late and was then checked upon its advance. These facts contributed to make the situation extremely precarious. The astonishing generalship and tenacity of the

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 217 f.

English leader, together with an extraordinary piece of good fortune, alone compensated for these disadvantages and secured the final brilliant success. The death of Montcalm had far more influence upon the result than that of Wolfe: this and the unexampled incompetence of Vaudreuil were factors far out of calculation. Yet to them was mainly due the final success of the highly commendable efforts of Pitt and his general.

The news of this great victory reached London on October 16. The delight and enthusiasm were naturally unbounded, the more so as a few days previously two very despondent despatches had arrived from Wolfe,<sup>1</sup> fully describing the difficulties of the situation, and barely alluding to the proposed attempt at landing. So sudden a success was almost miraculous. The full glory of it fell to Pitt, who would probably in case of failure have been the object of universal reproach, though it must be said that his action contributed nothing to the final event. Congratulations and expressions of pleasure came in from all sides, both from friends and from secret enemies.<sup>2</sup> Poems of varying degrees of badness celebrated his exploits.<sup>3</sup> 'Il faut avouer,' said Frederick the Great,<sup>4</sup> 'que l'Angleterre a été longtemps en travail et qu'elle a beaucoup souffert pour produire Monsieur Pitt; mais enfin elle est accouchée d'un homme.' Pitt showed himself no less a man by the use he made of his triumph, and by his preparations for the delivery of further blows.

<sup>1</sup> To Pitt, under date September 2, printed in the *Annual Register* for 1759, p. 241 ff., and to Holderness under date September 9, 1759.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 425 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 440 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See *Annual Register*, 1759, p. 445 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Mitchell to Pitt, October 22, 1759.—*Chatham Papers*, i. 444 f.



## CHAPTER XI

### WAR AND POLICY DURING THE WINTER

It is somewhat remarkable that in the general delight comparatively little account was taken of the man to whom the brilliant success of the campaign was chiefly due, and who had sacrificed his life in this endeavour—General Wolfe. Pitt was careful to express every mark of sympathy and regret with the general's only surviving relation, his mother. He proposed a memorial in Westminster Abbey to the hero of Quebec and delivered a pompous speech, eulogising his exploits in somewhat extravagant terms.<sup>1</sup> But the sympathy of official circles was so scanty that the mother was obliged to apply personally for a pension to enable her to meet her son's liabilities,<sup>2</sup> and the nation as a whole displayed more sympathy with his fate than enthusiasm for his exploits. No doubt the reason was that he had taken no part in politics and was therefore unknown to the country. No party interest was connected with his fame, and indeed, with the exception of Pitt, the leading politicians had rather an interest in depreciating his glory, in order to extol that of generals in closer connection with themselves. George Townshend did not hesitate to ascribe the credit of the conquest of Quebec to himself and the other brigadiers<sup>3</sup> who had conceived the plan of a landing above the town during Wolfe's illness. This view was to some extent correct, but Wolfe had materially modified their plan and thereby made it feasible, while the brilliancy of its execution was his work alone. Townshend also asserted that to his diplomacy was due the speedy capitulation of the fortress; this, however, was no great achievement, as the enemy's army had evacuated the field, nor could it be com-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 229.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 462.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 222.

pared with the energy that Wolfe had shown throughout the siege. The only man who could justifiably be placed before the fallen general was Pitt. His dispositions had made the siege possible and prevented its interruption by the enemy; at the same time great enterprises had been started in different places, for which the necessary means had been provided by his indefatigable activity. We have as yet made no mention of Indian affairs, in which the year 1759 marks the turning-point. Here, too, important successes were secured, which we have yet to examine in their proper connection. Of these the greatest was the relief of the besieged Madras, which was accomplished in March 1759.

Notwithstanding this series of victories, the state was still exposed to considerable danger. The French government had by no means abandoned the plan of invasion proposed in the spring, and was still holding troops and ships in readiness to land a considerable force at the first favourable opportunity. It was in the autumn, when the stormy weather made the task of guarding the harbours difficult, that they thought their chance would be best. Pitt was therefore careful to watch every point of egress, and to diminish the enemy's prospects by offensive measures. Hawke guarded Brest and the English coasts, Boys was cruising off Dunkirk and Brodrick was in the Mediterranean, while Rodney was again commissioned to bombard Havre, where an expedition was standing in readiness and the notorious flat-bottomed boats had been gathered. In September he attempted to execute this order with the weak force at his disposal,<sup>1</sup> but before he had completed his preparations it was apparent that the enemy had been greatly strengthened in the interval. Several new coast batteries had been erected, while floating batteries and gunboats lay outside of the harbour. Fortunately these defences were unmasked in time, and Rodney was able to countermand the advance, which might have ended in disaster. He therefore contented himself with continuing the blockade, until he was driven back to the English coast by unfavourable winds in October. His anxiety that an encounter with a superior force might deprive him of the power to check the transport of invading troops did not diminish until the beginning of November, when he received news that the hostile troops had

<sup>1</sup> For Rodney's operations see his letters to Lyttelton in Phillimore, ii. 615-25.

been withdrawn. He now anchored in the neighbourhood of Havre, and remained there until the next summer. In July 1760 he succeeded by a clever manœuvre in seizing five large flat-bottomed boats, which were carelessly sailing westward with ten others. A considerable number of guns fell into his hands, and eventually all the remaining boats were taken up the Seine for greater security.<sup>1</sup>

In other quarters it was also necessary to prepare for a French attack. The autumn proved very stormy, and, as the French had hoped, Admiral Hawke was driven from Brest on November 9 to Torbay on the English coast.<sup>2</sup> The blockade was thus broken; the West Indian fleet of Admiral Bompard sailed unimpeded into the harbour shortly afterwards, and on November 14 a fleet of twenty-one men-of-war under Admiral Conflans weighed anchor. Seeing no English ships the admiral turned south to Quiberon Bay, where the English Commodore Duff lay at anchor with a few ships, watching the French landing force of 18,000 men under the Duke of Aiguillon, which had been concentrated near the little town of Vannes. If Conflans could succeed in surprising Duff he would be able to embark the duke's force, and transport them to the Irish coast, where no preparations for defence had been made.

Meanwhile, however, Pitt had not been idle. In opposition to Newcastle he secured the despatch of Hawke in spite of stormy weather, and the admiral with his twenty-three battle-ships reappeared off Brest immediately after Conflans had left the harbour. Hawke at once assumed that the enemy's fleet had gone to Vannes to effect a junction with Aiguillon. He therefore followed, but contrary winds prevented him from coming in touch with the enemy until November 20. Conflans at first proposed to give battle and drew up in line; however, he overestimated the enemy's numbers—his report afterwards speaks of forty English men-of-war—and preferred to flee to the bay, where he expected that the English fleet would meet disaster amid the difficulties of the fairway.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, July 25, 1760.—Berlin Archives; Phillimore, ii. 625.

<sup>2</sup> For the operations of Hawke and Conflans see Thackeray, i. 447 ff.; Walpole, *Memoirs*, iii. 231; reports of the Prussian embassy; Mahan, *The Importance of Sea Power*, i. 349 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Annual Register*, 1759, p. 263 ff.

chase therefore began; the rearguard was soon caught up and forced to fight. At two o'clock a fierce conflict developed amid the many reefs and shallows of Quiberon Bay, the horrors of which were increased by an approaching storm, which burst towards evening. The centre of the struggle was a conflict between the two admirals' ships, in the course of which the French flagship, the *Soleil Royal*, was so badly handled that she became unmanageable and ran ashore in the night. The English were helped by Commodore Duff's four ships, whose participation brought the French fleet between two fires. In the result the French fleet was utterly scattered. Two ships were sunk, two were captured, two ran ashore and were burned the next morning. The remainder, with the help of the high tide, were able to flee across the usually impassable bar of the Vilaine river, while others escaped to Rochefort. Hawke, however, had to lament the loss of two ships which ran upon shoals, and, after a night of fearful storm, his fleet was scattered far along the coast. But he had attained his object. The great Brest fleet was no longer dangerous, and Pitt's bold strategy had been justified. The extent to which his audacity had inspired his admirals may be seen from the fact that Saunders, who reached Plymouth from America shortly after Hawke's departure, immediately hastened to his support without waiting for orders, to share in the destruction of the retreating fleet. He arrived too late, but his determination aroused general admiration.

Another, though far less significant, danger now arose. Thurot, who had been lying in Dunkirk with five frigates, was able to leave the harbour in October, as the blockading squadron under Captain Boys had been driven to the English coast. Thurot was carrying a force of 1200 troops, and was to support the attempt of Conflans by a landing in Ireland.<sup>1</sup> As soon as Pitt learned of the occurrence he sent information to the Duke of Bedford, the lord-lieutenant of Ireland, who announced the threatened invasion to the Dublin Parliament and provoked great and hardly justifiable excitement. On the other hand, the preparations for defence were highly inadequate. Great difficulty was experienced in collecting a few hundred men for reinforcements; Pitt complained

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 470 f.; Walpole, iii. 262 ff.



bitterly that the town of London made more sacrifices for the defence of the empire than the whole of the kingdom, while Bedford regarded the negligence of the landed gentry as chiefly to blame. Pitt, however, showed great dissatisfaction with the duke's administration, and the relations between the two men, which were already strained, were not improved in consequence.<sup>1</sup>

Thurot, even after the news of the defeat of Conflans, proceeded upon his undertaking and spent months in adventurous cruising off the Scandinavian coasts.<sup>2</sup> He visited the Swedish town of Gothenburg and the town of Bergen in Norway. By degrees accidents and illness reduced his force by half. With three frigates and about 300 men he passed round the north of Scotland in the middle of February to the island of Islay, where he took in provisions, and reached the north-east corner of Ireland on the 26th and landed his troops at the little town of Carrickfergus, near Belfast. No serious danger was to be apprehended from so insignificant a band of troops, the more so as the threatened county was thoroughly Anglo-Protestant, but the negligence of the government was fully exposed. Carrickfergus was so little prepared for an attack that the mayor forthwith declared his readiness to accede to all demands. The terms proposed by the invader included the delivery of large supplies, and in the course of their accomplishment fighting broke out; the ruined fortifications were stormed, the garrison taken prisoners, and the town plundered. Similar contributions were then exacted from the rich town of Belfast.<sup>3</sup> Bedford, however, had already sent out General Fitzwilliam with a detachment of several thousand men and hastened in person to the threatened county. Thurot, without awaiting the superior forces of his enemy, withdrew to his ships in possession of hostages and rich

<sup>1</sup> Correspondence of Pitt and Bedford, beginning of November 1759.—*Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 387 ff.; Walpole, iii. 224.

<sup>2</sup> For his enterprise see Walpole, iii. 262 ff.; reports of the Prussian embassy of February 29 and March 4.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Major-General Strode in Belfast to the Duke of Bedford, under date February 22, 1760: 'About 8 o'clock this morning a flag of truce came to this town and demanded the undermentioned articles, consisting of various provisions and supplies, to be delivered to-day at 2 o'clock, promising to pay for them, and threatening in case of refusal to burn Carrickfergus and then this town also, with which demand the gentlemen of Belfast thought it best to comply.'—*Hist. MSS. Comm., Twelfth Rep.*, Appendix, part ix. p. 229.

plunder. Meanwhile, however, Bedford had warned Captain Elliot, who was lying in Kinsale, near Cork, with three frigates, and he succeeded in intercepting the enemy in the Irish Channel. In the resulting battle, on February 28, Thurot's squadron was defeated by the more vigorous forces of his opponent. Thurot's ship was captured, and he himself fell in a heroic defence, whereupon the remaining vessels surrendered.

Thus the war continued throughout the winter, notwithstanding the unusual cold. Pitt did not wish to give the enemy a moment's rest, and strained the resources of his own country to the utmost. He intended to secure an indisputable supremacy at sea if not on land. France, as he expressed it, was to be brought not merely to her knees, but to be thrown upon her back.<sup>1</sup> The prospects of success steadily improved. At the end of 1759 France had already lost no less than twenty-nine men-of-war and thirty-five frigates, not including those which had been put out of action for a long time to come in the Vilaine river. England, on the other hand, had lost only seven men-of-war and five frigates.<sup>2</sup> It must also be remembered that the captured vessels were employed to reinforce the fleet, and that the English navy in consequence increased far more rapidly than the French, while many more ships were built in English dockyards, where there was no lack of money. In February 1760 the British fleet amounted to no less than 106 men-of-war of 100 to 150 guns, whereas France had then but a most insignificant force at her disposal. Pitt kept his different squadrons at sea throughout the winter to watch every movement of the enemy from their different posts and to protect the acquisitions of the previous year. The official list of February 20 ran as follows<sup>3</sup>:—

In the East Indies and St. Helena,	. 20 men-of-war.
„ West Indies (Leeward Isles and Jamaica),	13 „
„ North America,	. 7 „
„ Mediterranean under Brodrick,	. 7 „
At Lisbon or Cadiz,	. 1 man-of-war.

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, iii. 238.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of December 28, 1759.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS. Report of Prussian embassy of May 23, 1760.—Berlin Archives.

In Quiberon Bay, . . . . .	13 men-of-war.
Off Brest under Boscawen, who had re-	
lieved Admiral Hawke, . . . . .	8       ,,
In English harbours in readiness, . . . . .	9       ,,
Refitting in harbour, . . . . .	24     ,,
Cruising off the coast, . . . . .	4       ,,
	<hr/>
Total, . . . . .	106     ,,

Thus every station was provided with a superior force, while at the same time a suitable number of ships were in waiting, which could speedily be sent out as reinforcements in any direction. In the following spring, apart from the American fleet, ships were sent to the East Indies as well as to the Mediterranean, the latter squadron under Admiral Saunders, who took over the command in the southern waters from Brodrick.

Thus Pitt's action in the conduct of this war was extraordinarily vigorous and comprehensive; together with the measures to which we have referred, he was occupied with preparations for the American campaign and with the arrangements for the army in Germany. Yet during this winter, when his mind was filled with military projects, the force of circumstances obliged him to consider proposals for peace, to entertain and to make suggestions to that end. To suppose that he was seriously considering such intentions would be utterly to mistake the objects of his real effort, his energy and his ambition. Yet both the parties then interested, especially Frederick the Great, and also later historians, have regarded his efforts and his assertions as literally true. The fact is that throughout these winter months his energies were devoted to the avoidance of any serious negotiations for peace and to the task of securing full powers for a new campaign, which he hoped would conclude the war; at the same time he was forced to guard against his possible denunciation by the king and the people as the opponent of peace, and against offending any of the allies or neutral powers. The success with which he eventually attained his object was chiefly due to the attitude of the enemy, the war party in France, and the court of Vienna.

A highly important event for the further progress of affairs

was the change of succession in Spain.<sup>1</sup> Upon the death of his wife in 1758 Ferdinand vi. had retired entirely from state business. He lived in seclusion and had grown partially insane, with the result that Spanish policy came almost entirely to a standstill. The centre of gravity shifted to Naples, to the court of the successor, as King Charles iii. of Sicily had the next claim to the Spanish crown as the step-brother of the childless Ferdinand. He had long ago been approached by the belligerent powers, but had turned their quarrels to his own account, securing their consent to an arrangement of Italian affairs in accordance with his own ideas. According to the convention the succession in Sicily was to fall to his brother Philip, in case he himself secured the crown of Spain. However, he declared his third son, Ferdinand, as his successor, and Philip was compensated at the expense of Austria and Sardinia, an arrangement carried out without difficulty.

As regards the attitude of Charles to the belligerents, he felt himself at heart a Bourbon and entirely on the side of France. He had conceived a hatred of England, as that power had once humiliated him. In 1742, when he had joined the coalition against Austria, an English squadron had appeared off Naples and demanded the withdrawal of his troops from Lombardy. When Charles asked for time to consider the matter Commodore Martin pointed to the clock and informed him that the bombardment would begin in an hour if he had not previously come to a decision. The king then gave way, with a firm intention of resenting the affront at the first opportunity. Moreover, his wife was a daughter of King Augustus of Poland and Saxony, who had suffered severely at the hands of the Prussians, a circumstance which also inclined Charles to the side of the great coalition. Meanwhile, however, the king was sufficiently prudent to avoid any open expression of his intentions. Nor could his final decision be foreseen, as there were reasons enough to induce his adoption of an opposite policy.

It was in opposition to Austria that the Bourbon dynasty had come to power in Sicily, and there were many points of dispute existing between the two powers. Maria Theresa

<sup>1</sup> On Spanish affairs see especially Schäfer, *Siebenjähriger Krieg*, ii.a, and Lafuente, *Historia de España*.



had also broken off the engagement of her eldest son with a daughter of Charles III., which had naturally increased the tension. Nor could it be said how Charles might be influenced by a more intimate knowledge of Spanish affairs. European diplomatists were then wholly uncertain upon the policy which the new ruler of Spain might choose. At the outset of the year 1759 Pitt made an attempt to induce him to take part in the war on England's side, proposing that Italy should be divided between the dynasties of Bourbon and Savoy, naturally at the expense of Austria, from whom it would be necessary to extort consent. Charles, however, declined to agree to so adventurous an undertaking, as he was already secure of his main object, the succession of his son in Sicily. Prussia made similar proposals in Turin with an equal lack of success.

It so happened that the first movements towards peace which reached Pitt proceeded from the King of Naples.<sup>1</sup> In Madrid was a refugee Jacobite, George Keith, Lord Marischal of Scotland, who was acting as ambassador to the King of Prussia, and secured an amnesty by Frederick's intervention. Some time before the death of Ferdinand VI., which took place on August 10, 1759, he explained to the Sicilian ambassador, Yaci, that King Charles was the most suitable person to intervene between the belligerent powers with a view to peace, as he was on friendly terms with the King of England and nearly related to the King of France. Charles III., who regarded this proposal as an excellent means of veiling his real intentions, showed high delight at the project, and ordered the Sicilian ambassador in London, Prince Sanseverino, to inform Pitt confidentially of his readiness to act. Pitt then employed the methods which he usually adopted in such cases. He announced that no one would be more pleased than himself at the restoration of peace, but gave reasons in justification of a postponement. On this occasion he excused himself by asserting that he must await the conclusion of the campaign and the agreement of the King of Prussia, after which he would be willing to consider the matter. To this decision he adhered when Sanseverino repeated his proposals.

In reality Charles III. had long ago agreed with Louis xv. concerning the measures to be adopted upon his succession,

<sup>1</sup> Pitt announced the event in a letter to Lord Bristol on September 14, 1759. See Thackeray, i. 421 f.

and had shown a readiness to co-operate in the attack upon the British Isles, which was then in preparation. Upon his brother's death he proposed to start for France, declining Pitt's offer of an English naval escort, to confirm the alliance. His zeal, however, soon received a vigorous check. Shortly after his accession to the throne of Spain he received news of Boscawen's brilliant victory over de la Clue, while Spanish pride declined to regard the nation as a vassal of France. He therefore abandoned his proposed visit and continued to play the part of a neutral power. Before removing his residence to Spain he offered his services for intervention between the two conflicting naval powers.

Meanwhile, however, steps had been taken in another quarter with the object of paving the way to peace. We know that Frederick the Great, in June 1759, on the advice of his ambassadors, had proposed to the King of England the issue of a mutual declaration to the belligerent powers proposing a general peace congress.<sup>1</sup> Frederick had been induced to take this step by the movement of English domestic policy and the danger which threatened Pitt's ministry, and not by any real desire for a congress of the kind. He thus cherished hopes of crushing his enemies in the east, and was only anxious to remove his opponents in the west by means of a peace between France, England, and Prussia. The campaign, however, proved unexpectedly disastrous, and the defeat of Kunersdorf brought him to the verge of annihilation. The result was a complete change of policy. Frederick began to regard the congress, in which his previous interest had been wholly factitious, as his sole means of salvation. He hoped that a congress would enable him to emerge from this desperate war without any loss of territory, and perhaps with some gain, through the influence of triumphant England,<sup>2</sup> whose minister had already given an informal guarantee to secure his allies against loss.<sup>3</sup> He therefore ordered Knyphausen and Michel immediately after the battle of Kunersdorf to resume the

<sup>1</sup> See *supra*, p. 236 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick writes to Knyphausen on September 1, 1759: 'Vous jugerez dans cette situation combien la paix nous est désirable, mais nous ne pouvons l'avoir bonne que par l'Angleterre. Je mets toute ma confiance dans le Sieur Pitt. . . .'—*Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 512.

<sup>3</sup> For Frederick's ideas upon the conditions, see *Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 592.

proposals for a congress, which had been allowed to drop in the expectation of further successes. However, the ambassadors were sufficiently far-seeing and prudent to advise the king against any such precipitate action,<sup>1</sup> which would represent him to the English nation as begging for help, and therefore as a valueless ally. In that case Pitt would be unable to accomplish his benevolent intentions. Frederick saw the truth of these representations and waited patiently, notwithstanding his desperate situation, for some more favourable opportunity to reopen the question of peace.

The attitude of the London court towards this important question was very remarkable. The majority wanted peace, as there was a general idea that the state would soon be ruined by its enormous expenses. Concerning the form which the peace was to take there was wide divergence of opinions, and the old party divisions were revived on this point. The heir-apparent and the nationalist party were anxious to secure all the profit for England, and to give only a bare minimum to the English allies, Prussia and Hanover. The king and his friends desired not merely to retain Hanover intact, but to gain some further territory in compensation for its sufferings.<sup>2</sup> The king would have preferred to surrender Canada in order to gain some valuable addition to his Electorate, and the French began to flatter themselves with the hope that they might recover their lost colonies in America if they gave compensation in Germany. Pitt's adherents belonged to the first group, especially Lord Temple, while Newcastle and his supporters upheld the latter opinion, though out of consideration for Pitt they urged the inclusion of Prussia in the peace and a guarantee of her interests.

Pitt stood almost alone in his firm intention to continue the war until France was utterly defeated and the conquests in America completed. He could not venture to announce this opinion, as it was in entire contradiction to the national desires, and would have enabled his opponents to accuse him forthwith of unduly belligerent tendencies. He was therefore obliged to make such concessions as seemed likely to forward his final purpose, to either party, to popular opinion, and to the Prussian ambassadors. His real intentions are to be dis-

<sup>1</sup> Despatch of August 28, 1759.—Schäfer, ii.a, 567 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 27.

covered, not from any individual assertion, but rather from his utterances as a whole in connection with his actions. Examination of his policy will show that he constantly sought to oppose one project to another, with the object of destroying both.

The fact that Pitt was thus obliged to conceal his real intentions ended in a widening of the breach between himself and the heir-apparent.<sup>1</sup> The prince wished to be informed upon all measures by the secretary of state; as, however, Pitt did not intend to suffer any dictation from this quarter, he declined, with the king's approval, to accede to this desire. A continuance of this policy eventually cost him the place he had so long held in the prince's favour, which was immediately filled by a successor. This was Lord Holderness, the secretary of state for the north, who had no scruples in keeping the prince informed of all that was going on; in consequence opinion began to regard him as a rising man,<sup>2</sup> though erroneously, as even the future king required more capable characters than he. Holderness, who had already deviated widely from the straight course at the time of Pitt's promotion, was used by Leicester House merely as a tool.

The declaration in favour of a congress was the measure upon which all parties were agreed for the moment. Frederick the Great hoped that it would secure him a peace, and thus liberate him from his desperate situation. Newcastle also accepted it as a possibility of peace, though he would have preferred to negotiate with France in isolation. Pitt had used it from the outset as a device for stifling other and more hopeful attempts, and had therefore induced Frederick the Great, who was not then seriously desirous of it, to support the proposal. At the present moment Frederick was thoroughly anxious for the solution of his difficulties; Pitt, however, had not changed his views, but continued to use the project as a pretext. The heir-apparent could offer no objection, as he proposed to use his own influence during the negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> The following is based upon Pitt's narratives to Count Viry, dated October 30 and November 10, 1759.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

<sup>2</sup> Report of Count Viry, dated November 28, 1759: 'Mr. Pitt said that when my Lord Holderness had first insinuated himself into Leicester House, he [Pitt] well knew that it was *à ses dépens* . . . , that as to Mr. Pitt's situation at Leicester House, there was no intimacy, no great connection; but that Mr. Pitt would not give them any handle to be displeased with him.'—Newcastle Papers.



An opportunity of bringing the question to the front was provided by the joyful news received from the seats of war on September 6. Niagara, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point had been captured, while de la Clue's fleet had been destroyed by Boscawen. The Prussian ambassadors now ventured to urge the advisability of issuing the declaration, as England would be able to dictate peace after these successes. On September 26, in a conference with the ministers,<sup>1</sup> they succeeded in securing permission to draft the declaration; Pitt, however, demanded that it should not be issued to the powers until the decisive news had arrived from America. He also declared that he would have nothing whatever to do with any peace proposals if any French troops should be landed on the British coasts.<sup>2</sup>

At this moment Spain made a second attempt to interfere in the question of peace. The Spanish king was commissioned to take this step by the court of Versailles, which, in its anxiety for its colonies, earnestly desired an accommodation with England, but with England alone. In order to preserve his character as a neutral power Charles III. issued his proposals simultaneously to the two belligerent powers. He wished to see himself placed in the position of arbitrator. Choiseul naturally accepted the proposal with thanks, while Pitt, to whom it was unwelcome, declined with extreme politeness. In order, however, to assure the Spanish king of the pacific intentions of the English government, he informed him of the declaration which England and Prussia proposed to issue, a step that did not entirely exclude the good offices of another power. He also made other attempts to secure the favour of the Bourbon ruler,<sup>3</sup> until the too precipitate action of this monarch suddenly revealed his real intentions.

When Charles III. entered Spain towards the end of October he was informed of the fall of Quebec. This news threw him into great excitement, and he thought it his duty to attempt to check the progress of the English arms. He therefore ordered his ambassador in London, d'Abreu, to send a menacing despatch to Pitt,<sup>4</sup> in which he was to explain 'that his Catholic majesty could not regard with indifference

<sup>1</sup> Protocol of the Conference in Schäfer, ii. a, 569 f.

<sup>2</sup> Schäfer, ii. a, 437.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, he returned the captured papers of Prince Xavier of Saxony to the Queen of Spain.—Thackeray, i. 458.

<sup>4</sup> Schäfer, ii. a, 425.

the disturbances by the English conquests of the balance of power in America, as established by the peace of Utrecht; he was therefore anxious to see the naval war concluded by a peace in which England would show generosity and moderation, and was himself ready to act as intermediary.' D'Abreu executed these orders without delay, and Pitt now began to see what he might expect from the Spanish king. He knew that he had shown the utmost consideration for Spain, for in order to avoid giving offence at Madrid he had refrained from sending English forces against Louisiana or the rich colony of Santo Domingo and other settlements which were close to Spanish territory. Such action had been entirely in his power, as the forces of the British southern provinces in America were at his disposal throughout this campaign. Moreover, the settlement of accounts between England and France beyond the Atlantic was no concern of Spain. Pitt therefore replied to the ambassador's letter on December 13, referring to these facts in calm and dignified language.

France, however, now that Quebec had fallen, attempted to secure a separate peace with England favourable to herself by other means. The ambassador at the Hague was Yorke, the son of Hardwicke, who corresponded not only officially with Holderness, but also unofficially with his father and with Newcastle. Through this channel Choiseul sent repeated proposals to the peace party in London, and Pitt was obliged to be extremely careful lest he should find some arrangement concluded behind his back. If he could discover these machinations in time, he could nip them in the bud. It was only necessary to threaten a resignation and his colleagues would be obliged to give way, as otherwise there was a risk that France would resume the war with greater energy if she were relieved of her most dangerous enemy. Newcastle, however, had no intention of pushing matters to this point. It was consequently necessary to conclude some definite arrangement while Pitt was in office, and therefore without his knowledge. He would then be less indispensable, and might be allowed to resign if he showed himself dissatisfied. His anger would be a matter of no account if the war had been brought to an end and an honourable peace could be announced to the nation.

The correspondence with the Hague, which proposed a

diminution of the English sphere of occupation in America,<sup>1</sup> took place after the news of the fall of Quebec, in the middle of October, and chance or the force of circumstances brought it about that Pitt secured information of the correspondence and its contents. This fact was connected with another matter which deserves mention here.

Lord Temple, who was fond of playing the *enfant terrible* at times, was anxious to secure a vacancy that had occurred among the knights of the Garter, by way of compensation for the various humiliations which the king had inflicted upon him. The monarch had deprived him of the leadership of the admiralty, and had expressly declined to restore him to office; in return he was therefore to be induced to confer upon him the highest honour which the British crown could award. Temple was supported by Leicester House, and Pitt was accordingly obliged to take up his brother-in-law's wish. He began negotiations on the point with Newcastle, who took the business in hand with intentions undoubtedly serious, but met with a flat refusal from the king.<sup>2</sup> This event occurred in September 1759 with no immediate result. When, however, the above-mentioned correspondence with Yorke began, Holderness played the traitor; not only did he inform Bute of the fact, but, at Bute's instigation, he stirred up Pitt against Newcastle. In this way he strove to avenge himself upon the king, with whose wishes the correspondence was in accordance. The fact was immediately recognised by the Sardinian ambassador, Count Viry,<sup>3</sup> with whom Newcastle was intimate, and who repeatedly acted as intermediary between him and Pitt. The count immediately observed that confusion could only be averted by the grant of the decoration.

Pitt naturally displayed the highest indignation at the treacherous dealing of his colleague, and wrote a strong letter to Newcastle,<sup>4</sup> to which the latter replied with excuses that were

<sup>1</sup> Viry's conversation with Pitt, October 30.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 433-7.

<sup>3</sup> Pitt's report to Viry, October 30, 1759.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>4</sup> Pitt wrote on October 23: 'My Lord, I understand your Grace has received, some days since, a letter from Mr. Yorke relating to certain dapplings for peace on the part of some Lady [supposed to be the dowager Princess of Zerbst (mother of Catherine II., afterwards Empress of Russia)] together with Mr. Yorke's answer to the same. As it is so indispensably due to a Secretary of State to be informed, *instantly*, of every transaction of this nature,' . . . he was bound to remonstrate. Were the correspondence conducted by the king's orders, he would be obliged to present his resignation.—Newcastle Papers.

comical from their triviality;<sup>1</sup> he asserted that he carried on the correspondence merely as a pastime, that he would never correspond with Yorke upon questions of peace, and that he was as innocent and as ignorant in these matters as any man alive. Pitt, however, would not be mollified by such manifest absurdities, but firmly asserted his intention of resigning.<sup>2</sup> He was himself in considerable embarrassment. If Temple did not secure the dignity he desired he would join the opposition, and the ministry would be opposed by the whole weight of the prince's influence and of his following. In that case it would be impossible to pass the huge estimates required for the next campaign. Pitt, therefore, made every effort to induce the king to give way. He withdrew to the country in bad temper, threatened and prayed, but the king remained unshaken.<sup>3</sup> George considered that Pitt would never venture to abandon his own measures, and the minister piteously complained to Count Viry of his difficulties in securing anything from the king, notwithstanding his services, with the result that he was now obliged to resign his post in order to provide for the future, that is, in order to retain the favour of the heir-apparent.<sup>4</sup> Thus, if the king persisted in his refusal, Pitt was confronted by two alternatives: he might act either according to the wishes of the reigning or of the future monarch. In either case the war could not be continued as he desired.

On the day of the opening of Parliament, November 13, Temple delivered his intended blow. He wrote a cold letter to Pitt,<sup>5</sup> politely thanking him for his efforts to secure him the decoration as a reward for his (Pitt's) services, and informing him definitely that he would rather leave the king with the pleasure of refusal than accept the distinction as a reward for services which were not his. Pitt replied in the kindest possible manner, but could not shake the resolve of the prince's party. On the following day the earl resigned his post as keeper of the privy seal, though he left his brothers in possession of their offices. The accomplishment of this

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 445 f.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xviii. 644 f.

<sup>4</sup> Pitt's conversation with Viry, November 10, 1759.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>5</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 438 f. The date, October 13, is incorrect, as appears from its identification with Tuesday. It was in November that the 13th fell on a Tuesday.



fact and the approaching debate upon the budget caused the king considerable anxiety. He despatched the Duke of Devonshire to act as intermediary, and the wily Temple showed himself by no means obdurate to the anxious efforts of the court. After a conversation with Bute he consented to take back the seals on the condition that the king should request him to resume his office, and should promise him the order of the Garter upon the next vacancy.<sup>1</sup> Thus he prudently demanded and asked for nothing, but secured the offer of the order as a voluntary recognition of his merits from the king. At the end of January a vacancy occurred; he then reminded the king of his promise and threatened, when he made excuses, to decline to receive the order, as it did not seem to be a voluntary gift.<sup>2</sup> George II. was again obliged to give way and to grant Temple's demands with pretended pleasure. On the occasion of the investiture he gave expression to his vexation at his defeat, carelessly tossing the decoration to the earl and turning his back upon him with a muttered curse. Lord Temple had secured his triumph, which he owed chiefly to the young court, but he had also incurred the king's displeasure to the full. In any case, the event will serve to explain the character of the man whose life had been and was to be very closely connected with Pitt's career, whilst it also throws light upon the spirit prevalent in the ruling classes.

On November 13 the opening of Parliament took place.<sup>3</sup> In the speech from the throne, which naturally emphasised the brilliance of the victories gained and urged a vigorous prosecution of the war, Pitt permitted the insertion of a clause referring to the attempts to gain peace, upon which, however, he put his own interpretation during the debate upon the address. A eulogy delivered upon him by his friend Beckford gave him the opportunity of expressing his gratitude to the Providence which had crowned his conscientious energies with success, notwithstanding the occasional hindrance of illness. 'Not a week had passed in the summer but had been a crisis, in which he had not known whether he should be torn in pieces or commended. Success,' he said, with obvious reference to his colleagues, 'had given unanimity, not unanimity success. He was in the position of a man who had to roll a

<sup>1</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 330 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 337 f.

<sup>3</sup> Walpole, iii. 224 ff.

heavy stone uphill. As such a man would be crushed by relaxation of his efforts, so now a moment of weakness in the field or in the council might overturn all. There was no such thing as chance; all was Providence, whose favour was to be merited by virtue. It was especially important to support their allies, as if one wheel stopped, all others might. He had unlearned his youthful errors, and no longer thought that England could do all by herself' (a reference to his former opposition to the continental policy); 'it needed the help of their great ally, who had never been subject to panic, and was not likely to be terrified even by the momentary difficulties of his situation.' The object of this passage was not merely to assert England's obligation to support Prussia, as this would have enabled his opponents to accuse him of preferring Prussian to English interests, but rather to emphasise the value of the Prussian alliance to England. After some remarks upon the German army and the danger of invasion, he proceeded to deal with the question of peace. He explained the extreme difficulty of finding a solution satisfactory to all parties; 'he would, however, snatch at the first moment of peace, though he wished he could leave off at the war.' This latter observation is somewhat unexpected, and Horace Walpole in his *Memoirs* asserts that Pitt had perhaps involuntarily given expression to the intentions which he was afterwards able to realise. I should prefer to regard it as an expression of well-considered opinion and to take it in connection with the business of Temple's decoration. Pitt desired to throw out a hint of his possible resignation and to induce the king to compliance with his wishes.

The supplies demanded for the war<sup>1</sup> were a considerable increase upon those voted in the previous year, and Pitt explained that energetic expenditure was really the best economy. Including the militia the army was to be raised to no less a number than 175,000 men, and the extraordinary grants amounted to £15,852,706. The army alone required more than seven millions, apart from the numerous subordinate expenses, while naval expenditure amounted to more than three and a half millions. All these sums were voted without opposition, in view of the great successes already obtained.

Meanwhile the declaration of Prussia and England regard-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, iii. 234 f.

ing the peace congress had been transmitted to Prince Louis of Brunswick in order that he might present it to the ambassadors accredited to the Hague.<sup>1</sup> The prince delayed to execute this commission for a considerable time, and his action was perhaps connected with the secret machinations of Yorke. At length the formal communication was made on November 28 in the castle at Ryswyk, where peace had formerly been concluded between Louis XIV. and his enemies. The result, as Pitt had expected, was very unfavourable. France, whose great Brest fleet had just been defeated in Quiberon Bay, showed a greater inclination to peace, but insisted upon her former stipulation, proposing an arrangement with England, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, exclusive of Prussia. While the question of the congress was under discussion, Choiseul empowered the Duke of Aiguillon in Vannes to open direct negotiations.<sup>2</sup> Communications were begun during the exchange of prisoners, which followed the battle of Quiberon Bay, at the end of November. Captain Howe, before whom the proposals were laid, reported the fact to London, and Newcastle was very anxious to continue this line of action, but Pitt exerted his authority and secured a refusal. As for Maria Theresa, she had no intention of submitting her demands to a congress; on the contrary, she used all her efforts to restrain her allies from making any overtures. The decisive point in the whole matter was St. Petersburg. If the Russian court supported the congress, France would probably agree and Austria would find herself isolated. Only with Russia and Sweden did Pitt make serious efforts to secure an agreement; he did not, however, desire to bring the congress to pass with the help of the northern powers, but to make a separate peace with them, in the hope that he might then crush France with Prussian help, which Frederick would be more easily able to give when relieved of his other anxieties. He made no secret of the fact that this policy ran counter to the wishes, not only of France and Austria, but also in some degree to those of Prussia, as Frederick was anxious for a general peace.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. a, 441.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 463 f. Schäfer, ii. a, 462.

<sup>3</sup> Note by Newcastle, dated November 21: 'My friend [Count Viry] told me also Mr. Pitt's scheme of foreign politics, which is, above all, to cultivate and gain, if possible, the court of Petersburg, as a check upon both the courts of

The St. Petersburg court was by no means disinclined to negotiations, as Russian relations with Austria had become somewhat strained.<sup>1</sup> The reports of the ambassador Keith were very favourable, and Frederick the Great had already sounded Russian opinion. When Keith presented the declaration, a conciliatory answer was drawn up by the Russian government and preparations made for its despatch to London. News then arrived of the Prussian defeat at Maxen, and the Austrian ambassador at once recovered his influence. The despatch was withdrawn and a cold refusal issued on December 4, 1759, in which Russia announced her intention of vigorously prosecuting the war.

If France desired peace, no other course was now open to her than to agree to Pitt's ideas and include Prussia in any proposed arrangement. Choiseul was strongly inclined to this solution in view of the many defeats which France had suffered and the shattered condition of her finances. In January 1760 he therefore began serious preliminaries, proposing that the powers should refrain from any further participation in the German war<sup>2</sup> apart from the payment of subsidies; Frederick the Great also received proposals from Paris, which he immediately communicated to the London court.<sup>3</sup> When the French minister imparted his intentions to the court of Vienna, Austria threw every possible obstacle in the way, and her influence proved preponderant in the council of Louis xv. The project was abandoned at the beginning of February. Choiseul now attempted to outwit his opponents and to secure a separate peace with England apart from Prussia by the issue of proposals which tied him to nothing.

For the accomplishment of this purpose it was necessary to allay all suspicion, especially any that had arisen from France's relations with Spain. In the middle of December Charles III. had again tendered his good offices in somewhat dictatorial fashion, and requested the two powers to formulate their conditions, to which proposal Pitt had returned a polite refusal.<sup>4</sup> At this moment the king suddenly became extremely friendly, declared that he did not wish to press his services upon any one, and

Vienna and Versailles, and to a certain degree the court of Berlin also.'—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. a., 446 f. and 450 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 45 and 64.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. a., 461.

<sup>4</sup> Schäfer, ii. a., 460.



disavowed his ambassador d'Abreu, who had formerly sent a stern despatch to Pitt, as if he had acted without authorisation.<sup>1</sup> Lord Bristol, the English ambassador in Madrid, a diplomatist of no great insight, believed in the reality of the change, and when d'Abreu was recalled and replaced by Count Fuentes, he wrote saying that he had long ago asserted that d'Abreu alone was to blame for previous misunderstandings.<sup>2</sup>

Pourparlers were now recommenced between the ministers at the Hague, d'Affry and Yorke, which were destined from the outset to be fruitless.<sup>3</sup> Pitt was not the man to fall into so obvious a trap, the less so as the conclusion of peace was by no means his intention. As he was seeking reasons for refusal, he was not likely to miss the weak point in the French proposals. Frederick the Great, who honestly desired peace with France, expended much time and trouble in the effort to discover a compromise, Baron Edelsheim of Gotha and French friends, such as Bailli de Froulay and Voltaire, acted as his channels of communication.<sup>4</sup> He gained, however, no result beyond fine words, and no certain or reliable promises. The point of the proposals was that Frederick should first permit the conclusion of an agreement between England and France, when Choiseul, who had no wish for a disturbance of the balance of power in Germany, would do his best for Prussia. It was not until May 1760 that the king became convinced of the dishonesty of France. He then advised Pitt to cease negotiations and to resume the naval war with full energy,<sup>5</sup> an exhortation which was wholly unnecessary and almost ridiculous, if we remember that Pitt's every effort was concentrated upon his naval and colonial enterprises.

In the spring of 1760 Lord George Sackville's affair was also decided. As we have seen, Pitt had secured him one concession out of consideration for the heir-apparent: he had not been recalled from the army, but had received permission, at his request, to return to London, where he was shortly after-

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. a, 463.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, ii. 22 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 180 f.: Choiseul to Affry, March 31, 1760; dictate of Affry for Yorke, April 14, 1760, in the Chatham MSS.; *Chatham Papers*, ii. 29 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 103, 106 f., 108 f., 110 f.; Schäfer, ii. a, 469 f.; *Chatham Papers*, ii. 29 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 330.

wards removed by the king from his military posts. Pitt, who desired to restrain him from further action, then gave him to understand that he might expect no further support from himself; it was probably due to Pitt's influence that Sackville was informed by Holderness on January 18 that no formal complaint had been laid against him.<sup>1</sup> However, his confidence in himself and his patrons was so great that he insisted on demanding a court-martial. His wish was granted, and the inquiry continued from February 29 to April 3, 1760;<sup>2</sup> the accused was entirely unable to clear himself of the charges laid against him by Prince Ferdinand. No proof was needed of the fact that he had not shown the smallest desire for the success of the battle, and evidence of his formal disobedience to orders was also forthcoming. The most important witnesses only strengthened the case against him, and the final decision of the court was entirely adverse. For disobedience to legal authority he was declared incompetent to hold any further military office. The king, however, regarded this sentence as too mild, and increased its severity. He ordered the judgment to be read before the army, with the statement that he regarded it as worse than death, a proclamation which was read even on the shores of Lake Ontario;<sup>3</sup> he also erased Sackville's name with his own hands from the list of privy councillors and forbade his appearance at court. Sackville's friends incurred various marks of displeasure. The young court was expressly prohibited from receiving the condemned officer. The king regarded the result of the court-martial as a kind of victory over the party of the heir-apparent, which had attempted on so many occasions to bend him to their will. Pitt had done his best to avoid the appearance of participation in this triumph, but the tension between himself and the prince had grown too wide throughout the whole affair. Mutual confidence had disappeared,<sup>4</sup> and either party went its own way, which it tried to hide from the eyes of the other. Pitt's position was consequently more than ever dependent upon military success, but of this he gained full abundance in the summer of 1760.

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, iii. 252.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, iii. 257 ff. The documents in the *Annual Register*, 1759, p. 267 ff.; 1760, p. 375 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Kingsford, *History of Canada*, xiv. 383.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, iii. 237.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE LAST MONTHS OF GEORGE II.

PITT was extremely pleased with the successes of 1759, not only with the conquest of Quebec, which might be regarded as a masterpiece of generalship, but also with the enterprises of Amherst, though the object of these had not been attained. In a letter of December 11<sup>1</sup> he rewarded the general with unqualified praise and full recognition of the many difficulties with which he had to struggle. It is possible that his judgment would have been less favourable had the expedition against Quebec failed through the lack of co-operation on the part of the colonial army; in that case he would probably have blamed the systematic and prudent advance of the commander-in-chief. As things were, he felt entirely satisfied with his achievement; the security and full possession of the Champlain district afforded an admirable base for the conquest of the remaining French possessions on the St. Lawrence. The only man with whose performance he was dissatisfied was General Gage, who had not ventured at the end of the summer to advance upon Fort La Galette, a position at the outflow of the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. So early as September he had declared that the season was too far advanced for operations, whereas Amherst, as Pitt observed, had made an attempt to cross Lake Champlain for an attack upon the Isle aux Noix as late as October. He asked for a report from Gage that he might confirm his opinion.

Instructions for the campaign of 1760 were issued in January to Amherst and the governors of the individual colonies as in the previous year.<sup>2</sup> On this occasion they were far less detailed. Pitt's main object was obviously dictated by the position of affairs, as he himself admits; this was the conquest

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 468 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i. 465 ff.



*King George II.*

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of Montreal, but on other points the commander-in-chief had almost entire freedom of action. Pitt was conscious that he knew far too little of the conditions of warfare in the interior of the continent to give detailed instructions. In the previous year his dispositions for those outlying districts had been of doubtful value, and he was therefore anxious not to lay any obligations upon the general which might hamper his action or lead to disaster. Wherever he advised definite measures, it was under the form of proposal or wish, with the express proviso that the general was not to consider himself bound by these proposals. Thus his orders for the vigorous completion of the levy of troops, the thorough reconstruction and extension of the forts, the completion of the flotillas, the enlistment of rangers and boat crews are to be regarded merely as a stimulus to activity, and not as new or definite commands. Such facts as these were known to Amherst from his previous instructions, and were in any case perfectly obvious. The most important point for him was the fact that Pitt undertook to send out ships and supplies to a moderate extent. Great stores were not necessary upon this occasion, as there was no fear of a blockade of the St. Lawrence, and the munitions despatched in former years had been by no means exhausted. Upon the whole, it may be said that Pitt now left the conduct of the American war in the hands of the commander-in-chief, and contented himself with expressing his wishes upon the main objects of the campaign. No special instructions were issued upon this occasion to the subordinate commanders, who took their orders from Amherst. The unbroken success of the campaign proved that Pitt's action was entirely correct.

An important and wholly advisable measure for which the cabinet now issued orders was the demolition of Louisburg.<sup>1</sup> The destruction of this fortress permitted the employment elsewhere of the troops, who would otherwise have been retained upon garrison duty, while the enemy were deprived of the possibility of seizing the place in the rear of the English army by a *coup de main*. The plans were completed in February, and a company of sappers was sent out, all being done in strict secrecy, that the enemy might have no opportunity of disturbing the work or of seizing and restoring the

<sup>1</sup> Ligonier's report on the matter to Pitt.—Thackeray, ii. 473.

fortifications when half destroyed. In March Amherst could venture to send two regiments from Louisburg to reinforce the garrison of Quebec; at the same time he despatched three hundred pioneers from Boston to help in the task of dismantling the fortifications.<sup>1</sup> Louisburg was now replaced by Halifax, which in the previous winter had been provided with all necessary appliances for the repair and refitting of ships. It was thus possible for the main portion of the fleet engaged off Quebec to remain in America under the command of Lord Colville (Saunders had returned to England, and was commanding in the Mediterranean); in the early spring the fleet was then able to appear in the St. Lawrence, and was reinforced by a small squadron under Commodore Swanton, which sailed from England on March 9, and raised the American fleet to its former strength.

The first great action of the year was a second struggle near Quebec, which seriously endangered the safety of this latest acquisition. As in the case of Fort Duquesne, Quebec had also to pass through a critical period, after which alone could the English regard themselves as permanent masters of the place; this period was the months of winter, during which the garrison was cut off from its strategical base, and was obliged to defend itself in isolation. The British general was well aware of the danger to which Quebec was exposed at this time and of the importance of sending in supplies of provisions and military stores. The numbers of the garrison were conditioned by the supplies at hand, so that these in the last resort determined the relative security of the fortress. Pitt had already considered this point in organising the details of the siege, and had given express orders for the transportation of full supplies to the conquered fortress. The responsible authorities seemed, however, to have displayed some carelessness, with the result that a large deficiency was apparent. In particular they had omitted to supply the highly necessary amount of hard cash by means of which alone the garrison could secure fresh provisions from the inhabitants without resorting to compulsion. A constant diet of salt meat engendered disease, which greatly lowered the effective power of the troops.

<sup>1</sup> On this subject and on the whole campaign see Kingsford, *History of Canada*, IV. chaps. iv. to vii., and Parkman, II. chaps. xxix. and xxx.

The command in Quebec was given to Brigadier-General Murray, who had 6400 men at his command. The fleet left the St. Lawrence at the end of October with the other troops, only two sloops of war remaining behind. During the early months Murray was occupied in arming and strengthening the outworks of the town and improving the quarters of the troops; he also fortified the most important points in the environs, especially the river banks. He erected block-houses even at Point Lévis on the southern shore. He might be certain that General Lévis would appear before the town with a considerable force at the end of the winter, when the break-up of the ice made navigation possible, and the English fleet was still far away. The fortifications of the shore obliged this general to perform the larger part of his march by land, an extremely difficult enterprise in the spring.

The unusual hardships of the severe northern winter caused many losses among the troops; when these months had passed by, the critical weeks approached, which would last from the break-up of the ice to the appearance of the relieving fleet. At the end of March the French were reported to be making preparations and to be embarking their army on April 19. A few days afterwards the ice broke up, and a sloop was immediately sent downstream to Lord Colville to hasten his movements. Meanwhile Lévis was approaching with his flotilla; finding the river banks in the neighbourhood of Quebec well fortified, he disembarked far upstream and marched upon St. Foy. Murray had been anxious to form a well-fortified camp upon the plains of Abraham, but the frozen soil had prevented the execution of this project. The question then arose whether he should confine himself to the defence of the town or advance to meet the enemy in spite of his great superiority. Two considerations decided him in favour of the latter course. On the one hand the defence of the town was difficult against an enemy in occupation of the plains of Abraham, for the English were not in the position of Vaudreuil with a larger army at their disposal than that of the assailants. Moreover, the approach of the enemy would be considerably broken by the bad condition of the roads, and a surprise attack might enable the infliction of a considerable defeat, which would keep the French at a distance for some time. On April 28 Murray advanced with all the forces at



his disposal, only 3900 men, to oppose the French army of 10,000 men, the advance guard of which was already beginning to entrench itself upon the heights of St. Foy. The battle lasted only an hour and three-quarters. The English at first gained some advantage, but the constant arrival of the enemy's reinforcements obliged Murray to abandon the attempt. He was forced to retreat to the town under the rapid fire of the conquerors.

Now began a regular blockade; the siege operations were conducted by Bourlamaque, and the hopes of maintaining possession of the fortress sank very low. Murray, immediately after the battle, sent a sloop to Halifax with a report to Amherst explaining his desperate situation. This letter was opened by Commander Lawrence in Halifax on his own responsibility; he immediately sent a copy to Pitt, while the original was despatched to Albany by way of Boston. As the sloop had an admirable wind, and the despatch was forwarded on May 11, Pitt received news on June 17 of the defeat of the garrison of Quebec, and of the danger which menaced the most important acquisition in the whole country. A period of heavy anxiety and strained expectation began for England, especially for the minister, and lasted until June 27.<sup>1</sup> Pitt felt that the whole of his work, and with it his position, was menaced with destruction. If Quebec were lost it was highly uncertain whether he would be able to organise a further siege; the peace movement might become sufficiently strong to resist all his opposition. A peace concluded in such a situation could not secure the expulsion of the French from Canada, and if they remained in the country the English colonies would be no less exposed to danger than before. Nor was it possible to guarantee the repetition of so successful a war, while it was likely that France would do her best to make her navy superior to the English. As regards his own position, Pitt could not hope after the conclusion of peace that he would long be able to make head against his public and private enemies.

Pitt's power was thus at stake, and the prospect that Murray would maintain his defence was regarded in England as extremely slight.<sup>2</sup> It seemed unlikely that a little band of

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 477 and 480.

<sup>2</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 343 f.

defenders, weakened by sickness and privations in an ill-fortified and half-ruined town, would be able to resist for days or for weeks the assaults of a superior force until the ships arrived. One vigorous attack would overpower them. At the same time events were entirely removed from Pitt's control; before his orders could reach the scene of action, even before they were written, all would be decided. Thus the letter which he sent to Amherst<sup>1</sup> in this frame of mind makes an exceedingly melancholy impression. Wishes, hopes, and considerations form its content. Once again the fact was brought home to Pitt that his reputation and position were entirely dependent upon the energy of others, and that he could himself do but little to secure the success of his world-wide policy. More than ever must he have wished that his works of genius could be judged by themselves and not by their results. In that case such changes of fortune would have impressed him far less deeply. His religious views, to which I have formerly adverted, did not allow him to adopt this form of consolation.

The garrison passed through the critical period with success. Murray's superior artillery was able to keep the enemy at a distance, and Lévis did not venture to storm the town, as he cherished hopes that the French fleet, of which he had received notice, would reach the St. Lawrence before the English vessels. With the help of the fleet he thought he might then capture the town without risk or great loss. Thus the precious days went by, until on May 9 the frigate *Lowestoft* of Swanton's squadron arrived and announced the approach of the fleet. The garrison greeted the news with enthusiasm. Even then Lévis, who did not regard one ship as dangerous, could not decide upon the assault which would alone have afforded any prospect of success. On the 15th the rest of the squadron arrived, and was followed two days later by the main fleet under Lord Colville. Their arrival had been delayed by that wind which had carried Murray's message so rapidly to Halifax. Lévis now found himself obliged to retreat, as his communications with Montreal were threatened. His frigates weighed anchor, but were pursued by the English vessels and either captured or driven ashore. In the course of this action the *Lowestoft* ran upon a rock and was lost. By the end of May the French forces were back in Montreal and Quebec

had been saved for England. The last act of the drama could now begin.

Pitt received the news of this good fortune on June 27, and rarely did he experience such joy as this event provoked. 'Oh! ever happy day,' he writes to Hester, after the receipt of the information, 'my joy and excitement are indescribable.' We see that this frame of mind was henceforward continuous, as he regarded the future without anxiety and looked for the final success with certainty. He knew from the report of Major Grant of November 1759<sup>1</sup> that the Canadians were utterly tired of the war and weary of serving without pay and with inadequate commissariat. Their sole prospect of saving the colonies was the conclusion of peace in the spring. If these hopes were not fulfilled, as indeed they were not, no vigorous resistance was to be expected. Pitt was thus fully justified in his cheerful attitude.

As usual, success brought unanimity in the councils and the ministry. The misunderstandings of the winter were forgotten as one party no longer needed to fear the intrigues of the other. Pitt and Newcastle sat in full cordiality in Newcastle's castle of Claremont in the middle of July, and drank to the health of Lord Temple, who was unable to be present at this happy meeting.<sup>2</sup>

Amherst provided in his usual methodical manner for the further success of the campaign and the attainment of the final object of the North American war. Since May 9 he had been in Albany at the confluence of the Mohawk with the Hudson, the central point of the northern colonies, whence the road diverged on the north to Lakes George and Champlain, on the east to Boston, on the south to New York, and on the west along the Mohawk to Lake Ontario (Oswego). This was his best point for concentrating troops from the south and east and for despatching them to the north and west for their final meeting before the enemy's capital. Thus the enterprise fell into three parts. Murray naturally advanced by the St. Lawrence against Montreal. The second body, which Amherst placed under Colonel Haviland, was to take Amherst's route of the previous year, conquer the Isle aux Noix, go down the

<sup>1</sup> Remarks upon the present situation of Canada by Major Grant.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 346.

river Richelieu, which flows out of Lake Champlain, and turning aside at Chambly reach Montreal. The main body, under the command of the general himself, was to make its way to the St. Lawrence from Oswego, and after conquering the forts on the way to march downstream past the rapids to the capital. If these three armies met at the time appointed, success seemed almost inevitable.

The enlistment upon this occasion took more time than before, and it was less than ever possible to begin operations upon May 1, Pitt's former date. News of the peace negotiations had arrived, and the economically minded legislatures naturally hesitated to vote supplies, in order to avoid all unnecessary expense. These rumours were energetically denied by the government, and eventually the colonists were forced to resign themselves to the enlistment of troops. These began to arrive in Albany at the end of May, and at the end of June it was possible to start. Amherst left for Oswego, where 10,000 men with a large band of Indians had been concentrated in the course of July. The army embarked on August 10 in no less than 822 boats and skiffs, and started under the protection of armed vessels from which two French vessels fled, finally reaching the north-east end of the lake, whence they proceeded to descend the St. Lawrence. In a few days the expedition arrived at Fort Ogdensburg, which was garrisoned by a few hundred men and caused some delay. After a bombardment of several days, in the course of which an English ship was lost, the place capitulated on August 25. Then came the most difficult matter, the passing of the many rapids. This was no light adventure, as there were but few pilots available, and these were by no means infallible. The passage lasted from August 31 to September 4. A grievous mishap took place at the last rapids, when no less than 64 boats were upset and 84 men lost their lives. After this there was no further obstacle to the advance, and on September 6 the army landed at Lachine on the great river island Montreal, on the east coast of which the capital is situated.

Murray had arrived at the east of the town a fortnight earlier. He had started from Quebec in boats on July 14, and had gone slowly upstream under the protection of three frigates and other armed vessels. At the confluence of the Richelieu, the mouth of which had been ineffectually closed



by the French, he found the army of Lévis encamped on the north shore of the St. Lawrence. He therefore took up a position on the south shore and waited for the arrival of the other detachments.

Finally Haviland had left Albany for Crown Point. He started to advance on August 16 for Lake Champlain with 3500 men in boats accompanied by eight armed vessels. On the 20th he arrived on the east shore of the Isle aux Noix. The whole district from St. John upwards had been already explored in June by an advance guard, so that the commanding officer had been able to lay his plans beforehand. At the same time the appearance of this guard had induced the enemy to reinforce their outpost from Montreal, and their fortifications had been completed during the winter. Haviland thus found a well-prepared and admirably situated fortress, garrisoned by more than 1000 men. This garrison had been under the command of de Lagny, but upon his death, through an accident, Bougainville had assumed the responsibility. Haviland built his batteries in a half-circle to the north around the fort, and also directed his fire at the enemy's ships anchored below the fort. He succeeded in driving them out; some ran aground, and all were finally captured by the English. This misfortune broke the spirit of the garrison. On August 26 Bougainville secretly abandoned the fort, leaving a few defenders behind, and struck through the woods to St. John, whilst the fort capitulated on the 28th. On the next day the English forces appeared before St. John, where defence was also impossible, and the fort was burned by its own garrison. Chambly, where the path from the river Richelieu diverges westward to Montreal, fell on September 1, and no further obstacle remained. Lévis made some preparation to oppose the advance, but the news of Amherst's progress advised him to concentrate all his forces upon the island of Montreal.

The fate of the capital was decided before the struggle began, by the fact that the French forces began to melt away. The Indian troops withdrew and made peace with the English; proclamations to the Canadians were repeatedly issued by the English generals, advising them to lay down their arms and remain neutral, and threatening the destruction and confiscation of their property in case of disobedience.

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This was a measure which violated international law and was based upon an entirely false theory of the state of affairs; we have already seen a similar incident in the case of Quebec. As, however, the ultimate victory of the English was beyond doubt, the effects of the proclamations were now redoubled. In a short time the army of Lévis was reduced to 2400 men, with which it was impossible for the general to offer any permanent resistance to the 18,000 English troops encamped about the town. On September 6, immediately after Amherst's arrival, a council of war was held under the presidency of Vaudreuil which decided upon capitulation, and after a short conference with the enemy's commander the capitulation was signed on September 8.<sup>1</sup>

The conditions of surrender were extremely mild. The French troops were to lay down their arms and take no further part in the present war, but were to be allowed to march out with military honours and to be conveyed by English ships to the nearest French harbour. The capitulation, however, included all the forts in Canada and the lake district which remained in the hands of the French, and thus implied the complete subjection of the colony to English rule. The troops of these outlying forts were subjected to the same conditions as the garrison of Montreal.

In the meanwhile a conflict had taken place at another point, which resulted in heavy loss to the French. The reinforcements anxiously awaited by Vaudreuil and Lévis had arrived at the beginning of July in the Bay of Chaleurs, a deep indentation to the south of the mouth of the St. Lawrence. This force consisted of transport ships with about 400 regular troops and full supplies, accompanied by some frigates. Whitmore, the commander of Louisburg, received immediate news of their arrival and ordered Commodore Byron to sail for that point with a small squadron. He entered the bay with five frigates, destroyed the local settlement and pursued the enemy, who fled up the river Restigouche. The conflict was continued for some days with varying success, until the French burned their ships and supplies and took refuge in the woods.

Thus the great achievement was completed which formed the most important event in Pitt's ministry, the conquest of

<sup>1</sup> The capitulation is printed in Kingsford, iv.

Canada. The goal had been attained slowly and systematically in three stages: Louisburg, Frontenac, and Duquesne formed the first stage; Niagara and Quebec the second; and now the third, Montreal, had been reached, with the result that there was no further obstacle to the complete destruction of the French supremacy. Notwithstanding these brilliant successes there was still matter enough for anxiety. Pitt had declined to conclude peace against the wishes of the King of Prussia and of his own sovereign as Elector of Hanover, in order that he might first be able to complete the subjugation of Canada. It was now extremely important that the German war should continue without serious disaster or a final defeat for King Frederick, and that Hanover and the other allied principalities should be secured against French conquest. In these eventualities Pitt would have found himself in a difficult dilemma; he would be obliged either to keep his word and to surrender some portion of his conquests in order to save his allies, or to retire from his post and leave the arrangement of a peace to others. He therefore followed with anxious gaze the course of events upon the Continent, the ultimate success of which he could do very little to secure.

After the battle of Kunersdorf, Frederick the Great had asked Prince Ferdinand for help; this leader was in a difficult position, though his prospects were by no means so desperate as those of the king. At that moment he despatched a force of only 500 men. After the disaster of Maxen he was obliged to hold out a helping hand to his master in his last necessity. On December 15, instead of the 3000 or 4000 men which the king had demanded, he despatched 9000 to Saxony, under the leadership of the Crown Prince of Brunswick, in order to compensate in some degree for the great deficiency of troops. Though this force never came into action, its presence considerably influenced the enemy's movements. In England there was a considerable number of shortsighted individuals who condemned the prince's action as an infringement of English interests and as an undue assumption of authority. Loud outcries arose; the King of Prussia was regarded as a luckless adventurer, a second Charles XII., on whose behalf it was useless to sacrifice English troops.<sup>1</sup> On such occasions the public were accustomed to recall the indisputable fact that the

<sup>1</sup> Daniels, 'Ferdinand von Braunschweig.'—*Preuss. Jahrbuch* 82.

King of Prussia had begun the war against the express advice and desire of England. It was, however, irrational to abandon him at this moment when the two states were united by a loyal brotherhood of arms. Frederick was right when he wrote,<sup>1</sup> 'If I should be crushed, the English will certainly reproach themselves and regret their untimely delay, but it will then be too late.' Pitt too clearly recognised the necessity of keeping Prussia in existence to refuse assent to Ferdinand's measures. In the House of Commons he vigorously supported the prince's action, comparing Frederick and Ferdinand, the uncle and the nephew, to the two victorious Claudii, and quoting the lines of Horace :

' Nil Claudiae non perficiunt manus,  
 quas et benigno numine Jupiter  
 defendit et curae sagaces  
 expediunt per acuta belli.'

There was no further attempt to make any serious attack upon the prince. King Frederick retained his help until he felt himself comparatively secure, and in February the crown prince returned to the camp of the allies.

The campaign of 1759 continued until January 1760, and was occupied chiefly by manœuvring upon either side. Not until the new year did the troops go into winter quarters, as the result of a tacit agreement between the commanders. Either side now received considerable reinforcements, so that the French army amounted upon the whole to 140,000 men, while that of the allies was raised to 82,000. Thus, though Pitt had increased the strength of his troops by 15,000 men, the disproportion between the respective forces was even greater than in the previous year. A further disadvantage was the inferior quality of the recruits. Moreover, King Frederick soon recalled Prince Holstein with his 1500 dragoons, and the only Prussian troops left with Ferdinand's army were 750 hussars. Ferdinand and Prince Holstein were inclined to rebel, and attempted to stop the departure of the troops by various delays, but an energetic letter from the king secured their obedience. Pitt could not venture to object, as the lack of troops in the Prussian camp was only too obvious.

As the previous campaign had been long protracted, operations were begun unusually late in the new year. Not until

<sup>1</sup> To Knyphausen, March 22, 1760.—*Politische Korrespondenz*, xix. 195.



May 20 did Ferdinand leave his quarters, while the French appeared even later, in the middle of June. The struggle was continued for the most part in Hesse and Waldeck, and resulted in no important action. On July 10 the crown prince met with a repulse at Korbach, which he soon equalised by the capture of a detachment, while on July 31 Ferdinand successfully surprised General de Muy at Warburg, and defeated the French with a loss of 8000 men. This news aroused great delight in London and the prince once more became popular, but these feelings were damped by the next despatches, which announced that on the same day Cassel had been evacuated by the allies under Kielmannsegge, who was retreating from Broglie. This retreat was especially dangerous for the reason that a change in the succession had recently taken place in Hesse, and Frederick II., the new landgrave, a convert to Roman Catholicism, was anxious to abandon the cause of the allies. Fortunately provision had been made for the transference of his court to Brunswick before the arrival of the French.

Marshal Broglie was unable to advance beyond Cassel. At the beginning of September he was obliged to return to the town, while the crown prince destroyed a hostile detachment of about 1000 men at Zierenberg. In this month, however, the progress of the war suddenly changed. At Ferdinand's orders the crown prince made a raid upon Wesel through Westphalia with 20,000 men. The town was utterly unprepared for an attack, and the 1500 men who composed the garrison would obviously have been unable to resist an immediate assault. The crown prince, however, delayed this attempt and began a formal siege, thus losing the advantage of surprise. He was obliged to wait eleven days for his siege guns, the progress of which was hindered by the constant rain, and it was not until the night of October 10-11 that he opened his parallel trenches. However, the relieving force soon arrived on the left bank of the Rhine, and the crown prince, crossing the stream, met the enemy at Rheinberg on October 16. The battle ended in defeat; the allies were driven back, and were fortunate in being allowed to repair their bridge of boats and to withdraw to their old camp. The crown prince now found himself obliged to abandon the siege and to return to the main army.

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This enterprise was not without effect in England. When the crown prince had passed the Rhine, Ferdinand requested Pitt, through Lord Granby, either to despatch reinforcements to the allied army, or to make a diversion upon the French or Flemish coasts, in order to draw off the troops which were to be despatched from thence to the Rhine.<sup>1</sup> Pitt thereupon conceived the idea of a new coast expedition and concentrated troops at Portsmouth.<sup>2</sup> Admiral Keppel was placed in command, with orders to destroy the squadron blockaded in the Vilaine river as occasion might permit. Before the troops could be embarked the attack upon Wesel had come to an end. However, the regiments remained on board until December, when they were disembarked, after some 150 horses had been thrown overboard as useless. This waste of money, estimated at some £150,000, excited great dissatisfaction in the city.<sup>3</sup>

With the retreat of the crown prince the German campaign of 1760 came practically to an end without any result worthy of mention. Continuous rain prevented further operations until the middle of December, when both armies went into winter quarters. It was, however, well for Pitt that Ferdinand had held his ground for another year. The financial resources of France had been further weakened and her prospects by no means materially improved.

The minister's other anxieties were now relieved, if not entirely allayed. King Frederick had also succeeded in making head against his numerous enemies during the year, and increasing his reputation by brilliant victories. The firm resolve of the allies to crush their obstinate opponent in this year came to nothing, for the simple reason that they attempted to avoid any decisive blow. The great king had no intention of manœuvring until he was exhausted; he was able to deal several keen thrusts when a favourable oppor-

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, ii. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of November 25, 1760.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>3</sup> Fuentes to Grimaldi, December 16, 1760: 'The expedition so much boasted of is come to nothing, since by order of the Ministry all the troops are disembarking; they have suffered much, on which account they are displeased, and out of 300 horses, half have been thrown overboard; it is thought the design was against Ostend if the Hereditary Prince had succeeded, but as he did not, the project is laid aside in order to give no more umbrage to the Court of Vienna; the expences incurred amount to £150,000 at least. The City and Merchants talk with dissatisfaction of this profusion of money, crying out the more because the stocks fall.'—Confidential Miscellaneous, Public Record Office.

tunity presented itself. It was not merely Daun whose hesitation was to blame for this ill-success; the Russian generals were equally at fault. Their supineness has not yet been wholly explained, but was due to secret influence on the part of the English and Prussia, and of the heir-apparent, who was a friend of the Prussian king. As is well known, the campaign began very disastrously. The defeat of Fouquet at Landshut on June 22 was a heavy blow, which further shattered the king's prestige. However, the victory of Liegnitz in August gave the hard-pressed hero breathing space, while the moral effect of this action was very considerable; it brought him new friends, and inspired those he had with hopes of ultimate success. Among these was Pitt. He received the news on August 26, through Captain von Cocceji, whom Frederick had despatched to London to notify the victory to the British king. The importance of the battle was thus emphasised, and Pitt began to think that a decided change for the better had again set in. The value which he attached to the news is most clearly expressed in the outburst of joy which his wife displayed, and which recalls her delight at the conquest of Louisburg and Quebec. She dates her letter<sup>1</sup> 'Tuesday, Glorious August 26, one o'clock. You was [*sic*], my Life, a Prophet of this Victory, and expected it from the King of Prussia. Your sister had a second sight of it, for she was entertained all the night long with triumphs and trophies, which I told her displeased me greatly, and that I prayed Heaven we might not hear of something of quite a contrary sort. Thanks to Heaven, my forebodings have proved false. . . . I wait for the guns, and then Hayes bells shall speak for the King of Prussia, which I thought they never would again be employed in.' Even the children had their part in the triumph: John, who was four years old, cried 'Hurrah!' while the little William ran to his mother and kissed her for the welfare of the King of Prussia. This was the great statesman of later years, the fierce opponent of republican and imperial France.

In the autumn, however, the prospects of Prussia seemed to have suffered a change for the worse, for about October 18 news arrived that Berlin had been occupied by the Russians and Austrians, and the surrender of the capital naturally

<sup>1</sup> Chatham MSS., Public Record Office.

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made a deep impression. However, it was soon announced that the enemy had withdrawn, and that the campaign was continuing. Its not unfavourable conclusion with the bloody victory of Torgau on November 3 is well known. Pitt's hopes had thus been fulfilled. Thanks to the successful strategy of the Prussian king no disaster had arisen from his refusal of peace in order to secure the complete subjugation of Canada. Thanks to Frederick the venture had proved successful, and the advantage belonged to England, and to Pitt in particular.

Another anxiety which oppressed the minister at this moment, and appeared to menace his acquisitions, was the attitude of Spain. We have already seen that the court of Madrid attempted to use its influence to secure an acceptable peace for France, and that the Spanish ambassador d'Abreu had been disavowed and recalled for this purpose. It was hoped in London that the appointment of his successor, Fuentes, would initiate an improvement in the relations between the two countries. However, before he arrived, the attempt to secure peace had come to nothing, and the hostile intentions of the Spanish king became steadily more obvious. Charles III. found the finances and the military power of his state in a somewhat enfeebled condition; for the moment he considered it wholly inadvisable to provoke a war, but he did his best to increase the military resources of his country. The national debt was reorganised, and the expenses of administration reduced by the abolition of an indefinite number of lucrative sinecures, while the army and navy were strengthened and reconstructed.<sup>1</sup> He was now anxious to preserve the former points of difference with England while these measures were producing their due effect. He did not wish to provoke any actual breach, but at the same time was anxious to retain sufficient excuse for possible interference in the war. Fuentes therefore emphasised the old grounds of complaint, and brought forward fresh grievances. There were three main points at issue: the unauthorised confiscation of merchant ships by English privateers, the cutting of logwood on the Mosquito coasts and the shores of Honduras, and the claims of Spain to the Newfoundland fisheries. As regards the first two points, Spain was not entirely wrong. Many grievances existed at sea and in the American districts, but, had Pitt desired to

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Lafuente, vol. xiv.



maintain peace, a compromise might easily have been found. As regards the third point, Spain had absolutely no *locus standi*.

It would be futile to enter into the details of the negotiations and the despatches<sup>1</sup> which were exchanged between June and September 1760, as the content of these documents contributed nothing to the final development of affairs. It will be enough to know the aims of the powers negotiating. The Spanish statesmen, Wall and Fuentes, raised their demands so high, and presented them with such abruptness, that compliance on England's part was impossible. They demanded, for instance, that the King of England should absolutely prohibit the felling of timber on Spanish territory, and should decline to acknowledge as his subjects any Englishmen who continued this industry. Pitt attempted to conjoin a compliant with a sternly definite attitude, with the object of leaving a path for reconciliation open, and inducing Spain to abandon her domineering attitude. He adopted a very serious and decided tone when he met with a passage in a memorial from Fuentes to the effect that a copy of that memoir had been communicated to the French court. Pitt declared that he was utterly unable to understand the reason for this extraordinary step, the communication of such a document to a power at war with England. France had no business to interfere in these matters, and the opinion of the court of Versailles would never have that weight with the King of England which the opinion of the Catholic king possessed.<sup>2</sup> However, even in this instance he avoided any direct threats. He resorted to menaces only in a lengthy despatch to Bristol, of September 20,<sup>3</sup> which he desired to be brought to the notice of the Spanish minister, Wall. He added a private letter<sup>4</sup> to the despatch, requesting the ambassador to lay his document confidentially before the minister, and to tell him that he was acting upon his own initiative. In this case Wall would be informed of these menaces, while he could not regard them as a slight upon the national honour. Wall would be, so to speak, informed by agents of his own of the energetic

<sup>1</sup> The most important are printed by Thackeray.

<sup>2</sup> 'Réponse verbale' of Pitt to Fuentes, September 16, 1760.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 487-92.

<sup>4</sup> Chatham MSS.

intentions of the foreign government, and so be induced to change his attitude; in this despatch Pitt laid down the limits beyond which England would never go; he absolutely rejected the Spanish claims to the fisheries, and maintained the English right to the timber trade, though in other respects he declared himself open to conviction.

These transactions were interrupted by an event which political parties had expected for some thirty years, and had been a factor of great importance to Pitt's policy from his youth up. King George II. died on October 25. The occasion was so far fortunate in that death came upon him at the moment when the happiest news was arriving from every quarter. On October 7 the conquest of Montreal was announced, and the successful conclusion of the American war. The letter of congratulation which Pitt despatched to Amherst on October 24, loading this careful general with unqualified praise, was issued in the name of George II. On October 23 a valuable fleet of merchantmen arrived from the East Indies with the triumphant Admiral Pocock on board, and the national credit received a valuable stimulus in consequence.<sup>1</sup> News from the scene of war in western Germany was less favourable, as the Crown Prince of Brunswick had been defeated at Rheinfeld and driven back beyond the Rhine; but the bold enterprise upon Wesel showed that Ferdinand felt himself equal to his enemies, and gave grounds for hope that the Electorate and the allied territories might be successfully defended. Frederick had again proved himself invincible, and had saved his capital, the occupation of which had caused great consternation. Thus the old king could regard the future with confidence, and anticipate an advantageous peace in no long time. The domestic affairs of the country were marked by unprecedented unanimity. All quarrels between the leading politicians seemed to have been composed, and the approaching elections, in which Pitt's candidature for Bath was again supported by his friend Allen, afforded no excitement on this occasion.<sup>2</sup> Thus on October 25 the king rose according to his custom at six o'clock, and retired to his room after breakfast. A chamberlain heard a slight noise and

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy of October 23, 1760.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Allen to Pitt, October 7, 1760.—Chatham MSS.

entered the room to find the king lifeless upon the floor. Syncope had suddenly ended his life.<sup>1</sup> An entirely new scene was then opened, in which Pitt was called to play a less decisive part than previously. Though he maintained his position for the moment, a declension of his power was to be expected.

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, iii. 302 f.

## SECTION IV

### *THE DECLINE*

#### CHAPTER XIII

##### CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCESSION

GEORGE III. ascended the throne under the most favourable circumstances conceivable. The people hailed his accession with delight, not merely, as may happen in such cases, from mere love of change or in the vague belief that change was for many reasons desirable; the previous assertions and policy of the young prince gave reason to expect the abolition of certain long-standing and burdensome grievances. There was a prospect of the abolition of the hated party conflicts and the whole plutocratic system. The new monarch enjoyed the further advantage that the family of the Pretender had ceased to menace his existence upon the ground of their greater legitimacy; no one seriously ventured to contest the legitimacy of the reigning dynasty. The division in the tory party was thus a thing of the past; they could resume their old traditions even in support of the house of Hanover. The new monarch, with his sense of nationalism, was fitted above all others to restore the old relations of the monarchy with this party, and so to consolidate the power of his kingdom. A further advantage was that the existing government was both unusually strong and already under the influence of the young court, so that no considerable changes need be made. The foreign policy of the country could not have been more successful. There was no ground for fearing a disastrous result to the long war, even if it might not be possible to expect all those advantages which her leading statesmen hoped to secure for England. But the chief advantage that the new king enjoyed over his



immediate predecessors was the fact that he alone represented the strength and power of his kingdom, and that he need not fear the rivalry of a successor. This was an obstacle that had constantly hampered the efforts of his predecessors, and made them dependent upon groups of nobles or upon individuals; the presence of an heir-apparent who had attained his majority attracted general attention, while the strongest politicians shrank from opposing his views. In the present case no such obstacle was possible. The young king had no heir as yet, and years might pass before any possible successor came of age. Thus the kingdom, personified in one man, might proceed to develop the whole of its power.

There was thus every reason to regard the accession of George III. with the best of hopes. The only question was whether he would be able to make full use of the advantages at his disposal and would avoid provoking fresh opposition by untimely measures. The king's objects were both rational and opportune. He was anxious to free himself from dependency upon the whigs, who had hitherto used the royal prerogative for their own purpose; he thought he might stand aside from party politics and make the monarchy to some degree independent. He was particularly anxious to gain the power of choosing his servants with reference solely to the welfare of the state, and, as he said, to recover a privilege in this respect which the meanest of his subjects possessed undisputed. He could not see that such a course of action implied any infringement of the constitution.

The sole reason for distrusting the capacities of the new monarch was his youth and inexperience, which made it impossible at the moment for him to conceive or to prosecute his objects in complete independence. Not only did he need ministers who could relieve him of the task of administration, and were indeed indispensable under the English constitution; he needed also an adviser who would decide his attitude towards the motive powers of the constitution, his ministers, and Parliament, and who would help him to assert his prerogatives and influence. Without some personal friend of the kind, even experienced monarchs are unable to progress, and it was not to be expected that a ruler who had barely attained his majority would be successful. The prime minister is an unsuitable person for this post, as the question

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at issue is the assertion of the royal authority against that of the ministry. To appoint the chosen adviser to a ministerial post is an equally hazardous proceeding; the keen observer and critic of ministerial action, and the faithful friend of the king is but rarely suited for executive duties. The functions of a minister and of a royal adviser are so absolutely different that they can hardly be conjoined with satisfactory results in one and the same person.

George III. retained the adviser of his youth, and his mother's friend, after his accession to the throne. This was John Stuart, Earl of Bute,<sup>1</sup> whom we have already seen acting as the *spiritus rector* of the young court on many occasions, a man upon whom history has passed a highly unfavourable judgment, without justification, in my opinion. His bad relations with Frederick the Great have represented him to German historians merely as the evil principle at the English court; in England also he has been the subject of the sharpest attacks, while more favourable judgments are few and far between. If we regard his behaviour as a whole, including his relations with Pitt, we shall be obliged to repeat with Macaulay,<sup>2</sup> 'He was a man of undoubted honour,' a judgment that is confirmed by many assertions of unprejudiced contemporaries. His relations with the king were those of honest and devoted friendship, of a strength rarely found in England. It was a friendship characterised by the fidelity of the Highlander. English nobles generally served the king in the hope of securing wealth or power, and occasionally out of pure patriotism, but Bute served him for reasons of personal devotion and affection. He was not primarily anxious to increase the power of the state or of the monarchy; this was only a means to an end, as his object was to be of use to his master, George III., and to make his reign as happy as possible, a desire that is repeatedly obvious in his private correspondence. Bute was no bad judge of the kind of man needed for the king's service, and had a fine instinct for all who could contribute to strengthen his master's position; hence it may be said that he was exceptionally suited for the post of confidential adviser.

<sup>1</sup> On Bute cp. von Ruville, *William Pitt [Chatham] and Lord Bute*, p. 12 ff. Berlin, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> Macaulay, *Essays*, p. 752.

None the less the attempt to make a statesman of him, or to entrust him with responsible offices, was a mistake. He had no capacity for statesmanship, as he knew very well himself, though his political powers were by no means despicable. His ministry successfully accomplished its duties, but Bute showed no reluctance to throw off the wearisome burden of responsibility and to resume his previous occupation. His ministerial action naturally provided his enemies with constant opportunities for violent attacks, which may or may not have been justified, but which ended by clouding his reputation. Of enemies he had no lack: in the first place, because he was the favourite, and the favourite is popularly regarded as an unusually evil personality, a Strafford or a Jeffreys; and secondly and chiefly because he was a Scotsman. The union had not yet composed the long-standing opposition and jealousy between the two nations, and the elevation of Scotsmen to ministerial posts was regarded with misgiving. Hence the choice of a member of that nationality seemed ill-omened. There was some apprehension of a return to the Stuart period, when Scots had enjoyed many privileges, and the guidance of the state had often been entrusted to favourites.

Although Bute's position tended to impair the popularity of the new government, it implied no real danger. The king could retain Bute at his side undisturbed and leave the work of administration to the existing ministers until the war was successfully concluded. Further procedure would then be dictated by circumstances. The king, however, was disinclined from the outset to step into the secondary position which his grandfather had held, from whom a large number of measures had been practically extorted by his ministers. Similarly Bute was determined to undermine the supremacy of Pitt, who had shown a lack of compliance with the wishes of the young court previous to the accession of George III., and in particular to prevent any undue unanimity between the two ministers. A firm alliance between Pitt and Newcastle would have enabled the government to defy the crown. At the same time Bute was not anxious to secure Pitt's resignation. He wished the minister to continue his conduct of the war, and to pursue that course of policy which had been attended with such brilliant results. The favourite did not share the popular desire for peace, or the national dislike to the Hanoverian

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policy, though at times he may have given an outward approval to these views. He was equally far from sharing the apprehensions of Newcastle. His sole desire was that Pitt should guide the state as the king's servant, not as an independent ruler, and that the crown should be consulted upon every occasion.

This could hardly be regarded as a disadvantage for Pitt. Newcastle and his following was the only quarter from which he need apprehend interference. To their party, the nucleus of the old oligarchy, the young court was essentially opposed, and was anxious above all things to break their declared powers of absolutism. But for this reason it was necessary that the Crown should concentrate its strength lest it should be forced to make common cause with the opposition, and thus render the task of government impossible, as had often happened upon previous occasions. The best course of action for the moment was for the Crown to employ its power in securing a definition of Pitt's relations with the court. The opposition was imprudent enough to subserve this purpose in spite of the fact that their best and most obvious policy was an alliance with the triumphant war minister. Conceit allowed the old duke to accept the flattery of the court as literally true.

Pitt's treatment after the king's death seemed somewhat ominous.<sup>1</sup> Newcastle was hastily summoned to Carlton House, to which the young ruler went on October 25, but Pitt received no invitation of the kind. He therefore hastened to Princess Amelia, the daughter of George II., at Kensington Palace, to ask her advice as to whether he should present himself to the king or not. As she referred him to his own judgment he resolved to appear before the king, but he met with a somewhat cold reception from his new master. Newcastle was already in the audience-room, where he was warmly received, and given a particular assurance of Bute's friendly intentions; Pitt was kept waiting for a considerable time before he was summoned to the king's presence. The royal address to the privy council was then read, which Bute had already drawn up. As Pitt had been unable to gain a clear

<sup>1</sup> On this point cp. Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 8 ff.; Walpole, *Memoirs of George III.*, i. 5 ff., ed. Russell Barker, London 1894; *Bedford Correspondence*, i., Introduction, p. xii f., based upon Sir Gilbert Elliot's Memorandum.



idea of its contents, he was obliged to wait until the evening to communicate his views by letter.

The speech made mention of 'bloody and expensive war,' and of securing 'an honourable and lasting peace.' Pitt desired that the phrase 'bloody and expensive' should be replaced by 'expensive, but necessary and justifiable,' and that after the word 'peace' should be added 'in agreement with our allies.' This transaction is usually recounted as if two diverse currents of political opinion had come into collision, the military and the peaceful, the policy of fidelity or of infidelity to alliance, as if, in short, Bute had been anxious to inaugurate a new system. This was, however, by no means the case. The speech merely flattered the wishes entertained by the nation and the Newcastle group, but made no definite promises. Pitt's additions, however, gave the speech a partisan character, and read into it a conflict of opinions, when the sole object had been the more or less successful concealment of the projects actually entertained. The king was more anxious to show pacific intentions than Pitt, but he was by no means so entirely an advocate of peace as Newcastle. George III. insisted obstinately upon his own phrasing, and was not induced to give way until noon on the following day. His attitude gave the utmost satisfaction to Newcastle and his friends.

Immediately after his accession the king summoned the banished Lord George Sackville to a levée and showed him much condescension, this action also being interpreted as unfriendly to Pitt.<sup>1</sup> The ministers, however, raised the strongest objections and exacted a promise that there should be no repetition of this scene. Sackville was thus obliged to continue in retirement.

With Bute, Pitt had a long conversation within the first few days.<sup>2</sup> The favourite proposed the restoration of their former good relations, and offered to support Pitt with the king under certain conditions. Pitt, however, had become somewhat distrustful of the attitude of the new court, and reiterated his demand for the sole and responsible conduct of the war, as under the former government, asserting that he could be satisfied with nothing less. This was a justifiable demand under the former system, when the state was in

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, i. 11; Almon, *History of the Late Minority*.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole, i. 10.

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grievous danger and when the king and the heir-apparent were paralysing their respective powers; it was an impossible claim at the present moment, when the end of the war was in sight and the royal power was unimpaired. While Bute did not directly refuse his request, he took measures to secure himself against the minister's power, which had already grown too strong. The conference ended with an interchange of formal courtesies.

Newcastle's position was very different. He was luxuriating in the full favour of the court, and even ventured to play the worn-out scene of an attempt at resignation.<sup>1</sup> He went to the king and requested to be relieved of the burden of his office on account of his age. The king naturally declined to agree, and the duke then enjoyed the pleasure of showing the world that he was indispensable. The sole difference between his action now and formerly was the fact that he could not now propose any conditions. Pitt also seized the opportunity of flattering him by asserting the necessity of his retention in office, and hinting the desirability of a closer connection. Hardwicke was the go-between in this affair,<sup>2</sup> in which Pitt was entirely serious. He wished to use Newcastle as a counterpoise to the favourite, in whom he saw a menace to his position, and thus to secure the existing system. The duke, however, was so entirely captivated by the young king and his council as to have no intention of opposing their views, least of all for the sake of Pitt, whose supremacy he had long regarded as oppressive. He forgot that his own power had lost its former means of support, and that politeness was no guarantee for the future. Pitt afterwards used this refusal as a reason or excuse for declining overtures on the part of the duke.

Bute had thus attained his immediate object: the alliance between his opponents had been prevented, and the tension between the two powerful ministers had been increased. It was thus less necessary to pay attention to Newcastle, and we soon find the duke complaining bitterly that he was treated as a nonentity by the court, and could secure hardly a word of recognition from the king and hardly a question upon the affairs of his office.<sup>3</sup> 'As regards myself,' he writes on Novem-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, i. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Hardwicke to Newcastle, October 29, 1760.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 425; Harris, iii. 230.

ber 7 with entire correctness to Hardwicke, 'I am the greatest cipher that ever appeared at court.' This was a wholly unexpected change of front, accomplished within a few days, and the anxiety which it caused to the unfortunate duke may easily be conceived. Pitt was in a much better situation. He had indeed been forced to suffer some affront, and had no prospect of security for the future, but for the moment he continued his office as before. His preparations for the projected campaigns continued undisturbed, and Newcastle was obliged to provide both the money and the consent of Parliament. The new king was very far from desiring to be rid of his energetic minister, while Newcastle was merely a tool in his hands, to be employed as he thought desirable for his own purposes.

The speech from the throne at the opening of Parliament on November 18 aroused special interest on this occasion as being the first public act of the new monarch; at the same time no material divergence was to be expected from the principles and the policy announced upon previous occasions of the kind; the ministry whose opinions and objects were expressed in the speech had suffered no change. As usual Lord Hardwicke drafted the speech, and discussed it with Pitt on November 12, the day following the late king's funeral.<sup>1</sup> The speech expressed sorrow at the king's death, proposed fidelity to the principles of the constitution, detailed the brilliant successes of the last campaign, and emphasised the strength of the kingdom in every direction. The maintenance of the Prussian alliance was expressly asserted. The speech was a song of triumph, and Pitt's references to the naval supremacy of the country were bound to make a deep impression. To all this the king had no objection to make; when the draft was laid before him he requested merely the insertion of a short passage, which he sent by the hands of Bute. This passage runs as follows: 'Born and educated in this country, I pride myself upon the name of Briton, and it will be ever the special happiness of my life to secure the prosperity of a nation whose loyalty and warm affection to myself I regard as the greatest and most permanent security for my throne.' These words, however, appositely described the change which had taken place notwithstanding the ap-

<sup>1</sup> On this affair see Harris, iii. 231 f.



*King George III.*

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parent avoidance of change. Once again a genuine British king was at the head of the state, enjoying the affection of the nation and a consequent increase of power. Hardwicke was correct in his reported assertion that the passage was an injury to the memory of the late king, who was thus represented as a foreigner pursuing foreign interests; however, the Hanoverian sympathies of George II. had been so opposed and so vigorously denounced that this harmless allusion was not likely to cause surprise. The term 'Briton' instead of 'Englishman' also attracted attention, and it was asserted that its introduction was due to Bute and his Scottish nationality; it was, however, a correction which any careful editor would have been bound to make. In the Parliament of Great Britain the king could not characterise himself as an Englishman. At any rate the king's desires met with no opposition. The ministers were entirely satisfied to find that their draft had suffered no material alterations.

The financial measures were practically a repetition of the budget adopted in the previous year, and included a considerable rise in the extraordinary demands and votes. More than seventeen millions were demanded, as against fourteen millions in the preceding year, and more than nineteen millions were granted, as against the former grant of £15,850,000. For the provision of this enormous sum it was necessary among other measures to issue a new loan of twelve millions, which was taken up without the smallest difficulty, though at a percentage of no more than three per cent.<sup>1</sup> The flourishing condition of trade, and in particular the arrival of the rich fleet from the East Indies, were responsible for this success. High as this budget was, it did not correspond with Pitt's wishes. He regarded it as an intrigue of Newcastle's to discredit himself and the war policy by increasing the unpopularity of these expensive enterprises and of his ministry in general. 'He attacked me very vigorously,' runs a note of the duke,<sup>2</sup> 'and said that the expenses had been estimated at an unduly high figure, for the purpose of making the war unpopular and impracticable; his war, as he said it was generally known.' This fact naturally did not prevent Pitt

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, November 14, 1760.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> Of February 12, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

from using these rich supplies for the purpose of extensive enterprises and the vigorous prosecution of operations. However, the financial situation was soon to change for the worse. The disembarkation of the proposed expedition to France<sup>1</sup> aroused much misgiving, as we have seen, sent down the funds, and deterred subscribers to the new loan. The difficulties of the situation were increased by reports of fresh differences within the ministry.

These reports were not unfounded. The king was anxious not merely to influence state affairs, but also to place his counsellor in the responsible position of secretary of state, and at the end of November this question became prominent.<sup>2</sup> Bute now asserted, and afterwards repeated his assertion with great consistency, that he had no desire for a ministerial post, and that he had secured a promise from the king to abandon all discussion of the project;<sup>3</sup> eventually, however, he was obliged to comply with the monarch's request. It is customary to regard these assertions as simple falsehoods, by means of which the favourite strove to excuse himself for the responsibility of his appointment and its results. This theory seems to me impossible for the following reasons. To begin with, so consistent a lie supported by action in correspondence with assertion, as we shall afterwards see, appears highly improbable. We need only compare the mendacious assertions of Newcastle, who occasionally contradicted himself in one and the same conversation, and the difference will immediately be obvious. The cases where Bute concealed the truth, as he did in his negotiations with Newcastle and Pitt, are discoverable without difficulty. Moreover, he had no reason to be ashamed of a desire for office, at a time when such desire was universal, and if his promotion had been in any way illegitimate he certainly would not have thrown the blame upon the king, whose burdens he was particularly anxious to take upon himself. Finally, it was quite intelligible that as the king's adviser he should not be hampered by duties of administration. We have already seen the danger of uniting functions so widely different in one person. Bute was well aware of this danger, and regarded his powers as suitable for the post of adviser

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 307.

<sup>2</sup> *Dodington's Diary*, p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Note of Newcastle's, dated March 10, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

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but not for that of administrator.<sup>1</sup> It is not to be supposed that the king was unaware of these facts; he must have had special reasons for insisting upon his request, reasons which eventually induced Bute to abandon his resistance.

At the end of November an attempt was made to induce the favourite to take office by a special group of politicians which aimed at securing a close connection with the court;<sup>2</sup> this was led by Dodington, whose acquaintance we have previously made as a not wholly reliable friend to Leicester House. The action of this group was probably instigated by selfish motives. Dodington insisted primarily upon the fact that the ministers in power might secure great popularity and gain an advantage over the king by abandoning the Continent and concluding a separate peace with France. He expressed his conviction that some project of the kind was on foot, and Bute also believed that the inclinations of the ministry ran in this direction, though he considered that the tension existing between Pitt and Newcastle would prevent any action of the kind. Hence in January 1761 Dodington repeatedly urged the favourite to take over the ministry, to abandon Hanover, and to arrange a peace, as the ministerial position would become impregnable if the execution of this project were left to them.

Bute did not follow this advice, as he felt no immediate apprehension, but he acquired, if he had not previously possessed, the conviction that he could not venture to leave the task of concluding peace to the existing ministry. In the interests of the king, whose advantage was his sole motive, he regarded his entry to the government as desirable the moment that peace negotiations were opened, in order that he might claim a share in the task of arranging conditions as the king's confidential adviser. With the conduct of the war he wished to have no concern. Pitt might retain this in his own hands, though under the influence and control of the king. Bute's future policy is to be explained upon these principles.

<sup>1</sup> In Harris, iii. 307, and Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, i. 164, are to be found some remarks of Bute's upon this point. In a note of Newcastle dated January 27, 1761, we read, 'He [Count Viry] told me, to my great surprise, that my Lord Bute did nothing and would do nothing, that he [Bute] never talked of business (that is foreign affairs) to him [Viry]; and would have it thought that Lord Bute was no minister and would be none, and that the carrying on of the public business was the affair of others and not his [Bute].'  
—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Dodington, p. 422 ff.



The project was no secret to the ministers, though they regarded it from very different points of view. Pitt openly declared to his colleagues the utter inadvisability of giving a ministerial post to a favourite and to Bute in particular;<sup>1</sup> 'he would make no reference to the special circumstances of Bute's nationality, but he would never, under any conditions, contribute to his promotion, and this he would repeat whenever and wherever he thought his words might reach Bute's ears.' We have to observe that Pitt did not undertake to oppose the scheme, but merely declined to support it. At the same time he constantly complained of Bute's position as intermediary, and of the amount of business that passed through his hands, and continued to make observations upon resignation, even requesting Newcastle to procure him an honourable retreat.<sup>2</sup> Pitt was thus inclined to shrink from Bute's promotion; he had not actually pledged himself to resign in that event, but attempted to arouse a belief that he would resign by asserting his objection to the project and his desire to go out of office. Newcastle, on the other hand, did his best to persuade the favourite to take office, partly in order to increase his popularity at the court, and partly in the hopes of overthrowing Pitt's domination in the cabinet. When Bute persistently declined, and would have nothing to do with any ministerial post, Newcastle became convinced that he was afraid of Pitt, and would not venture to act against his declared wishes.<sup>3</sup> This was certainly not the case, for Bute was well aware that he could easily secure an arrangement with Pitt if he so desired.

A change in the attitude of the court was eventually caused by the further development of the peace problem. Notwithstanding his victory at Torgau, Frederick the Great was still in a most dangerous position. His resources were growing exhausted, and the numbers of his enemies were undiminished; 'notwithstanding all these facts' (previously

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, January 20, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of Newcastle of February 12, 1761: 'Then talked of his going out, and begged me to procure him an honourable retreat. If the king would give it to him he should be obliged; if not he must do as well as he could; for he would have nothing to do, where nothing could be conveyed to the king but through the representation of my Lord Bute. . . .'—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of Newcastle dated January 27, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

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quoted and favourable), he writes to Knyphausen<sup>1</sup> on November 26, 1760, 'and notwithstanding my victory, you must regard me as lost in the coming year, should the war continue. There are three means to save me: the first, if it were possible to separate France from her present allies, an event which would soon result in a general pacification, in my opinion; the second means would be to withdraw Russia from Austria, a prospect of which I see no likelihood; the third, if the Turks could be induced to make a serious attack upon the Austrians.' Under the influence of this opinion Frederick advised that negotiations should be opened with France by the English ministers, and that stipulations should be made only for the withdrawal of the French troops from Germany, apart from the 24,000 men lent to Austria, and for the cessation of subsidy payments to Russia and Sweden. He desired that he should then be given half of the Anglo-Hanoverian mercenary forces, and that the subsidies should be raised sufficiently to meet their expenses. He would then be able to make head against the empress-queen, who would be deprived of any effective support from the northern powers.

This proposal of Frederick led to a long correspondence, though agreement could not be attained.<sup>2</sup> England required a detailed account of the Prussian demands in the event of peace, and this Frederick could not provide until he knew the number of troops which England proposed to furnish. The real hindrance to the progress of negotiations was Pitt's objection. He was not anxious to ask for peace merely for the sake of Prussia, and to place himself in consequence at a disadvantage with his enemies. If France wished to end the war she could come forward and make her own proposals. As long as the matter remained on this footing Bute had no reason for interfering in the affairs of the ministry. He had long been aware of Frederick's wishes for a separate peace,<sup>3</sup> but had waited to see whether the ministers would make overtures in this direction. Until something of the kind occurred he showed great disinclination to take office, and asserted his regret at Pitt's threats of resignation.

At the end of February, however, the English ministers

<sup>1</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xx. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, xx. 157 f., 162, 190, 224, 256.

<sup>3</sup> Dodington, p. 425.

received information that France intended to offer proposals for peace. It was a general custom at that period to open the despatches of foreign ambassadors whenever they could be secured, to take copies and to decipher them if possible. The despatches collected in the Public Record Office are an important source of information for English as well as for foreign history, as these reports naturally deal at length with London affairs. Thus the correspondence between the Spanish ambassadors in Paris and London, the Marquis of Grimaldi and Count Fuentes, was often intercepted, as also was that between Fuentes and the minister Wall. An insecure cipher<sup>1</sup> made the task of translation comparatively easy. Thus it was possible for ministers to keep themselves fairly well informed of the relations between France and Spain, and of the temper prevailing at the court of Versailles. In this way the ministry learned on February 15<sup>2</sup> that France was greatly anxious for peace, and was working energetically to induce Austria and Russia to permit the issue of a joint note to England and Prussia. A second letter to Grimaldi, under date February 26,<sup>3</sup> contained the news that France had resolved to conclude peace on the basis of the *status quo*, and had succeeded in securing the consent of her allies. This news naturally decided Bute's action, for there was now every reason that negotiations should soon begin. The feeling of the nation and of the Prussian ally would make it impossible for Pitt to refuse or to shelve a declaration from the enemy. And in fact we find that at this moment the favourite changed his policy and proceeded to work for a ministerial post.

About February 25 Bute had a meeting, not with Pitt but with Temple,<sup>4</sup> to discuss the conditions of his entry to the ministry. The result of the negotiations proved entirely satisfactory and led to a speedy settlement; hence it is obvious that Bute could have entertained no special apprehension of a refusal from Pitt, as otherwise he would not have advanced with such directness and certainty upon his object, when the situation appeared to demand this action. Temple was satisfied with a promise of the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland, while Pitt was given the means of immediate and unbroken

<sup>1</sup> Fuentes asks for a better cipher on March 10.—*Chatham Papers*, ii. 96 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 91 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 92 f.

<sup>4</sup> Memorandum of Newcastle of February 26, 1761.—*Newcastle Papers*.

communication with the king, a condition which he had made a *sine qua non*. There was thus no further obstacle in Bute's path, as Newcastle would be ready to help his projects. In fact, as soon as the duke heard of Bute's change of attitude and of his arrangement with Temple, he proceeded to show himself the most loyal of the whole party. Immediately after the prorogation of Parliament, which preceded the dissolution on March 6, he hastened to the king and informed him with much detail and circumlocution of the official determination to appoint Lord Bute secretary of state.<sup>1</sup> The king showed high pleasure at the news, and stated that he had now every reason for repeating his wishes to Bute in view of the express desire of his prime minister.

At this moment a further important conversation took place between the duke and the favourite,<sup>2</sup> in the course of which the latter announced the conditions on which he would accept the post, conditions which placed the entire influence of the Newcastle faction at his disposal, for use against Pitt in case of need. Bute explained to the duke that he had hesitated to accept the proposed distinction, merely owing to his apprehension of Pitt's temperament and behaviour. He said he must first know whether he could calculate upon the support of the duke and his friends, in the event of differences between himself and Pitt. Newcastle readily gave the desired assurance on behalf of himself and his adherents, and then proceeded to expound his views upon Pitt's position. Now that the alliance had been concluded, Bute attempted to disabuse him of his fear of Pitt's power: he said that his popularity had greatly diminished, that he would certainly never join the opposition, and that in the last resort he would resign with an honourable compensation, and that it was impossible for him to gain the king's favour in view of his own character. Bute thus attempted to inspire Newcastle with the idea that he was inclined to overthrow Pitt and to carry on the administration in concert with the duke himself; in reality he was inclined to co-operate with Pitt, and to adopt an independent attitude only upon the question of peace, when he would

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle's notes of the interview, dated March 6, 1761. — Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Substance of what passed in my conversation with Lord Bute this day, March 10, 1761. — *Ibid.*



require Newcastle's support. That support was highly necessary in view of the approaching elections, and he was therefore obliged to represent himself to Newcastle as a loyal confederate.

Finally, Bute had a long interview with Pitt himself, which lasted no less than three hours, and in the course of which he attempted to allay all distrust.<sup>1</sup> He repeated his assurance that Pitt should enjoy unimpeded intercourse with the king, declared his intention of abiding by the speech from the throne upon questions of foreign policy, and offered as a special sign of royal favour the post of cofferer of the household to his brother-in-law, James Grenville, together with the free disposal of the American offices. Pitt adopted an attitude of cold reserve at the outset, though he could find no objection to the agreement, but he became more cordial when he discovered that Bute did not propose to thwart his policy and was honestly anxious to restore good relations. He confined himself to regrets that the members of the court party attempted to denounce him as a supporter of the German war and as a servant of that country, and declared his readiness to abandon his continental policy if the king should regard such action as advisable. Eventually the two men parted, if not in friendship, at any rate in better agreement than before. Newcastle was informed of this interview by Bute, and was delighted at the dexterity with which the favourite had gained his own way in the teeth of the powerful minister.

The Parliament which had been in existence since 1754 was dissolved on March 21, and the proposed changes in the government followed immediately. Pitt took the oath as member of the privy council and secretary of state for the second time, an event unprecedented, but rendered necessary by the change of monarchs.<sup>2</sup> Lord Holderness retired and handed over the secretaryship of state for the north to Lord Bute. Legge, the chancellor of the exchequer, who had lost the favour of the court, was dismissed and replaced by Barrington, whose position as secretary of war was taken by Charles Townshend. At Pitt's desire Lord Temple retained the privy seal, although he had been already proposed for the

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, March 13, based on Bute's description. — Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Chatham MSS.

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lord-lieutenancy of Ireland. Pitt was unable to dispense with so reliable a supporter of his interests in the House of Lords.<sup>1</sup> Lord Halifax was made lord-lieutenant in his place. A further change had been previously introduced by the king on February 11. George Grenville, while retaining his post as naval paymaster, was summoned to the cabinet.<sup>2</sup> The fact is not without significance, as Pitt had treated his ambitious and capable brother-in-law with some coldness and done nothing for his advancement. It was thus not surprising that Grenville secured his future by strengthening his connection with the young court, of which he had always been a supporter. After Bute's promotion this connection continued, and was strengthened by the fact that the new secretary of state chose a friend of Grenville, Mr. Jenkinson, as his under-secretary.<sup>3</sup> Jenkinson's letters to Grenville<sup>4</sup> are an important source of information upon the proceedings and the attitude of the favourite's party.

Bute's importance as a minister was further increased by two events which happened at this time: the death of his uncle, the Duke of Argyle, whose power and influence in Scotland descended to himself, and the death of his father-in-law, Wortley Montagu, who left an enormous property to his daughter, Bute's wife, and to their second son.<sup>5</sup> The inheritance was estimated at £1,340,000. It is obvious that the favourite's political position would be greatly strengthened by the possession of this wealth in an age of universal corruption. Pitt and his small following would be completely overshadowed in comparison. He remained the great and indispensable minister, but he had no political following of any account which he could oppose to his colleagues or to the crown.

As we have observed, this business produced but little influence upon the conduct of the war. Pitt remained firmly resolved to wrest, if possible, every colonial possession from the hands of France in order to force a peace in accordance with his ideas.<sup>6</sup> He therefore issued his orders as usual, and made

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, i. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Bute to Grenville, February 11, 1761.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 359.

<sup>3</sup> Jenkinson to Grenville, March 24, 1761.—*Ibid.*, i. 359.

<sup>4</sup> Printed in the *Grenville Papers*.

<sup>5</sup> Walpole, *Memoirs*, i. 28.

<sup>6</sup> Thus the report of the Prussian embassy on January 30, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

the necessary arrangements for the American campaign at the outset of the winter. He seems, however, not to have been in so wholly independent a position as before; his first despatch to Amherst of December 17<sup>1</sup> does not define with any certainty the objective of the next campaign, although he had had time enough to consider the situation; at the same time it must be remembered that after the conquest of Canada the choice of an objective was a matter of greater difficulty than before, and that longer deliberation may have seemed desirable to him for technical reasons. There is hence no reason to suppose any interference on the part of the king or of Bute.

Two points came under consideration in deciding the operations for the following year: these were the French possessions about the mouth of the Mississippi, and Martinique with the other West Indian islands. At first there was some doubt which of these points it was advisable to attack, but at the beginning of January the islands were chosen as the objective. The reasons for this decision are unknown to us. The choice may have been influenced by consideration for Spain, who might easily have felt herself threatened by a war on the frontier of her colony of Florida. The court of Madrid had already declared its interests to be affected by the conquest of Canada.

As early as December Pitt issued circular letters to the colonial governors to the effect that troops were everywhere to be levied as in the previous years, but only to two-thirds of the former strength.<sup>2</sup> These troops were intended to guard their own homes in the new conquest against any attack, while the greater proportion of the regular troops were to be employed for the enterprise in the south. Their maintenance, as before, would be the care of the English state. On January 7 Pitt sent definite orders to Amherst concerning the coming operations.<sup>3</sup> He designated Martinique as the chief objective, but strangely enough did not venture to advise the immediate commencement of operations. He considered that the troops would not be able to leave America early enough to complete the conquest before the hurricane months, that is before August 1761. It is not immediately obvious why the concentration of troops and their transport to Guadeloupe or Martinique should have taken so unusually long a time. It

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 495 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 497 ff.

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must, however, be remembered that the regular troops, who were stationed in Quebec and Montreal, could not be withdrawn until the provincial battalions had taken their place. Pitt strongly emphasised the necessity of making the security of the conquered districts a cardinal point. He knew from the experience of previous campaigns that the governors were very slow to complete their levies of troops. Nor was the readiness of the legislatures likely to be increased by the fact that their own territories were freed from all menace of invasion. Under no circumstances was it likely that the battalions would begin their march before May; the month of June or even more time would then elapse before the regulars were removed and transported to the West Indies. The remaining time would then be too short for the successful completion of this difficult enterprise. Hence Pitt was entirely correct in appointing the autumn for the commencement of operations, when the dangerous weeks of hurricane were past. One question remains: it may be asked why the whole expedition was not undertaken from England. For this purpose the troops at his disposal were insufficient, as at this moment the task of recruiting was embarrassed by extraordinary difficulties. Barrington had already proposed the most desperate measures to supply part of the deficiency.<sup>1</sup> He proposed that such of the marines as could be spared should enter the service of the army with high enlistment money, for which purpose an act of Parliament would have been necessary, or that recruits should be sought from the militia, or that Protestant prisoners should be enlisted. Thus we can understand that Pitt ventured to employ for a new campaign only such troops as were not wanted elsewhere.

Amherst was therefore ordered to prepare a body of 8000 men for the autumn, which was to be joined by 1000 more in Guadeloupe. He was also entrusted with the task of providing full supplies of artillery and the proper number of sappers. The necessary transports were to be despatched from England in due time, but Pitt ordered, as in former years, that a reserve fleet should be concentrated in case the fleet from England should be delayed. The command of the expedition was not entrusted to Amherst, as Pitt wished to keep him in

<sup>1</sup> Barrington to Pitt, January 21, 1761.—Chatham MSS. Cp. *Hist. MSS. Comm.*, *Twelfth Rep.*, App., part ix. p. 231.



North America, which he regarded as of chief importance, but on the other hand Amherst was requested to appoint the commanding officer whom he thought best qualified.

Pitt was well aware that it was against English interests and somewhat dangerous at the outset of peace negotiations for so long and so complete a cessation to take place in the American war. He therefore ordered the despatch of a smaller expedition to the West Indies in the spring. Amherst was to collect 2000 regular troops for despatch to Guadeloupe, whence they could attack Domingo and afterwards St. Lucia in conjunction with the troops stationed in the West Indies. He gave express orders that this attempt should not be made unless the troops could reach Guadeloupe early in May at the latest. The governor of the latter island, Mr. Campbell Dalrymple, received timely orders<sup>1</sup> to place all the troops that he could spare at the disposal of the expedition, and to offer what other help he could. At the end of March the prospects of peace became more definite, and Bute, who was regarded as a supporter of peace, took over the secretaryship of state; Pitt then urged General Amherst<sup>2</sup> to begin the attack upon Martinique immediately upon the conclusion of the stormy season, and to employ the largest force he could raise, as an early impression upon the enemy in America would have a decisive influence upon the attitude of the French court. We cannot but conclude from this that Pitt had no serious thoughts of peace before the following autumn or winter, and that he proposed to postpone negotiations in order to make use of the conquest or threatened conquest of Martinique, seeing that he might have brought the preparations in North America to a standstill if he so wished. In any case his words find a natural explanation if we suppose him to have expected that negotiations would be protracted until the winter.

While he was attempting to secure fresh successes in this quarter, and to use them in England's favour during the negotiations, a highly important acquisition had been secured in another and far distant seat of war, which can well rival the American conquests in value. We have now to turn our attention to the course of developments which led up to this event.

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Dalrymple, February 14, 1761.—Colonial Office Records, Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt to Amherst, March 24, 1761.—Thackeray, ii. 499 f.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE STRUGGLE IN INDIA

HITHERTO I have been able to make but casual reference to the war in India, which, up to a certain point, falls within the limits of Pitt's career. It would have been inadvisable to treat the events of that war in chronological order; on the one hand they form a self-contained whole, and their influence upon the general course of events was unimportant and inappreciable until a later time; on the other hand no general view of the somewhat complicated progress of events in India would have been secured by such a manner of treatment. It is now time to resume this portion of our narrative, as without a knowledge of these events we cannot entirely explain the progress of the peace negotiations, or the final destiny of our hero.<sup>1</sup>

For two special reasons the war in India ran a separate and wholly characteristic course. On the one hand the scene of war was very far removed from the mother-country, and on the other hand the French and English colonies in India were under the control of companies, facts which greatly limited the possibility of co-operation by the home government. It was necessary to entrust the whole conduct of the war to some almost entirely independent person or corporation; the minister in London was too ignorant of the conditions to prescribe any course of operations, nor was it possible for his orders to reach the seat of war in time to be of value. Letters from India to London might take nine months or more in transit. Moreover, a representative power was already on the spot in the person of the colonial government, which was subordinate to

<sup>1</sup> The chief historical works on which I have relied are Robert Orme, *Military Transactions in Hindostan*, London 1803 (3 vols.), and Malleison, *History of the French in India*, London 1868.

the company, so that even personal questions remained without the competence of the home authorities. In the case of France this fact made little difference, as the French East India Company was entirely under the influence of the court, and the company's action might therefore be regarded as the action of the state. In England, however, the company was an individual and absolutely independent organisation, pursuing that policy in Asia which it deemed in accordance with its own principles and interests. It was so far dependent upon the diplomacy of the mother-country that it could not begin a war with European powers on its own responsibility. The struggle with the French was limited to the period between the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace. This limitation, however, was by no means strict, as either company constantly interfered in the struggles of native princes and fought as an auxiliary power even in time of peace.

England naturally had every interest in the retention and prosperity of her Indian possessions. French rivalry had become a very serious danger during the last decade, and must be crushed or expelled. The government was therefore far from averse to supporting the company during the war with money, troops, and ships. The home government, however, was in the position merely of an allied power; her relations with the company were analogous to those with Prussia in Europe; moreover, the supplies which the authorities sent out were by no means so full in the case of India as elsewhere. The government confined itself to sending what it could do without elsewhere, and left the company with the responsibility of defeating its enemies in all other respects. None the less, it cannot be denied that the eventual success of the English company was largely due to the help of the mother-country, and to the consistently opportune arrival of the royal fleets, and the credit for this service belongs chiefly to Pitt. The blockading and gradual destruction of the French naval power, and the ceaseless activity of the English dockyards, made itself felt in India, with the result that though the enemy possessed important resources and fought under favourable circumstances, they were unable to attain their objects, and eventually, exhausted by many fruitless efforts, lost their possessions.

I do not here propose to give a detailed account of the

whole course of the war, but to explain in a short narrative the influence of Pitt's arrangements upon the progress of the struggle. Such influence was chiefly exercised by means of the fleet, and to a lesser extent by the supplies of troops and money which it brought, though these were by no means unimportant. Naval operations are thus of primary importance to our present purpose, and at this point we have to refer to a fact which alone makes explicable naval movements off the Indian coasts, namely, the special character of the prevailing winds.

In the Indian Ocean these winds are extraordinarily regular. During the spring and summer the vast extent of Asiatic continent is warmed by the heat of the sun, and an upward current of air is consequently maintained. The air which thus rises is replaced by the cooler strata coming from the south seas, so that throughout this period a steady south wind blows along the coast of Nearer India. The modifications induced by the rotation of the earth may here be neglected. In the autumn and winter these conditions are reversed. The south seas are then warm, the air rises, and a backward current from the Asiatic continent follows, so that during that period the north wind prevails. These periodic winds are known as the monsoons. The south monsoon lasts from the beginning of April till the beginning of October, and the north from the end of October till the end of March; the intervening period of about twenty days is characterised by calms or light and fickle breezes. Off the Coromandel Coast, on the east of India, the north monsoon generally sets in with heavy weather and hurricanes; the more moderately these begin the longer they last, the stormy season may extend to December or even January, and to its dangers the ships on the open roadsteads of the Carnatic are almost entirely exposed.

These facts were naturally of extreme importance in a period when vessels depended entirely upon their sails. It was an advantage, especially for mercantile traffic, to be certain of a definite wind at definite times, but the difficulties of passage from point to point upon the coast at certain times were an extreme disadvantage to military operations. To sail from Ceylon to Madras and thence to Bengal in the winter, and to sail from the north to the south in summer, was almost



impossible, and in any case necessitated a great expenditure of time. Moreover, if a fleet delayed beyond October 15 off the Coromandel Coast, or reached that district before December 20, there was a risk of severe damage, if not of destruction, from storms. The admirals were consequently greatly hindered in their movements, and were often prevented from executing these at the proper moment.

With the first year of the war Pitt was not concerned, and his first measures respecting India date from January 1757; these could have produced no effect for many months. Hence it is advisable to give a short account of the events within that period.

We have already noticed<sup>1</sup> the grievous disaster which threatened to crush the English power in Bengal. On June 20, 1756, Calcutta had fallen into the hands of the nabob, Surajah Dowlah, who signalised his triumph with an unparalleled display of barbarity. The news of this appalling blow reached the presidency of Madras at the beginning of August; apprehensions for the safety of the town were accompanied by the deepest indignation at the cruelty of the nabob. In Madras measures had been proposed for securing an advantage of extreme importance. Colonel Bussy, who commanded the French Life Guards of the Subahdar of Deccan and was able to use the influence of this great prince in the interests of France, had incurred his master's disfavour as the result of a court intrigue. The Madras government was naturally anxious to turn this opportunity to account by replacing the French force with a body of English troops, and thus securing the confidence they had long striven to gain among the petty princes of the southern Indian states. The troops were already on the march when the news from Bengal obliged the abandonment of this promising project and the employment of all available forces for the recovery of the lost town and the punishment of its cruel enemy.

Admiral Watson had been posted at the English station from September 1754 with three men-of-war and a sloop of war; in December of that year he had been joined by Admiral Pocock with two men-of-war. In October 1755, when the approaching change of the monsoons forbade a further stay on the Coromandel Coast, the united squadron made an ex-

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 134 f.

pedition against the piratical Prince Angria, between Bombay and Goa. The expedition was supported by the help of Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, who had just arrived in Bombay to take command of Fort St. David; he was an officer who had already performed important service in previous campaigns. The force succeeded in overpowering the fortress of Gheria in February, and when the south monsoon began Clive returned to Madras on board of Watson's squadron, arriving in May 1756. When a commander-in-chief was required for Bengal he was chosen for the post, but it was not until the autumn that arrangements were made and forces concentrated for the expedition. On October 16 Watson's squadron of five ships weighed anchor with Clive and his troops on board. The delay cost the expedition dear, as only three ships were able to struggle against the violent north monsoon, which had just set in, and to reach the mouth of the Hooghly in December by a circuitous course. Although considerably weakened by the disaster, Clive succeeded within a few weeks in reconquering not only Calcutta, but also the settlement of Hooghly further up the river. Immediately afterwards the nabob advanced to recover his lost conquest, but on February 4 he was surprised in his camp by Clive; in his terror he agreed to a peace and to an alliance against all enemies.

Meanwhile the news of the outbreak of war had arrived. Clive, however, negotiated with the authorities of the French settlement Chandernagore, and secured the neutrality of the place, as he did not wish to stir up fresh enemies. However, when the nabob was recalled by disturbances in the west, Clive broke off negotiations and attacked the place, which surrendered on March 24 after a ten days' siege, in which the squadron operated. Admiral Pocock was present on this occasion; he had succeeded in reaching the mouth of the Ganges with one of the lost ships, and had rowed upstream in small boats. The nabob, incensed at the capture of the French settlement, an attack upon which he had expressly forbidden, returned with a powerful force; Clive then succeeded by great promises in inducing Meer Jaffier, an influential subject of the nabob, to betray his master. Secured by his agreement with this man he ventured to attack the nabob's superior forces, and succeeded in winning a decisive victory at Plassey on June 22, owing to the desertion of the

vassals who had been bribed. Surajah Dowlah was forced to flee, and Meer Jaffier ascended the throne of Bengal as the client of the English, after promising great accessions of territory to the company and to Clive. The possibility of a French return to these districts had thus been anticipated.

The organisation of these affairs naturally occupied a long time, during which Clive was kept in Bengal. He corresponded with Pitt upon the subject, and the views of that statesman upon the new acquisitions are of large interest. Pitt considered that there was some doubt as to whether these conquests belonged to the company or the crown, and in either case there was a possible danger that their high revenues might menace the freedom of the English nation. Clive might certainly be trusted to use these revenues for the public weal, but so much tact was not to be expected from his successors. Pitt was not entirely wrong in this view. The control of such vast wealth by a corporation or an individual would contribute more than ever to undermine the independence of Parliament in view of the prevailing system. The Indian 'nabob' with his purchase of constituencies, as prefigured in his own grandfather Thomas, was an influence of highly ominous nature upon English constitutional life.

The Madras presidency, of which since 1755 Mr. George Pigot had been governor, was reduced to a desperate condition by Clive's departure, and might well be satisfied if it succeeded in passing through this critical period, when its forces were reduced to their lowest limit, without serious loss. To begin with, the former unfavourable conditions at the court of the subahdar were soon restored. Bussy was able to maintain his ground and to secure a reconciliation with the ruler, who had been abandoned by the English. In the following year he crossed over to crush a revolt in the so-called Circars,<sup>1</sup> the coast provinces, and ample sources of help were thereby brought to the disposal of his government. The town of Vizagapatam, in which Pocock had left reinforcements, fell into Bussy's hands on June 25, 1757. However, in the Carnatic, the district about Madras and Pondicherry, the English cause was more successful. It is true that an expedition against the southern settlement of Madura was unsuccessful; the French under d'Auteuil availed

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 24.

themselves of the absence of the forces despatched on this expedition to make a fresh attempt upon the fortress of Trichinopoly, which had repeatedly proved impregnable during the time of Duplex. Here, however, a reverse took place. Captain Calliaud, the leader of the detachment, succeeded with great cleverness in entering the besieged town and repelling the attempted assault. A protracted invasion of the Mahrattas was not concluded until August 1757, but while inflicting severe loss upon the country, it caused no material damage to the English. Apart from these events, the war consisted of a series of indecisive skirmishes.

However, it was only to be expected that the position of the English would grow more desperate. The heavy losses incurred under Newcastle's ministry obliged the new government to retain their forces in Europe and to send all the troops that could be spared to America in order to restore the balance of power in that country. Little could be done for India in consequence. Moreover, Pitt was not yet able to prevent the departure of French expeditions, as England's naval strength was still inadequate for this purpose. The crisis which threatened England, Europe, and America until 1755 produced even more effect in India, and intensified the crisis which the struggles in Bengal had caused in that country. The forces sent out by France were more important than those despatched by England, though by no means proportionate to the power of the French state.

In the winter of 1756-7 arrangements were made to despatch two French squadrons to India, one in December with the Marquis de Soupires, the other at the beginning of March under Count Lally. The first squadron consisted of six men-of-war and six smaller vessels, the second of five men-of-war and a frigate. Either squadron carried more than 1000 infantry (the regiments of Lorraine and Lally) and 50 artillerists. England, on the other hand, sent out in that winter only four transport ships belonging to the company, with 200 recruits, together with Stevens's squadron, consisting of four men-of-war and a frigate. Thus the French forces were increased by eleven men-of-war, seven smaller vessels, and about 2300 men, the English reinforcements at the same time amounting to only four men-of-war, one frigate, and 200 men. As regards the naval forces, it must be remembered



that five English men-of-war were already in Indian waters, whereas the French government had no warships at its disposal, with the exception of a few cruisers belonging to the company. At the same time France was bound to become superior both at sea and by land if the whole of these transports arrived at the proper time, nor would Clive's return from Bengal, whenever it should occur, be able to restore the balance.

The squadron of Commodore Stevens weighed anchor in the first days of January. At the same time Pitt sent letters under date January 11, 1757, by the overland route through Asia Minor to Bombay, whence they were to be forwarded to the addressees, the Presidency of Madras and Admiral Watson. In the despatch to Watson,<sup>1</sup> which was to be regarded as containing the instructions of the new ministry, the following passage occurred: 'The Company have, it is to be hoped, a complete understanding of their own affairs, and may therefore make such plans of operation as they deem best suited to secure their possessions, or to inflict loss upon the enemy; the king is therefore anxious to arrange that the commanders of his ships should assist those of the Company's vessels in the execution of their plans; at the same time they are on all suitable occasions to inform the Company's captains of such actions as are practicable and suitable for his Majesty's ships and advisable for the general conduct of the war.' The commanders of the English squadrons were thus not placed under the orders of the Indian government, but sent out as an auxiliary force; while they were not empowered to take the conduct of operations, they were expressly given the right of making representations and offering such advice as they might think necessary. These letters arrived with a ship from Bombay in Madras on August 8, 1757, so that the Madras government received comparatively early news of the coming reinforcements.<sup>2</sup> They might be expected to become of effective value

<sup>1</sup> Mentioned in a despatch to Stevens of December 30, 1760.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Orme, ii. 230. We find information concerning the conveyance of such despatches in a memorandum of the Colonial Records, which refers to despatches afterwards sent overland, but gives no information upon their contents. It runs as follows: 'Spencer the Messenger was despatched from Whitehall to Constantinople by way of Vienna on the 11 of June, with letters to be forwarded

during that year, a prospect which influenced the conduct of the war.

On September 6, 1757, the four company's vessels previously mentioned reached the Coromandel Coast to hand over to the government the 200 recruits which they had on board. A frigate was immediately sent to meet them with orders for them to land their troops in St. David, where they were chiefly wanted. While this order was being executed eleven ships of war suddenly appeared on the horizon on September 8, and were immediately recognised as the enemy's squadron in spite of the fact that they showed the English colours. However, the task of disembarkation was successfully concluded, and the company's vessels escaped to Madras, passing by Pondicherry. The authorities of St. David, however, were deceived by the false colours, and imagining that they saw Stevens's squadron approaching sent out a messenger with a letter to the commodore, requesting him to cruise off Ceylon until Pocock's squadron returned from Bengal, whence he was expected in the middle of September. The messenger recognised his mistake too late and was captured, while his despatch, which he had hidden in the boat, was afterwards found and read.

The squadron which had thus appeared at St. David was that of the Marquis de Soupires. On June 25 he had reached the Isle de France, the island to the east of Madagascar, which the French used as an arsenal and a base of operations for India; there the governor of the island, Bouvet, had taken over the command of the fleet, which then appeared off St. David's on September 8. Soupires proposed an attack

from thence, overland, to East Indies. He arrived at Constantinople on the 9 of July. Mr. Porter sent the letters on the 10 to Mr. Drummond at Aleppo, who received them on the 25, since which no account has been received of these letters. Garstin the Messenger was despatched from Whitehall on the 16 July by way of Venice to Constantinople. He arrived at Venice the 10 August. Mr. Murray does not mention the day this Messenger left Venice, but it appears by Sir James Grieg's letters that he came to Naples about the 18 or 19 of August, and set out again on the 21. Mr. Porter in his letter of October 2 mentions the receipt of these despatches, but not the day the Messenger arrived at Constantinople. The route Mr. Murray directed this Messenger to take was from Naples to Otranto, from thence to cross over to Corfu, and proceed to Constantinople by Salonichi. It thus appears to have been the practice to send two messengers by different routes. According to Orme the first despatch went through Arabia, though it is more probable that it also was taken to the Persian Gulf by the route through the Euphrates district.

upon the town, and proceeded to disembark his troops as rapidly as possible. The fleet might have done excellent service in the course of the siege. When the above-mentioned letter was discovered, however, it appeared that the council of the fort was expecting an English fleet and that Pocock had been ordered to the south, whereupon the governor, Bouvet, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of his ships. He was continually apprehensive of his security, and, notwithstanding the general's opposition, returned to the Isle de France the moment that the disembarkation had been completed. He even carried off a portion of the artillery, declaring that it was impossible for him to sail without ballast. Under these circumstances Soupires could not venture to begin a siege of St. David, as he feared that his operations would soon be disturbed by the arrival of the English fleet. He might have turned upon Trichinopoly and have attempted to decide the struggle in that quarter, but his instructions forbade all enterprises at a distance until the commander-in-chief had arrived. Thus the danger threatened by the arrival of these forces was successfully obviated, and Pitt deserves much of the credit. His energy had secured the rapid despatch to India of the news that the squadron had started, news which fell by chance into the enemy's hands, and paralysed their action.

Bouvet's departure had been totally unnecessary, as neither Stevens nor Pocock appeared off the coast of the Carnatic. Watson had not received Pitt's despatch; he had died on August 16, and the naval command was left in the hands of Pocock, who did not feel himself able to leave Bengal. The revolution which brought Meer Jaffier to the throne was in full progress; he had also heard of the arrival of the French fleet, and feared a collision with so superior a force if his five vessels returned to the southern waters. The cheerful news of the Bengal revolution reached Madras on October 16, together with a communication from Pocock announcing his intention to remain in the Ganges. Immediately afterwards the hopes which had been placed upon the arrival of the ships from England were shattered. In that month the frigate *Queensborough* arrived, which Stevens had despatched to Madras from Madagascar, with the news that the approach of the monsoon change had decided the commodore to make Bombay

his first objective and to visit the Coromandel Coast at the beginning of the next year, 1758. No objection could be offered to this plan, as Stevens had been already so far delayed that he could not venture to expose his vessels to the danger of the storm period. His absence, however, was dangerous to the English cause, in so far as further French reinforcements might easily arrive during that period. Fortunately, it was soon discovered that the enemy expected no further vessels in that year, and the authorities were able to face the winter months with some equanimity.

These months produced no material change in the military situation. The English lost some neighbouring settlements, but Bussy was involved in a fresh series of difficulties. While he was absent at the coast the brother of the subahdar, Nizam Ally, succeeded, upon the occasion of a Mahratta invasion, in making himself viceroy, and in some degree guardian of his brother's person. Bussy thus received a check in this quarter for some time, and English apprehensions were relieved.

It was not until the spring of 1758, when the different fleets assembled at their respective meeting-places, that a more vigorous resumption of the war began. Pocock arrived with his whole squadron on February 24; he had been joined by the frigate *Queensborough* while returning from Bengal. He immediately despatched two frigates to cruise off Pondicherry and observe the enemy's movements. There they met Commodore Stevens on March 24, who was arriving with his four men-of-war from Bombay. The English fleet under Pocock thus amounted to nine men-of-war and three frigates, a force with which he might well venture to attack the enemy, even if they received further reinforcements. After the monsoon change, which was unattended with danger in the spring, the fleet sailed to the north point of Ceylon in order to get the weather gauge of the enemy on that coast, which would enable them to begin an engagement under more favourable conditions. For ten days, from April 17, the squadron had been beating against the wind, when the whole of the enemy's fleet was sighted in the neighbourhood of Negapatam.

This fleet ought to have left Brest on March 6, 1757, under the command of Count d'Aché, with Lally's troops on board. Pitt had received news of this intention, and had despatched



Admiral West in the middle of January 1757 to the French coasts with eleven ships of the line in order to intercept the departing squadron.<sup>1</sup> Pitt supposed that the departure would take place from Port l'Orient, where a flotilla of the company's ships was stationed; these, however, were merchantmen which had been refitted for war, and were intended only to complete the Brest squadron in case of necessity. Four of them had already started for India with Soupires. West therefore failed to meet the squadron, and d'Aché was able to sail unhindered. However, a storm damaged two of his men-of-war and obliged him to return to Brest for repairs. The governor then resolved, in view of the unfavourable news from Canada, to send these two ships to that country instead of to India, and d'Aché was obliged to replace them with three of the company's ships above mentioned. Thus his squadron amounted to five, one ship in excess of the previous number, though its offensive power was somewhat diminished. At length anchor was weighed for the second time on May 5, 1757, but unfortunately an infectious disease, contracted in port, made its appearance at sea and carried off no less than 300 men. The admiral was therefore obliged to put in at Rio de Janeiro and to wait for two months until he thought the disease had been stamped out. On the voyage to the Isle de France, however, which was reached on December 18, the troops suffered further from this malady.<sup>2</sup> Here d'Aché found the squadron of Bouchet, the addition of which gave him command of an imposing force. The last stage of the voyage was accomplished with extreme slowness, and three months were expended in reaching the Coromandel Coast, where they arrived on April 28, 1758.

Pocock found the French fleet, at nine o'clock in the morning of April 28, lying at anchor off Cuddalore, near St. David. A short time previously they had surrounded two English frigates and driven them ashore. D'Aché immediately set sail for Pondicherry. He attempted to recall two ships which had been sent in advance, the *Comte de Provence* and the frigate *Diligente*, with which Count Lally was on his way to Pondicherry; his signals, however, were disregarded,

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, January 15, 1757.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> This so-called Brest fever soon infected the English ships, and caused much mortality.

an act of disobedience which caused considerable friction between Lally and d'Aché. The latter now sailed north-east, the wind being from the south-east, and Pocock gave orders to pursue the enemy's fleet. About half-past twelve the enemy prepared for battle and formed in line. The French fleet numbered eleven ships, the English nine, but two small vessels which were attached to the French fleet took no serious part in the struggle, and retired at the opening of the cannonade. The squadrons were thus equal in number, though the English artillery was somewhat superior. The issue of the battle was not wholly successful for the English owing to the fact that Pocock's signals were misunderstood by the rear-guard. Instead of immediately tacking towards the ships they were intended to oppose, these three vessels remained in file, so that they could only enter the struggle in succession. The fire on either side caused great damage. The rigging of several English ships was destroyed and they became unmanageable, while on the French side two explosions took place, which cost a large number of lives. Eventually d'Aché broke off the fight prematurely at the moment when the *Comte de Provence* came to his support and the English line had been thrown into confusion. He sailed unpursued to Alamparva to the north of Pondicherry, where one of his men-of-war, the *Bien Aimé*, who had lost her anchor, ran ashore and was destroyed. Pocock was driven further northward beyond Madras, on account of two damaged vessels, which could not make head against the wind. Upon the whole he had suffered far less damage than the French, but for the moment he was unable to offer support to the land operations or to interfere with the extensive plans of the new French governor-general. However, the reinforcements despatched by Pitt enabled him to maintain his position on the coast.

During these events in India, Pitt, at the request of the directors of the East India Company, and after securing a legal opinion from Pratt and Charles Yorke, had granted the company the entire right of sovereignty over all districts that they might conquer.<sup>1</sup> Although he had received no news of Commodore Stevens's movements he had taken measures to secure that the English naval forces in those waters should be

<sup>1</sup> Colonial Office Records : East Indian Affairs.—Public Record Office.

a match for the enemy. On March 6, 1758, he despatched a transport fleet of six ships, with a force of 900 troops on board, under the energetic but extremely impetuous Lieutenant-Colonel Draper. Hitherto the government had contented itself with an annual grant of £25,000 to the company<sup>1</sup> in place of troops, but Pitt regarded Lally's expedition as so formidable a menace that he determined to send out a regiment of regular troops. The fleet sailed under the convoy of a company man-of-war bearing the name *Pitt*, a name for the second time in close connection with Indian affairs, and with two king's ships, the *Grafton* and the *Sunderland*, which were intended to reinforce Pocock. As France became more incapable every year of providing ships for Indian service, it was to be expected that the timely appearance of this squadron would finally remove the danger which threatened the English possessions.

Immediately after his arrival in Pondicherry Count Lally proceeded to besiege Fort St. David, a design which the French had long entertained. For six days the fleet beat up to Pondicherry from Alamparva against the monsoon and disembarked all the troops on board on May 6. Pocock also attempted to reach the decisive point, and made every effort to complete the refitting of his ships and to augment his crews from Madras, but his voyage against the wind was accomplished with such difficulty that he did not arrive off Pondicherry until May 28. The French fleet retired to St. David, and the poor condition of his vessels prevented a pursuit, the fleet being driven back to Alamparva. Meanwhile the fate of the fort was decided; after a bold defence which lasted a month, it succumbed to the enemy's superior forces, which could only have been equalised by the arrival of a powerful fleet. The capitulation was signed on June 2.

The immediate danger now was that the French governor might advance upon Madras with his whole force; here the English had concentrated their strength, abandoning their outlying posts. The Count, however, feared the presence of the English fleet, and thought it better to await its departure; moreover, he was short of money and of transport for his siege-train. He therefore began an expedition in July against the kingdom of Tanjore, where the French possessed the coast

<sup>1</sup> Cunningham, *Taxes*.

settlement of Karikal. He proposed to extort a large supply of money from the ruler, but the enterprise produced no result, as the capital town, Tanjore, repulsed the enemy, and an engagement between the fleets off Karikal ended in a French defeat. The French fleet, which had arrived in Karikal in May, was imprudently recalled to Pondicherry in the middle of June. Meanwhile the English squadron had been thoroughly refitted, and sailed southwards on July 25, whereupon d'Aché was obliged to work up once more to Karikal; after several skirmishes the battle began on August 3. It lasted barely two hours, severe damage being inflicted upon the French vessels with heavy loss of men. The English ships were also somewhat battered as regards their masts and rigging, though this was of less importance in view of the mildness of the prevailing winds. At two o'clock the French began to flee, and Pocock ordered a pursuit; his ships, however, were outailed by the enemy, and he therefore came to anchor off Karikal.

Thus the attempt upon Tanjore had ended in failure; a second attempt upon Trichinopoly produced the same result, and d'Aché, who declined to expose his vessels to fresh danger, resolved to return to the Isle de France. Lally and the council of Pondicherry made vain efforts to dissuade him; he agreed only to leave 500 sailors behind for the protection of the coast, and set sail with his whole fleet on September 3. Pocock was thus able to help the land operations with his squadron wherever his interference seemed advisable or possible. The position of the English was improved by the arrival of the vessel *Pitt*, which reached Madras on September 14 with Draper and 100 men on board. They announced that the remaining vessels would arrive before the change of the monsoon, though this statement was not realised. The fleet had made an admirably rapid passage.

Meanwhile Lally had committed a grievous error. Colonel Bussy had succeeded with great trouble in recovering his influence at the viceroy's court by replacing the friendly potentate in the possession of his power. No sooner had he attained his object than he was ordered by the governor-general to come to Pondicherry and to transfer the command of the Life Guard to another officer. The result was a diminution of French influence, and a force despatched by



Clive under Colonel Ford succeeded in subduing the most important settlement of the Circars during the autumn. The struggles and negotiations were long protracted, but the French enterprise no longer met with any effective support from the viceroy's court.

A critical time was now approaching for the English, as their fleet was also obliged to leave the east coast at the change of the monsoon. However, the presidency hoped that Lally would make no attack upon Madras during the rainy season, which lasted till the end of November, and that help would then be provided by Pocock's return or by the arrival of reinforcements from England. The admiral therefore weighed anchor on October 16, leaving behind a naval force of 100 men, and on his return to Bombay he found that the English fleet of transports and men-of-war had already arrived with 600 troops, so that upon the conclusion of the stormy season he would be able to confront the French with superior forces.

Meanwhile, however, the storm was gathering in Madras. After securing his hold of the interior as far as was possible, Lally advanced upon the capital, while the English abandoned all the less important posts and concentrated their forces for the protection of the town. The struggle began on December 12, and the native or black town fell into the hands of the French forthwith. Siege operations were then directed against Fort St. George, where Pitt's grandfather had formerly been governor and had successfully resisted the nabob. The siege material was laboriously transported by sea in boats, but the French preparations were deficient in many respects, and much time was lost, from which fact the English reaped no small advantage. It was not until January 6 that the bombardment began, and a few weeks afterwards the garrison received a message from Pocock together with the help of one of the company's ships, which had remained in Ceylon during the storms, and now arrived before the rest. The only men on board were the invalids of the expedition, but many valuable supplies were disembarked. The assailants suffered from want of money, a standing deficiency in the French camp, and began to consider the advisability of raising the siege. Their sepoy were already revolting, as they could not secure their pay. Their deliberations were

decided by news of the approach of a transport fleet from Bombay which they received on February 16. A vigorous bombardment was maintained for a day and a night, but proved ineffective; on the 17th the English reinforcements were disembarked in the morning, and Lally was forced to order a retreat. The besiegers blew up a redoubt and powder mill in the black town, and retired southwards, abandoning many guns. The town was saved and the most difficult crisis was successfully surmounted, a change of fortune which formed a suitable introduction to the most successful year of Pitt's ministry. As we have seen, the news of the success reached him with accounts of victories from many other quarters. Here again it may be said that success was largely due to Pitt, as his despatch of a regiment of imperial troops ultimately necessitated the raising of the siege, a result which Pocock's original fleet would not have been able to effect so immediately.

The failure of this, the chief effort of the French, naturally raised the prestige of the English among the native princes, and facilitated the task of maintaining their ground elsewhere and of recovering settlements that had been lost. The war continued in a series of skirmishes and petty expeditions until one of the combatants had gained sufficient advantage and power to deliver a more decisive blow. The English naval forces appeared off the Coromandel Coast on April 28, 1759, but exerted no material influence for the moment upon the operations which were in progress in the interior. Pocock concentrated his attention upon the expected French fleet, and betook himself for that reason to the north promontory of Ceylon, where he met fresh reinforcements from England in July. In the winter of 1758-9 Pitt had again been able to use a regiment of the king's troops, commanded by Colonel Coote, which was despatched to India on transports under a convoy of four men-of-war, the command of the squadron being entrusted to Admiral Cornish. Pocock now took command of five of these ships, and transferred their troops to his own vessels in Negapatam. Though himself urgently in need of men, he then handed over these forces to the governor of Madras, as the conquest of the French Circars in the north absorbed a large number of troops.

Count d'Aché had refitted and materially reinforced his

fleet at the Isle de France during the winter, for upon his return to the island in September he found three ships of the line in harbour, apart from several merchantmen. His return to India upon this occasion was unusually delayed, as he had the utmost difficulty in providing the necessary provisions for his numerous force. He was obliged to send ships to Madagascar and to the Cape to purchase what was wanted. Thus it was not until the end of August 1759 that he arrived off Ceylon, where Pocock's squadron had long been waiting for him. After much manœuvring the battle began on September 10 off Point Pedras.

On this occasion the English were in a minority, which was not merely apparent, but real. D'Aché had eleven men-of-war and Pocock only nine. The battle was fierce and obstinate, and on either side most of the ships were put out of action. One after another was forced to leave the line, until finally the pilot of the French flagship gave the signal to retreat on his own responsibility. D'Aché attempted to prevent the movement, but was severely wounded at that moment, and the whole fleet turned to flight. The condition of the English ships, many of which had to be taken in tow, made pursuit impossible. Though the English had some right to claim the victory, the result was by no means decisive. The English fleet was in a far more desperate condition than the French, and would probably have suffered a severe disaster had the enemy shown a little more tenacity.

After the battle Pocock anchored in the roadstead of Negapatam and D'Aché four miles further to the south. The French commander, after repairing his ships as rapidly as possible, sailed to Pondicherry, where he disembarked some troops and provisions. He himself remained on board and resolved to return immediately to the Isle de France, as he had received news of the approach of Admiral Cornish. The authorities again protested against his departure, and a great assembly of citizens solemnly declared that the loss of the colony was inevitable if he did not remain. While these negotiations were in progress the English fleet appeared in the neighbourhood on September 25, but unfavourable winds prevented them from taking the offensive. Formed in line they waited the assault of the French for a whole day, but D'Aché declined the conflict, and leaving 900 men on shore,

began his retreat to the Maskarenes. Thus Pocock was once again master of the sea, and the native tribes became convinced that the French power was declining, an idea which made its influence felt in all land operations.

In the middle of October Pocock prepared to run down as usual to the Malabar Coast for security against the storms, when he received news of the approach of the expected squadron. He at once set sail, and met Cornish off Pondicherry on the 18th; the newly arrived troops were immediately sent to Madras on a frigate and three transport ships, and from thence a detachment proceeded to Bengal. Pocock himself sent Cornish's man-of-war with two of his own, which were in need of repairs, to Tellicherry, near Mahé, on the southern coast of Malabar, and sailed with his own vessels for Bombay. Cornish was to return to Madras on December 15, but so protracted was his voyage that it was not until February 27, 1760, that he entered the roadstead of the capital.

Meanwhile the French camp was divided by a conflict of opinions as to the mode of waging the land war during the winter. Lally was anxious to deal rapid and decisive strokes, as he had no supplies for lengthy operations, and wished to profit by the absence of the English fleet; Bussy, on the other hand, desired to avoid an engagement until the English had been sufficiently weakened by the cutting of their communications. There was much to be said for both projects, but the count insisted upon his view, and the French therefore resumed the offensive. After a series of minor undertakings, including a second raid upon the southern states, Lally resolved to attack the town of Wandiwash, lying between Madras and Pondicherry; this enterprise ended in a battle which decided the fate of southern India. The English, under the command of Coote, advanced to the help of the threatened town, and on January 21, 1760, Lally accepted battle, for which the main forces of either combatant were concentrated. The European portion of the French army amounted to 1350 infantry and 150 cavalry, supported by 300 sepoy and 60 Mahrattas; an alliance with the Mahratta chief had been concluded, though no greater force could be secured at the decisive moment. On the English side fought 1900 Europeans, including 80 cavalry and 350 natives. The opposing armies were thus extremely small, but none the



less the result of the conflict was to be of extreme importance for the history of the world. For our purpose it is especially noteworthy that the flower of the English force consisted of the regiments of Draper and Coote despatched by Pitt, together with two regiments of the East India Company, and that the commanding officer, Colonel Coote, was one of Pitt's appointments. Without these reinforcements it would certainly have been impossible to break the French power.

The French occupied a defensive position, the strongest point of which was on the left flank, where Bussy was in command. On that side was a tank, with entrenchments on its further shore. In the centre, which showed no special point of strength, Lally himself was in command, and the cavalry was on the right wing, upon the open ground. Behind the centre were two defiles occupied by fifty men with two guns. The English attack upon this position was made in two movements. Coote himself led the first assault, his force being composed of his own regiment and a battalion of sepoys, while Colonel Draper commanded a second force, consisting of his own and two regiments of the company. On their approach Lally ordered the cavalry to attack the columns on the left flank, in the hope of throwing them into confusion, but the prevailing lack of discipline in his army became fatally apparent. The commanding officer declined to obey, and when the count replaced him with another, the insubordination was repeated. Not until Lally placed himself at the head of the squadron did the cavalry advance, but the favourable moment had then passed. Colonel Draper had observed the danger, and placed two guns in position, which threw the assailants into confusion with a discharge of grape, and forced them to retreat. Lally returned to the infantry in the centre, formed them into column, and broke the enemy's lines, notwithstanding their very effective fire. The neighbouring troops then turned and assaulted the assailants upon the flank in a furious hand-to-hand conflict. The battle, however, was not lost, provided that the left wings defended their fortified position. Here, however, a misfortune broke the force of the defence. A powder waggon exploded, and not only put eighty men out of action, but so appalled the remainder that they left their trenches in wild flight. Bussy immediately brought up the battalions of the centre and delivered a bayonet charge,

but his horse was shot under him, and he himself was taken prisoner. Resistance at this point was paralysed. Overpowered by superior forces, and harassed by the artillery, the troops retreated. Fortunately the cavalry opposed the victors and prevented an effective pursuit.

With this battle of Wandiwash the fate of the French in India was sealed. Hitherto they had shown superiority at least by land, and only the interference of the fleet had prevented the success of their operations; now, however, they had suffered a decisive defeat at the moment when the fleet was absent. There was thus little hope that they could maintain their ground after the return of the English squadron. The English operations after this battle aimed at surrounding the hostile capital of Pondicherry. On February 23 Admiral Cornish appeared in the roadstead of Madras with his six men-of-war, and prepared to take his part in the proposed enterprise.

The most important of the measures in preparation was the siege of Karikal, situated in the south at the mouth of the Coleroon, a place remaining in French possession to the present day. Pondicherry drew most of its provisions from this source. A detachment from Trichinopoly and the fleet of Cornish were sent upon this enterprise, notwithstanding the danger that the reappearance of the French fleet from the Isle de France might ruin the whole of the operations, or even end in the destruction of the English squadron. Fortunately these apprehensions were not realised, and after a siege of several days the town was forced to surrender on April 5. The other important places in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry were unable to hold out, and fell, one after another, into the conqueror's hands. Thus the French army was gradually driven back to its last possession, while reinforcements steadily came in to the English, both from the native princes, who joined the victorious side, and from the mother-country, where Pitt was making special efforts to procure them.

In the winter of 1759-60 most eager preparations were made in England, as we have already seen, to complete and to turn to the best account the great successes of the preceding campaign. In these preparations India was not forgotten, as the most recent news of the safety of Fort St. George had marked a turning-point in the great struggle. In the spring of 1760

two expeditions were despatched, one in February, consisting of three ships of the line and several belonging to the company, with 500 men of a Scottish Highland regiment; the second expedition followed in May, and was composed of two men-of-war, some merchantmen transporting the remainder of the regiment. The first arrived on September 2 off Cuddalore, near Pondicherry, and was able to take part in the whole of the siege operations; the second was forced by the change of the monsoon to make for the coast of Malabar, which was reached in the second half of December, and the troops were employed upon an expedition in that district. Admiral Pocock did not return to the Coromandel Coast, the scene of his former triumph. During his stay in Bombay, in the winter of 1760, he received orders from the admiralty to return to England on the *Yarmouth*, and to convoy a large fleet of Indian merchantmen from St. Helena to English harbours. This step was no affront to the admiral's meritorious services and to his five years of success in India, but rather a token of the importance attached by Pitt to the safe arrival of this rich fleet. The results of that arrival we have seen elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> Stevens took Pocock's place as naval commander-in-chief. With four men-of-war he arrived off Cuddalore on April 25, and effected a union with Cornish, who was returning from Karikal. To this force were soon added the remaining ships, which had been obliged to wait in Bombay, so that in the summer no less than fourteen men-of-war were concentrated in the neighbourhood of the enemy's capital, a force sufficiently powerful to oppose the expected French fleet.

This fleet, however, did not appear, and France accordingly lost her last prospects of retaining her Indian possessions. Count d'Aché found a most dismal state of affairs in the Isle de France upon his return in December 1759. There was a lack of almost every kind of supply, and it was difficult to make provision for the needs of the fleet. At the end of January the island was devastated by a fearful hurricane, which inflicted heavy damage upon the fleet, and caused yet greater destruction by land. Whole buildings, including the naval arsenals, were destroyed, the crops were ruined, and large numbers of cattle were killed. No less than three months

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *supra*, pp. 311 and 321.

were expended in repairing the damage of the storm and bringing the ships into a seaworthy condition. Before the necessary supplies could be procured news arrived from France on June 8 that the English government was fitting out a squadron for an attack upon the Maskarenes, and that the French ministry was therefore sending out 700 men for the protection of the islands. D'Aché was accordingly ordered not to return to India, and to recall any ships that might have been sent out. The news was false, but Pitt seems purposely to have circulated such rumours, with the object of paralysing the French power. In the winter of 1760-61 the Prussian ambassadors reported a great expedition to the Maskarenes, which was ultimately directed against the island of Belle Isle. Pitt had merely sent orders to Admiral Stevens to offer his co-operation should the East India Company project an attack upon this island.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the French sea power came to an end at the moment when the war entered upon its final stages, and the task of the English generals was greatly facilitated in consequence. They were full masters of the sea, and could therefore close the besieged town far more hermetically than the French had been able to blockade Madras. At the beginning of September the remaining three warships arrived, bringing the other part of the Scottish regiment, so that the roadstead was now guarded by seventeen men-of-war with other vessels. The French had only three frigates, the *Compagnie des Indes*, which d'Aché had left behind, the *Hermione* and the *Baleine*, which had arrived from the Isle de France in July with news of the hurricane; they had also a schooner, which enabled them at times to bring boat-loads of corn to the town. These ships, however, fell into the hands of the English. The *Hermione* and the *Baleine* were captured under the shore batteries by a cutting-out expedition on the night of October 6; the other two ships were captured in November by the *Salisbury*, which was unexpectedly returning from its winter quarters.

A period of crisis was caused by the change in the monsoons and the resulting stormy season, for it was absolutely necessary to abandon the coast during these months. Departure was delayed as long as possible, until October 22-23,

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Stevens, December 30, 1760.—Chatham MSS.



and the return voyage was begun unusually early. As on this occasion the fleet had not been into action or suffered any disaster, there was no necessity for any extensive repairs at Bombay. Stevens therefore sailed with all his vessels except two, which were in need of repairs, to the harbour of the Dutch settlement of Trincomalee on the east coast of Ceylon, which offered adequate protection from storms, and returned to Pondicherry about the middle of December with eight ships of the line and some other vessels. Cornish was to arrive with the remainder at the end of the month. The importance of the issue at stake outweighed considerations of prudence. The result was a grievous disaster. On December 30 a violent storm arose, and most of the ships were unable to reach the open sea in good time. Only Stevens's flagship remained uninjured; four of the men-of-war were obliged to seek safety by cutting away their masts, and six vessels, including three men-of-war, were driven ashore or foundered. On these latter no less than 1100 European lives were lost, though the whole of the crews were saved from the others.

This was a disastrous conclusion to the maritime operations, but the French hopes that the fleet had been destroyed were not realised. Those ships that had been saved soon met and were made moderately seaworthy. Cornish, who had already started and had escaped with slight damage in the open sea, arrived, and a week after the catastrophe eleven men-of-war were again riding off Pondicherry. From that moment only a few days passed before the capitulation of the town, though the rising hopes of the garrison delayed the end for a short time.

The siege was unexpectedly protracted, as Lally made every effort to oppose the superior forces of the enemy. He had made an alliance with the military commander of Mysore, in whose favour he evacuated the town, with a promise of further acquisitions of territory. This general, afterwards the famous Hyder Ali, succeeded in defeating the English forces on July 18. Shortly afterwards he was recalled by his prince, but with rare honour he did not hesitate to return the town to the French. On September 4 Lally undertook a bold and well-prepared sortie; but the attempt was ruined by the mistake of a subordinate, and no further obstacle could be raised to a close blockade. The chief danger to the

French was the disunion in their own camp. Lally could with difficulty secure obedience, and was exposed to the violent hostility of his council and of the citizens. There was, moreover, a grievous want of stores, which eventually necessitated the capitulation. When the storm broke out and destroyed a large portion of the English works, in addition to the damage to the fleet, the prospect of a sortie seemed favourable. Lally, however, was ill in bed, and did not care to entrust such an enterprise to any one else. The opportunity was thus allowed to pass, and as the expected French fleet did not appear, the government eventually resolved to begin negotiations, which ended in a capitulation on January 16, 1761. Admiral Stevens remained off the town until the end of February, when he sailed with his prisoners and a number of artillery to Bombay, to help if necessary in the siege of Mahé, the only settlement on the west coast. The Bombay troops, however, proved adequate to this task, together with the final reinforcements despatched by Pitt, which were landed at the beginning of January in Dellicherry, near Mahé. On February 13 the commander surrendered the fortress without waiting for an assault.

Thus the French power in India was not only broken, but destroyed. The reasons for its utter disappearance within a few years are to be found in the grievous mistakes of the French commanders, in the vacillating, timorous movements of the French fleet, and particularly in the inconsistent attitude of the home government. On one occasion the French sent out a considerable force, a clever use of which might have secured the upper hand, but they then declined to provide the necessary reinforcements, so that their forces consequently diminished. On the other hand, though Pitt showed great economy at the outset, he allowed not a year to pass without sending out as many ships and troops as he could spare, so that the final amount of reinforcements despatched was considerable, and not merely was the lost equilibrium restored, but a large preponderance secured to the English side.

All these forces were now available for use elsewhere after the capture of the last fortress. Apart from the vessels and regiments available from America, Pitt had no less than fifteen men-of-war and three regiments ready for action at

any other seat of war. The fact naturally exercised a considerable influence upon his diplomatic attitude, and made him disinclined to meet his adversaries with compliance. We shall observe the effects of this circumstance in the peace negotiations which we have now to describe.

## CHAPTER XV

### NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE

WE have now a general view of the military situation, without which the progress of negotiations would be unintelligible. All the military events which we have hitherto mentioned were known in London by March 1761, with the exception of the siege and conquest of Pondicherry. This, however, seemed only a matter of time, as at the beginning of December a French fleet had been destroyed off the Maskarenes (though this news was exaggerated), and as information had been received of the fall of Karikal, a settlement of high importance to Pondicherry.<sup>1</sup> It remains only to mention a few events in western Germany which disturbed the calm of the winter and inflicted a new blow upon the pride of France.

The French army had been divided in December 1760. Marshal Broglie was in command of the troops on the Maine and in Hesse, while the body stationed on the lower Rhine was under the independent leadership of Prince Soubise. Both divisions lay widely scattered in their winter quarters, Cassel and Göttingen forming the most advanced positions. Fighting began as early as January, as Broglie attempted to protect his wings against the enterprising cavalry leaders of the enemy, but the main action was reserved for February. At the outset of this month Ferdinand concentrated his troops in several bodies, which took the offensive almost simultaneously, and beginning a wide détour upon either side attempted to occupy the country to the south of Cassel. Broglie had made no preparations for such an attack, and was only able to bring up his divisions very slowly. He was therefore obliged to retire from the capital of Hesse and was driven from one position to another, burning his magazines

<sup>1</sup> Reports of the Prussian embassy, December 2 and 6, 1760.—Berlin Archives.



for the most part, and with them the fine collegiate church of Fulda. Eventually the marshal took up a fortified position in the neighbourhood of Hanau, and resolved to offer resistance to the enemy's approach. Meanwhile the allied troops who had been left behind began the siege of Cassel, which they regarded as of more importance than any other possible advantage.

The retreat of the French almost became a flight, and immediately led to friction between the allied courts. The Austrian general, Haddick, had neglected to comply with Broglie's request for reinforcements from Thüringen. On this account the Austrian statesmen were bitterly reproached by the French, and the differences of opinion already subsisting on the question of peace were intensified. Starhemberg in Paris anticipated a complete breach between the powers.

The position, however, soon changed. At Hanau Broglie, with other reinforcements, received a considerable acquisition from the army of the lower Rhine, and became by degrees not only equal, but superior to his foe, until he found himself able to exact retribution for the loss he had suffered. While Cassel was hard pressed and regarded as lost by the French ministry, the army of the Main slowly advanced into Hesse. On March 21 the Crown Prince of Brunswick received a severe check at Altenheim, and on the 28th Count William of Bückeburg withdrew the besieging forces from Cassel. By the end of March the armies were in their former positions, and the French seemed to have repaired their defeat; at the same time, the successful surprise and repulse of Broglie's force had increased the general confidence in the offensive powers of the allied army and caused a corresponding diminution in the prestige of the French.

The prospects of the great coalition were thus none too favourable, nor could success be foreseen with any certainty. Consequently the courts both of Vienna and Versailles became exceedingly anxious for peace during this winter, but widely different views prevailed upon the methods which could be adopted to secure this result.<sup>1</sup> Kaunitz saw little prospect of further advantage in Silesia, and therefore attempted to secure compensation by means of a complicated interchange of territory;<sup>2</sup> he was anxious for a general congress of all

<sup>1</sup> On the following see Schäfer, ii. b, 186-98.

<sup>2</sup> Arnetz, *Maria Theresia*, vi. 209 f.

the belligerent powers. If the work of a congress of this nature was slow, it was yet absolutely effective, and it did not destroy the possibility of finally crushing the King of Prussia, even in this year, should some favourable change of situation occur. The French minister, on the other hand, was anxious to secure peace as rapidly as possible, as he felt the knife at his throat. He wished to see England and France conduct negotiations in the name of their allies, and therefore urged the different courts to lay their proposals before the authorities at London and Versailles. The composition of these proposals would then be the task of the western powers. These conflicting projects led to a violent quarrel between the two ministers in February, which was increased by the above-mentioned action of General Haddick. Eventually the Austrian proposal was accepted, and the allied powers were asked whether they were prepared to send delegates to a peace congress at Augsburg. Answers in the affirmative arrived in the middle of March, and Choiseul then asserted his resolve to begin direct negotiations with England side by side with the congress. Starhemberg was little inclined to agree, but saw no way to refuse his assent, and in a conference of ambassadors on March 25 the declaration<sup>1</sup> was formulated for presentation to the courts of Berlin and London. The declaration was in continuity with that formerly issued by England and Prussia, and proposed, without adducing further reasons, the holding of a congress in the very convenient centre of Augsburg. Far more important, and far more likely to be successful, was a memoir transmitted to Pitt, with a covering letter, in which Choiseul proposed direct negotiations between the two western powers. The Russian ambassador, Prince Galitzin, undertook the task of its presentation.

This memoir began by asserting that the questions at issue in the Anglo-French war were entirely different from those involved in the German war, and required separate treatment. As a basis for negotiations the memorial proposed the principle of *uti possidetis*; either party was to be regarded as in actual possession of the districts occupied, and the process of exchange

<sup>1</sup> The official documents of the negotiations are printed in Comte de Garden, *Histoire générale des Traités de paix*, iv. 96 ff. Other sources are quoted separately.

would then take place as might appear in harmony with the interests of either side. That the process of conquest might not go on to infinity, continually changing the situation and delaying any definite conclusion, the memoir proposed definite dates, which should determine the question of possession, epochs, as they are known in the later negotiations. These epochs were to vary with the distance of the several seats of war, so that operations already begun might be concluded. Thus, for Europe the date proposed was May 1, 1761; for West India and Africa, July 1; and for East India, September 1. In this manner Choiseul hoped to arrive speedily at his object, provided that the English were as honestly anxious for peace as the French.

Negotiations were thus opened; their success depended upon the views prevailing upon either side and upon the vigour with which those views were pressed.

To understand what follows we must realise the fact that peace is possible at any moment of a war, provided that either side can gain a clear conception of the actual situation, and is desirous to perpetuate this situation by a compact arranged under forms as advantageous as possible to both parties. Thus the actual military situation is not the only point at issue; other important factors must be taken into account: the favourable or unfavourable prospects of either side, the military and financial resources which could be brought into play, possible alliances, and everything else which could influence the further development of the war. All these matters have, so to speak, to be previously discounted before a satisfactory peace can be produced. It is also necessary to take account of the safety of territory after the conclusion of peace, as compared with its previous insecurity, the danger of a possible outbreak of a war, or of future tension, if too high an advantage is secured, and the reluctance of subject nations to the government of a conqueror. In modern times these somewhat intangible factors have become of great importance, and the occupation of whole states has often ended in the acquisition only of small portions of frontier land. The question is also connected with the change in strategical theory, which aims rather at the destruction of the enemy's forces than at the occupation of his territory. Finally, the intensity of desire for peace is also an important factor, acting

to the disadvantage of the party with whom it is strongest. This, too, is more important at the present day, when a nation is affected by a war in a wholly different degree than was possible in the eighteenth century.

In the present case a very different view of the situation was taken by either party. To begin with, a war extending over much of the habitable globe is not easily followed, and to form a correct and therefore identical opinion was difficult; moreover, every reason for divergence of opinion was provided by the highly complicated diplomatic relations and alliances into which either party had entered. Thus, if any favourable result was to be secured, the intangible factor, the desire for peace, must be so strong on either side, or at least upon one, as to prepare the nation for real or apparent sacrifice, and so to bridge the gulf. The matter, however, was further complicated by the fact that the leading statesmen in either camp were not absolutely independent. They were obliged to consider other powers which did not regard the situation in a similar light, a circumstance the influence of which might be favourable or unfavourable, but must always be remembered if we are to gain a complete conception of the progress of events.

The conduct of French policy lay, as we know, in the hands of the Duke of Choiseul, whose predominance at that moment was quite unusual.<sup>1</sup> He owed his position to his capacity and political experience, though he was by no means pre-eminent for these qualities, and still more to his determination and boldness, which led him to stake his full resources in a struggle for power, and never to be satisfied with a half-success. His daring but dexterous use of sarcasm enabled him to subjugate M<sup>me</sup> de Pompadour, so that he remained in entire possession of the king's confidence. His power was further strengthened by the death of Marshal Bellisle, his old rival, at the end of January 1761, which brought both the ministry for foreign affairs and the war ministry under his control. The duke was strongly desirous of peace, which he regarded as urgently necessary for France on account of the shattered condition of her financial and economic resources. He was prepared to make great sacrifices, and to begin by abandoning the interests of his allies.<sup>2</sup> Austria, Saxony, and

<sup>1</sup> Stanley's account is printed in Thackeray, ii. 579 f.

<sup>2</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 335 ff. Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, vi. 193 f.



Poland troubled his conscience but little, in view of the dismal results achieved by the great alliance, and the suspicions entertained of his intentions by these powers are apparent in the violent resistance which they offered to the separate negotiations with England. In transmaritime questions Choiseul was also prepared to make important concessions, provided he could secure certain vital interests for France; on this latter point he showed an invincible tenacity.

High as his power was, it was by no means absolute. Counteracting forces were constantly attempting to thwart his plans and undermine his position. The dauphin and his Saxon wife zealously upheld the Austrian alliance, and were anxious only for a peace in accordance with the wishes of the allied courts. They were ready to allow Choiseul to give away as many of the colonies as he liked, provided there was no infringement of the understanding with Vienna and Dresden, or of the existing compacts. On their side was the powerful Jesuit order,<sup>1</sup> the existence of which was threatened by the king as it was hated by the people, and which therefore clung to the heir-apparent. The Jesuits were also anxious for a continuance of the great alliance which represented a union of the chief Catholic states against the champions of Protestantism. A further opponent of a premature conclusion of peace was the Marquis of Grimaldi, who had held the post of Spanish ambassador in Paris since February 1761; he considered that concessions for Spain might more easily be gained from England while the war was in progress than after its conclusion. Charles III. was vigorously engaged in improving his army and fleet in the hope of increasing the pressure upon England. Lord Bristol found himself obliged, at the end of February, to send an inquiry to the Spanish government with regard to these extraordinary preparations,<sup>2</sup> which were then conducted with greater prudence.

Choiseul's views were supported by the king and the leading classes, and for the moment he had no reason to fear the opposition. If, however, the negotiations ran too unfavourable a course, in other words if his policy proved disastrous, their views might become dangerous, and he might even be forced

<sup>1</sup> See Stanley's report in Thackeray, i. 521.

<sup>2</sup> Bristol's report of February 23, 1761.—Chatham MSS.

to accept them.<sup>1</sup> There were certain limits of compliance which he could not pass, particularly with regard to trans-maritime territory, as he would otherwise lose the support of the nation. If peace could not be secured without such concessions, he would be obliged to fall back upon the opposition, and at their demands to break off negotiations, in order at least to secure their further support. In the event of a continuance of war, the help of the Austrian alliance and of Spain was an urgent necessity. It was possible that the English government might be induced to give way by the threat of an alliance with Spain.

Such was the position on the French side. The views of the English authorities were to a certain extent precisely the contrary. The leader of the English policy had been willing to consider peace, but upon the absolute condition of turning an unusually advantageous position to the utmost advantage, preferring to continue the war rather than make it possible for the enemy to menace England afresh hereafter. Pitt was anxious that a peace should secure to his state all territorial acquisitions now in military occupation, while he was inclined to make no concessions to those less tangible influences, such as the desire for peace, which also existed in England. Such was the general tenor of the advice which he gave to the king in the middle of April. After emphasising the advantages of the military situation in Germany and elsewhere, and the probable victories to be gained in the East Indies and in Martinique, he explained 'that these should enable us to secure a peace, securing us in absolute possession of Canada, Cap Breton, the islands, harbours, and fisheries, and especially the exclusive right to the Newfoundland fisheries; if he was ever brought to sign a treaty which did not secure these points, he would regret that he had ever recovered the use of his right hand.'<sup>2</sup> His attitude may be regarded as unjustifiably aggressive, and has often been thus explained, and not only by partisans of France. Consideration, however, must be given, as Pitt gave it, to the favourable prospects afforded by a prosecution of the war, which increased even during the negotiations. These were to a certain extent discounted by the fact that Pitt declined all moral obligation to concession,

<sup>1</sup> So in the instructions to Bussy.—Schäfer, ii. b, 335.

<sup>2</sup> Report of an audience of the king.—Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 23.

and insisted obstinately upon the retention of all conquests. On the other hand was the Spanish alliance, which France certainly had in prospect, but this Pitt hoped to prevent by diplomatic means. In the last event the Pyrenean peninsula might be brought to its senses by a few rapid blows. The English fleet was not only far greater than the allied fleets of the two Bourbon powers, but possessed long military experience and capable admirals, while the Spanish fleet was a new construction. There was, moreover, no lack of points beyond the seas where Spain lay open to attack.

Notwithstanding the advantageous nature of his prospects Pitt did his best during the early stages of the negotiations to remain on good terms with Spain, but his view of the situation forbade any extensive concessions upon the disputed points at issue or any intimidation by the possibility of a new war. He did not attempt to provoke war, and even sought to avoid it by a pacific attitude, but he would make no serious sacrifices for peace, whereas Spain expected some such sacrifice from England, which was already involved in war and menaced by further trouble of the kind.

The views of the Duke of Newcastle were entirely opposed to those of Pitt. The duke regarded peace as absolutely necessary for England, for he considered the country as unable to bear the steadily increasing expense of war for any longer time. Moreover, he hoped that peace would restore him to his old power. He therefore wished compliance pushed as far as would secure this object. The surrender of this or that acquisition seemed to him at bottom a matter of indifference. This was an utterly unstatesmanlike attitude, unjustified by the situation, and likely to end in severe loss if strictly maintained. The desire for peace at any price is ever a most dangerous factor, as the enemy may be impelled by news of it to the most immoderate demands. No conqueror can secure a rational peace unless he be willing for the continuation of war.

Midway between these extremes stood Lord Bute and the king, whose views provide the key to the further course of events, and therefore require a closer examination. Bute was as anxious as Newcastle to see peace restored, and would perhaps have been ready to make some sacrifice to secure it, but he had reasons for divergence upon the point. In the

first place he was obliged to consider the national opinion, as he did not wish to endanger the popularity of his master, which would be useful to the king in the approaching struggle against the party system. The greater part of the nation was indeed still anxious for peace, but a long series of victories had so raised their self-esteem that they regarded the permanent maintenance of their conquests as an indispensable condition; the surrender of conquered territory would be regarded as culpable weakness, if not as treachery. So far public opinion coincided with Pitt's ideas, but, unlike Pitt's, it was not based upon a clear knowledge of the military situation and the prospects of future success, but upon irrational greed, which produced a chance similarity of opinion. Bute was thus forced into Pitt's arms, and supported his policy even where he disapproved of his measures.<sup>1</sup> We find him vigorously supporting these views, especially against the Duke of Bedford, the champion of a compliant peace policy, and the public gained an impression that Pitt and Bute were in close alliance, an impression indeed confirmed by the remembrance of Pitt's earlier relations with Leicester House.

Bute's attitude was not merely decided by his respect for public opinion. He would have thrown his influence into the scale against Pitt if he had regarded his aims as impracticable or the prevailing public opinion as irrational. But his esteem for Pitt's diplomatic capacity and for the weight of his reputation was so great that he regarded the subjugation of France as entirely possible, so long as Pitt remained at the head of affairs. Hence he considered that obstruction on his part to the progress of negotiations was neither advisable nor necessary. He was also under the dominant influence of his experienced colleague, who was able to explain and to demonstrate the advisability of his measures. This attitude was naturally conditioned by the hypothesis that these measures would really lead to peace. Failure in this direction might easily destroy Bute's confidence in the diplomatic powers or the honesty of his colleague, as Pitt had openly avowed his desire for a peace policy. In this latter event a divergence in the policies of the two ministers was to be apprehended.

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, June 28, 1761.—Newcastle Papers. Walpole, i. 54.



The declaration of the five powers of March 26 received a prompt answer on April 3, accepting the proposal for a congress in Augsburg, and promising the appointment of ambassadors. A few days afterwards a memoir to the French government was transmitted to Choiseul, together with a letter from Pitt, in which the English minister explained his views concerning the separate proposals of the court of Versailles. Pitt declared his agreement with the principle of the proposals, accepted the basis of *uti possidetis*, and requested the despatch of a special ambassador; he dissented, however, from the French proposals with reference to the definition of epochs. Pitt desired, during the negotiations, not only to conclude the operations that had been begun and to reap their fruits undiminished, but also to begin further enterprises, the success of which would justify an increase of his demands. At the moment when he despatched his answer to the French memoir a strong squadron, with a landing force under Admiral Keppel, put to sea, with the object of conquering the island of Belle Isle, on the west coast of France, and thus securing a compensation for Minorca. In America, moreover, the action against Martinique was not to begin until the end of September. The limits proposed would have brought these operations to an earlier termination and endangered their full success. Pitt therefore desired that the epochs should be determined in relation to the moment of peace, in other words that the time limit should be dependent upon the earlier or later conclusion of negotiations. In this case every diplomatic delay would provide further time for the English arms to come into action. Pitt also attempted to deprive his opponent of the hope that an agreement with England would leave France free to act against Prussia. He laid an apparently uncalled for emphasis upon his fidelity to his allies, and demanded that the negotiations of the western powers should imply no postponement of peace in Germany.

The second interchange of memoirs of April 19 and 28 produced no agreement upon this point; Pitt, however, considered that the epochs should be made a subject of negotiation, and it was agreed that the powers should exchange plenipotentiaries for conference with the respective ministers of foreign affairs. The French government appointed M.

Bussy,<sup>1</sup> a ministerial official of wide diplomatic experience, who had previously carried on negotiations with George II., by whom both his commissions and his domineering attitude had made him somewhat disliked; the English government appointed Hans Stanley, a cultured and cosmopolitan member of a distinguished family, though of somewhat eccentric habits; he was a lord of the admiralty, and had not yet been employed upon diplomatic service.<sup>2</sup> The arrangement was not particularly happy, as it implied a simultaneous conduct of separate negotiations, which could be kept in touch with difficulty, the more so as the ambassadors were naturally affected by the party differences in their respective countries. Bussy was in relation with the dukes of Richelieu and Aiguillon, and seems to have been somewhat inclined to the Austrian side, so that an increase of tension would not have been wholly unwelcome to him.<sup>3</sup> Stanley had been appointed by Pitt on account of his capacity, but was a member of Newcastle's following, and inclined to a conciliatory attitude and to a tone of undue cheerfulness in his reports.<sup>4</sup> None the less Pitt was anxious to place the conduct of negotiations in his hands, for the reason that Stanley was his subordinate as secretary of state for the south, whereas the cabinet as a whole would control the negotiations carried on in London. These intentions were, however, opposed by a majority of the ministers led by Bute, with the result that while Stanley's powers as plenipotentiary were formally confirmed, his instructions were very limited. Whatever he agreed to would be accepted, but he was not allowed to agree to anything without a special order from one of the state secretaries.<sup>5</sup> It is clear that Bute was extremely anxious to secure his own power of co-operation in the work of restoring peace.

When this matter was settled a meeting of the cabinet took place on May 13, at which Pitt attempted to explain the principles of the negotiations, which were still doubtful.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On the negotiations with Bussy cp. Alfred Bourget, 'Le Duc de Choiseul et l'Angleterre. La Mission de M. de Bussy à Londres.'—*Revue Hist.*, t. 71, p. 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 333; Albemarle, i. 21 f.

<sup>3</sup> Stanley to Pitt, *Grenville Papers*, i. 370; Albemarle, i. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, *George III.*, i. 45 f.

<sup>5</sup> Stanley's instructions of May 18, 1761.—Thackeray, i. 508.

<sup>6</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 14, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

After reconfirming the agreement that had been made with reference to Stanley's appointment, he said that he wished to have a declaration from France to the effect that the separate peace should precede the congress. Here Newcastle opposed, asserting that Choiseul could give no such declaration without coming into collision with his allies; it was not worth while for the sake of such a demand, the fulfilment of which was in any case probable, to risk a break in the negotiations. Bute then observed, after supporting Pitt's view, that they might refrain from demanding a declaration from France, but issue one to that effect themselves, which would produce the same result. Pitt agreed, and the question was thus settled.

Of far greater, indeed, of decisive importance, was another disputed point; until agreement was secured upon this, Pitt declared that the negotiations could not be continued. The principle of *uti possidetis* had been recognised, but the question now arose whether this principle was to include merely the losses of the English Crown, or also those of their German allies. As Pitt explained in a long speech, in the first case the restitution of the territories of Hesse, Brunswick, and Hanover was left for treatment by the congress, to which solution he had no objection; in the second alternative England would be obliged to make sacrifices for the restitution of these territories. Pitt was well aware that the desertion of the allies was wholly incompatible with his public utterances, and was therefore anxious to see a decision in the sense of the second alternative. At the same time he was also aware that to surrender a conquest in favour of the German princes, and of Hanover in particular, would make him unpopular, and provide further opportunity for his opponents to emphasise the contradiction between his speeches in opposition and his policy as minister. He therefore declared himself inclined to accept the nationalist solution, but gave no definite vote, leaving the question entirely to the majority of the cabinet, whose decision would instruct him upon his future attitude. However, Bute and the other ministers had no intention of burning their fingers. Bute asserted that they must await Bussy's arrival, and see what he had to say. Pitt grew angry, and maintained with vigour that Bussy could say nothing germane to the point at issue; however, all the members with

the exception of Lord Temple voted for a postponement of the question.

The matter was brought to a satisfactory conclusion between Pitt, Bute, and the king, from whom Pitt obtained an audience on the following day.<sup>1</sup> The losses of the allies were to be considered in the separate peace, but France was specially informed that England made the concession out of desire for peace, and in order to remove obstacles to an agreement, and not because she regarded the occupation of German territory as any real loss to England. Pitt thus obtained what he wanted, and the cabinet decided as he wished, while relieving him of the responsibility of decision.

The double mission which began by the despatch of Bussy and Stanley was intended to secure full apparent advantage for either side. This object might be facilitated by a meeting of the ambassadors half-way at Calais, after which they would proceed to their destinations. Bussy, however, did not keep the appointment. He delayed so long that Stanley, who reached Calais on May 25, was obliged to wait for him two days,<sup>2</sup> and it began to seem that France was about to exhibit herself as the power least anxious for peace. Pitt, however, made energetic representations to the French government, which was obliged to give a satisfactory explanation and to offer an apology. He rightly emphasised these points of outward decorum as affecting the prestige of his government.

Before the negotiations began an event occurred which could not fail to influence their progress, the conquest of Belle Isle. To understand what follows, it is therefore advisable to consider the progress of this enterprise, which may be regarded as Pitt's special work.<sup>3</sup>

The island of Belle Isle is situated on the south coast of Brittany, some eight miles to the south of the Quiberon peninsula, near a number of highly important points upon the coast. On the east the Loire and the Vilaine empty themselves into the sea, and in the latter river mouth were still lying the warships which had been driven upstream by Bos-

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, May 20, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, i. 509 f.

<sup>3</sup> The sources utilised are the *Annual Register* of 1761 and the Prussian embassy reports in the Berlin archives.



cawen's victory. To the north extends Quiberon Bay, and to the north-west lies the important harbour of Port l'Orient. The island might thus be regarded as a useful base for a blockade of the French coast. Its actual value at that time was not great; in extent about thirty-two square miles, it was inhabited by a population of five thousand, who lived upon the fisheries and cattle-breeding. Louis xiv. had commissioned Vauban to build fortifications, which secured the capital town of Le Palais with a circuit wall and a citadel. The island had previously come by purchase into the hands of the intendant of finance, Fouquet, whose grandson, the Marshal Bellisle, had surrendered it to the Crown for compensation in 1719. The island might perhaps have been easily conquered at an earlier stage of the war, when Admiral Hawke spent much time cruising in those waters, but Pitt's object then was the infliction of damage upon the enemy, and not the permanent occupation of points upon the coast. The approach of peace negotiations had given him the idea that he might here secure an object of compensation and at the same time draw off some of the enemy's troops from the German war, which would thus be influenced for the better. He was particularly anxious that the French should gain as few possessions as possible in Germany, for which exchanges would have to be made, as he would then be better able to veil that delicate question of the obligation to make sacrifices on behalf of the allies.

Pitt's plan met with little support. Many regarded a menace of the French coasts, at the outset of negotiations, as inopportune provocation,<sup>1</sup> and thought they saw a tendency in the minister to oppose the peace. This view was certainly incorrect; until an armistice had been concluded, it was the business of either belligerent to gain as much advantage as possible, and there could be no question of sparing the enemy. Others condemned the plan as too difficult and expensive in comparison with the results to be secured; this was the view of Admirals Hawke<sup>2</sup> and Boscawen, who were well acquainted with the facts from personal experience. Pitt, however, insisted upon his proposal, and employed all the forces available to secure his object. From the strength of the fortifica-

<sup>1</sup> Walpole, *George III.*, i. 56.

<sup>2</sup> *Historical MSS. Commission, Twelfth Report*, App., part ix. p. 229 f.

tions and garrison in occupation of the island, he thought he might conclude that France attached great importance to the place, and that its conquest would be a severe blow to French pride.<sup>1</sup> A fleet of twelve men-of-war and fourteen other vessels was concentrated at Portsmouth, with a landing force of 10,000 men under General Hodgson, and their destination was kept as secret as possible. The Prussian ambassadors supposed that the expedition was intended for the Maskarenes, though they at first suspected an attack upon the ships at the mouth of the Vilaine. On March 29 the squadron put to sea and arrived off the island in a few days. The surprise was complete; the island was surrounded with the men-of-war and the frigates with such rapidity that only one boat was able to escape with the news to the Continent, but no help was available in that quarter. At the same time a strong garrison of several thousand men was in occupation of the town, which held out for a considerable time under its determined commander, the Chevalier de Sainte-Croix. Moreover, some work had been expended upon repairing the fortifications since the appearance of Hawke and Boscawen.

The first attempt at landing was made on April 8, and ended in complete failure. The point chosen was the south-east coast on the further side of the capital, which lies on the north of the island; here the shore was less steep and crowned by a single fort. A small number of the troops gained the shore by means of flat-bottomed boats, but the remainder were unable to follow, as the boats upon their return were destroyed by the violent wind, or driven upon stakes, which the enemy had placed in the shallows. The landing party, 500 in number, were all taken prisoners, and a fresh attempt was impossible until other boats had been brought from England. The ships, however, succeeded in setting a redoubt on fire by bombardment.

This disaster made a bad impression, and threatened to give an unfavourable turn to the peace negotiations. Pitt therefore hastened to despatch the necessary material, and a landing was effected on April 25. The operation was similar to that formerly employed at Louisburg, and it is clear that the English had profited by their long military experience. A

<sup>1</sup> *Annual Register*, 1761, p. 15.

particularly steep spot was chosen in the neighbourhood of the first landing-place, which was inadequately protected, while the enemy's attention was distracted by two feints delivered elsewhere. In this way a division of General Lambert succeeded in gaining the shore and climbing the heights, where they were able to hold out against the larger forces until the whole of the general's division had followed them. The disembarkation of the rest of the army and of the siege-train was then a matter of no difficulty.

Operations were now concentrated upon the well-fortified capital Le Palais, the citadel of which was divided from the town by a narrow arm of the sea. The rocky soil made the digging of parallels a difficult task, and it was not until May 18 that batteries could be erected. The besiegers then speedily gained the upper hand, as their position dominated the town. Pitt, meanwhile, sent out a constant stream of reinforcements, with the object of securing a speedy surrender. More than 4000 men were thus added to the army, and ten additional men-of-war were prepared to repel any French attempt to relieve the place by sea. The French spread a rumour that a relieving fleet would be fitted out, and Keppel consequently kept a strict look-out upon all neighbouring harbours. The appearance of a fleet, however, would have been wholly agreeable to Pitt, who had no reason for doubting a victory. His energy was redoubled by the information which he received, that troops intended for the army of Prince Soubise had been recalled for action against Belle Isle.<sup>1</sup> He then began to cherish hopes that this object of his enterprise might also be realised.

At length on May 26 a dominant position was stormed, and the garrison was forced to abandon the town. They retired to the citadel, where Sainte-Croix held out bravely for twelve days longer, until his resources were exhausted. On June 7 he capitulated with full military honours and the right to march out.

This success left Keppel's fleet free to watch the coasts and prevent the formation of a hostile squadron.<sup>2</sup> The troops were left in Belle Isle to protect the island against attempts

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, May 22, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

<sup>2</sup> *Chatham Papers*, i. 129 f. Report of Prussian embassy of June 16, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

at reconquest. The fall of the island was especially important to Pitt, as it placed once more at his disposal those transports which had been employed during the siege. For this expedition he had borrowed some of the vessels intended for Martinique, and the American expedition might easily be delayed in consequence. He now hastened to despatch the delayed transports, and sent definite orders to Amherst<sup>1</sup> at the same time to carry out the enterprise at the time arranged, and not to delay on account of the peace negotiations, to the commencement of which he referred.

The pourparlers began in Paris and London during June, and at the outset a certain difference became apparent between the assertions of Choiseul and those of his representative. The minister had shown compliance and a real anxiety to bring about an understanding, whereas Bussy adopted a somewhat peremptory tone. Thus, for instance, Bussy insisted upon the epochs proposed by France, whereas Choiseul hinted to the English ambassador his readiness to reconsider his proposals upon this question.<sup>2</sup> After the conquest of Belle Isle, Bussy demanded the immediate return of the island without compensation, whereas Stanley heard nothing of so absurd a demand. Choiseul asserted that it was due to a misunderstanding; he did not wish for an exchange, and England might either keep the island or give it back.<sup>3</sup> These existing differences were intensified by the above-mentioned party views of the two ambassadors, who gave their statements and reports the colouring which their friends desired. Bussy also attempted to sow dissension in the English ministry by moderating his tone towards Pitt's colleagues and so giving the latter a distorted view of Pitt's attitude.<sup>4</sup> Pitt himself, in order to keep the matter in his own hands as much as possible, endeavoured to conceal much of the business from his colleagues. Bute's secretary complained to George Grenville that his office only received third-hand information of the contents of Stanley's despatches.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Amherst, June 18, 1761.—Thackeray, ii. 500 f.

<sup>2</sup> Stanley to Pitt, June 8, 1761.—Thackeray, i. 516. Pitt to Stanley, June 19, 1761.—Thackeray, i. 534 f.

<sup>3</sup> Thackeray, i. 549 f.

<sup>4</sup> Jenkinson to Grenville, June 9, 1761.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 363.

<sup>5</sup> Jenkinson to Grenville, June 16, 1761: ' . . . but, I know not from what reason, Mr. Pitt endeavours to keep from us here everything that he can. . . . '—*Grenville Papers*, i. 365.



It seemed, however, likely that an understanding would be secured with comparative rapidity. Choiseul disavowed Bussy's attitude,<sup>1</sup> and under a seal of strictest secrecy, especially from Bussy and from the representatives of the powers allied with France, he explained to the English ambassador that his previous assertions had been influenced by consideration for the French allies, that he had merely proposed the epochs to throw dust in their eyes, and that he could not proceed to serious action until he was convinced of the honesty of England's intentions, as a rejection of his proposals would expose him to general odium both in France and among her allies. He then dictated to the ambassador a brief summary of the conditions under which France would be willing to make peace. Guadeloupe, Marie Galante, and Gorée were to be exchanged for Minorca, and England was to retain the whole of Canada, with the exception of Cap Breton, which island France would retain, with the fishery rights, in accordance with the peace of Utrecht. The boundary of Canada on the side of Louisiana was to lie upon the watershed between the Ohio and the Lake district, and an accurate frontier-line was to be laid down. France would return all the territory she had occupied in Germany. A conversation took place in the course of this dictation, in which Choiseul showed yet greater readiness to make concessions, and Stanley began to feel that there would be no difficulty in concluding an agreement with him. Choiseul explained the frontier proposed between the American possessions as a point for future discussion, and stated expressly with reference to Germany that the French troops would also be withdrawn from Prussian territory. These were very considerable proposals even for a conquered power to make, if we remember that they were but preliminary, and there was every reason to expect a speedy conclusion of peace.

Meanwhile Pitt, whose principle was not to make offers, but merely to answer them, had issued an announcement of his views almost simultaneously. The cabinet council, which had been entirely restored to unanimity by the conquest of Belle Isle, had granted him unanimous permission for this purpose.<sup>2</sup> In a memorial to Bussy of June 17 he replied to Choiseul's

<sup>1</sup> Stanley to Pitt, June 18, 1761.—Thackeray, i. 539 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Grenville Papers*, i. 368 f.

proposals for a change of epochs, suggesting July 1, September 1, and November 1, and expressed further desires under the form of conditions attaching to this concession. He demanded that all negotiations between the two Crowns should be considered as definite, without reference to those of the Augsburg congress, and that peace should be concluded before August 1. He also offered to exchange Belle Isle, while he awaited further proposals from France upon other points. These proposals arrived a few days afterwards in the form of Stanley's report of June 18, accompanied by the points dictated by Choiseul, and it was thus possible for the English government to draft proposals for peace.

The importance of this business demanded two lengthy cabinet councils, which were held on June 24 and 26. Newcastle had already attempted to secure an understanding with Bute on the 23rd, but with no definite result. Bute had merely mentioned the question of the fisheries as a vital point, and expressed the hope that Pitt would be moderate. In the session of the 24th it was determined to issue a counter proposal, and to invite discussion of individual points. When the fishery question came up for discussion Pitt declared his wish to maintain the sole possession, but said that he was ready to give way to the majority. The decision was thus left for Bute, who would certainly be followed by Newcastle and his adherents, but he was careful not to diverge from Pitt. The expulsion of French fishermen from the Newfoundland waters was a special desire of the London mercantile world, and the support of this party might easily be lost by a disregard of their wishes; at any rate it was necessary to make a show of consideration. Bute thus decided that an attempt should be made to secure this point. The majority agreed, and only the Duke of Bedford energetically opposed Pitt as the champion of greater moderation.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with this conclusion Pitt drew up instructions for Stanley.<sup>2</sup> Under this form, not as a memorial, an answer was to be sent to the French government to Choiseul's informal proposals. Pitt proceeded to explain that these proposals did not provide a fair basis of settlement. The territory occupied in Germany could not be regarded as

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, June 28, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, i. 543 ff.

conquest, as those countries were subordinate to the German empire; the surrender of Minorca would be more than equalised by that of Belle Isle; there could be no arbitrary division of special districts from Canada; on the question of the fisheries, appeals to the peace of Utrecht were unnecessary, as this was obviated by the conquest of the St. Lawrence district. Here a remarkable passage was added which made the ultimate determination of this point somewhat doubtful. The passage ran as follows: 'But whatever shall be His Majesty's ultimate determination thereon, this arduous matter can only with propriety come under consideration when the renewal of that treaty with regard to other material points,' and most particularly the demolition of Dunkirk, shall come to be discussed.' Pitt further added that if the immediate evacuation of Germany was to be regarded as a compensation for Guadeloupe and Marie Galante, the restoration of the Indian possessions would be wholly gratuitous.

To these observations, which were intended to prove the incompatibility of the French proposals with the principle of the *uti possidetis*, Pitt added a number of demands, from which he asserted the king would, under no circumstances, depart, and which might therefore be regarded in a sense as an ultimatum. Pitt demanded:—

(1) The whole of Canada in the extension hitherto recognised by the French themselves, and therefore including the districts of the great lakes and Ohio, where the French garrisons had everywhere capitulated.

(2) Senegal with its dependencies and the island of Gorée, which latter Choiseul had wished to exchange.

(3) The demolition of Dunkirk, in accordance with the peace of Utrecht.

(4) The evacuation or partition of the so-called neutral islands of the West Indies.

(5) The restoration of Minorca and Bencoolen, the latter an English settlement in Sumatra, which the French had occupied.

(6) The evacuation of all occupied German territory, including the Westphalian provinces of Prussia.

All other questions Pitt declared to be subjects for negotiation, in the course of which Stanley was to gain as much as possible for England, but not to carry inflexibility so far as

to prevent the conclusion of peace upon the basis of the indisputable points.

The composition of this document was somewhat remarkable. Upon the question of the fisheries a direct contradiction was apparent; in one place the prospect of the king's final decision is held out, while elsewhere this decision is shown to have been taken, as this point forms one of the indisputable conditions. Pitt, moreover, committed the same mistake for which he blamed Choiseul's proposals. He failed to bring his demands under the scheme of the *uti possidetis*, in other words, he failed to group the acquisitions which might be subject to exchange in such a way as to make the justice of his proposal clear. Concession is barely perceptible throughout the document. The demands are raised to the highest possible point, and no consideration was given to such desires of France as England could have fulfilled with little disadvantage to herself in comparison with the advantage implied for France. No attempt was made to accommodate mutual interests for the sake of mutual advantage; there was a rigorous adherence to the general principle of those days, that an enemy's loss should imply an equivalent gain for the conqueror. The pride of victory and the consciousness of superiority induced Pitt to adopt an attitude which can only be described as imprudent, assuming that he seriously desired peace, and which therefore aroused the suspicion that he wished to break off negotiations.

In the session of June 26 the instructions came up for consideration. We have unfortunately no account of the discussion, which was kept entirely secret. Like the sitting of the 24th, it lasted from one o'clock till seven,<sup>1</sup> and seems to have led to a hot debate. Bute afterwards complained to Newcastle<sup>2</sup> of his treatment by Pitt, which he characterised as coarse. The favourite, however, made no decisive statement of his apparently divergent views, as otherwise he would have joined the majority. He preferred to retain a neutral attitude, for he afterwards reproached the old duke, who would certainly have followed his lead, for his inadequate support.

<sup>1</sup> Hardwicke to Lord Royston, June 27, 1761: ' . . . We have sat on Wednesday and Friday from a little after one till almost seven. Nothing has passed that one is at liberty to say one word of.'—Harris, iii. 243.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle to Bedford, July 2, 1761.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 19.



He did not wish to break with Pitt, who would obviously have made the point a cabinet question, but he was anxious to remove the responsibility for Pitt's triumph from his own shoulders. It is impossible to say how far he was influenced by consideration for the king's approaching betrothal, for the confirmation of which the whole privy council was summoned to a solemn meeting a few days afterwards; it is, however, possible that at this moment Bute was seriously concerned about the maintenance of domestic peace. In any case Bute and the king were much dissatisfied with Pitt's letter, and the former upbraided his colleague for his attitude,<sup>1</sup> though he could not influence the decision that had been taken. If matters went well this friction would end in nothing, but a disastrous result might easily become dangerous for Pitt.

Pitt's proposals were by no means so ill received by Choiseul as might have been feared. When Stanley executed his commission and discussed the different points with the minister,<sup>2</sup> he was unable to secure a consent to the whole of the obligatory points; but none the less Choiseul made some slight concession. With reference to the German districts, he very properly observed that France could use these conquests elsewhere if England declined to make them an object of exchange. They could be offered to Austria in return for concessions in the Netherlands, especially harbours. He had no objection to the cession of the whole of India within the limits demanded by Pitt, and was also willing to observe the *status quo* in the uncolonised districts between Canada and Louisiana. On the other hand, he declared his intention to insist very definitely upon the Newfoundland fishery question. He first demanded Cap Breton, and only after a long struggle, which nearly ended in a breach, did he propose to name another harbour where fishermen could find shelter and dispose of their catch. This harbour was to be under French sovereignty, but to contain no fortifications or military defences. With reference to Dunkirk, he considered that England would hardly insist upon her demands if she knew of the choked condition of

<sup>1</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 19: This dissatisfaction might certainly be interpreted as a pretext, to keep Newcastle and Bedford on Bute's side. As the king also showed displeasure, it was probably genuine, and this view is in better harmony with Bute's attitude upon other points.

<sup>2</sup> Stanley's report.—Thackeray, ii. 532-40.

the harbour. Pitt's unwillingness to surrender the little island of Gorée, in return for so many concessions, filled the duke with indignation, and he went so far as to utter the phrase, 'de la mauvaise volonté,' which Stanley politely refused to accept. He went on to explain that the whole of the West Indian possessions would become useless to France if she had no point on the African coast whence she could secure her supply of slaves, and that England might well content herself with Senegal without suffering disadvantage. Eventually, however, he dropped a hint that he would be satisfied with some third place. Upon other points he showed himself open to discussion, so that no further difficulties appeared to threaten the negotiations.

This reply was by no means in accordance with Pitt's categorical demands, which he had asserted he would never yield, and the natural consequence would have been the conclusion of negotiations. Choiseul, however, had shown inclination to concession, and the English court therefore became extremely anxious to manifest a like readiness to compliance in the hope of realising the desired object. Bedford and the peace party expressed complete satisfaction with the conditions offered, but the adherents of Pitt's policy also begged for a less peremptory attitude. During these days Bedford wrote a long letter to Bute with the object of converting him to his own views.<sup>1</sup> He emphasised the dangerous position of Hanover, the purposeless nature of enterprises upon French coasts, the difficulties of the expedition against Martinique and many other points, finally asserting that it was foolishness to try and deprive France of the whole of her sea power; this would end in a coalition of all European powers against England, and cause her overthrow. As a matter of fact the British state was obliged to defend itself against a powerful naval federation not long afterwards, though the event proved far from disastrous. Bedford ended by declaring his intention to absent himself from the meetings if a decision were given against his views.

Bute replied by a refutation of these various assertions.<sup>2</sup> He used all the arguments which Pitt was accustomed to bring forward, clearly showing how great an impression Pitt's

<sup>1</sup> Bedford to Bute, July 9, 1761.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 23 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Bute to Bedford, July 12, 1761.—*Ibid.*, iii. 30 ff.

eloquence had made upon him. Canada was a valueless possession without the exclusive rights to the gulf district; if Hanover should actually be lost, it must be allowed to go, as its recovery would cost too much; every concession would spur France to fresh demands, while she would be reduced by a firm attitude to unconditional compliance in view of her hopeless condition. In conclusion, while enumerating the conditions of peace to be offered, Bute made some not unimportant concessions. He was willing to concede the right of fishery if no other solution were possible, to give the enemy some other harbour than Gorée and Senegal for purposes of the slave trade, and, as regards Dunkirk, to be content with the milder conditions of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Finally, he expressed his hopes that the duke would not deprive the king of the benefit of his advice.

Calculations based upon the unconditional compliance of France proved to be false. A change of opinion set in at the court of Versailles, which was necessarily produced by the impossibility of securing a tolerably acceptable peace.<sup>1</sup> King Louis, indignant at the severity of Pitt's demands, abandoned his pacific intentions and allowed the Austro-Spanish party to gain the upper hand. His opposition to the measures against the Jesuits enforced by Parliament increased his connection with the friends and the politics of that order. Choiseul therefore found himself obliged, if he were not to lose his hold, to make common cause with the war party, and this change of attitude was expressed in the memorial which the minister sent to Bussy on July 13 as his answer to the English demands. It showed a tone of greater pride and decision than his previous assertions, and a very ominous feature was the fact that it introduced the Spanish points of complaint into the Anglo-French negotiations.

The first memorial had been a draft peace and was intended to settle the question of the epochs. The conditions fell into two groups, those affecting transmaritime affairs and those dealing with the position in Germany. On this occasion considerably greater space was given to the latter, as the necessity for satisfying the allies was asserted, and the general policy of the whole proposal was thus indicated. The former memoir was, however, in certain points inconsistent with Choiseul's

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 357 ff.

later assertions. Full toleration to Roman Catholicism was made a condition of the cession of Canada as in the former instance. This was intended to benefit the Jesuits, who were chiefly concerned with the missions to the settlers and their spiritual welfare. Together with the fishing rights, the return of Cap Breton was demanded, though Choiseul had previously spoken of another mode of settlement. The convention of 1754 was proposed as a basis for the settlement of the East India conflict, although the situation had entirely changed. Stipulations were made for the return of the African settlements, either Senegal or Gorée, whereas Choiseul had formerly been willing to accept a third harbour. Thus, though the proposal on other points overthrew none of the concessions already offered, it was none the less marked by a peremptory and unconciliatory tone, which could not but strike the receiver of it. This attitude was still more obvious in the second group of conditions.

The evacuation of the German territory was again confirmed, but postponed to a wholly indefinite date, by the assertion that a general armistice throughout the world, to begin with the ratification of preliminaries, must precede such evacuation. This might be interpreted as though the French troops were not to retire until news of the armistice had reached India, possibly a year after the ratification. It was further demanded that Prince Ferdinand's army should be no longer employed in the struggle of the eastern powers, in any way, or under any excuse. Thus the King of Prussia would have been deprived of the advantage which had induced him to advise the conclusion of a separate peace with England. Pitt could not possibly make this concession without utterly contradicting his previous assurances. For the same reason the following condition was equally unacceptable. The French were to remain in occupation of the Prussian territories of Westphalia until the Augsburg congress had decided their fate; they had been conquered in the name of the empress-queen and were thus administered, so that France had no right to dispose of them. Choiseul had not formerly been so conscientious towards his allies when he was seriously anxious for peace. As regards later conquests, all that were made after the conclusion of the convention were to be restored without compensation, a stipulation which would have settled the



question of epochs. A lengthy article dealt with the merchant vessels captured by England previous to the declaration of war, the return of which was demanded. On this point all negotiations would have broken down, as concession by England would have been tantamount to admission of a breach of international law. In conclusion, however, so much at least was conceded that the memorial bore the character not of an ultimatum, but of a proposal for discussion.

Upon the whole this new memorial displayed the French government in a fresh and somewhat unpromising light. Far more serious, however, was the second memoir referring to Spain, though this again was the inevitable result of circumstances. Choiseul's support of the Austro-Spanish policy, which he had now begun, did not indeed exclude the possibility of restoring peace, but any peace concluded would have to provide not only for Austrian but also for Spanish interests. The respect evinced for Austrian interests in the first memoir had made a collapse of negotiations probable. If the wishes of Spain were entirely disregarded, the prospects of peace were somewhat improved, but all hope of Spanish help in the event of a resumption of the war was precluded. Such neglect was impossible, for only the support of Spain enabled French politicians to contemplate a rupture of the peace negotiations. It was for this reason that Choiseul had desired to introduce a passage with reference to Spain in the first memoir,<sup>1</sup> though Stanley had dissuaded him from this course by an appeal to his pacific intentions. He withdrew the passage, and sent a second memoir to Bussy dealing exclusively with the Spanish interests, and this the ambassador was to use as occasion might arise.

This memorial proposed to guarantee the permanence of the peace by securing its recognition by the court of Madrid, and proceeded to explain that such a result would only be possible if the opportunity were used for a full composition of the differences between England and Spain, which his Catholic majesty had communicated in confidence to the King of France. At this point the three grounds of complaint were enumerated. In conclusion, a note was added to the effect that the consent of the empress-queen to the separate peace had just been received under the condition

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii, 544.

that the demands put forward in the first memoir with reference to the German war should be maintained.

England was thus confronted with a choice of alternatives: either she might risk a war with the whole coalition including Spain, or might abandon Prussia and compose her Spanish differences. The choice presented not a moment's difficulty to Pitt. He had no intention of allowing his beaten adversary to dictate conditions, or of retreating merely because menaced with a new enemy, whom he despised. The only problem for his consideration was the possibility of securing an acceptance of his views under present conditions. The whole cabinet, including Bute, was anxious for peace, and had supported Pitt's proposals only on the supposition that he would be able to secure the most advantageous peace possible. In their eyes the present unfavourable change in the situation would be regarded as a defeat for Pitt. He had raised his demands too high, and his peremptory and inflexible attitude had destroyed the favourable moment when desire for peace was dominant in France. The only course open to the enemy was to rejoin those friends whom they had been willing to abandon, with the result of further complications for England. The situation might thus become highly menacing to Pitt; he was not the man to carry on a policy in absolute contradiction to his own ideas, while it was hardly to be expected that his colleagues would fall in with his views. If Pitt resigned, the prospects of peace diminished, in so far as his resignation would arouse the courage of the enemy; on the other hand peace was even then possible, whereas a breach seemed inevitable if he remained in office.

It was thus a remarkable coincidence, and one which delayed the conflict for some time, that at the moment when the memorials were delivered in London news arrived of three important victories in quick succession.<sup>1</sup> On the morning of July 20 news came to hand of the fall of Pondicherry, which filled London with jubilation; at midday the ominous documents were received from Paris, and in the evening the capture of the island of San Domingo was reported; two days afterwards news arrived from Germany that Prince Ferdinand had defeated the united French army at Vellinghausen.

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 368; report of the Prussian embassy; *Grenville Papers*, i. 376.

*Dominica*

As regards the expedition against ~~San Domingo~~,<sup>1</sup> Pitt had given orders that it should not be attempted unless troops arrived at Guadeloupe at the beginning of May. These orders, however, were disregarded by Lord Rollo, who was entrusted with the expedition, in spite of the fact that the troops did not arrive until May 31, while he himself only reached Basseterre from North America on July 2. Moreover, he brought with him only four transports, with a few hundred men, to the West Indies, instead of the 2000 that had been ordered, as the remaining vessels had been scattered by a storm. The companies which he had taken up at Guadeloupe raised his landing force to 700 men, and two days afterwards, on June 4, these troops set sail on the ships ordered by Sir James Douglas. Upon their arrival in the Bay of Roseau, the commander summoned the inhabitants to capitulate, and was informed that the island was neutral, and would, it was hoped, be so regarded by the belligerents. Rollo declined to discuss the question of neutrality, but referred to his orders for the subjugation of the island; the ambassadors immediately returned to the shore, and a coast battery opened fire. A landing was accordingly forced on the evening of June 6, and fighting began. The main objective was the conquest of the batteries commanding the bay and the expulsion of the enemy from the heights in the neighbourhood, which were protected by entrenchments. These attempts succeeded, after a battle in which very few were lost, and at nightfall the English were fortunate enough to capture M. Lamprée, the commander of the island, and some other important officials, as they were making a round of inspection under cover of the darkness. The possibility of a lengthy guerilla warfare was thus avoided; on the following day the planters, deprived of their leaders, began to surrender themselves and their weapons, and on June 13 it was possible to send despatches to England announcing the conquest of the island.

As soon as Pitt was informed of this success, he immediately instructed Lord Rollo,<sup>2</sup> Sir James Douglas, and Governor

<sup>1</sup> Based upon the journal of Captain Douglas, who took part in the fighting, and was then sent to the ministry with despatches announcing the victory.—Chatham MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt to Rollo, August 5, 1761.—Colonial Office Records, where are also the other letters.

Dalrymple concerning the proposed attack upon Martinique, ordering them to make all necessary preparations, and to place such of their forces as could be spared from garrison duty on the conquered island at the disposal of General Monckton, whose arrival was fixed for the month of October.

As we are now fully informed of events in the East Indies, it remains to give some short account of those in West Germany, which ended in Ferdinand's victory.

For the summer campaign of 1761 the main responsibility was given by the French to Prince Soubise. The army on the Lower Rhine, which he commanded, was to be brought up to 100,000 men, but, as Pitt was informed, a number of them were to be retained in France in view of the siege of Belle Isle, so that the prince had about 80,000 men at his command. Marshal Broglie had some 60,000 at his disposal. Soubise was to advance from Westphalia, and Broglie through Hesse, both making Hanover their objective, the occupation of which was highly important for its possible influence upon the peace negotiations; to secure an adequate supply of forage the advance was not to be begun until the month of June. Ferdinand was able to bring together only 79,000 men, so that upon this occasion he was in a decided minority. He therefore chose a central position in Westphalia, from which he could easily advance in any direction. He proposed to strike a blow at Soubise before Broglie could arrive, but the prince declined to give battle, and retired eastward when Ferdinand threatened his rear. This movement enabled him to effect the desired junction with Broglie in the neighbourhood of Soest on July 8. Not far from that town, at the village of Vellinghausen, between the Lippe and the Ahse, a battle was fought a few days later, on July 15 and 16, between 92,000 troops of the French and 56,000 of the allies. The latter were enabled to win a victory, or at any rate to maintain possession of the battlefield, solely by the want of union between the enemy's generals, in consequence of which 60,000 troops of Soubise gave no help to Broglie's weaker force, but allowed themselves to be held in check for two days by 23,000 men under the Crown Prince of Brunswick. Broglie was thus attacked by superior force and obliged eventually to retire, whereupon Soubise also abandoned his position.

This battle could not be called a decisive victory, and pro-



duced no material change in the military situation, but its moral effect was highly important at the seat of war, where it secured a further division between the French armies and doomed the campaign to failure, and also upon the peace negotiations, which we have now to consider.

These victories afforded Pitt an admirable issue from the dilemma into which he had fallen. He was himself doubtless aware that he had gone too far, but he could not withdraw. These successes, however, created a situation in which the proposals that the French had already rejected might seem either acceptable or worth consideration. Thus, as Stanley urged in his covering letter, there was no need to agree to the French demands, but merely to abide by the previous proposals, perhaps with some concession. In reality this step implied a considerable retreat from the former position, as the new situation would have justified increased demands.

Pitt had no difficulty in securing the consent of the cabinet to his wishes at a sitting held on July 21.<sup>1</sup> Only Bedford demanded the acceptance of the French proposal, and, when he was outvoted, executed his previous threat of absenting himself from the cabinet. Bute, who might have withdrawn his support had Pitt's attitude caused a rupture of the negotiations, was induced to continue his compliant attitude by the military successes which had reconsolidated the position of his colleague. He agreed to the conditions proposed in general, but suggested some modification by way of concession, in order to secure the consent of the meeting.<sup>2</sup>

Hitherto the memorial regarding Spain had remained absolutely unknown. Stanley had heard nothing of it; it had indeed been sent only to Bussy, who was to present or withhold it as the situation might demand. At a meeting with Pitt on the 23rd he was much inclined to withhold the document, as the news of Vellinghausen had just arrived; but the Spanish ambassador, Fuentes, insisted so urgently upon its presentation that Bussy agreed. The result was a violent scene between himself and Pitt, in which the latter overwhelmed the French government with reproaches, and absolutely declined to recognise any introduction of Spanish

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 368 f.

<sup>2</sup> Jenkinson to Grenville, July 21, 1761.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 376 f.

affairs into the negotiations.<sup>1</sup> The cabinet council had already empowered him to make this refusal, as they had passed a resolution of the kind on the 21st, in reference to a passage in Stanley's letter which spoke of Choiseul's original intention to demand a guarantee for Spain. A second cabinet council then took place,<sup>2</sup> in which the text of the ultimatum was determined which they proposed to despatch. Once again the members agreed with the moderate proposals of Bute, which were in accordance with those of Pitt upon the main points, and especially with reference to the strong tone advisable, though at the same time they displayed a desire for moderation. Pitt then expressed his conviction that peace was certain. He did not think that France would insist upon her new standpoint after the defeat she had suffered. Bute saw more clearly, and regarded the change in French opinion as far from transitory. Others thought that peace was certainly in progress, and would possibly be secured somewhat late in the year.<sup>3</sup>

The final proposals of the English government, determined by this discussion and despatched on July 24, contained nothing essentially new. The former points were reasserted, but the fishery question was marked as a subject for discussion on condition that the demolition of Dunkirk was conceded; the equal partition of the neutral islands was also retained, notwithstanding the recent conquest of San Domingo. The late demands of France were rejected without exception, especially those regarding Germany. The two supplementary memoirs were returned to the French government as unacceptable. These proposals became of no importance, as Choiseul was no longer seriously concerned to make peace. He had already begun negotiations with Spain for the Bourbon family compact, and was only anxious to protract negotiations until this business had been settled. Bussy therefore explained to Newcastle that the introduction of the Spanish question had been caused only by culpable precipitancy on the part of his government, a mistake which might easily have been redressed

*San Domingo*

<sup>1</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 369 f.

<sup>2</sup> Jenkinson to Grenville, July 28, 1761.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 380 f.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of Newcastle of a conversation with Bussy on July 29, 1761.—*Newcastle Papers*.

if Pitt had moderated his peremptory tone. The duke was entirely deceived by these explanations.

The further development of affairs is so closely related to the domestic change which brought about Pitt's resignation, that we are forced to regard these two subjects in connection.

## CHAPTER XVI

### PITT'S RESIGNATION

THERE can be no possible doubt that Pitt was honestly anxious to secure peace,<sup>1</sup> but he would not have peace on any lower conditions than those which the military situation seemed to justify. He was therefore obliged to face the possibility that negotiations might prove ineffective; not only did he continue his military policy as though the war might last for years, but he also used diplomatic means to improve England's prospects in the event of such continuance. He was thus induced to consider the possibility of a breach with Spain.

England was hampered by the constant necessity for considering the interests of Prussia and by the German war. Not only did this war absorb the greater part of the regular troops, but it was also of enormous cost to the country. Military expenditure for the current year amounted to seventeen millions, and of these from six to seven millions were expended upon the continental war alone. These resources had been admirably employed at an earlier period, when King Frederick's actions and the army raised for the protection of Hanover had occupied so large a proportion of the French troops and resources that France could spare but little for maintaining her sea power or defending her colonies. Pitt was thus necessarily obliged to renounce his former principles, and to champion the maintenance of the German war and the support of Prussia. Only by this means were his maritime conquests possible, and only so was the danger of a French invasion averted. Now the situation had changed. The enemy's chief

<sup>1</sup> Pitt to Temple, August 10, 1761: 'The Duc de Choiseul does me no small injustice in supposing, as he does, that I wish nothing but to continue war, at any rate.—*Grenville Papers*, i. 386.



colonies had been captured, and the French fleet so reduced that it could no longer keep the seas. It was therefore practically impossible for France to use her troops directly against England, even had she been free to control her movements; on the other hand, England could use her troops chiefly for the purpose of manning her powerful fleet, and for expeditions to the most distant parts of the world. This would have been her policy in the event of a war with Spain, which would have demanded the defence of her Portuguese ally, and an attack upon rich colonies overseas. Thus the English forces were more valuable than the French for future struggles, and it would be an advantage to England to withdraw them from Germany, while the consequent diminution of expense was not to be disregarded. The only question was whether Hanover could be abandoned to the enemy. The great loss which the royal family would suffer, a loss chiefly pecuniary, would in all probability descend upon the English state in one form or another. For this reason the troops were not withdrawn, even in Bute's ministry, before the conclusion of the war. There was a reluctance to cause unforeseen danger by the surrender of positions in Germany. At the same time, the advisability of this measure was even now considered, and Pitt was by no means averse to it, as it seemed in accordance with English interests. However, his previous assertions made it difficult for him to take the initiative.

The Prussian alliance was, as regarded its present value, on the same footing. It had been highly valuable when King Frederick was able to take the offensive, and to give occasional help to the Anglo-German army. But since the defeats of Kunersdorf and Maxen, the Prussian king had been fighting for his very existence, had been supported by English money, and upon occasion by troops in English pay. During the negotiations England found herself obliged to support the interests of Prussia, a necessity which made it difficult for her to secure her own desires. Alliance with Prussia had thus become a burden, and it was the obligation of every English minister to relieve his state of this burden by every means in his power. Sympathy or sentimentalism could not be regarded as factors in the question, though English prestige might require that her faithful ally, who had done such valuable service, should not be unceremoniously abandoned. Pitt was

thus anxious to be relieved of his obligations to Prussia, and here again his position was extremely difficult, as his relations with King Frederick were those of personal friendship, and he had repeatedly assured the king of his firm support. He therefore endeavoured to secure an understanding between the two German powers, but this, in his opinion, would only succeed if Frederick were ready to make concessions to Austria.

Hence, at the beginning of June, in view of the proposed congress, Pitt represented his views to the Prussian ambassadors,<sup>1</sup> explaining how dangerous it was for the king, in his desperate position, to decline all concessions of territory, a point upon which a little compliance would often avoid grievous difficulty. He also asserted that the announcement of such a principle would only help the cause of the king's enemies in England. They would be able to persuade the English nation that the Prussian war was interminable, and might lead to the most inconvenient results. It would, therefore, be better for the Prussian king to insist upon no principle of the kind, but to propose suitable preliminaries for a treaty of peace.

These arguments originated with Pitt beyond all doubt; had they proceeded from Bute, as might be supposed in view of later events, Pitt would have had nothing to do with them. The Prussian correspondence was in any case in Bute's hands. Pitt was obviously hinting, though in a most careful and friendly manner, at the withdrawal of English help, if Frederick showed no readiness to make concessions. As usual in such cases, he naturally made the king's enemies, and the supposed pressure of national feeling, his excuse for the necessary withdrawal from Prussia. This is not to be explained as an unjustifiable measure, or as mere folly and short-sightedness. Any unprejudiced observer must have regarded Frederick's insistence upon the retention of his whole territory as sheer madness, at a moment when the iron ring was closing round him. The later events of this campaign simply confirmed these pessimistic views. With Schweidnitz the greater part of Silesia was lost, as was half of Pomerania with Kolberg, while half Saxony was already in the hands of the enemy. Who could foresee that the Empress Elizabeth would die, and that the Russian conquests would be returned without compensa-

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, June 9, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

tion by Peter III.? If Frederick supposed that England would sacrifice territory to secure the integrity of his dominions, it was necessary for Pitt to inform him that such hopes were doomed to disappointment.

Frederick the Great was extremely dismayed by the report of his ambassadors, announcing as it did the greatest danger that could possibly befall him under existing circumstances, the secession of England. His claim to maintain the integrity of his possessions was chiefly based upon the continuance of the alliance. The English government was indeed in a position to extort sacrifices from him. The importance of the matter induced Frederick to send a personal letter to Pitt,<sup>1</sup> and it is characteristic that he adopted a highly pathetic tone for want of really adequate arguments. He spoke as one who thought there must be some misunderstanding, as such intentions were impossible on the part of England, and he also gave expression to the thought that England was bound to maintain the integrity of his domains. He based these arguments upon the guarantee expressed in the treaties, a claim upon which he had previously laid very little stress. Guarantees of this kind were everywhere and constantly given, and no one thought of carrying them to their logical conclusion should such action seem impolitic. Frederick then attempted to prove that England was the one power that had invariably performed her engagements to the letter, an assertion very flattering to an English ear, but hardly consistent with facts. The rest of the letter was occupied by the king with reflections upon his policy, which he attempted to justify, and by pathetic appeals which would make no deep impression upon a competent statesman. It is noteworthy that he did not refer to the treaties of 1756 and 1758, an omission which shows that he did not regard the former treaty as applicable to the present situation except upon the point of territorial guarantee, and that he was well aware of the time limitation to one year which had been stated in the other treaty. The ties between England and Prussia were chiefly those of moral obligation, and Frederick therefore laid special emphasis upon the consideration which England owed to his prestige, and to the future relations between the two states. He

<sup>1</sup> Frederick to Pitt, July 3, 1761.—*Politische Korrespondenz*, xx. 507 ff. *Chatham Papers*, ii. 107 ff.

committed the mistake of expressing unfounded suspicions of the English government, hinting that English politicians were prepared to conspire against himself with Austria and France. Though this was little more than a rhetorical flourish, it gave occasion for justifiable remonstrance.

The letter was not answered until the news of the victories had arrived on the 20th and 22nd of July, by which the situation was very materially changed. Pitt assumed that peace with France was certain, as he had not increased his demands in spite of these triumphs; King Frederick would then be able to maintain his ground with the help of Prince Ferdinand's army. He therefore expressed to the Prussian ambassadors his recognition of the honour which the king had done him, while he also disclaimed the suspicions which Frederick had expressed, and requested that the king should correspond henceforward, not with himself,<sup>1</sup> but with the minister in charge of the secretaryship for that country, namely Bute. In his answer to Frederick<sup>2</sup> Pitt admitted that he had trembled 'pour les états et pour le salut du plus invincible Monarque,' but that he now hoped the moment of danger was passed for ever. This letter was intercepted by the enemy and never reached the king's hands.<sup>3</sup>

It was not, however, the mere expectation of peace which inclined Pitt to dissolve his connection with Frederick the Great. He had already conceived a new plan for the settlement of the points at issue in Germany. He expected to find himself in secure possession of Westphalia, as a result of the battle of Vellinghausen; he also proposed to secure for an Austrian archduke the bishopric of Münster, which had hitherto been held in personal union with the Electorate of Cologne;<sup>4</sup> in return Maria Theresa was to abandon entirely

<sup>1</sup> Report of the Prussian embassy, July 31, 1761.—Schäfer, ii. b, 737 f.

<sup>2</sup> Pitt to Frederick, undated.—*Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 112 f.

<sup>3</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 339.

<sup>4</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 1, 1761: 'He [the King] was pleased to tell me that Mr. Pitt wanted to see me, to communicate an idea of his making an offer by the channel of the Court of Turin and Count Viry to the Court of Vienna of the King's assistance for procuring to one of the Arch Dukes the Bishoprick of Münster, as a sort of equivalent for the totality of Silesia to be left to the King of Prussia. I told H. Maj. . . . that I entirely approved, as it would shew, that H. Maj. did not desire to remain always desperate with the Court of Vienna, whatever immediate effect such an offer might have with regard to Silesia. . . .'—Newcastle Papers.



her claims to Silesia, which she had been already inclined to yield in some degree. As the bishopric had fallen vacant at that moment, the arrangement offered no difficulties. Negotiations were to be conducted with Vienna through Count Viry by way of Turin. King George had no objection and Newcastle was a strong supporter of the plan, as he favoured any opening of communications with the Vienna court. Mitchell was therefore requested to discuss the matter with Frederick the Great, as without his consent no attempt was to be made.<sup>1</sup> As we hear nothing more of the subject, it is probable that he disapproved, and Pitt was relieved by his resignation of the disagreeable necessity of forcing the Prussian king to make fresh concessions to Austria. I am inclined to believe that the wish to avoid this necessity was a strong motive for his resignation. His successor was able to take this inevitable measure in hand with greater freedom, as he was not personally bound by previous assertions or ties of friendship.

The negotiations with France gradually came to an unsuccessful conclusion; indeed, no other result could be expected after the proposal from the court of Versailles. Pitt's hopes that the enemy would be influenced by their most recent defeats to accept the conditions were utterly falsified; Bussy handed him an ultimatum from Choiseul, dated August 5, which left little hope of final agreement. Choiseul was not in the least anxious for an acceptance of his proposals which were formulated from this point of view; he issued instructions that if negotiations should be opened or the conditions should be unexpectedly accepted, the Spanish question was to be brought forward, and in the last extremity an article was to be read from the Franco-Spanish convention, which was just ready for signature.<sup>2</sup>

The ultimatum contained some concessions upon transmari-time questions: France was willing to accept another island in exchange for Cap Breton, and thus made some show of peaceful intentions; but as regards German affairs she maintained her former attitude unchanged. A few days afterwards Bussy presented a letter, also composed by Choiseul,<sup>3</sup> in which, after explaining the aims of his court, he curtly asserted that

<sup>1</sup> Bute to Mitchell, August, 4, 1761.—Public Record Office.

<sup>2</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 380.

<sup>3</sup> Bussy to Pitt, August 10, 1761.—Chatham MSS.

the King of France would intervene in the differences with Spain without consideration for any power which might offer objections. He also seized the opportunity to complain of the peremptory tone in which Pitt's previous answer had been composed. In a letter received together with the ultimatum,<sup>1</sup> Stanley attempted to put a different construction upon the actions of France in the account which he gave of his conversations with Choiseul and of the aims of the various personalities and groups. He had naturally been informed that the old aims and differences had been revived in full vigour, that the domineering tone of Pitt's last letter was the sole cause of the French change of front, and that England's obstinacy upon the fishery question alone prevented Choiseul from adopting a more compliant attitude. These assertions were intended to cause delay until a full understanding with Spain had been secured. Stanley, however, was influenced by his pacific intentions and his connection with Newcastle, and consequently gave full credence to these explanations, sent his reports composed from this point of view to his court, and provided the peace party with some further means of support.

Pitt was naturally not deceived by these accounts. He had previously believed that France would be obliged by her desperate situation to give way. His eyes, however, were opened by the ultimatum, and he no longer trusted the honesty of his opponent's intentions. Lord Bute, who had expected nothing better, was entirely convinced of the hostile intentions of France. He characterised Choiseul's memoir as a declaration of war,<sup>2</sup> and fully agreed with Pitt on the necessity for returning a strong answer to Bussy. This agreement on the part of the two secretaries of state was highly disagreeable to the Duke of Newcastle. He felt that he had been set on one side and neglected. His advice was no longer regarded, and thus he conceived the idea that Bute was anxious to step into his place.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 571 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 6, 1761: 'Lord Bute calls it a declaration of war. . . . Lord Bute seems not at all alarmed with the junction of Spain.'—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, August 5, 1761: 'I must observe to your Grace that in every conversation I have lately had, either with the King or with M. L. Bute, I find them both less determined upon peace; and more disposed to give in to, and support, Mr. Pitt in his warlike notions and dispositions, than they

Under these circumstances a cabinet council was held on August 13 and 14 in order to establish the text of the answer to be given to Bussy.<sup>1</sup> The strongest opposition was once more offered to Pitt's draft by Bedford; Newcastle and his friends also opposed, and though Pitt repeatedly beat the table to emphasise his views, the despatch was eventually adopted only by a majority of one. The form of reply agreed upon<sup>2</sup> stated that negotiations were now practically broken off, and left it open to the French ambassador to request further discussion with Pitt concerning both ultimata, in order to explain the views of his government. After this determination, Bedford repeated his previous assertion that he would no longer attend the sittings. The document was despatched on the following day, and Bussy replied with a note stating his readiness to discuss the ultimata. A conference took place on the 17th,<sup>3</sup> which ended in nothing, as might have been foreseen. Pitt was ready to leave one harbour at the mouth of the St. Lawrence under English sovereignty for the use of French ships, and to come to an agreement about the slave trade, but declined to make any concessions of territory; Bussy, on the other hand, clung firmly to his demands and to the connection with Spain.

At this moment, however, a domestic crisis approached, which eventually brought both Pitt and Bute to a more compliant attitude.

Newcastle thought he could no longer bear the many affronts he had received, and the continued disregard of his advice. He proceeded to assert that it was impossible to raise money for a new campaign, the expense of which he estimated at twenty millions.<sup>4</sup> He was resolved to retire and to enter the opposition unless he were treated with greater respect. After the sitting of the 14th he therefore invited

were formerly. . . . I think it probable that the party is taken to have no regard to my situation, to any recommendations that may come from me, and to leave me to take such resolutions thereupon as I may think proper; either to swallow it, and thereby make the most contemptible figure that ever man did, or to resign my employment, in which case M. L. Bute is ready and desirous to undertake it. . . .<sup>2</sup>—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>1</sup> Devonshire to Bedford, August 16, 1761.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 36 f. Hardwicke to Royston, August 15, 1761.—*Albemarle*, i. 26 f.

<sup>2</sup> De Garden, ii. 165 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Schäfer, ii. b, 388.

<sup>4</sup> *Albemarle*, i. 30 ff.

the Duke of Bedford to dinner to secure an understanding with himself, a move regarded with mistrust by the court party. The unity of the ministry seemed to be coming to an end. Once again it was the Duke of Devonshire who brought about an understanding, in which task he was supported by the young king. George III. was probably highly disinclined to a change of ministry, in view of his approaching marriage. He expressed his dissatisfaction, immediately after the above-mentioned cabinet council, at the scantiness of the majority, and asked 'Why words were not chosen in which all might have concurred.'<sup>1</sup> Devonshire then attempted to dissuade Bedford from his intentions, and to act in general as mediator.<sup>2</sup> The duke's representations to Bute produced little effect. Bute was ready to see the retirement of the prime minister, and asserted with confidence that the king would then find the support he required.<sup>3</sup> Eventually, however, an understanding was secured. The opposition were assured that negotiations were not yet broken off, and that some inclination to concession would be shown, in return for which they promised to attend the next sitting. Pitt was by no means satisfied with this solution, and it must have been difficult for him to retreat a single step. As, however, Bute fell in with the king's wishes, he was obliged to do the same, or to resign, and he did not regard the question as sufficiently important to justify resignation. The conduct of the war was not affected by the continuance of negotiations, and he was also obliged to consider the king's marriage.

During the week of August 17-22 two cabinet councils were held,<sup>4</sup> at which Bedford reappeared, and the two secretaries of state showed greater moderation. The king had asserted through Devonshire that the demands of the English government had been presented to the French court with a certain lack of precision. A detailed answer was now

<sup>1</sup> Bute to Pitt, August 1761.—*Chatham Papers*, ii. 136.

<sup>2</sup> Devonshire to Bedford, August 16, 1761.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 36 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 17, 1761: 'His Lordship [Bute] answered (to my proposal of resignation) he was very sorry for it. . . . He admitted that my going out may have bad consequences, and create difficulties, but if that it was to be so, the King *must be supported and should be supported*.'—*Newcastle Papers*.

<sup>4</sup> Walpole, i. 54; Albemarle, i. 33 f. The date in Walpole (25) is discrepant.



drawn up to the French ultimatum,<sup>1</sup> which Stanley was to present. The material point upon which this differed from former memoirs was the concession of the little island of St. Pierre, at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, to France, as her sovereign possession, under the restriction that it should not be used for military purposes. The French fishing rights were, however, limited to a definite portion of the Newfoundland coast. France, moreover, was to pledge herself to the demolition of Dunkirk. If France disagreed to these conditions, negotiations were to be broken off. Newcastle declared himself satisfied, but Bedford had expected greater concessions, and therefore absented himself from the second council, at which the votes were taken.<sup>2</sup>

Domestic peace had thus been secured for some time, and preparations for the king's marriage and coronation could be continued. It was for this reason that such anxiety had been shown to secure an agreement. On the day before the decisive council Lord Anson, who had been appointed high admiral for this special purpose, left for Harwich, whence he was to proceed to Stade with a squadron, to bring over the king's bride, Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz. Unfavourable winds were encountered on the return voyage, and it was not until December 7 that the princess could land at Harwich. The ceremony took place on the 8th.<sup>3</sup>

It now appeared that the agreement between the parties was nothing more than an armistice concluded in view of the king's marriage, and that it would be broken the moment any important question arose for discussion. The critical point at this moment was the attitude of Pitt to Lord Bute, which now underwent a remarkable change. Upon points of policy they were entirely at one, and their desire for co-operation remained undisturbed. Bute wished nothing more than to see the next stage of the war continued upon Pitt's plans, and Pitt would have been quite ready to give full consideration to the king's wishes. The usual relationship between ruler and prime minister prevailing in a truly monarchical state would have been secured. The disturbing force was the presence in Parliament of the powerful oligarchy of former times led by Newcastle. The two secretaries of state disagreed upon their

<sup>1</sup> De Garden, ii. 169 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Harris, iii. 247 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 42.

attitude to this group. Under George II. Pitt had been obliged to consider them, and to steer a middle course, as the division of power between the king and the heir-apparent gave him no means of securing his position. He had now succeeded in composing the differences with the young court which had arisen from the complications produced by this division of power, and had gained the all-important favourite entirely to his side. Hence he was no longer willing to listen upon questions of domestic and military policy to the feeble and short-sighted Newcastle. He demanded that the policy recognised as correct should be carried out even against the duke's will, notwithstanding the danger of evoking fresh opposition in Parliament. Any such movement he thought he might master by means of his popularity and eloquence, with the help of the king's influence. Bute was at bottom much inclined to act with Pitt, as he had already shown in August upon the occasion of Newcastle's proposed resignation. The king, however, was anxious to secure domestic peace, and demanded that the opposition should be brought to reason by concessions, and that there should therefore be no absolute execution of Pitt's ideas. Bute was thus obliged to modify his action, though at the same time he did his best to avoid a breach with Pitt. It was thus the king who declined the solution which Pitt proposed. Possibly he feared that premature rejection of Newcastle's party would make him too entirely dependent upon the powerful minister. Moreover, his confidence in the capacities of his favourite was so great that he expected him to bring the war to a favourable conclusion in the event of Pitt's resignation.

The conflict arose from these differences of opinion, but not from these alone. Pitt's idea throughout the peace negotiations had been to crush the power of France as far as possible, in order that she might not again become dangerous to England, and to retain Spain in a position of neutrality, partly by certain concessions and friendly overtures, and partly by the influence of the great increase of British naval power. This plan had failed, and it became increasingly clear that the two Bourbon powers were preparing to take the offensive in common. Pitt's obvious policy was to deal a series of rapid blows which would shatter the coalition before it had been entirely completed. Further delay would merely improve the

prospects of the enemy, and the country would find itself involved in another long war. (A war of that kind would necessarily oblige England to concentrate all her forces for a conflict by sea and in the colonies, which effort would diminish her power to prosecute a continental policy. In any case Pitt was forced to realise the difficulty of maintaining the alliance with the Prussian king, who was now reduced to the last gasp, and was convinced that Frederick must be forced to fall in with his views by strong measures. This necessity would be increased if England were to be confronted by new enemies. It seemed that a complete change of policy was demanded, and for such change Pitt was entirely unsuited by reason of his previous attitude. Upon the completion of the change he might easily resume the reins of power, and bring the war to a successful conclusion, but he would be forced to leave the process in other hands.

A few days after the marriage festivities a fresh situation was created by the arrival of news from different quarters. First of all certain letters came from Stanley reporting the nature of the reception which had been accorded to England's last and milder declarations.<sup>1</sup> The ambassador had gained the impression that no immediate reconciliation with France was possible, although Choiseul was careful to avoid an absolute breach, and constantly gave proofs of such compliance that Stanley could not resolve to ask for his passport. He treated the utmost concessions that had been wrested from Pitt by his colleagues as nothing more than points of discussion, and made a series of counter proposals which were formulated in a new memoir. Stanley's reports arrived on September 11, and Bussy presented the memoir to Pitt on the 13th.<sup>2</sup> On the disputed points Choiseul demanded more than England had proposed, or else adduced other propositions; it was clear that he was anxious to protract negotiations. He asked for a second island beside St. Pierre at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, was anxious for two definite points in Africa, declined to give back Wesel, Geldern, etc., and asked for new proposals to determine the further support to be granted to the allies. The form of these demands and their practicability or otherwise mattered

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 608 ff.; Schäfer, ii. b, 391 f.

<sup>2</sup> De Garden, ii. 178 ff.

little to Pitt; it was enough for him to know that France could not accept England's final conditions, and Stanley's recall seemed to be the inevitable result.

On this occasion the minister acted very energetically, in order to avoid a second postponement or a further attempt to show compliance to the beaten foe. He told his colleagues plainly that he would resign unless the ambassador were recalled immediately.<sup>1</sup> Some members of the cabinet were already convinced that a breach was inevitable; Bute, Devonshire, and Hardwicke declared that Stanley must be recalled, seeing that he had himself no hope of securing any result. Newcastle thought otherwise. He still hoped for a favourable change in the situation, which the ambassador must be ready to use, and was unable to see any disadvantage in his remaining at his post. However, the duke would not revolt against the will of the majority, especially, as he wrote to Bedford, 'upon a point which would certainly decide Mr. Pitt's resolve, a decision for which he may now be glad, for many reasons, to have an excuse.' He was thus attempting to delay Pitt's resignation, for which he supposed Pitt to be seeking a favourable opportunity. Bedford thought as Newcastle, but preferred to absent himself from the deliberations rather than to vote against his convictions.<sup>2</sup> He still cherished the delusion that France might be brought to an agreement by the offer of better conditions.

On September 15 Bussy presented the memoir dated the 9th, and on the same day a cabinet council was held to decide the question of recall. The king had informed Pitt that he would leave the decision entirely to the cabinet.<sup>3</sup> As was to be expected, the council decided to recall the ambassador, and their decision was ratified by the king, so that it was possible to issue the order to Stanley on the same day.<sup>4</sup> Thus this important question was settled as Pitt desired, and a continuance of the war with France became certain. A new question, however, immediately arose, upon

<sup>1</sup> This and the following are from a letter of Newcastle to Bedford of September 13, 1761, in abstract in the Newcastle Papers, while the original is printed in the *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 43 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Bedford to Newcastle, September 14, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Bedford, September 13, 1761.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 43 ff.

<sup>4</sup> Thackeray, ii. 624.



which Pitt was unable to secure acceptance of his views. This was the problem of the attitude to be adopted towards Spain, as peace was now out of the question.

Pitt had been negotiating throughout the summer with the court of Madrid, with the object of settling the points in dispute with reference to the Newfoundland fisheries, the English settlements in Honduras, and the illegal capture of merchantmen, but Spain, relying upon France, could not be induced to make concessions of any kind. The correspondence became more peremptory in July, when France openly intervened in the interests of the related court, a measure which seemed to confirm the existing suspicions of an understanding between the two governments. Pitt made vigorous representations on the point to General Wall, the minister for foreign affairs, and demanded an explanation. Wall attempted to throw the blame upon France, asserting that that country had offered to represent the Spanish interests, and explained to Lord Bristol that he had not considered it possible for him to reject the friendly services of the related court.

Though Pitt had every right to condemn and to refuse to recognise the action of the French court in this matter, there seemed to be no sufficient ground for a breach with Spain. But in the middle of August evidence increased to show that a definite agreement existed between the two states, which was directed against England. Among Pitt's papers are two intercepted letters from the Marquis of Grimaldi, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, to Count Fuentes in London, under dates August 31 and September 13,<sup>1</sup> in which reference was made to the conclusion of treaties. The first letter stated that Paris opinion considered the government bound to the family compact and to the convention, especially after the signature of these two documents on the 15th. The second letter emphasised the fidelity of France, who was giving up her own property in the ultimatum on behalf of her ally, and asserted that it was to the interests of Spain that peace should not be concluded without due consideration for her demands, but that her differences were not to appear the reason of a breach. Apart from this, Stanley informed Pitt, in a private letter<sup>2</sup> of September 2, that he had

<sup>1</sup> *Chatham Papers*, ii. 139 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, i. 578 f.

seen an article of the Franco-Spanish Convention known as Article 10, which had been sent to Bussy on August 10. In this France pledged herself not to conclude peace except in accordance with Spanish interests. The ambassador was unable to give any account of the other articles. Finally, a passage in the first letter of Grimaldi of August 31 ran as follows: 'The not unfounded fear of our court is for the safety of the silver fleet from America. They wish to gain time to enable it to reach Cadiz, and propose to send out twelve ships in secrecy as a convoy.' This passage is, upon the main point, in accordance with the announcement of Stanley dated September 8,<sup>1</sup> to the effect that fifteen Spanish ships had been hastily despatched to accompany the fleet which was expected.

Such was the secret information which actually reached Pitt concerning Spain's intentions. We have no evidence that he possessed anything more; stories of secret sources of information at his disposal were no doubt to be ascribed to the energy of his friends, who attempted to justify his peremptory attitude upon the Spanish question, or to the desires of others to make themselves important. A year after Pitt's resignation a paragraph appeared in the newspapers to the effect that he had received the information in question from George Keith, Earl Marischal.<sup>2</sup> It was said that Keith was then the Prussian ambassador at Madrid, and was treated with such confidence by the grandees, that they informed him of the family compact, which he then transmitted to his patron Pitt, though these assertions, which are preserved in the Chatham Anecdotes derived from Lord Temple, are utterly inconsistent.<sup>3</sup> The Earl Marischal, the elder brother of the Prussian Field-Marshal Keith, was certainly Prussian ambassador at Madrid in 1759-60, and was the object of much favour at court, even after the change of monarchs. These attentions were provoked by the aversion of Charles III. to Maria Theresa, which her marriage project had aroused. He thus learnt many details of the Spanish preparations, and when he returned to England

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, ii. 618.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *supra*, p. 280. Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*, iii. 210, App. Rep.

<sup>3</sup> Schäfer, ii. a, 421 ff. *Dictionary of National Biography*, art. George Keith.

under the amnesty, he may have communicated them to Pitt. But he cannot possibly have brought news of the family compact, as in 1761 he was in Spain only for a short visit, probably to carry away his property; thence he went to Neuchâtel,<sup>1</sup> where he occupied the post of Prussian governor from 1763. This visit to Spain was paid in the spring, and therefore long before the conclusion of the convention. Moreover, Bute afterwards asserted in the House of Lords during a debate upon this subject: 'My Lords, I assure you upon my honour, that we had no information of any accomplished fact of the kind at that time.' To this Temple certainly replied that they had received news of the highest importance,<sup>2</sup> but it is impossible to conceive that Pitt should not have disclosed this information at the decisive council, when he was anxious to enforce his ideas upon his colleagues; even if he were pledged to silence, he would at least have announced his possession of further information. But not a word of the matter is to be found in the notes of the persons present, and Pitt's arguments were based upon the same material that the other ministers had at their disposal. It is possible that Temple may have referred to a detailed 'intelligence' from France, which exists among Pitt's papers, but as Pitt's retirement is there spoken of as an accomplished fact, this paper must belong to the period when he had left office.<sup>3</sup> It represents the whole of the peace negotiations as conducted by a prearranged system between France and Spain, a view by no means in accordance with facts. It naturally could not influence Pitt's attitude before his retirement, but the difference of dates may have been forgotten by Lord Temple through lapse of time.

A certain Frenchman, by name Dutens,<sup>4</sup> whom we have previously<sup>5</sup> mentioned, had been the English representative in Turin for a time, and asserted that he had procured for Pitt a copy of a despatch from the Spanish minister Squillaci, which expressed the warlike intentions of Charles III., and that Pitt's tenacity with reference to his demands was inspired by this document. But as Dutens himself asserts, his

<sup>1</sup> *Politische Korrespondenz*, xx. 327.

<sup>2</sup> Almon, *Anecdotes*, i. 282.

<sup>3</sup> Chatham MSS.

<sup>4</sup> Dutens, *Mémoires d'un Chevalier qui se repose*, i. 178f.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. i. p. 333.

despatch was delivered within the year 1760, and could therefore hardly refer to the events of September and October 1761. The existence of a war policy at Madrid was no novelty.

Further evidence is adduced in an article 'Pitt and the Family Compact,'<sup>1</sup> with the object of showing that Pitt had seen the text of the compact, and so had been induced to act as he did; the argument, however, is based upon erroneous influences and conjectures from the evidence at our disposal. Too much stress is placed upon the communication of Dutens and upon the existence of a copy of the compact among the Newcastle Papers. The duke might equally well have secured this at a later date. Had it come at that time into his hands or into Pitt's, the influence of such important information upon the attitude of the ministers would have been obvious.

If we examine the actual news upon which Pitt's action must have been based, we shall see that the existence of the compact between France and Spain, signed on August 15, was beyond doubt, but that the content of the one article reported contained no promise of help, but merely a guarantee that France would not conclude peace without due consideration of Spanish interests. All other references refer only to this point, apart from those affecting the plate fleet, the arrival of which was announced in Spain for August. There was no certainty whatever that Spain would begin war. Even if the French war were to continue, Spain might very well preserve her peaceful attitude, supposing that the secret compact contained no distinct provision for her participation. The fact was that the Madrid court had promised to interfere after May 1 if the war were not ended by that date. Apart from this there were strong suspicions that an offensive and defensive alliance existed between the Bourbon powers, which would sooner or later come into force. The question for decision was the advisability of waiting until the breach became inevitable in order to preserve the chances of avoiding a new war, or, on the other hand, the advisability of beginning the war to secure the advantages of surprise and of the offensive. It was a problem similar to that which confronted the

<sup>1</sup> *Quarterly Review*, No. 190, p. 352 ff. The article is based upon good sources of information, but is greatly lacking in critical power and perspective.



English government in 1755, when Boscawen was despatched to intercept the French transport fleet off Newfoundland, except that upon that occasion the certainty of an approaching breach was far greater.

The question of the measures to be taken against Spain was discussed in a cabinet council held on September 18 in the house of the Duke of Devonshire. Pitt demanded the action which he deemed best, and would give way on no single point, though he must have been tolerably certain that his views would not be accepted.<sup>1</sup> After referring to the menacing attitude of the Spanish court, especially to the manner in which she had pressed her grievances on France, who was at war with England, a step which justified an immediate declaration of war, he explained the great advantages which England, as mistress of the sea, could secure in the rich Spanish colonies, and referred to the American plate fleet, which had not yet reached Spain. He then presented a memorial upon the subject, which he had composed in conjunction with Temple.<sup>2</sup> This document contained a summary of his assertions and a demand that Bristol should be immediately ordered to present a declaration of war, and to return to England without taking leave of the court.

The other ministers were by no means inclined to agree with this advice.<sup>3</sup> They were willing to send out reinforcements to the West Indies and the Mediterranean as though war was certain, and especially to despatch men-of-war and infantry to Guadeloupe; but they wished to send an ultimatum to Spain before taking the offensive, and give the Spanish government an opportunity of showing their colours. They would not begin war until they had received an unsatisfactory answer. Lord Bute, by inward conviction, was certainly upon Pitt's side, but we know that he could not follow his inclinations or risk the retirement of the Newcastle group. Pitt was therefore outvoted, and he might now have taken the opportunity to resign. However, immediately after the sitting, the greatest efforts were made to induce him to give way.<sup>4</sup> Bute had a private conversation with Temple

<sup>1</sup> Thackeray, i. 589.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in the *Grenville Papers*, i. 386 f.

<sup>3</sup> Notes by Newcastle of September 19, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>4</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 20, 1761.—*Ibid.*

and Mansfield with Pitt upon the inconveniences which their obstinacy might cause. Hardwicke, whose services as mediator upon such occasions were invaluable, was not present, as his wife was on her death-bed.<sup>1</sup> Their main object was to prevent Pitt from presenting his document to the king and so opposing the conclusion of the cabinet; Pitt, however, persisted in his intention, with the exception that he agreed to communicate the content of the document to the monarch by word of mouth, and then to hand the paper to Bute, a procedure which resulted in the same effect.

As no concession could be wrested from Pitt, Bute turned to the other party. At one o'clock on the 19th he had a conference with Newcastle, Devonshire, and Mansfield in Devonshire House.<sup>2</sup> He deeply regretted Hardwicke's absence, and informed his companions of the danger that Pitt's resignation would cause. If there were any prospect whatever of peace, he would be the less inclined to support Pitt's measures, but as things were, they should do all they could to avoid his resignation, as otherwise the responsibility of his war would be thrown upon their shoulders. He declared his willingness to do all that they should consider advisable for this purpose, and counselled them to explain their reasons for divergence, but in such a manner as not to wound Pitt personally, and above all to deprive him of the opportunity of asserting that they had missed the occasion of reducing Spain to helplessness.

It is thus clear that the favourite was honestly and seriously anxious to prevent Pitt's resignation; at the same time he was obliged to consider the matter from another point of view, which he had repeatedly contemplated upon previous occasions, when the possibility of Pitt's resignation was discussed. As he expressed it, he did not wish Pitt to take his popularity with him, in other words, he did not wish him to resign for reasons which might increase his prestige with the nation above that of the king. This, however, was a most important matter for Pitt; resignation under these conditions would increase his influence and strengthen the probability that

<sup>1</sup> Harris, iii. 252. She died on September 19, and to her death, which necessitated Hardwicke's absence for some time, we owe Newcastle's numerous letters during these momentous days.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 20, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

if things went wrong he would be recalled to office under more favourable circumstances. His reasons for resignation were consistent with this purpose; if his colleagues declined to begin a war forthwith and he resigned in consequence, he would always be able to say that disasters had been due to their hesitation, and this was precisely the point that Bute was anxious to avoid.

The final decision was, however, delayed by the king's attitude. When Pitt wished to present his document on the 21st, George declined to receive it, explaining that he would make up his mind upon the Spanish question when Stanley arrived. No objection could be offered to this course; in the cabinet council held that day Pitt denied that Stanley could produce any fresh evidence, and reiterated his reasons for rapidity of action, but he could not avoid the passing of a decision in support of the king's action. Immediately afterwards he handed his paper to Lord Bute, who considered this action as his colleague's irrevocable decision to retire from office. When Newcastle advised some further attempt to retain him, Bute declared such efforts as entirely useless. His thoughts were concentrated upon the task of replacing the outgoing minister.<sup>1</sup>

On the following day some slight hope appeared of an improvement in the situation, as letters from Stanley arrived affording a prospect of a change for the better.<sup>2</sup> The ambassador reported that the influence of Choiseul, who desired peace, had begun to rise, and that the duke had requested him, through his sister, Madame de Grammont, not to break off negotiations, as peace might yet be restored if England honestly desired this result. Stanley added that this information was derived not merely from Choiseul's sister, but also from enemies of the duke and from others of the highest rank and dignity. Orders for his recall had been already issued, but Stanley had hinted in another letter that under certain circumstances he would venture to take the responsibility of remaining longer. Thus the possibility of continuing negotiations with France and of securing a favourable result was again reopened. Pitt gave not the slightest

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 21, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Thackeray, ii. 623 f. Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 23, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

credence to this possibility, and to avoid evoking further doubts he attempted to conceal from the other ministers the more important of the two letters, the existence of which was known only to Bute and the king. George III., however, obliged Pitt to leave the letter in his hands, and showed it to the Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire, though without entrusting it to their keeping. They were naturally confirmed in their attitude, and it would indeed have been foolishness to declare war against Spain until the court of Versailles had finally issued its decision.

The letter seems to have made no impression upon Pitt. He declared that Choiseul was only trying to cause delay, and modified his own views in no degree whatever. However, the king and Bute took a more serious view of the message. The king showed much dissatisfaction at the minister's obstinacy, and declared his intention of putting an end to the difficulty with Pitt under any circumstances. Bute did not agree with this view, but he speedily became convinced that Pitt could not be retained in office. Stanley's next letter spoke more definitely of war and seemed to make a breach with Spain more likely.<sup>1</sup> The favourite, who was well aware of his colleague's intentions, asserted that a new war would make it necessary to abandon the German war, and that if Pitt did not resign upon the question now at issue, he would certainly do so when German affairs came up for discussion.

The last hope of the Newcastle group was that Pitt would abandon his claims and avoid any return to the subject,<sup>2</sup> but this was not fulfilled. Shortly before Stanley's arrival he called a cabinet council, against the wish of the other ministers.<sup>3</sup> However, on the following day, September 29, the ambassador arrived. In view of Pitt's categorical orders he had been unable to venture upon a longer stay. His information produced no change in the situation, as he had already informed the cabinet of the warlike attitude of the French court.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 26, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Newcastle to Hardwicke, September 23, 1761: 'My Lord Mansfield thought that Mr. Pitt would let that sleep and go on with other business.'—*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Newcastle to Devonshire, September 28, 1761.—*Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Albemarle, i. 44.



The decisive council<sup>1</sup> was held on October 2, and apparently all the members were present: Lord Granville as president, Lord Temple, the Dukes of Devonshire and Newcastle, the Lords Bute, Hardwicke, Ligonier, Anson, Mansfield, and Pitt as secretary of state. Pitt announced the object of the meeting, namely, the decision of an answer to Lord Bristol's last letter, and declared his intention of abiding by the document containing his own opinion and that of Lord Temple, in which they had been confirmed by the letter received on August 13. One member after another gave his vote, explaining his reasons at greater or less length; only the more important of these need be recounted here.

Newcastle saw no adequate reason for beginning hostilities with Spain; such action would lay intolerable pecuniary burdens upon the state and would further protract the existing war, as in any future peace negotiations it would be necessary to consider the demands and interests of an additional contracting party.

Hardwicke asserted that the latest news, of the last letter in particular, had produced no change in the situation, and regarded the possibility of a breach of the peace by Spain as very doubtful; France was attempting to lead Spain to adopt measures calculated to incite England to war, and a response to this was tantamount to falling into the enemy's snare.

Bute regretted that Stanley had brought no information by which existing differences of opinion might have been composed; in the absence of such information he could not vote for hostilities against Spain, which should be avoided as long as possible in view of the grievous consequences involved; if this necessity appeared unavoidable, he should proceed to ask what portion of the existing war could be abandoned, in order to lighten the burden of a new war.

Anson asserted that the fleet was not in a condition to begin serious operations against Spain forthwith.

Mansfield finally expressed his apprehension of the impression that would be made upon neutral powers by the vast projects of England.

After the votes had been given, Pitt made a long speech, in which he attempted to explain his position: he had been

<sup>1</sup> The description is based upon Newcastle's full notes of October 2. —Newcastle Papers.

called to office, though he had never in his life demanded a single post from his sovereign, and he might say that in accepting office he had acceded to the request of the nation to come to the help of the state at a moment when others had refused to do service. In consequence he had been obliged to overcome greater difficulties than any minister had ever before struggled against; yet, perhaps from his own good fortune, the measures he had adopted had resulted to the honour and welfare of the nation; he had hardly ever proposed an expedition, whatever its prospects of success, and however great its eventual success, which had not, at the outset, been treated as chimerical and ridiculous. He further referred to the standing charge that the war was exclusively his war, and again enumerated the advantages secured, which, as he hinted with considerable plainness, were due only to himself. Now, however, he continued, the situation had changed; he saw that through an agreement between some of the most important persons in the kingdom confidence in him had been destroyed within the cabinet council and that he had little influence in cabinet or Parliament, as only one cabinet member agreed with him, with whom he was ready to live and die (Lord Temple). He then emphasised the fact that England's honour demanded an immediate cessation of the undeclared hostility existing with Spain, and asserted that he stood unconditionally by the content of his memoir. He said that in his office and his position he was responsible for the results, and would not remain unless he could lead; no one would therefore be surprised if he declined to act any further; he again repeated that he would be responsible for nothing except the results of his own administration; apart from this he was glad to see such harmony and unanimity between the most important and distinguished men of the realm, and he hoped that they would be able to conduct the king's business with success.

When he had concluded Lord Granville rose, and referred in appreciative terms to Pitt's energy, and went on to assert that the claims which Pitt advanced were unduly excessive unless he pretended to infallibility. He was well aware that the king was fully justified in deciding upon matters of foreign policy in conjunction only with his secretary of state; when, however, he referred these matters to the cabinet council, the opinion of the majority was to be regarded as the

measure to be taken, and all other action merely as details of execution. So far the president was undoubtedly right, and Pitt himself had often recognised the constitutional nature of this position, when he sheltered himself behind the majority to avoid the responsibility of disputable and yet necessary measures; on this occasion, however, he was anxious for definite reasons not to yield, and at the same time to justify his action to the nation. His arguments, which could produce no effect in the cabinet, were intended for the nation and the Continent, where so apparently decisive an appeal could not fail to make an impression.

Pitt did not attempt to refute Granville's arguments, but contented himself with some polite expressions of thanks for the support that had been given him during his conduct of office. It was finally resolved to despatch considerable reinforcements forthwith to Admiral Saunders in the Mediterranean, in order that he might be able to resist any hostilities on the part of Spain. Further correspondence with Spain was left in the hands of the secretaries of state.

On October 5 Pitt returned his seals to the hand of the king,<sup>1</sup> informing the monarch that his retention of office would produce difficulties and differences of opinion in the cabinet council, but that while out of office he would do everything in his power to support his majesty. At the same time he recommended himself to the king's favour, hinting that he would not decline any manifestations of that favour. The monarch thanked him for his services, regretted his departure, but plainly declared that he would have been obliged to abide by his opinion even if the council had agreed with Pitt's proposals.

A final examination of Pitt's behaviour must confirm us in the opinion that he was not purposely driven out of office by the king or by his colleagues, much as the old oligarchy must have desired the time when they would be able to throw off his supremacy without damage to themselves; it rather seems that Pitt, against the wish of the king and of his colleagues, seized the opportunity of resignation. He saw that his past made him an unsuitable minister to complete that change of policy which the course of events dictated with growing imperiousness. When the change had been accomplished, a

<sup>1</sup> Newcastle to Bedford, October 6, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

series of disasters might oblige the nation to remember his powers, and in that case he would be able to resume the cares of state. In view of this possibility he was careful to avoid any breach with the dominant personalities, and especially with the king. The growth of the king's power appeared to him the best foundation upon which he could afterwards base his own position, perhaps with permanence. The era which was now approaching seemed to him to offer the most favourable prospects.

END OF VOL. II.







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